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ABSTRACT 
The repatriation of refugees is a complex phenomenon that requires extensive 
consultation especially among refugees and potential returnees. Even though several 
repatriations have failed as returnees flee again, the refugee actors have not significantly 
changed their approach to refugee repatriations so as to curb and reduce such failed 
repatriations. In this dissertation, I examine the Tripartite Agreement signed between the 
governments of Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR on 10th November 2013.This agreement 
is to guide the repatriation of approximately half a million Somali refugees from the 
Dadaab refugee camp in Northeastern Kenya. I argue that organized repatriations 
overlook refugee voices as experts and elites influence politics and policy surrounding 
repatriations. With refugees at the periphery of this decision-making, refugee actors make 
decisions about them that lack their input and, subsequently, the legitimacy of the 
decisions made on behalf of refugees. While tripartite parties agree, theoretically, on the 
need to promote voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees from Dadaab, in practice, they 
differ on how this should be carried out without rendering repatriation involuntary. I 
maintain that the refugee regime, the 1951UN Convention, needs to be changed as it is 
outdated, narrow in scope and does not address the new realities of the refugee problem. 
For instance, it does not recognize socio-economic causes of refugees. The study finds that 
the majority of Somali refugees in Dadaab neither know of the existence of a TA 
supporting their voluntary return, nor its contents. In this regard, I argue that refugees 
should be actively involved in decision making regarding repatriation and must not be 
relegated to the periphery. To address the refugee problem in Africa, I argue that focus 
should shift from the plight of refugees to addressing the reasons for the flight. As argued 
in this dissertation, only about 25% of Somali refugees in Dadaab have accepted 
repatriation since 2014 with many citing insecurity, lack of livelihood opportunities and 
social services as some of the reasons they have not repatriated. Cases of involuntary 
returns like that of Afghan, Rwandese and Rohingya refugees are cited as warning 
against unsustainable induced returns. As a deterrent measure, I contend that efforts by 
the international community should be focused on mitigating potentially explosive 
conflicts without necessarily interfering with sovereignty of concerned states. I argue that 
sustained peace and security that guarantee involuntary return is only possible by 
solving the reasons for the flight. The primary sources of the study included interviews, 
focus group discussions and personal observation. It was then categorized into various 
themes to address the set objectives. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Background of research topic 
Dadaab refugee camp is undoubtedly the world‘s largest refugee camp, hosting more 
than half a million refugees. Most of these refugees are of Somali nationality who fled 
their country more than two decades ago (1991) after the then president Siad Barre1 was 
ousted, ushering the country into anarchy. This was after warring clans of Auliyan, 
Shikhals, Degodia , Ajuraan, Ogaden and other unranked families of Hawiye, Darod, 
Isaq, Dir and Digil2failed to agree on how to share power, forcing the country to drift into 
a civil war that has claimed thousands of lives and displaced millions. Many of these 
displaced persons have fled to Dadaab camp in Northeastern Kenya as refugees. The 
Islamic Court Union3, and currently Al Shaabab, has been fighting to install a sharia 
compliant government, with the population divided along both religious and clan lines4. 
Until August 2012, apart from the Transitional Federal Government, Somalia had been 
                                                          
1Siad Barre was a Somali military general who overthrew the second democratically elected, but corrupt, 
civilian government of Somalia in October 1969.While in power Siad Barre significantly eroded the norms 
and mechanisms of governance within clans and the agreements that had existed between them. He was 
later toppled in a coup by clan-based forces with external support in 1991.A protracted period of civil war 2 These ar  a few major clans in Somalia. Most conflicts in Somal a are fought along clan lines since the
Somali community is homogenous and almost 99% Muslim. Clanism is a platform to advance and defend 
interests. 
3This was an Islamic militant group that ruled Jubaland in Somalia between mid 2006-2007.It was 
dominated by Hawiye and Ogaden clans including leaders from RasKamboni and Al Shabaab. 
4G. Loescher, G. Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper 268, London: Brassey‘s for IISS, 
1992. 
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without a functional government for almost 20 years5. The Somali Federal Government 
(SFG) was inaugurated in August 2012.This first internationally recognized Somali 
government since 1991is struggling to restore law and order with opposition from 
militant group Al Shabaab. 
 
Geographically, Kenya is located in the Eastern part of the African continent, between 5 
degrees North and 5 degrees South latitude and 24 and 31 degrees East longitude. The 
equator cuts across the country from East to West. The neighbouring countries comprise 
Uganda to the west, Ethiopia and Sudan to the north, Tanzania to the south, Somalia to 
the northeast, and the Indian Ocean to the southeast with a coastline of about 536 
kilometres. The country‘s total area covers about 582,650 Km2. From this, 569,250 Km2 
(97.8%) constitutes dry land while 13,400 Km2 (2.2%) constitutes water bodies. 
Approximately 80% of the land area is arid or semi-arid and only 20% is arable. After the 
promulgation of the new constitution on 27 August 2010, the country was divided into 47 
administrative units referred to as Counties which replaced the previous 8 provinces. The 
47 Counties were further sub-divided into districts, divisions, locations and sub-locations 
as the smallest administrative units. 
 
Five combined refugee camps give Dadaab the unenviable title of the world‘s largest 
refugee complex comprising Hagadera, Dagahaley, Ifo 1, Ifo 2 and Kambios. According 
                                                          
5Amnesty International, No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced. AFR 52/001/2014. 
London: UK. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-home-2014.pdf 
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to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are more than 
half a million refugees—mostly Somalis—in Dadaab.6 The complex is based in the 
Garissa district of Kenya, approximately 100 km from the border between Somalia and 
Kenya. 
 
Kenya, like other refugee hosting countries in the world, has been reluctant to host 
refugees citing, inter alia, security and political threats posed by the refugees. Somali 
refugees in Kenya have posed a particular challenge to Kenya, given Somalia‘s historical 
relationship with Kenya. This has been a hostile relationship. Somalia has been a security 
concern to Kenya since independence (beginning with the Shifta movement that waged a 
secessionist war supported by Mogadishu) to the current security threats posed by 
terrorist elements.7. 
While the Shifta movement and the current terrorist groupings like the Al Shabaab have 
been motivated by different interests, both militant groups have helped entrench the 
perception of Kenya towards Somalia-that of seeing Somalia as a security threat8 to 
Kenya. This explains why the Kenyan government has frequently accused Somali 
refugees of being Al Shabaab sympathizers and providing a safe haven for terrorist 
                                                          
6 Interview with one UNHCR official in Dadaab on 20 February,2016.There is a sizeable  number of 
‗unregistered refugees‘ who reside in the camps and cities like Nairobi but who do not appear officially as 
refugees in either the UNHCR records or those of the Government of Kenya. 
7 See P. Kirui, (2012) ‗The Impact of Refugee Settlement on Security: A Case Study of Dadaab Refugee 
Camp in North-eastern Kenya, 1991-2011‘, p.9.Unpublished Master‘s Thesis, SASS, Moi University, 2012. 
8NIS, ‗Terror groups pose biggest threat to Kenya‘s security‘, The Daily Nation, 20 September 2017, 
www.nation.co.ke/news/NIS-terrorism-security-threat/1056-4103606-b06cccz/index.html (accessed 27 
November 2017). 
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elements inside9the refugee camps in Kenya. Some10 however have dismissed this as 
mere scapegoating by Kenya for the failure to provide adequate security to its citizens. 
 
The ‗Shifta‘ war (1963-1967) was sponsored by Mogadishu in a bid to claim the North 
Eastern Province (NEP) of Kenya, occupied by Somalis, as part of the ‗Greater Somalia‘. 
During independence, many of the residents of NEP in Kenya favoured secession from 
Kenya in order to unify with Somalia. Kenya‘s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, resisted 
and crushed the secessionist group vowing not to concede an inch of Kenyan soil to 
Somalia. Consequently, Kenya imposed emergency rule in the NEP which lasted until 
1991.The recent rise of terrorist groupings in Somalia that wage attacks on Kenyan soil 
continue to strain the relationship between Kenya and Somalia, resulting in continued 
suspicion and mistrust. 
 
The need to manage the political aspects of Somali refugees that range from armed 
militants, terrorist elements, and radical clerics that call for the killing of non-Muslims 
(among others), has increasingly made Kenya uncomfortable with hosting thousands of 
Muslim Somali refugees within the state. More than 99% of Somalis are Muslims. While 
some Kenyan nationals engage in the above criminal activities too, the government of 
                                                          
9 M. Yusuf, ‗Kenya, Somali Refugees Exchange Blame for Attacks‘, Voice of America,21 December 2012, 
www.voanews.com/a/kenya-somali-refugees-exchange-blame-for-attacks/1569769.html(accessed 27 
November 2017) 
10The Economist, ‗Kenya and its Somalis Scapegoats: closing a huge Somali refugee camp in Kenya would 
not reduce terrorism‘, The Economist, 9 May 2015 (accessed 27 November 2017) 
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Kenya has been very outspoken in condemning refugees for the rising cases of insecurity 
especially those that are terror related. For example, following the September 21, 2013 
WestGate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi that claimed at least 68 lives, the Kenyan 
government  accused refugees and the Dadaab camps as having acted as a training 
ground for the perpetrators of the attack.11 
 
Kirui and Mwaruvie suggest that, ‗A major security threat in Dadaab is that caused by 
combatants and military groups such as Al Shabaab posing as refugees.‘12Besides this, 
Kirui notes that the long Kenya-Somalia border is porous and security agencies are 
overstretched to monitor all border points.13In view of this, the refugees in Dadaab suffer 
with further insecurity as conflicts in Somalia easily spread to the camps. Repatriation, 
therefore, may not necessarily affect the physical security of refugees as the boundary 
between Kenya and Somalia remains porous. Consequently, repatriating Somali refugees 
to Somalia and next to Kenya‘s border has little implication in terms of their physical 
security. In fact, the security of Somali refugees may improve as they would be free to 
engage in economic activities as citizens, as compared to the encampment policy in 
Kenya. Kenya as a host to the world‘s largest refugee camp should therefore be proactive 
at the forefront in facilitating the permanent settlement for refugees. Kenya‘s military 
                                                          
11 Aljazeera News, 25th Oct.2013, BBC News, 30th September, 2013 
12 P. Kirui and J. Mwaruvie, ‗The dilemma of hosting refugees: A focus on the insecurity in North-eastern 
Kenya‘, International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol.3, no.8, 2012, p.168. 
13P. Kirui, ‗Impact of Refugee Settlement on Kenya‘s Security: A case study of Dadaab Refugee camps in 
Northeastern Kenya, 1991-2011‘, MA Thesis, Moi University,2012,p. 66. 
6 
 
incursion14further complicates the matter since Kenya has now actively involved itself in 
Somalia‘s affairs, making it practically difficult for Kenya to continue pursuing her policy 
of non-interference and non-aggression towards her neighbours, especially Somalia. As a 
result, Kenya has not only involved itself in Somali affairs inside Somalia but has to also 
deal with the challenges posed by Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya 
 
It is evident that countries are reluctant to host refugees in the long-term.15 According to 
Weiner, ‗the very form and intensity of response to unwanted migrations is itself an 
indication that such population flows are regarded as threats to security or stability.‘16In 
Kenya, Somalis are perceived as a homogenous ethnic group, ‗practicing a single religion, 
Islam, the Somali form a distinct nation‘17It is this distinction that creates challenges for 
integration within Kenya whose population is predominantly Christian.  
 
                                                          
14Kenya‘s military incursion began in mid-October 2011 when the Government of Kenya declared war on 
the terrorist group Al  Shabaab and deployed the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) in hot pursuit inside 
Somalia. Following the military offensive,  Al Shabaab promised retaliation, threatening attacks on 
Nairobi and to bring war to Kenya. See also BBC News, Somali militants Al Shabaab threaten Kenya 
retaliation, 17 October 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15342091, [accessed 14.12.13]. 
15Host countries have become reluctant to host refugees because of the fear that the refugees are no longer a 
short-term challenge as earlier thought in the 1940‘s during the Second World War. The unquestionable 
assumption in the 1940‘s was that refugees were in their host countries temporarily and that they would go 
back to their home countries as soon as the Second World War ended. Prolonged refugee stays however put 
undue strain on already fragile economies and attitudes in the host countries began to shift. See also El-
Abed, Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948,Ontario, Co-Published by Institute for Palestinian Studies, 
Washington DC and International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2009, p.170 
16M. Weiner, ‗Security, Stability, and International Migration‘, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter, 
1992-1993), p.125 
17D. Kromm, ‗Irredentism in Africa: The Somali-Kenya Boundary Dispute‘, Transactions of the Kansas 
Academy of Science,vol.70,no.3,1967,p.359 
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The failed campaign of the Somalia government in the Shifta War18(1963-1967)that sought 
to annex Northeastern Kenya in order to have a unified Greater Somalia was motivated 
by the desire to have all Somalis in a one-nation19Somalia. While Somalia in the 1960‘s 
maintained that peace with Kenya would only prevail after the NEP province in Kenya 
joins Somalia, the civil war that broke out in Somalia 1991 was neither related to the 
secessionist movement, the Shifta, nor its agenda. The protracted civil war in Somalia, 
therefore, seems to be mainly fuelled by dynamic local conflicts within Somalia that 
undermine efforts to revive the state. As Menkhaus observes: 
 
Only by distinguishing between local interests in armed conflict, 
criminality, and state collapse can observers make sense of the otherwise 
puzzling behavior of the Somali political, civic and economic actors who 
promote peace and local policing systems while quietly undermining efforts 
to revive the state.20 
 
According to him, local forces in Somalia may not be interested in sustainable peace and 
will tend to upset any attempts to restore functional governance structures in Somalia. 
Repatriation is normally informed by other broader dynamics like the perception of the 
host community towards refugees, perceptions around state collapse and failure, the 
                                                          
18An armed secession movement started in the region, which led to a series of confrontations known as the 
‗Shifta wars‘. In 1963, Kenya imposed emergency rule in NEP which lasted until 1991.The conflict 
continued throughout the 1960s until the brutal suppression of the uprising by Kenya‘s security forces. This 
marked the beginning of decades of human rights violations against ethnic Somalis which saw thousands 
killed. For more information see USAID (Ken Menkhaus), Kenya-Somalia Border Conflict Analysis, 31 
August 2005, p 10. See also Human Rights Watch, ‗Criminal Reprisals: Kenyan Police and Military 
Abuses Against Ethnic Somalis‘, May 2012, p 14. 
19 M.Tarmakin, ‗The Roots of Political Stability in Kenya‘, African Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 308, p.320. 
20K. Menkhaus, ‗Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and 
the Politics of Coping‘, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3 2007,p.76. 
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relationship between the Kenyan state and the Somali state, and perceptions by UNHCR, 
NGOs, refugees and the international community at large concerning the implications of 
hosting refugees and immigrants in general. When refugees are perceived as useful to a 
host country, it is unlikely that the host state will call for their repatriation. Congolese 
refugees in Johannesburg, for instance, experience the perceptions of many South 
Africans who ‗regard the refugees in their midst as fakes and fraudsters.‘21Few host states 
would portray refugees as contributing significantly to the host state both politically, 
economically or socially but will instead tend to underscore the perceived adverse effects 
associated with refugee presence.22 Complaints against the refugees tend to attract the 
international attention which could in turn promote various forms of funding supposedly 
to correct the ‗harm‘ that could have been caused to the environment, the economy, and 
the labour23market. Blaming refugees could also be a strategy in which refugees are used 
as a scapegoat by politicians in the host state whom have failed to provide basic essential 
services to the population24.In its report, the Human Rights Watch argues that despite 
frequent accusations, Kenyan government officials haven‘t produced any tangible 
                                                          
21 J. Crush, Immigration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South Africa. Cape Town, SAMP,2001,p.20 
J. Crush and V. Williams, Evaluating Refugee Protection in South Africa. SAMP Immigration Policy Brief, No.7, 
2002, p.14. 
22For instance, when the town of Macenta on the Liberian border was attacked on 29th September 2000, 
claiming 67 lives and forcing both Guineans and refugees to flee the area, the Guinean government blamed 
the refugees (Sierra Leoneans and Liberians)in its territory for the attacks. See Human Rights Watch, ‗The 
Refugee Crises in Guinea: Another Macedonia?‘ www.hrw.org/news/2000/10/03/refugee-crisis-guinea-
another-macedonia(accessed 27 November 2017) 
23 The influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan since early 2012 has raised concerns that it constitutes a threat to 
the employment and livelihoods of host community Jordanians. See S. Ajluni and M. Kawar, ‗The Impact of 
Syrian refugee crisis on the labour market in Jordan: A preliminary analysis‘, International Labour 
Organization, Regional Office for the Arab States,2014,p.18 
24Human Rights Watch, ‗Dispatches: Scapegoating Refugees in 
Kenya‘www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/11/dispatches-scapegoating-refugees-kenya   (accessed 27 
November 2017) 
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evidence that refugees are responsible for the attacks.25 According to the report, multiple 
investigations, including parliamentary inquiries point to pervasive corruption, lack of 
coordination, and other bungling by security agencies as key contributors26 to the failure 
to prevent or adequately respond to attacks. 
 
Although repatriation is arguably the most suitable27 solution to refugee problems 
worldwide, the manner and timing of the process is a delicate and dynamic one. 
UNHCR‘s support for repatriation as the most preferred solution to refugee problem may 
have been informed by the fact that it is relatively easier for one to relocate to his or her 
home country as compared to the complex dynamics of integration into a host state or 
resettlement in a third country. It could also be as a result of a reasoned judgment that 
with the world now grappling with millions of refugees, repatriation may be the most 
tenable solution especially when dealing with several thousands or millions of refugees. 
In the rest of the world, until the early 1980s, solutions to the refugee problem were 
invariably sought in the context of exile28. It was only since the beginning of the1980s that 
                                                          
25Human Rights Watch, ‗Dispatches: Scapegoating Refugees in Kenya‘ 
www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/11/dispatches-scapegoating-refugees-kenya   (accessed 27 November 2017) 
26Human Rights Watch, ‗Dispatches: Scapegoating Refugees in Kenya‘ 
www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/11/dispatches-scapegoating-refugees-kenya   (accessed 27 November 2017) 
27Of the three ‗durable‘ solutions to refugee situations-voluntary repatriation, integration, and resettlement-
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) proclaims voluntary 
repatriation to be the most desirable. See, B. Harrell-Bond, ‗Repatriation: Under what conditions is it the 
most desirable solution for refugees? An agenda for research‘, African Studies Review, 32(1), 1989, p. 41. 
28 G. Coles, ‗Solutions to the Problem of Refugees and the Protection of Refugees - A Background Paper‘, 
Geneva, International Institute of Humanitarian Law and the UNHCR, 1989. 
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repatriation ‗whenever feasible‘ has been emphasized as constituting ‗the most desirable 
solution to the refugee problem‘29. 
 
However, sustainable solutions may not be found through boardroom meetings that tend 
to overlook the refugees who are key players in the success of the programme. A more 
refugee-centered approach is therefore paramount if refugees are to appreciate and own 
the repatriation process as a solution that considers their interests as paramount. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
After hosting Somali refugees for more than two decades, Kenya, has in the recent past 
insisted that Somali refugees should be repatriated. Citing improved physical security in 
Somalia and Kenya‘s security challenges (especially those posed by the Somalia terror 
group, Al Shabaab), the Government of Kenya signed a Tripartite Agreement (TA) with 
the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees on 10th November, 2013. This was a roadmap for the voluntary repatriation 
of Somali refugees.30 The effectiveness and efficiency of the Tripartite Agreement remains 
to be seen in the future. Kenya, having sent troops to secure Somalia, claims that Somalia 
is now ‗safe for the return‘ of refugees and, as such, Somali refugees are no longer 
welcomed in Kenya. This has raised alarm among conflict experts, refugees, 
                                                          
29EXCOM 1980 UNHCR Executive Committee 31st Session No. 18. 
30The Tripartite Agreement between The Government of the Republic of Kenya, The Government of the 
Federal Republic of Somalia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Governing the 
Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees living in Kenya was signed 10 November, 2013.It provided the 
legal framework and roadmap for voluntary repatriation. 
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humanitarians31 and political scientists on the sincerity of Kenya in terms of the safety of 
Somalia. This is especially so considering the fact that the comment32 that Somalia was 
now ‗safe‘ was preceded by accusations of terrorism and criminality against Somali 
refugees33. This dissertation, seeks to interrogate repatriation process especially as viewed 
and understood by refugees through their lived experiences in Somalia and Dadaab 
refugee camps in Kenya. 
 
While the government and other players have often emphasized repatriation, little focus 
upon what constitutes a successful repatriation, and when and how to repatriate, has 
been considered. Repatriation processes have also tended to bypass the refugees‘ active 
involvement leading to many failed repatriations and hence ‗recycled‘34 refugees.  
                                                          
31K. Kelly, ‗Majority of Somali Refugees in Dadaab ‗unwilling‘ to return, medical charity MSF says‘, Daily 
Nation, 13 October 2016.  www.nation.co.ke/news/Majority-of-Somali-refugees-unwilling-to-return-MSF-
says/1056-3415224-mg2r9x/index.html. (Accessed 27 November 2017).This paper quotes the head of MSF 
mission in Kenya, Liesbeth Aelbrecht, as saying ‗It is unacceptable that, without any other solution being 
offered, thousands are essentially being pushed back into conflict and acute crisis-the very conditions that 
they fled‘. MSF was lamenting the repatriation of Somali refugees was immature as Somalia was still not 
‗safe‘ for return. 
32 The Government of Kenya had earlier blamed the Somali refugees for supporting terrorism before shortly 
announcing their decision to close down Dadaab refugee camps, hosting thousands of Somali refugees. The 
Government announced that it will not close down the Kakuma refugee camp in Northwestern Kenya that 
hosts a majority of Sudanese refugees. Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps were yet to be closed at the time 
of compiling this dissertation. 
33 While Kenya blamed the terrorist attacks (especially that at Garissa University where 148 student were 
killed) on terror cells in Dadaab refugee camp, there is little direct evidence of the group‘s activities there. 
See also G. Joselow, ‗Somali Refugees in Kenya fear forced repatriation order‘ Voice of America, 27 April 
2015. Available www.voanews.com/a/somali-refugee-in-kenya-ready-to-go-home-despite-
fears/2736048.html (accessed 27 November 2017) 
34This is a term connotatively used to refer to refugees who fled their home country after repatriation as a 
result of protracted violence or re-emergence of the same. Forced repatriations are likely to produce a 
‗vicious cycle‘ of refugees or asylum seekers 
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Many scholars too, have tended to rely to reports from state and non state actors, risking 
endorsing them instead of interrogating matters by themselves. Consequently, there are 
glaring gaps on academic literature as to when, if and how to repatriate refugees. 
 
This dissertation explores repatriation from the perspectives of Kenya, Somalia, the 
UNHCR and refugees with a view to emphasizing the crucial role of refugee involvement 
in decision-making. It is hoped that the findings of this dissertation will both contribute 
to the scholarly literature and also influence state and non-state actors in policy matters 
vis-à-vis the permanent settlement of refugees.  
 
Among the questions the study seeks to answer include: a) Is Somalia perceived as safe 
for return of refugees? b) What are the roles of the Kenya-Somalia-UNHCR (tripartite 
parties) in ensuring successful voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees? c) How would 
voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees be made refugee-centered, even in the context 
of Tripartite Agreements? Borrowing examples from other (un)successful repatriations, 
the study proposes a more refugee-centered approach in the repatriation of Somali 
refugees, which could broadly apply to Africa and beyond, as a remedy to protracted and 
emergency refugee situations. 
 
1.3 Proposition 
 
It is proposed in this dissertation that: 
13 
 
1. Refugee participation and inclusivity in decision-making is paramount for 
successful repatriation. 
2. A refugee-centred approach could apply more broadly to other African/regional 
refugee crises. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the study 
In this study, I seek to fulfill the following research objectives: 
 
1. To explore the views of the governments of Kenya and Somalia, the UNHCR and 
refugees on the safety and security of Somalia as a pre-requisite for repatriation. 
2. To examine the roles and responsibilities of the Kenya-Somalia-UNHCR (tripartite 
parties) in ensuring successful voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees and in 
promoting stability and security in the region. 
3. To determine the level of refugee inclusivity and participation in decision-making 
on their repatriation. 
4. To evaluate challenges associated with the Tripartite Agreement on voluntary 
repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya. 
5. To extrapolate the ways in which a refugee centred approach to repatriation could    
apply more broadly to the region and other African refugee crises. 
1.4 Key research questions 
 
The key research questions explored in this dissertation are: 
14 
 
1. In what ways are the conditions of safety and security in Somalia perceived by the 
governments of Kenya and Somalia, the UNHCR and refugees as a requirement for 
repatriation? 
2. How would the tripartite parties ensure successful voluntary repatriation of Somali 
refugees while promoting stability and security in the region? 
3. Why would the Tripartite agreement be difficult to implement without the active 
initiative, inclusion and participation of the Somali refugees in decision making? 
4. What does a more refugee-centered approach, as explored in this case study, tell us 
about the repatriation of refugees more broadly in Africa. 
 
1.5 Theoretical framework 
Elite theory 
This dissertation adopts elite theory in general and elite theory specifically in politics 
around refugee situations. Elite theory provides a distinction between elites and non-
elites to advance explanatory constructs that can be assessed empirically for accuracy or 
at least plausibility. Elite theorists posit that a small minority consisting of members of 
the economic and political elite and policy planning networks hold the most power and 
that this power is independent of a state‘s democratic elections process35. In this study, I 
look at the process of repatriation and how elites infiltrate this process at the expense of 
refugees. 
                                                          
35L. Vergara, ‗Elites, political elites and social change in modern societies‘, Revista de Sociología, no.28. 2013, 
p.41-43 
Elites play a key role in decision making including in refugee situations. 
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Among the classical contributors to elite theory are Vilfred Pareto36, Gaetano Mosca37, 
Robert Michels38 and Wright Mills.39Pareto argues that elites can either be governing 
elites or non-governing elites. Mosca on his part posits that elites are an organized 
minority and the masses are an unorganized majority. He divides the world into ruling 
class and class that is ruled.40Mills, on the other hand, identified a triumvirate of power 
groups‘ namely political, economic and military elites and argues that they form a 
distinguishable, although not unified, power wielding body.41More recently, Schubert, 
Dye and Zeigler42have argued that public policy does not result from the demands of the 
people, but rather from elite consensus found in non-profit foundations, special interest 
groups, and law firms, among others. Plainly put, Dye and Zeigler argue that the strong 
in society (minority) make decisions on behalf of the weak (majority).  
 
Elite theory characterizes elites (minority) and non-elites (majority) as follows: 
a) In every complex and large society, power is distributed unequally and is concentrated 
in the hands of elites. 
                                                          
36V. Pareto, The rise and fall of the elites. An application of theoretical sociology, New Brunswick, New Jersey. 
Transaction Publishers, 1901 
37 G. Mosca, The ruling class, Greenwood Press, Westport. 1896, 1939 
38R. Michels, Political parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy, Kitchener,  
Batoche Books,1915, 2001 
39R. Mills, The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956 
40G. Mosca, The ruling class, Greenwood Press, Westport. 1896, 1939 
41R. Mills, The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956 
42 L. Schubert, T. Dye and H. Zeigler, Irony of Democracy: An uncommon introduction to American politics, 
United Kingdom: Cengage, 2016. 
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b) In every complex and large society, the key socio-political distinction is between elites 
and non-elites. 
c) Elite configurations can be said to be key determinants of economic and political 
success or failure. 
d) The social backgrounds of elites are disproportionately those of privilege. 
I consider the elite theory appropriate as a theoretical framework to inform this study as 
the power relationships between elites working through various agencies involved in 
repatriation is a key determinant of the success or failure of the repatriation process. 
Although majority refugees are ideally non-elites and may not directly influence policy 
decisions, which is the domain of the elites, their involvement is crucial as it will 
determine whether the decisions of policy makers will finally be sustainable in the long  
run. This framework is useful when considering the role of refugees (ideally perceived as 
masses or non-elites) in influencing the success of their repatriation process as already 
determined by the Tripartite parties (minority or elites). The question is whether the 
terms of the Kenya-Somalia-UNHCR voluntary repatriation agreement (representing 
elites) is perceived as a true representation of the feelings, perceptions and aspirations of 
the majority (non-elite) Somali refugees? How far have the political elites in the 
Government of Kenya, UNHCR and FGS come up with the Tripartite Agreement that 
provides for voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees without the input of refugees 
themselves? 
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The fact that the number of cases where refugees have claimed they were not involved43 
in the repatriation process is increasing, or that they were threatened44or duped45 into 
believing that home was (now) safe for return is indeed worrying. One may argue that 
the Tripartite Agreement signatories, who represent the elites, by virtue of their strategic 
positions could substantially influence politics in favour of repatriation without refugee 
input as argued by Higley: 
 
Elites may be defined as persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations 
in large or  otherwise  pivotal  organizations  and  movements,  are  able  to  
affect political  outcomes  regularly  and  substantially.  Put differently, 
elites are persons with the organized capacity to make real political trouble 
without being promptly repressed.  They consist not only of prestigious and 
‗established‘  leaders,  top politicians,  important  businessmen,  high-level  
civil  servants,  senior  military officers  –  but  also,  in  varying  degrees  in  
different  societies,  relatively  transitory and  less  individually  known  
leaders  of  mass  organizations  such  as  trade  unions, important  
voluntary  associations,  and  politically  consequential  mass  movements.46 
 
The elite consist of those few individuals who wield powers and hold leading positions in 
the strategic aspects of society. The majority, the masses, only obeys and are guided, 
controlled and governed by the few47. The majority are mostly led by the minority48. 
                                                          
43C. Karooma, ‗Reluctant to return? The primacy of social networks in the repatriation of Rwandan refugees 
in Uganda‘, Working Paper Series No.103,Refugees Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2014,p.10 
44C. Karooma, ‗Reluctant to Return? The Primacy of Social Networks in the repatriation of Rwandan 
refugees in Uganda, Oxford, Refugees Studies Centre, Working Paper series no. 103, 2014.pp.4-21. 
45B. Harrell-Bond, ‗Repatriation: Under what conditions is it the most desirable solution for refugees? An 
agenda for research‘, African Studies Review, vol.32, no.1, p.56. 
46J .Higley, J. Elite theory in political sociology, University of Texas at Austin, 2008.p.4 
 
47C. Okeke, ‗Alternatives to the predatory local government‘, Arabian Journal of Business and Management 
Review,vol.4, no.2.2014.p.80 
48 M. López, ‗Elite theory‘, Sociopedia.isa, 2013. DOI: 10.1177/2056846013112 
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Many elites do not hold formal or legal authoritative powers, but are rather behind the 
scene, influencing and manipulating overt political and policy actions. It is on the basis of 
presumptions that the masses are contented and are incapable of challenging the 
authoritative position of the elite that the elites dominate public policy and its processes.49 
 
Besides that, elite theory is a useful framework to enable the explanation of decision-
making by powerful actors, and to explore the claim by Menkhaus of the ‗otherwise 
puzzling behaviour of the Somali political, civic and economic actors who promote peace 
and local policing systems while quietly undermining efforts to revive the state‘50 Who 
could these ‗powerful‘ individuals or entities be with such powers to undermine the 
efforts of the international community to stabilize Somalia for more than two decades 
now? One could easily conclude that only elites have such financial muscles, skill and 
power to warrant such deterrence. Elites, perhaps because they are less averse to losses51, 
also appear to be more cooperative than the masses. Deducing from elite theory, the 
study attempts to answer the research questions regarding the decision making process 
before, during and after repatriation. 
 
                                                          
49D. Arowolo and O. Aluko, ‗Democracy, political participation and good governance in Nigeria‘, 
International Journal of Development and Sustainability, vol.1.no.3.p.800 
50K. Menkhaus, ‗Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of 
Coping‘, International Security, Vol.31 no.3.p.76 
51E. Hafner-Burton, D. Hughes and D. Victor, ‗The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of 
Elite Decision Making‘, Perspectives in Politics, American Political Science Association, 2011, p.70 
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Contemporary democratic elite theory may also be understood as a framework for 
explaining and understanding decision-making in all its facets, especially in situations of 
uneven power relationships. It is hoped that this contextually rich empirical case study 
will also contribute to further theoretical development of this body of theory. 
Traditionally democratic elite theory has been used to explain relationships between 
elites and non-elites, but it can also be applied to decision-making within elite groupings. 
 
1.6 Rationale and motivation for the study 
 
As of July 2009, Dadaab refugee complex52 - comprising of Hagadera, Dagahaley, Ifo 1 
and Ifo2 - was recorded as being the world‘s largest refugee camp.53 It comprises of 
majority Somalis with almost all clans represented. Others include South Sudanese, 
Ethiopians, Ugandans, Congolese, Burundians and Eritreans54. This, therefore, implies 
that Kenya is one of the countries in the world with one of the world‘s largest refugee 
burdens. I was motivated to carry out the study as part of my contribution in suggesting 
a more refugee driven debate on repatriation. Although repatriation lessens the refugee 
burden to the host state and the international community, it is hoped that this could be 
successfully done without infringing on the rights of refugees to voluntary repatriation. 
                                                          
52
 https://www.unhcr.org/ke/dadaab-refugee-complex.  
53P. Kirui, and J. Mwaruvie,  ‗The dilemma of hosting refugees: A focus on the insecurity in north-eastern 
Kenya‘, International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol.3 no.8, 2012, p.165 
54 https://www.unhcr.org/ke/figures-at-a-glance 
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Secondly, the Dadaab complex in Kenya represents one of the protracted conflicts in 
Africa having been established in 1991 after the fall of Siad Barre. The international 
community‘s engagement with refugees has since the 1990‘s focused largely on mass 
influx situations and refugee emergencies, and encouraging large-scale repatriation 
programmes in high-profile regions55. In stark contrast, over two-thirds of refugees in the 
world today are not in emergency situations, but instead trapped in protracted refugee 
situations56.This therefore means that researchers, academics and policy-makers should 
give more attention to protracted refugee situations and not just refugees in emergencies 
and during large influxes. This study, therefore, is timely as it focuses on a protracted 
refugee situation with a view to building more sustainable refugee repatriation. 
 
Thirdly, the physical security problems that Kenya has faced in the recent past, notably 
the WestGate Mall Attack in 2013 in Nairobi and the Garissa University attack in 2015has 
consolidated the perception that Dadaab refugee camps are being used as a training 
ground and hideout57 for Somali terror militants. Studies by Kirui and Mwaruvie58and 
                                                          
55Since the 1990‘s, the international community has focused largely on refugee emergencies in high profile 
regions such as the Balkans, the Great Lakes region of Africa and more recently Darfur(Sudan), Chad and 
Syria. These regions are known to produce millions of refugees. See  UN, ‗Protracted refugee situations: 
Millions caught in limbo, with no solution in sight‘, available at 
www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/print.asp?storyID=2600(accessed 28 November 2017) 
56 G. Loescher et al, ‗Introduction‘, Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, human rights and security 
implications, New York, United Nations University Press, 2008,p.3 
57The Guardian, ‗World‘s largest refugee camp scapegoated in wake of Garissa attack‘ 14 April 2015 
Available at www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/kenya-garissa-dadaab-scapegoat-al-
shabaab(accessed 28 November 2017).The Government of Kenya had termed Dadaab refugee camp ‗a 
nursery for Al Shabaab‘, before calling for its immediate closure. 
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that of Kiswii59among others, have maintained that amass influx of Somali refugees could 
have negatively affected Kenya‘s physical security. In this case the relationship between 
international refugee flows and national  security  can  be  understood  as  a  social  
construct  whereby  discourses  and practices have shifted refugee flows from a 
humanitarian idea to a security-oriented idea. Because of this perceived threat, Kenyan 
anti-terrorist operations have targeted non-nationals, including Somali refugees, 
perceived by them as a source of terrorism.60 The  Government‘s  concerns  are  that  
terrorists  can  camouflage themselves as  refugees  to  enter the country and, in so doing, 
they can hide their activities including those that target refugees for recruitment. Some 
groups, such  as  the  Al-Haramain  Islamic  Foundation61,  Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya62  which  
have  links  with  Al-Qaeda63, were carrying out humanitarian work in Somali refugee 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
58P. Kirui and J. Mwaruvie, ‗The dilemma of hosting refugees: A focus on the insecurity in north-eastern 
Kenya‘, International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol.3.no.8.p163. 
59 E. Kiswii, ‗Refugee Influx and (In)security: Kenya‘s experience,1991-2012‘, Masters Thesis, University of 
Nairobi,2013.p.11 
60 Amnesty International The Impact of Antiterrorism Operations on Human Rights, (Washington DC: 
Amnesty International,).2005 
61 A charity foundation based in Saudi Arabia that later became a major source of funds to the terrorist 
groups. It was listed by United Nations Security Council as terrorist group on 13 March 2002. Available 
www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/al-haramain-islamic-
foundation-(bosnia-and(accessed 29 November 2017) See also E. Kiswii, ‗Refugee Influx and (In)security: 
Kenya‘s experience, 1991-2012‘, Masters Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2013.p.5 
62It is an Islamist militant group in Somalia. It is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, 
United Kingdom and New Zealand. It seeks to establish Islamic caliphates based on strict Islamic Sharia 
law. Available https://fas.org/irp/world/para/ogadin.htm(accessed 29 November 2017) 
63 It is a militant Sunni Islamist multinational organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden, Abdullah 
Azzam and several other Arab volunteers who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 
1980s.After the Cold War the group seem to be pushing for the establishment of Islamic states based on 
strict Islamic Sharia law. Available at www.un/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/fact-sheet-on-updating-list 
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camps where they have established close links with the Somali refugees consequently 
smuggling dangerous weapons to Kenya via the Kenya-Somali border.64 
Yet, despite all this, a permanent solution for protracted refugee situations must be sort. It 
is not acceptable, as former High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers said in 2001, that refugees 
spend years of their lives in confined areas.65 Yet the political failure to find durable 
solutions for refugees lead to precisely the kinds of protracted situations that degrades 
the displaced. Unable to return to their homeland, settle permanently in their country of 
first asylum or move to a third state, many refugees find themselves confined indefinitely 
to camps or holding areas, often in volatile border zones.66Such restrictive conditions are 
a denial of rights under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention67 and a waste of human 
talent.68Furthermore, the prevalence in prolonged refugee situations of idleness, aid-
dependency, a legacy of conflict and weak rule of law can induce fresh cycles of violence, 
                                                          
64G. Loescher and J. Milner (eds.), Protracted Refugee Situations, Domestic and International Security 
Implications, London: IISS, 2008)41. E. Kiswii, ‗Refugee Influx and (In)security: Kenya‘s experience, 1991-
2012‘, Master Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2013.p.5-6 
65R. Lubbers, High Commissioner for Refugees, Statement to the European Conference on Migration, 
Brussels, 2001. 
66J. Crisp, ‗No Solutions in Sight? The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa‘, New Issues in 
Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 75, UNHCR, Geneva, 2003. 
67The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of refugees is the centerpiece of international 
refugee protection. The Convention entered into force on 22 April 1954 and it has been subjected to only 
one amendment in the form of a 1967 Protocol, which removed the geographic and temporal limits of the 
1951 Convention. Among its notable principles is that of non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-
refoulement. The Convention defines a refugee as ‗a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of the country‘. 
68M. Smith, ‗Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity‘, World Refugee Survey, 2004, 
pp. 40–1. 
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threatening human security.69 In this regard, it is imperative that the search for durable 
solutions be intensified.70 
 
It is against this backdrop that the Government of Kenya intensified calls for repatriation 
of Somali refugees in Dadaab, Northeastern Kenya culminating in the signing of the 
Tripartite Agreement (TA) signed between Government of Kenya, FGS and UNHCR, as a 
roadmap for the repatriation of Somali refugees. The need to establish the roles, 
contributions and aspirations of Somali refugees in the TA motivated the study with a 
view to capture the views of ordinary Somali refugees in this process of repatriation. 
 
1.7 Contribution of the study to the repatriation debate 
 
No doubt the repatriation debate and the role of the refugees therefore have been on the 
agenda for some time now. Perhaps the assertion by Malloch-Brown71on the need to 
include refugee views in all refugee-related matters, including repatriation, makes this 
study part of the answer to his call. As far as Malloch-Brown is concerned, 
 
I would hope that experts will never again have the effrontery to sit down 
together to discuss refugees without refugees being present, but I doubt it.  
Refugee work remains, perhaps, the last bastion of the ultra-paternalistic 
                                                          
69A. Helton, The Price of Indifference, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 154–62. 
70UNHCR, ‗Protracted Refugee Situations‘, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner‘s Programme, 
Standing Committee, 30th Meeting, UN Doc. EC/54/SC/CRP.14, 10 June 2004. 
71 Mark Malloch Brown is a former United Kingdom government minister (2007-2009) and United Nations 
Deputy Secretary General (2006) as well as development specialist at World Bank and the United Nations 
(1994-2005). 
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approach to aid and development.  It is hard to think of another area where 
the blinkered nonsense of the ‗we know what's best for them‘ approach 
survives so unchallenged.72 
 
While Mark Malloch-Brown may have made this tough observation more than two 
decades ago, the role of the refugees, especially in the repatriation process, remains 
peripheral or non-existent at all. Although this study underscores the need to bring 
refugees on board while making decisions concerning them, other scholars, like Anon, 
are of the view that governments are not expected to engage in a discussion with refugees 
as their main role is political decision-making and it should remain just that. He states the 
following. 
 
I believe that if you want political action, you must get governments 
together. Their deliberations will be the springboard for action. In my 
opinion, it is quite unrealistic to expect them to meet together with 
individual refugees (or groups representing refugees) and NGOs [non-
governmental organizations].  Where the adoption of recommendations for 
political action is concerned, it does not work like that.  Eagles don't consort 
with sparrows.  It's a law of nature.73 
 
However, Anon‘s view of exempting governments from engaging refugees (or their 
representatives) seems to be working on a premise that political decision-making does 
not require a process of consultation. This view is not only untenable, but tends to 
support the ‗big man syndrome74‘ of isolating the less privileged refugee (as eagles don‘t 
                                                          
72 Mark Malloch-Brown, as quoted in Harrell-Bond and Karadawi (1984). 
73 Anon as quoted in Harrell-Bond (1989) p.41. 
74The big man syndrome within the context of political science refers to corrupt, autocratic and often 
totalitarian rule of countries by a single person. Disregarding refugees in decision making in this case is 
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consort with sparrows). The fact that Anon, and possibly others, think that this is the law 
of nature does not mean that this dominant view should be left unchallenged. This study 
challenges this view by propounding refugees as a solution to their plight, and the state 
and non-state actors as mere ‗third parties‘. Borrowing heavily from the elite theory, the 
study suggests that ‗might is not always right‘. The fact that policy makers can decide on 
crucial matters pertaining to refugees , without refugee input or resistance, does not 
legitimize the process. The ‗weakness‘ of the refugee should not be mistaken as 
ignorance, ineptitude or inability, but rather as a temporary limitation as a result of 
unfavourable circumstances both in the home and host countries. 
 
Academically, there are glaring gaps in the literature regarding how, and when, refugees 
should be repatriated. Active refugee participation in the repatriation process is missing 
and in most cases tends to be overlooked, or not given the weight it warrants. This study 
endeavours to contribute to filling this enormous vacuum. 
 
Finally, many scholars in refugee issues have tended to rely on humanitarian agency 
reports or state reports in their research hence find themselves endorsing instead of 
interrogating them. Research on refugee matters, especially by academics should be more 
of ground-led with a view to seeking information from the refugees themselves. In order 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
promoting the ‗big man‘s syndrome‘-which is unacceptable. It is highly personalized and restrained little 
by modern institutions. See also M. Meredith, ‗The fate of Africa: A history of fifty years of independence‘ 
New York, New York Public Affairs, 2005. 
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to avoid deducing the findings largely from already existing reports on refugees, the 
study draws extensively from the field findings. The study introduces a paradigm shift in 
the approach to refugee resettlement process(es) that focuses on the views of refugees as 
determinants of their successful repatriation. 
1.8 Reflection upon research methodology 
 
In this study I adopt an interpretative meta-theory of knowledge and a corresponding 
qualitative methodology. A research methodology is an arrangement of conditions for the 
collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance with the 
research purpose75. In this particular study I adopt a case study approach, as a basis for 
collecting and analyzing data. A case is an entity or specific bounded system where it is 
possible to identify that some features are within the case while others are outside, but 
are significant as context76. The study is a case study because it focuses upon refugees 
located in Dadaab refugee camp, rather than any other refugee location. 
While the researcher may have a variety of purposes of study and research questions, the 
general objective is to develop as full an understanding of that case as possible. Because 
the refugees are a people of concern to international bodies like the UNHCR, the 
divergent interests of a home country, a host country, refugees and the international 
community makes this group of people complex and dynamic. Because of these 
complexities, a case study is best placed as it suits ‗an empirical inquiry that investigates 
                                                          
75 D. Kombo. &D.Tromp, Proposal and Thesis Writing: An Introduction. Nairobi: Pauline Publication Africa, 
2006. 
76E.Stake, ‗Qualitative Case Studies‘ Denzin, N.K and Lincoln, Y.S(eds)Sage Handbook of Qualitative 
Research.3rd Ed. London, Sage,2005.p.1. 
27 
 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident77‘.Assuming a 
deductive approach, I use elite theory to test hypotheses based on the in-depth 
information from the case findings.  
 
Being qualitative research, the emphasis is upon the specific and rich findings from the 
case, rather than the number of cases. According to Denzin and Lincoln, a qualitative 
approach: 
Implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on process and 
meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured (if measured 
at all) in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency. Qualitative 
researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate 
relationship between researcher and what is studied, and the situational 
constraints that shape inquiry.78 
 
 
In a case study, the researcher recognizes that s/he is not overly concerned with trends 
and consistencies for the purposes of generalization, but rather a detailed explanation 
understood through the eyes of the participants in their context. In a nutshell, a case 
study is an ideal form of qualitative research, whereby an in-depth study of an individual 
unit is used to gain in-depth understanding of the participants, focusing on the process 
                                                          
77K. Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods (3rd Ed). London: Sage Publications,2003.p.14 
 
 
78K. Denzin, &Y.Lincoln, Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research, in N. K Denzin 
and Y. S. Lincoln, (eds.)The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, 3rd Ed. Thousand Oak, CA: Sage 
Publications,2005, p. 10. 
28 
 
rather than outcome.79In such research, there is a focus upon experiential knowledge of 
the case and close attention is paid to the influence of its social, political and other 
contexts. Consequently, a case study is best suited in this study as it brings to light the 
dynamic social, political and economic contexts regarding the challenges associated with 
the permanent settlement of refugees. 
 
While the natural sciences are looking for consistencies in the data in order to deduce 
‗laws‘(nomothetic), the social sciences often deal with the actions of the 
individual(ideographic).As noted by Crotty, 
 
Our interest in the social world tends to focus on exactly those aspects that 
are unique, individual and qualitative, whereas our interest in the natural 
world focuses on more abstract phenomena, that is, those exhibiting 
quantifiable, empirical regularities.80 
 
In qualitative research, the researcher is prepared to sacrifice quantity for detail.81This 
helps the researcher to acquire detailed in-depth information within its social and 
political context, rather than shallow in-breadth information.  
 
                                                          
79J. Creswell, Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches (2nd ed.). California, Sage 
Publications, 2009 
J. Gerring,Case study research: Principles and practices. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
R. Burns, Introduction to research methods (4th Ed).London: Sage Publications, 2000. 
80M. Crotty, The Foundation of Social Research: Meaning and Perspectives in the Research Process. London, Sage, 
1998, 68. 
81 D. Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research 2nd, London, Sage, 2005 
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While inquiring about the subject matter of the permanent settlements of Somali refugees 
and the dynamics thereof, the researcher recognizes that since he is not interested in any 
trends and consistencies for purposes of generalization, but rather a detailed explanation 
from a few cases, it was prudent to employ the interpretive approach. This ensured the 
avoidance of a boring repetition from large samples and further that each individual case 
was analyzed intensively to an extent that it contributed significantly to the findings of 
the study. As such, the research, as a set of interpretive activities that privileged no single 
methodological practice over another as it utilized multiple interpretations, methods and 
techniques82In order to understand people‘s outlooks, perceptions and experiences, we 
must be close to groups and look at the world from their view points. While this may be 
deemed subjective (by non-interpretivists), subjectivity in qualitative research is not seen 
as a failure that needs to be eliminated, but as an essential element of understanding.83 
 
Dadaab refugee camps comprise an enclosed settlement near the Kenyan frontier in 
Northeastern Kenya. As such, the key informants and participants that were interviewed 
are easily identifiable. Because case studies work with fewer participants in order to 
emphasize intensity rather than extensity, the researcher employed stratified purposive 
sampling alongside snowball sampling, targeting key informants in the government 
agency dealing with refugees, UNHCR, NGOs, refugees and ordinary Kenyan citizens. 
The researcher engaged 25 key participants in extensive interviews (using semi-
                                                          
82 J. Mason, Qualitative Researching (2nd Ed.) London, Sage Publications, 2002 
83E. Stake, The Art of Case Study Research. London, Sage Publications, 1995 
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structured open-ended questions) and conducted focus group discussions. Purposive 
sampling targeted politically important cases (such as refugee leaders and local 
administrators). It also utilized homogenous sampling targeting participants in focus 
group discussions (such as officials of government, UNHCR and NGOs).  
 
Having previously worked in the refugee camp for 3 years as a humanitarian worker, it 
was relatively easy to mobilize individuals who participated in this study on the basis of 
informed consent. They included refugees, Kenyans (in Dadaab but not affiliated to 
NGO‘s), NGO workers, security agencies (Kenyan Police and Kenya Defense Forces 
(KDF), and UNHCR officials in Dadaab. 
All the 25 respondents were individually interviewed and their responses transcribed. 
They included: 15 refugees, 2 Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) officials, 1 police, 1 
Kenya Defence Force officer, 2 Kenyan businessmen, 2 Kenyan teachers and 2 NGO staff 
(1 international and 1 national staff). After the interviews, 3 Focus Group Discussions 
(FGD) were conducted as follows: FGD 1 (5 refugees); FGD 2 ( 2 NGO staff and 3 
refugees) and FGD 3 ( 1 DRA staff, 1 police, 1 national NGO staff, a teacher and 
businessman).  
 
In keeping with a qualitative approach, a variety of methods were used during the design 
phase, including desk and field based research, a literature review, key informant 
interviews, and empirical analyses of existing data. The researcher also drew upon 
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international, Kenyan, and Somali legal documents and legislative acts on refugees and 
displaced people. Digital and print media reports were also reviewed as they contained 
the most recent reports and provided various case scenarios. 
 
In analyzing the data from the field work, it was first transcribed from the audio 
recordings to script form. This generated a substantial amount of text (for example every 
hour generated several pages of raw data). The researcher then re-familiarized himself 
with the data to draw out the themes contained in the data. After re-familiarization with 
the data, the researcher coded (labeled) the chunk of data to form of headlines and 
categories. Because coding involves phases, the coding approach went through open, 
axial and selective coding respectively. In the open coding phase, the researcher is 
interested in distinctive issues and conceptualization. In the axial phase, the researcher 
merged similar or related codes, downgrading some while upgrading others in order to 
elicit themes and sub-themes. In the final phase of selective coding, the researcher related 
the themes with the corresponding research questions. 
Ethical considerations were accorded high importance in the study. Participants‘ names 
were kept confidential and comments anonymous. Names of respondents (especially 
refugees) cited are pseudo names hence protecting their privacy. 
 
1.9 Scope and limitation 
The study began by indicating the general scope to be covered. In this specific 
interdisciplinary study, the focus is repatriation in protracted refugee situations and the 
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role of the refugee stakeholders in general, and the refugees in particular. Drawing from 
repatriation experiences in Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan and 
other select countries, this dissertation emphasizes the need for active refugee 
involvement in the repatriation process. The reasons for the need to repatriate, integrate 
or resettle as a permanent solution to the refugee problem is also highlighted, as argued 
by many refugee hosting countries. 
 
This study discusses the Tripartite Agreement signed by Government of Kenya, the 
Federal Government of Somalia and the UNHCR on 10th November 2013 with a view to 
explaining the role of the refugees in the TA. The perception of Somali refugees upon 
safety and security in Somalia, the role of the tripartite parties and the refugees in the 
repatriation process is also discussed. 
 
Even though resettlement and integration are part of the solution to the refugee problem, 
the study focuses on repatriation as the most appropriate solution when dealing with 
large numbers of refugees during emergencies and in protracted situations. 
 
The area of study is a limiting factor, where the focus is on the repatriation process of 
Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps in Northeastern Kenya. The Tripartite 
Agreement signed by Kenya, Somalia and UNHCR as the roadmap to the repatriation 
process is discussed in detail in this study. Other tripartite agreements signed elsewhere 
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are used as a basis of understanding this TA and drawing the necessary lessons and 
trends. 
While many tripartite agreements are similar in terms of their provisions in the 
repatriation process, refugee situations are dynamic to particular circumstances. The 
findings of this study, regarding the tripartite agreement between Kenya, Somalia and 
UNHCR may consequently differ significantly if the study was to be done elsewhere. 
Results could therefore be taken as a general trend in repatriation circumstances and 
specifically regarding Somali refugees Kenya in Dadaab camps. Besides that, there is only 
scarce academic literature on the repatriation of Somali refugees in Kenya after the 
Tripartite Agreement that was signed on 10th November 2013.The contemporary nature 
of this study, was also a limiting factor as academics are yet to fully delve into the matter. 
Contemporary references especially from published academic works were therefore rare. 
Consequently, this dissertation draws upon historical examples in order to situate this 
case within the broader trend of involuntary repatriation movements and to exemplify 
the consequences of forced and premature repatriation in relation to the current situation 
under study. 
 
The short time available for this study, financial limitations and the challenge of 
movement in the larger Dadaab camps, as a result of safety and security restrictions, 
limited the study in one way or another. Although there is no agreement among scholars 
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on what constitutes a failed84/failing state, Somalia may be considered as a failed/failing 
state. Acknowledging this debatable term, this dissertation uses failed state in reference 
to Somalia. It is still recovering from the ravages of civil war and is still dangerous, even 
for military personnel. Consequently, the researcher utilized reports from various 
humanitarian agencies in an attempt to describe the actual state of Somalia. Even so, 
these reports acknowledge too that most parts of Somalia are inaccessible and large 
swathes of land are still under the control of the militia. This may have limited the study 
as the researcher did not have the benefit of corroborating this information with any 
empirical findings as this was not practically possible to carry out. 
 
In conducting the study, it was not unexpected that many respondents were hesitant for 
the interviews to be recorded and preferred that the interviewer take notes from the 
interviewee. Those who chose not to be recorded opted for this option after being 
informed of their right either to consent or decline to be recorded.  In this regard, their 
wish was respected. In interviewing the security personnel, they indicated their fear of 
contradicting the Government of Kenya position concerning repatriation, which may 
have been a limiting factor in the free expression of their views. This also applied to 
UNHCR officials who express their concern of not wanting to contradict the Government 
of Kenya position insisting that they would not want to be drawn into the politics of 
repatriation. To protect the identity of the informants, anonymity was offered to them. 
                                                          
84 A. Simmons, A & D. Tucker, The misleading problem of failed states: a sociogeography 
of terrorism in the post 9/11 era‖. Third world Quarterly, Vol. 28, No.2, 2007, pp 387-401. 
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To protect their identities, the researcher gave pseudo names to all refugee respondents 
and other respondents who, because of their sensitive positions, preferred to remain 
anonymous. Names of refugees appearing in this dissertation, therefore, are not their 
actual names. This assurance made the respondents freer to be candid in their responses. 
 
1.10 Definition of terms as used in dissertation. 
The following terms and their meanings as used in the study are hereby defined: 
 
Refugee: A refugee is any person ‗who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country(The 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to status of Refugees).It may also include those persons who 'owing 
to external aggression, occupation,  foreign domination  or  events seriously  disturbing  
public order'  in the  home country are compelled to flee abroad(1969 OAU Convention, 
Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa). 
Repatriation: To return to one‘s country. Refugees return must always be voluntary. The 
1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees envisages voluntary returns 
according to the principle of non-refoulement. Involuntary returns, however, do happen 
when refugees are coerced either directly or indirectly to return.  
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Sustainable repatriation: For purposes of this thesis, sustainable repatriation is one that 
is done after conditions at home have improved. Refugees then repatriate voluntarily 
after participating fully and agreeing to the decision to return. Hence refugees repatriate 
in (to) safety and in dignity. In this case, there is a limited chance that the returnee will 
flee again. This is the best form of repatriation. Most voluntary repatriations are 
sustainable. 
Unsustainable repatriation: These are repatriations that are rushed and may happen 
even if conditions at home that necessitated the flight have not changed. As a result, 
returnees may be forced to flee again hence making the repatriation process 
unsustainable. Most involuntary returns are unsustainable and may lead to a vicious 
circle of ‗re-cycled‘ refugees 
 
Resettlement: To be granted citizenship or permanent residence in a third country. It is to 
be resettled in another country, other than the country of origin and the first country of 
asylum. Less than 1% of total number of refugees in the world benefit from resettlement. 
 
Integration: This is where refugees are incorporated into the political, social, economic or 
cultural system of the country of asylum. Integration, and the rights thereof, may be 
partial or full. When integrated refugees enjoy all rights as citizens of a host state then 
that can be termed as full integration. On the contrary, if integrated refugees enjoy some 
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rights and are denied others, (for instance, being denied right to vote) then refugees can 
be termed as partially integrated. 
 
Asylum: The protection granted by a state to someone who has left their native country 
as a political refugee. One is termed as a refugee after crossing his/her national border 
and welcomed by host state as asylum seeker. 
 
Asylum seeker: A person who has left their home country as a political refugee and is 
seeking asylum in another. 
 
Dadaab Refugee Camp: The world‘s biggest refugee camp, hosting the largest Somali 
population outside Somalia. Dadaab in North Eastern Kenya is a group of five 
settlements that have been home to refugees since 1991 and comprise of Hagadera, 
Dagahaley, Ifo I, Ifo II and Kambios. A ‗camp‘ is a temporary shelter in accommodation 
comprising huts, tents, or other structures. It denotes a planned and organized area for 
displaced persons to seek protection and where they will be provided with access to 
essential services such as food, water, health care and sometimes education.  
 
1.11 Structure of the dissertation. 
The themes of this dissertation are divided into the following chapters. 
Chapter one provides an introduction to the study, the problem statement, hypothesis, 
objectives, theoretical framework and the rationale and motivation behind the study. The 
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contribution of the study to knowledge, a reflection upon the research methodology 
selected, the scope and limitations of the study and a definition of key terms as used in 
the study are provided. This provides the parameters and scope of the study, keeping it 
focused and concise. 
 
Chapter two provides a comprehensive review of the literature onthe research topic. This 
chapter places the study in the repatriation debate highlighting the current gaps in 
knowledge and the areas to which the study contributes. In this chapter, I trace Kenya‘s 
relationship with Somalia and why it is characterized by suspicion and mistrust. The 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol is also analyzed in detail and I suggest a review of the 
these in line with emerging refugee challenges. I argue that refugees are key players in 
refugee matters and as such need more attention from researchers. As it is at the moment, 
the crucial role of refugees seems to have been usurped by various stakeholders in the 
refugee sector, and this ought to change. I claim that refugees are used as scapegoats by 
host states when faced with various political, economic and social challenges. 
Chapter three provides an exploration of the perceptions of the governments of Kenya 
and Somalia, the UNHCR and refugees on the safety of Somalia as a pre-requisite for 
repatriation. I argue that refugees will only accept voluntarily repatriation once they 
perceive that it is safe to do so. Since the idea of ‗safety‘ is relative, I conclude that it is 
neither possible to objectively declare Somalia as ‗safe‘ nor ‗unsafe‘. Various refugee 
stakeholders have declared Somalia un(safe), depending on their perceived indicators 
39 
 
and underlying interests. The Government of Kenya for instance is likely to advance the 
narrative that Somalia is safe for return as it serves its interest of wanting Somali refugees 
out of the Kenya. 
 
Chapter four explains and analyzes the roles and responsibilities of the Kenya-Somalia-
UNHCR (tripartite parties) in ensuring successful voluntary repatriation of Somali 
refugees and in promoting stability and security in the region. Since the stability of 
Somalia affects that of the entire Horn of Africa and East Africa, players in the Tripartite 
Agreement need to meticulously discharge their mandate while undertaking the 
repatriation process to avert further crises. In this regard, I conclude that all stakeholders 
need to actively be engaged in repatriation decision-making process so as to produce a 
sustainable solution. Refugees, especially, need to own the process and should be treated 
as such. I further claim that there is a big difference between the theory of the TA and its 
practice. 
Chapter five critically evaluates the challenges associated with the tripartite voluntary 
repatriation agreement for Somali refugees with a view to promote refugee-centered 
initiatives, inclusivity and participation in decision making. As the study asserts, refugees 
have been relegated to the periphery, yet repatriation is all about refugees. This needs to 
change. I conclude that unless refugees are actively involved in decision making 
regarding repatriation, the process will not be sustainable and in the long run may even 
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cause further refugee crises. Failure to include refugees in decision making delegitimizes 
it among refugees. 
 
Chapter six extrapolates, to the African continent, the possibility of a refugee-centered 
approach to repatriation. While refugee situations are unique and dynamic across the 
African continent, a refugee centered approach will safeguard against such dynamics and 
provide acceptable solutions, especially to the refugees. I conclude that there is a need to 
support refugee initiatives on repatriation as this will form a good basis for ‗home-grown‘ 
solutions. Refugee initiatives minimize resistances from host states, home countries and 
even UNHCR as it creates common ground on refugee solutions. I suggest that the key 
focus should shift from that of refugee plight to that of addressing the reason for their 
flight. 
In Chapter Seven the findings of each chapter are brought together into a conclusion. In 
a summary, all decisions, prior, during, and after repatriation should focus on the refugee 
interests as the centerpiece of such decision process(es).Recommendations are made, 
based on the study findings. There need be a closer working relationship between the 
Governments of Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR to avoid what appears to be ‗reading 
from different scripts‘. Refugees ought to be actively involved in the process of decision 
making regarding repatriation to encourage a sense of ownership and belonging and to 
avoid possible resistance. Despite the dynamic interests of different refugee actors, a 
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common ground can be reached based on common interests which will facilitate refugee 
based solutions. 
In the next chapter, chapter two, I examine existing literature on there fugee crisis in 
Kenya, Africa and selected cases globally. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter I explore literature about Somali refugees, Somalia and the UNHCR. To 
contextualize the subject of repatriation, I trace the developments in Dadaab refugee 
camps since its inception in 1991.The relationship between Kenya and Somalia is also 
reviewed in detail. Further, the UN 1951Convention regime is also examined together 
with the subsequent protocols of 1967 that sought to expand its mandate. The 
Organization of African Unity Convention, Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa of 1969 is also explored. Security challenges associated with hosting 
refugees are further discussed. The study establishes that often times refugees are 
relegated to the periphery in matters affecting them including repatriation. It is also 
established that most available literature regarding refugees are by humanitarian 
organizations and calls for academic research is suggested. 
 
2.0 Definition of refugee and historical background. 
According to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees:  
A refugee is any person ‗who, owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of the country85. 
 
 
                                                          
85 The 1951 UN Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, 28 July 1958,United Nations Treaty, Vol. 189 No. 
2545,p. 137. 
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While this may have been a suitable definition in 1951, this definition was later to be 
revised by various regional instruments to suit their various emerging circumstances. For 
example, the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, a 
regional instrument adopted by the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) in 1969, expands 
the UN definition to include people fleeing external aggression, internal civil strife, or 
events seriously disturbing public order in African countries86.  
 
Regionally, this framework accepted the definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
expanded it to include those compelled to leave their country owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order. 
At the time of adoption, the concern of the African states was in regard to refugees from 
territories that were still under colonial rule or occupation.87 The African Union‘s 
definition also recognizes non-state groups as perpetrators of persecution, and does not 
demand that a refugee shows a direct link between herself or himself and the future 
danger. It is sufficient that the refugee considers the harm sufficient to force her/him to 
abandon their home. 
 
Some scholars view the refugee definition as envisaged by the 1951 UN Convention 
above as limited as it overlooked other reasons that may necessitate forced migration, like 
                                                          
86The Organization of African Unity Convention, Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10th 
September 1969, OAU Document CM/267/ Rev.1. 
87Okoth-Obbo, G. (2001). Thirty years on: A legal review of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1 
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social and economic rights abuses. For example, as Hyndman88notes, it was intended to 
apply primarily to refugees in post WWII Europe. Significantly, the 1951 Convention had 
minimized social and economic reasons for flight in determining the definition of a 
refugee, factors that may be more relevant in refugee-producing countries today than 
they were in post-war Europe. In Africa for example, drought and famine may cause the 
mass exodus of ‗economic‖ refugees. This happened in the 2011/2012 famine that forced 
150,000 Somali refugees to cross the border into Kenya and became refugees in Dadaab.89 
 
Indeed, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between a political and an economic 
refugee since the dangers inherent in Africa means that economic rights are frequently 
violated which puts people in danger. In Africa, political power is often used as a means 
of accumulating wealth. Those not in power are frequently marginalized, and their 
economic livelihoods90 ruined, leading to economic refugees. 
 
The 1951 Convention Relating to status of refugee does not recognize economic or social 
refugees as it limits its definition of refugee to one fearing political persecution91. 
                                                          
88J. Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism, Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000.p.8 
89Refugee Consortium of Kenya(RCK), Asylum Under Threat – Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in 
Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration corridor, Nairobi, RCK with the support of Danish Refugee 
Council 2012,.p.7 
90N. Cheeseman, ‗Re-evaluating multiparty politics in Africa on International Democracy Day‘, Daily 
Nation, 17 September 2017. Available www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Re-evaluating-multiparty-politics--
in-Africa-/440808-4098662-11175gn/index.html(accessed 29 November 2017) 
91The 1951 UN Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, 28 July 1958,United Nations Treaty, Vol. 189 No. 
2545,p. 137 
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Attempts by developing countries to push for inclusion of socio-economic rights into a 
UN charter at the Bandung92 conference came under stiff resistance by the states in the 
industrialized developed world. That notwithstanding, refugees should however be 
treated as such regardless of the reasons of the flight. The complexities of this are now 
seen in the way in which the rights regime is practiced, rather than theorized. 
 
Political and economic exclusion in the global arena, too, is not a novel idea. Africa, for 
instance, has in the recent past been pushing for an African representation93 in the 
coveted 5 member United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with veto powers. Citing 
exclusion on security matters, Africa is seeking to have a bigger say in determining 
security issues globally. 
 
Under the international refugee law, one is only recognized as a refugee after entering 
another country. People fleeing internal or external aggression, but still within their 
national borders, are, on the other hand, referred to as Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs). 
                                                          
92 The Bandung conference was the first large scale Afro-Asian conference which took place on April 18-24, 
1955 in Bandung in Indonesia. The conference aimed at promoting economic and cultural cooperation and 
to oppose colonialism or neocolonialism by any nation. Further details on, ‘Final Communique of the 
Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955)‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of 
Indonesia (Ed.) Asia-Africa speak from BandungJakarta, 1955, pp.161-169. 
93United Nations, ‗African Representation, future of veto power, inter-governmental process figure 
prominently in General Assembly Annual Debate on Security Council Reform‘, GA/11715 30 October 2015, 
General Assembly plenary, seventieth session,43rd&44th (AM &PM) 
Availablewww.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11715.doc.html(accessed 29 November 2017). See also G. Phiri, 
‗African Nations push for permanent UNSC seat‘, Aljazeera, 26 September 2013. Available 
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/09/african-nations-push-for-permanent-unsc-seat-
2013924133231925482.html 
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The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was focused on 
millions of refugees, who, at the time, had been displaced by the Second World War that 
had ravaged Europe between 1939 and 1945.Many countries at the time sympathized and 
empathized with the refugees hence many got a warm reception in their countries of 
refuge. Though refugees were received well in their countries of asylum in the late 1940‘s 
and early 1950‘s, this willingness was short-lived and it soon faded away with prolonged 
stays94. Host countries have become reluctant to welcome refugees because of the fear 
that the refugees are no longer seen as a short-term challenge, as was earlier thought in 
the 1940‘s during the Second World War. The unquestionable assumption in the 1940‘s 
was that refugees were in their host countries temporarily and that they would go back to 
their home countries as soon as the Second World War ended.95 As a result they received 
immense sympathy. For instance, when Palestinian refugees began flooding into their 
neighbouring Arab states as of spring of 1948 they received a warm welcome. 
 
 The prolonged refugee stay however put undue strain on already fragile economies and 
attitudes in the host countries began to shift96. In Africa, the earlier responses by African 
countries to the plight of refugees were characterized by immense sympathy and warm 
                                                          
94O. El-Abed, Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948. Ontario: Co-Published by Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, Washington DC and International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2009, p.170.This is 
example of Palestinian refugees in Egypt. 
95O. El-Abed, Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948. Ontario: Co-Published by Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, Washington DC and International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2009),170. 
96O. El-Abed, Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948. Ontario: Co-Published by Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, Washington DC and International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2009, p.170. 
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welcome97.As refugee situations became more protracted in nature, host states became 
reluctant to host refugees as the problem was seen as long-term and hence complex. 
Today, more than 7.2 million98 refugees are trapped in protracted refugee situations. 
Some, like Milner and Loescher99even argue that the average length of a refugee or IDP‘s 
displacement is now approaching 20 years. 
 
Hathaway attributes the shift in policy as occasioned by the changing context from that 
which it was initially contemplated in the mid 20th century. The convergence of interests 
that motivated the assimilation of refugees in host countries has largely withered away 
with time100. In Africa, the period beginning in the late 1980s and culminating in the 
1990s, was marked by a shift in refugee policies, with less incentive on the part of states to 
receive refugees, sometimes rejecting them at the frontier, forcibly returning them or 
refusing to offer meaningful protection to those who manage to enter their territory101. 
From this policy shift, refugees are no longer welcomed nor celebrated. Writing on 
foreigners (refugees or economic migrants) in South Africa, for example, Landau argues 
that, ‗…non-South Africans ─ makwerekwere102in local vernacular ─ serve a dual purpose. 
                                                          
97P. Kirui, & J. Mwaruvie, ‗ The dilemma of hosting refugees: A focus on the insecurity in north-eastern 
Kenya‘, International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol.3,no.8, p.163.. 
98UNHCR, Sixty Years and Still Counting: Global Trends 2010. http://www.unhcr. 
org/4dfa11499.pdf.2011.p3 
99J. Milner, and G. Loescher, Responding to protracted refugee situations: Lessons from a decade of discussion. 
RSC Policy Briefing Paper No.8.2011.p.3. 
100 J. Hathaway, ‗Temporary Protection of Refugees: Threat or Solution‘, in Handmaker, J. et al (eds.) 
Perspectives on Refugee Protection in South Africa. Pretoria: Lawyers for Human Rights, 2001.pp41-49. 
101 J. Hathaway, J. ‗Temporary Protection of Refugees: Threat or Solution‘, in Handmaker, J. et al (eds.) 
Perspectives on Refugee Protection in South Africa. Pretoria: Lawyers for Human Rights, 2001.pp41-49. 
102Makwerekwere translates to ‗other other‘. 
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First, as scapegoats, they help preserve the post-apartheid project‘s legitimacy by 
providing a convenient explanation for widespread crime, disease and 
unemployment103‘. Negative attitude of South Africans in Johannesburg towards 
foreigners is replicated in almost all parts of the world where refugees and migrants are 
no longer celebrated. 
 
2.1 Implications of the historical relationship between Somalia and Kenya. 
 
Historically, Kenya has had antagonistic relationship with Somalia long before Somali 
refugees sought asylum in Kenya in 1991.  
 
The Republic  of  Somalia  is  itself  a  union  of  the  former British and  
Italian Somalilands which emerged  into sovereign statehood as one state in  
1960.  Since then, the  basis  of  Somalia's  foreign  policy  has  been  the  
―liberation‖  and unification  of  the  Somali-inhabited  territories.  In  the  
early  1960s,  Somalia indicated  that  she was ready  to  join the  East  
African  Federation  (which  had been proposed by Tanzania, Uganda and 
Kenya) but only when  the Somali question in  Kenya had  been 
satisfactorily  solved104 
 
 
                                                          
103 L. Landau, ‗Transplants and Transients: Idioms of Belonging and Dislocation in Inner-City 
Johannesburg‘, African Studies Review, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2006, p.127. 
104S. Makinda, ‗Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa‘, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
1982, p.97. Somalia's foreign policy has been focused upon the ‗liberation‘ and unification of the Somali-
inhabited territories, especially in Kenya and Ethiopia. Though unsuccessful, their liberation military 
campaign in Kenya started in 1963 and ended in 1967. Their claim in Kenya is over the former North-
Eastern Province currently comprised of Garrisa, Wajir and Mandera, counties that are occupied by 
Somalis. 
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According to the Somali leaders at the time, since colonial  divisions  of  Africa are  an 
archaic  legacy  which has  little  relevance  for  modern  African  nationalism,  the  
Somalis  cannot  be considered  fully  independent  ‗until  that  legacy  is  eradicated  and  
all  Somalis  are united  under  a single  political  jurisdiction‘105. At the 1963 Pan African 
summit the Somalis maintained that all Somali people were, 
…members of a single Somali nation. Somali is our language, spoken from 
the Gulf of Aden to the Northern Frontier District [of Kenya]. Islam is our 
culture, pastoralism our way of life. We want to reunite with our brothers 
with whom we can evolve an administration suited to our way of life106 
 
Somalis  in  Kenya had earlier indicated in a  1962  British-supervised  referendum107,  
that they  wanted to  join  Somalia  when  Kenya gained  independence  in  1963.When 
Somalia obtained independence in 1960, ahead of Kenya, it supported a political party, 
the Northern Province Peoples‘ Progressive Party, which campaigned for a greater 
Somalia that would unify the ethnic-Somali population in all the countries that neighbor 
Somalia.108 Using this argument, Somalia maintains that the Somalis in Kenya and 
                                                          
105J. Boyd, ‗African boundary conflict: An empirical study‘, African Studies Review, vol.22.no.3. 1979.p2 
106 A. Ajala, Pan Africanism, New York, St. Martins, 1974,p.150 
107 The referendum was to ascertain and report public opinion in the Northern Frontier District (NFD), later 
called the Northeastern Province (NEP) regarding the wish to break away from Kenya. According to the 
report by the then Secretary of State for colonies Duncan Sandys,87% voted to secede while the rest said 
‗no‘. This was not implemented and NFD/NEP, occupied by ethnic Somalis, remained a Kenyan territory. 
See ‗We wanted to have our way as minority, says pre-secessionist‘, The Standard, 6 November 2010. 
Available www.standardmedia.co.ke/mobile/article/2000021832/we-wanted-to-have-our-way-as-
minority-says-pre-seccesionist[Accesssed 30 November 2017) 
108‗War with Somalia ‗started way before independence‘ reveals Karangi‘, Daily Nation, Sunday 16th,2015 
p.17 
The Sunday Nation was reporting on a presentation by the retired Chief of Kenya Defense Forces, Major 
retired .Julius Karangi. 
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Ethiopia have not exercised their right to self-determination as advocated for by the 
United Nations109. 
 
As expected, Kenya refused Somalia‘s claim over the Northern Frontier District (NFD110) 
and declared that it was ready to defend her territory militarily. When Kenya turned 
down  Somali  demands, Somalia  encouraged and helped the  Somalis in  Kenya to  fight  
for the  right  to  secede  between 1963  and 1967111.  That war came to  an  end  when  the  
leaders  of  Kenya  and Somalia  met in  Arusha, Tanzania,  in  October  1967  under  the  
chairmanship  of  Zambian  president Kenneth Kaunda and signed  a Memorandum of  
Understanding112. That memorandum, inter alia,  called  for  the  normalization  of  
relations  between  the  two countries, the ending of hostile propaganda and emergency  
regulations, and the appointment  of  a  Working  Committee  of  Kenya,  Somalia  and  
Zambia  to implement the  agreement113That did  not,  however,  mean an  end  to  the  
Somali  problem in  Kenya. For example, early  in  1981,  a Somali  irredentist  movement 
                                                          
109S. Makinda, ‗Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa‘, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
1982,p.97 
110 Northern Frontier District (NFD) was the name used to refer to the NorthEastern part of Kenya 
especially in the colonial period. It is occupied by ethnic Somalis. Under the constitution of Kenya 2010, it 
comprises Garissa, Wajir, Isiolo, Marsabit and Mandera counties. Prior to and during the early years of 
independence (for Somalia and Kenya), the NFD expressed interest to unite with the Somali nation to form 
a greater Somalia. This was denied by independent Kenya and marked a series of guerilla wars between 
Kenya‘s security forces and secessionist groupings supported by Mogadishu. 
See S. Cheboi, ‗welcome to Garissa, eastern and central Africa‘s safest town‘, Special report, Daily Nation, 
Tuesday June 15, 2010.p19. 
111 This war is also called the Shifta War. Shifta is a Somali word meaning ‗insurgents‘. 
112‗Arusha Agreement on Ending of Kenya-Somali Border Hostilities, Somali-Ethiopian Agreement‘, 
Keesing‘s Record of World Events (Formerly Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives) vol.13, November 1967.p. 
22386. 
113S. Makinda, ‗Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa‘, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
1982,p.97 
The Working Committee  of  Kenya was to implement the Memorandum of understanding 
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calling itself the NFD  Liberation Front114  toured  several  Arab  states  soliciting  for  
arms  and  money  and  later announced that it was determined  to  ―liberate‖ about 
200,000  Somalis in  Kenya.115 
 
The current Somali refugee crisis in Kenya can be traced to the overthrow116 of Somalia‘s 
president Siad Barre117 by forces led by Mohamed Farah Aidid118 in January 1991. 
Following the coup, Somalia was left without a central government and fighting among 
clan factions that followed soon after made Somalia a failed state as it slowly descended 
into a civil war. Attempts by the USA to intervene in the civil war failed in 1993 leading 
to the infamous Black Hawk Down119 in Mogadishu where dozens of USA special forces 
were killed after failing to capture Mohamed Farah Aidid120.   
                                                          
114NFD Liberation Front, as the name suggests, was formed in 1980-1981 to purportedly ‗liberate about200, 
000 Somalis in Kenya‘. The group sought to advance secessionist ideology in NFD hoping to‗re-unite‘ it 
with the greater Somalia. This was reported in Kenyan papers in May 1981.  See, for instance, The Weekly 
Review (Nairobi) 8May, 1981.See also Rono Jona, ‗Kenya Foreign Policy‘, Africa Foreign Policies Stephen 
Wright (ed.) (Colorado: Westview Press,1999), 10 
 
115 This was reported in Kenyan papers in May 1981.  See, for instance, The Weekly Review (Nairobi) 8May, 
1981.See also Rono Jona, ‗Kenya Foreign Policy‘ Africa Foreign Policies Stephen Wright (ed.) (Colorado: 
Westview Press,1999), 10 
116S. Beswick, ‗If You Leave Your Country You Have No Life!‘ Rape, Suicide, and Violence: The Voices of 
Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese Female Refugees in Kenyan Refugee Camps‘, Northeast African Studies, 
New Series, Vol. 8, No. 3, Special Issue: Women in the Horn of Africa: Oral Histories, Migrations, and 
Military and Civil Conflict, 2001, p.77. Since the January 1991 overthrow of the dictatorial regime of 
Mohammed Siad Barre by forces led by Farah Aidid, the country has been without any effective central 
government or formal economy. 
117Siad Barre was overthrown in January 1991 and died while in exile in Lagos, Nigeria on January 2, 1995, 
reportedly of a heart attack. 
118 Mohamed Farah Aidid was a Somali Military commander and political leader. He was the chairman of 
United Somali Congress (USC) and later led the Somali National Alliance (SNA).He declared himself 
president of Somalia in June 1995 although his declaration did not receive international recognition. Aidid 
died on 2 August 1996 after succumbing to injuries inflicted on the battlefield a week earlier. 
119 Black Hawk Down refers to the Battle of Mogadishu between USA Special forces and militia allied to 
Mohamed Farah Aidid, on October 3 1993, after a failed attempt to capture him in Mogadishu. It is reported 
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During the colonial era, when  Italy and Great  Britain occupied the region and  most  
clans  shunned  Western  education, one  Somali  clan group, the Mejerteen121,  became  
the  most  highly educated. Thus, in  modern  times many  Mejerteen  served  as  
bureaucrats  in the  Siad  Barre regime and,  hence,  became among the  wealthiest  of 
Somalis, but  also highly  unpopular122. The unpopularity of the Mejerteen clan led by 
Siad Barre created a conducive environment for the coup that overthrew him in January 
1991. Consequently, thousands of Somalis crossed to Kenya to seek asylum leading to the 
establishment of Dadaab refugee camp in 1991. 
 
Two decades later, little has changed. A refugee complex designed for 90,000 inhabitants 
in 1992 is now bursting at the seams. By May 2013, the official number of registered 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
that 19 USA Special forces and about 1000 Somali militia and civilians were killed. Since then, the USA 
withdrew from direct combat in Somalia and has largely resorted to ‗technical assistance‘ in support of the 
struggling Somalia government after decades of being a failed state. Mark Bowden later wrote a book titled 
Black Hawk Down based on investigative research on the battle. 
120 Mohamed Farah Aidid and his senior commanders were being sought after for attacking humanitarian 
and UN staff working in Somalia. He was also accused of attacking Unified Task Force(UNITAF), a USA-
led United Nations sanctioned multinational force, which operated in Somalia between 5December 1992-
4May 1993.UNITAF was to create a protected environment to facilitate humanitarian operations in 
Southern Somalia.Seewww.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm(accessed 1 December 2017). 
121 One of the clans in Somalia that had embraced education and became wealthy but unpopular. Siad Barre 
belonged to this clan. See S. Beswick, ‗If You Leave Your Country You Have No Life!‘ Rape, Suicide, and 
Violence: The Voices of Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese Female Refugees in Kenyan Refugee Camps‘, 
Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 8, No. 3, Special Issue: Women in the Horn of Africa: Oral 
Histories, Migrations, and Military and Civil Conflict, 2001, p.77 
122S. Beswick, ‗If You Leave Your Country You Have No Life!‘ Rape, Suicide, and Violence: The Voices of 
Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese Female Refugees in Kenyan Refugee Camps‘, Northeast African Studies, 
New Series, Vol. 8, No. 3, Special Issue: Women in the Horn of Africa: Oral Histories, Migrations, and 
Military and Civil Conflict, 2001, p.77 
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refugees in Dadaab was 425,238123 with 51% of them being women, living on land with an 
official capacity of 190,000 people. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs  (OCHA) in its March 2013 report 
places the number of refugees in Kenya at 474,483124 .The 2011/2012 famine caused the 
latest exodus –a crisis which estimates suggest killed up to 260,000 Somalis, and forced 
150,000 across the Kenyan border.125 
 
2.2 Security challenges in Dadaab refugee camp 
 
While the Government of Kenya has often perceived the presence of Somali refugees in 
Kenya as posing a serious security threat to Kenya, the refugees too have suffered 
immense abuse as a result of their stay in the refugee camps in Kenya. The plight of 
Somali refugees in Kenya and the challenges of living in designated refugee camps with a 
limited freedom cannot be overemphasized. Jeff Crisp, Stephanie Beswick and Peter Kirui 
have extensively highlighted the problems of refugees while in Dadaab refugee camps 
especially regarding the physical security of refugees. Writing on ‗The Political Economy 
of Violence in Kenya‘s refugee camps‘, Jeff Crisp captures this scenario when he asserts 
that all forms of insecurity including sexual abuse and violence, armed robbery, domestic 
                                                          
123 UNHCR data as of May 2013. However it has been reported that at least 40,000 people or more are 
Kenyan Somalis who have opted to register as refugees in order to receive food rations. Interview with the 
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) representative in Dadaab. 13 September 2016. 
124Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs  (OCHA),  Eastern Africa: Displaced Populations 
Report, Issue no.14 (30 September 2012–31 March 2013) 
March 2013 
125 Asylum Under Threat – Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along 
the migration corridor, (2012) RCK with the support of DRC. 
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violence, among others, are rampant in Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps126.Stephanie 
Beswick, while describing religious intolerance  in the refugee camps cites a scenario 
where a wife of a Somali  family who had  converted  to Christianity was  beaten  and 
raped in  the  Ifo  section  of the camp127.As Evelyne Kiswii observes, the concentration of 
refugees along the  Kenyan  border  points  have  become  extremely  insecure  which  has  
been  caused  by  the mass movement  of  armed  immigrants assumed  to sneak  in  small  
arms that have had devastating consequences on Kenya‘s security128.She maintains that 
insecurity in  Kenya  has  been  on  the  rise  since refugees  started  streaming  in, in  large 
numbers.  This situation has caused a lot of concerns129 in the government  institutions 
mandated with handling security in Kenya. 
 
These realities paint a grim picture of the safety of refugees while in the refugee camps, 
portraying their prolonged stay in the camps as one of last resort and as a result of a lack 
of alternative. While Kenya complains of the insecurity associated with the hosting of 
thousands of Somali refugees, the refugees too are complaining of the unbearable 
physical insecurity conditions in the camps that seem to pose even more danger. The 
                                                          
126J. Crisp, ‗A State Of Insecurity: The Political Economy Of Violence In Kenya's Refugee Camps‘ vol.99, no. 
397, pp  601-632 
127S. Beswick, ‗If You Leave Your Country You Have No Life!‘Rape, Suicide, and Violence: The Voices of 
Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese Female Refugees in Kenyan Refugee Camps‘, Northeast African Studies, 
New Series, Vol. 8, No. 3, Special Issue: Women in the Horn of Africa: Oral Histories, Migrations, and 
Military and Civil Conflict, 2001, p.94. 
128E. Kiswii, ‗Refugee Influx and (In) security: Kenya‘s experience, 1991-2012‘, Master Thesis, University of 
Nairobi, 2013.p.5. 
129E. Kiswii, ‗Refugee Influx and (In)security: Kenya‘s experience, 1991-2012‘, Master Thesis, University of 
Nairobi, 2013.p.5. The concern, among others, was the fear that terrorist can camouflage as refugees to enter 
the country and cover their activities including recruiting from the refugee population. 
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violence and instability which prevail in many refugee-populated areas is worrying as it 
tends to legitimize the argument that refugees are a source of insecurity, and that it is 
therefore justifiable to repatriate them from their countries of asylum. 
 
It is therefore clear that the long-term stay of refugees in the restricted camps serves 
neither the interests of the host state nor the refugees. Hence the need to repatriate, re-
settle and/or integrate refugees is paramount, as a permanent solution to the refugee 
problem. It is against this background that calls for the repatriation of refugees having 
become more vocal and intense by the day. While the Government of Kenya is keen to 
repatriate refugees, it admits that Somalia‘s political and economic recovery, as well as 
the effectiveness of humanitarian programmes, would not be viable without first tackling 
the issue of security.130 
 
2.3 Somali refugees and Kenya’s national security 
 
In the case of Kenya, the burden of hosting Somali refugees seem to have weighed 
heaviest since 2011, the year that marked two decades of hosting Somali refugees who 
fled the war-ravaged Somalia after the ousting of President Siad Barre in 1991. The year 
2011 was not only the 20th anniversary of hosting Somali refugees in Kenya, but it also 
                                                          
130Presidential Press Service ‗Uhuru: security key to relocation of refugees‘ in The Sunday Nation ,7th May 
2013.This was part of President Uhuru Kenyatta‘s comments during The Somali Conference in London on 7 
May, 2013.Available at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Uhuru-Security-key-to-relocation-of-
refugees/1056-1845230-jkqs41/index.html[Accessed 7th May, 2018] 
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marked the beginning of a war between Kenya and Al Shabaab militants inside Somalia. 
Announcing the war on Al Shabaab, the Government of Kenya maintained that it was not 
at war with Somalia but were simply in hot pursuit of the militant group that had 
infiltrated across the Kenyan border.131 The Kenyan military engagement inside Somalia 
led to several reprisal attacks in Dadaab refugee camps, targeting Kenyan government 
security agents, namely the police and the military132. While it is difficult to identify the 
actual perpetrators of these attacks in the refugee camps, the government of Kenya 
maintained that Somali refugees were supporting armed militias within and outside 
Kenya and consequently started calls for refugees to repatriate to their home country. 
 
Even though Kenya would want Somali refugees repatriated as soon as possible, it has an 
international obligation in terms of the Somali refugees. Kenya is signatory to the 1951 
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol as well as to the 
1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in 
Africa.133This in essence means that Kenya is obliged to conform to the provisions of 
these refugee instruments, even as it seeks that the voluntary repatriation of Somali 
refugees be sooner rather than later. 
                                                          
131 Presidential Press Service ‗Kenya not at war with Somalia‘ Daily Nation Newspaper, Friday October 28, 
2011. p1. Available at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-not-at-war-with-Somalia/1056-1263672-
o8m60dz/index.html[Accessed 7th May, 2018] This were comments made by Kenya‘s then president Mwai 
Kibaki while attending a Commonwealth Heads of Government in Perth, Australia. Kenya declared war on 
militant group Al Shabaab on 16th October 2011. 
132‗Explosion kills Policeman in Dadaab Refugee camp‘ The Standard Newspaper, Monday, December 5th, 
2011.The militant group Al Shabaab have since mid-October 2011 used guerilla tactics to kill tens of police 
and military officers in Kenya especially in Northeastern and Coastal parts of Kenya. 
133Kenya ratified the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol in 1981 and the 1968 OAU Convention in 1972. 
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Kenya‘s claim that Somali refugees contribute to insecurity in Kenya seems to resonate 
with Crisp‘s assertion that Somali men and adolescents are sometimes obliged to leave 
the camps in Dadaab to fight134 on behalf of a particular clan or faction within their 
country of origin. This notwithstanding, various state and non-state actors have called on 
Kenya to avoid the general condemnation of Somali refugees as violent, but to seek to 
weed out criminal elements among the refugees in the Dadaab camps. Kenyan Somalis 
have also called on the Government of Kenya to stop the blanket condemnation of Somali 
refugees arguing that they have suffered from the stigma too. This is because according to 
Prestholdt, Muslims in Kenya (including Somali refugees) are unfairly targeted135by anti-
terrorism initiatives largely supported by the United States of America (USA).The 
Muslim community complains of victimization by security apparatus. According to 
Prestholdt, 
 
Most notably, the Kenyan government has pursued the domestic war on terrorism 
by means that are often heavy handed and ineffective. Instead of addressing the 
ease with which terrorists enter Kenya or the limitations of Kenya‘s intelligence 
apparatus, authorities have often articulated the problem of terrorism narrowly, as 
one nurtured by Kenya‘s Muslim minority.136 
 
 
                                                          
134J. Crisp, ‗A State Of Insecurity: The Political Economy Of Violence In Kenya's Refugee Camps‘ vol.99, no. 
397, p. 603 
135Muslims, especially of Arab descent, like the Somali, seem to have been victimized. This may have been 
informed by the wrong perception that Muslim Arabs were ‗likely‘ to be terrorists. The largely publicized 
photo of late leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, who was Arab, seem to have entrenched this negative 
perception. See alsoJ. Prestholdt, ‗ Kenya, the United States, and Counterterrorism‘, Africa Today, Vol. 57, 
No. 4, 2011.p.5 
136J. Prestholdt, ‗Kenya, the United States, and Counterterrorism‘, Africa Today, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2011.p.5 
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While a few armed refugees could be a threat to the stability of both the hosting and the 
home countries, the physical security of refugees themselves is also crucial. The fact that 
refugee protection and security lies in the hands of the host government brings the level 
of that protection into question, when the government that is expected to provide the 
protection is demanding that refugees should repatriate. The need to reconcile the 
interests of each side, in the best long term interests of the refugees and the host state is 
essential in order to avoid potential conflict. 
 
The perception of refugees as a political problem is not a novel phenomenon. Gil 
Loescher stresses the need to not only see refugees as a humanitarian problem but also as 
a political security problem. He argues that: 
 
Too often refugees are perceived as a matter for international charity organizations, 
and not as a political and security problem, yet refugee problems are in fact 
intensely political. The presence of refugees accelerates existing internal conflicts in 
the host countries. During the 1980s, for example, the proliferation of arms following 
the influx of three million Afghans contributed to a resurgence of Pathan conquest 
in Pakistan.  Elsewhere, Palestinian refugees upset delicate domestic balances in 
Lebanon and Jordan137. 
 
The presence of refugees in many third world host states is further compounded by 
armed groups of exiles actively engaged in warfare with political objectives. Loescher 
contends that refugee warriors invite military retaliation, complicate relations with other 
                                                          
137G. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper 268, London, Brassey‘s for IISS, 
1992, p14. 
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states and threaten the host states and the security of their citizens138. As a result, host 
countries have often been unwillingly drawn into conflicts with their neighbours. 
According to him, the dilemma for the African states, therefore, is a dilemma between a 
humanitarian concern for refugees, and a realization that refugees can be a source of 
tension between the African states. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention 
on refugees also recognized the political aspects of refugees (OAU, 1969). In addition, 
refugee flows present a challenge to one of the key principles of state sovereignty: the 
control of borders and of non-citizens in the country. According to Jacobsen, ‗the most 
serious of these problems is cross-border raids and the import of conflict from the 
sending country‘139. 
 
Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania are also stigmatized for being highly militarized 
and for harbouring rebel movements, including Centre for the Defence of Democracy 
(CNDD)140, Party of the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu)141, and Front for 
National Liberation (Frolina)142. This accusation is partly a result of a well waged 
                                                          
138 G. Loescher,  Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper 268, London, Brassey‘s for IISS, 
1992, p14. 
139 K, Jacobsen, ‗Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African State building‘, The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, vol.40, no.4, 2002, p. 586. 
140 CNDD: Centre for the Defense of Democracy, with its splinter group CNDD-FDD (Forces for the 
Defense of Democracy), W. Nindorera, The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The path from armed to political struggle, 
Berlin, Berghof Foundation, Transition Series No.10, 2012. 
141Palipehutu: Party of the Liberation of the Hutu People. It launched cross-border incursions against 
Burundi beginning in the 1980s.It recruited from refugee camps and settlements, and carried out active 
training and small scale cross-border attacks from the bush not far from their Tanzanian encampments. See 
www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad4c74.html (accessed 1 December 2017) 
142Frolina: Front for National Liberation. It launched cross-border incursions against Burundi beginning in 
the 1980s.It recruited from refugee camps and settlements, and carried out active training and small scale 
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propaganda campaign by the Buyoya Government in Burundi143.Tanzania‘s experience of 
the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire between 1994 and 1996, which included 
perpetrators of the genocide144 raised security concerns. 
 
Oroub El-Abed, argue that refugees can be of benefit145 to the host governments if they 
are allowed to work unhindered and become productive members of the society.She 
admits that most governments, however, have been reluctant to incorporate refugees in 
their national systems146. 
 
A good example in support of Oroub-El-Abed‘s argument is that of Palestinian refugees 
who have been integrated with Egyptian communities to such an extent that they are 
virtually undistinguishable from one another147. On the contrary, proponents of 
repatriation maintain that ‗to be rooted is perhaps the most important and least 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
cross-border attacks from the bush not far from their Tanzanian encampments. See also The AU and the 
Research for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi and Comoros, Centre for Human Dialogue, 2011. 
143Major Pierre Buyoya led a military coup d‘état in September 1987 against the second Republic of 
Burundi, lead by Jean-Babtiste Bagaza and installed himself as the first president of the Third Republic. 
Although he had proclaimed an agenda of liberalization and mending relations between Hutu and Tutsi, 
he presided over an oppressive regime consisting primarily of Tutsi people. Hutu people led uprising in 
1988 that claimed approximately 20,000 lives. After the assassination of president Melchior Ndadaye on 
October 1993(only 4 months after winning election), Buyoya intensified military campaigns against interim 
president  Ntibantunganya and toppled him in July 1996. 
144 When genocide occurred in Rwanda in 1994, nearly two million refugees fled into Eastern Zaire. Those 
refugees included the ex-Far and Interahamwe, and former Rwandan officials involved in the genocide. See 
also International Crisis Group Report, Nairobi, 25 November 1999, ‗Burundi Refugees in Tanzania: The 
Key Factor to the Burundi Peace Process‘. 
145Oroub El-Abed, Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948. Ontario: Co-Published by Institute for 
Palestinian Studies, Washington DC and International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2009, p.170. 
146O. El-Abed, Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948. Ontario: Co-Published by Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, Washington DC and International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2009, p.170. 
147 L. Brand, ‗Nassir‘s Egypt and the Re-emergence of the Palestinian National Movement‘, Journal of 
Palestinian Studies, vol.17, no. 2 , 1988, p.85. 
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recognized need of the human soul148‘.While this quotation may apply to integration, it is 
assumed that a sense of belonging seems to be more real and natural in repatriation as 
compared, relatively, to integration. Ignatieff also argues that, ‗belonging…is first and 
foremost protection from violence149‘. The Co-ordinator of the Mozambique Repatriation 
Operation observed, ‗…people have this strong, compelling urge to go home. The 
yearning to return is not reduced by the time they spend away150‘. 
 
It is clear therefore that while Oroub El-Abed‘s idea of integrating refugees into the host 
state is worthwhile, it works on the assumption that all refugees embrace integration to 
the host state which may not be the case. This was revealed by Rwandan and Burundian 
refugees in Tanzania, where some rejected the offer151. Because of the concept of ―home‖ 
and belonging, therefore, repatriation may be easily embraced by many refugees if 
prevailing circumstances in home countries allow for such repatriation. 
 
2.4 The theory and practice of the principle of non-refoulement in Africa. 
 
While the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees does not address the 
question of voluntary repatriation as such, it contains several provisions with significant 
                                                          
148Cited in L. Malkkil, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology among the Hutu Refugees in 
Tanzania. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992,p.24. 
149 M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging, Canada, Penguin, 1994,p. 6. 
150C. Dolan, ‗Repatriation from South Africa to Mozambique: Undermining Durable Solutions‘ InThe End of 
the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction. M. Walsh et. al (eds.) Oxford: Berghahn 
Books,1999,  p. 94. 
151  World Refugee Survey, 2008, p2. 
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relevance to UNHCR's respective statutory functions. There are two key principles. The 
first of these is the principle of non-refoulement. Article 33prohibits a state from expelling 
or returning (‗refouler‘) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 
where he or she would be exposed to persecution.152 The second principle is the well-
founded fear of persecution. Such fear, as defined in Article 1, is central to the refugee 
definition of the Convention. The fact that repatriation must be voluntary implies that the 
subjective fear should have ceased. Refugee status can cease, however, once meaningful 
national protection is re-established.153 
 
The principle of non-refoulement was meant to ensure that the refugee who is fleeing for 
fear of persecution is not exposed to such danger by being refused entry to a country of 
asylum or being forcefully repatriated. Unless the conditions that necessitated the forced 
migration change, the refugee should remain a person of concern to UNHCR, the refugee 
protection agency. 
 
Although non-refoulementis a key principle of the 1951 UN Convention, many historical 
examples in Africa seem to suggest otherwise. 
 
Contrary to a common conception, r e f o u l e m e n t in Africa is very 
                                                          
152 See Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
153Article I paragraph 4 of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa. The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
attempted to domesticate the global 1951 UN Convention to align it to the African realities. Also see The 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
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common: hundreds of refugees fleeing conflict in Sierra Leone were sent 
back by Guinea in 1999; Namibian authorities implemented a dusk-to-dawn 
curfew, with soldiers under orders to shoot violators all along a 450 km 
bank of the Kavango River in 2001. This last example prevented Angolan 
refugees escaping violence in Cuban Province from seeking asylum because 
government and UNITA patrols could be avoided safely only at night154. 
 
 
Elsewhere in the mid-1990‘s, both Tanzania and Zaire at times closed their borders to 
masses attempting to flee the conflict in Rwanda.155 To thwart the entry of refugees, states 
may sometimes erect direct barriers that serve as border closures. This was the case in 
South Africa during the apartheid era when the government of Pretoria erected a 3,000 
volt electrified razor wire fence to prevent the entry of Mozambican refugees.156Refugees 
who succeed in crossing a state border to asylum may still face ejection by officials, which 
can be a matter of formal policy and may be truly massive in scope. In July 1999, without 
court review, Zambia ordered the deportation of all nationals, including refugees, of the 
                                                          
154 These examples are cited in J. C. H a t h a w a y, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, 
Cambridge 2005, 280. 
155 See: Border closure triggers debate, Guardian, July 19, 1995. Besides, as some 50,000 refugees attempted 
to flee ethnic clashes either in Rwanda or in Burundi, the Government of Arusha officially closed its border 
with Burundi on March 31, 1995. At that time the Tanzanian Prime Minister told Parliament that: ‗[t]he 
gravity of the situation, especially for those coming from Burundi and Rwanda, has made it inevitable for 
Tanzania to take appropriate security measures by closing her border with Burundi and Rwanda.‘ Cited in 
H a t h a w a y, op. cit. note 29, 281. About Zaire, on August 19, 1994, Deputy Prime Minister Malumba M b 
a n g u l a declared that no more refugees would be allowed to cross from Rwanda into Zaire. Before this 
announcement, some 120 refugees per minute had been crossing into Zaire at the frontier post in Bukavu. 
See: Le départ des soldatsfrançais du Rwanda. Le Zaire fermesesfrontières aux réfugiés, Le Monde, August 
22, 1994: ‗La frontièreestferméedans le sens Rwanda-Zaire, et resteouvertedansl‘autresensafin de permettre 
aux réfugiés de regagnerleur pays.‘ 
156 C. N e t t l e t o n , Across the Fence of Fire, 78 Refugees (1990), 27-28. 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo because Zambia‘s national budget could not cover 
their assistance.157 
 
Intolerance of refugees among the host communities in the state of asylum may lead to 
non-state agents being used by state agents to either force the refugees to repatriate or to 
be denied entry at the frontier. Sometimes, non-state agents carry out ejection with the 
complicity or tolerance of national authorities, as in Kenya in the mid 1990s.158Sierra 
Leonean and Liberian refugees fled Guinea-Conakry in 2000 during a wave of 
xenophobic violence that was unleashed after the president of Guinea-Conakry 
encouraged citizens to form militia groups for the purpose of forcing refugees to be 
repatriated.159 
 
As Kenya and other countries hosting refugees continue to call for the repatriation of 
refugees, the principle on non-refoulement seems to be under threat. This is because, 
legally, asylum states can revoke international protection by activating a cessation clause. 
Article 1C (5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention allows states to cease to offer 
refugee status when a change in circumstances takes place in the country of origin that 
                                                          
157 Cited in H a t h a w a y , op. cit. note 29, 284. However, to highlight the importance of refugees for the 
Zambian economy, see news: Zambia: repatriation leads to decline in food production: ‗The repatriation of 
Angolan refugees is creating food shortages in and around the Zambian camps they have lived in for 
decades‘, 201 Jesuit Refugee Service Dispatches (28 September 2006).33 
158 F. D e l  M u n d o , The Future of Asylum in Africa, 96 Refugees (1994), 7: ‗There is resentment, for 
example, in Kenya, at the security problems the presence of Somali refugees has brought. Last year, Kenyan 
security forces pushed back over 1,000 refugees from a border camp, something unheard before in Africa.‘ 
159 D. F a r a h , For Refugees, Hazardous Haven in Guinea, Washington Post 24 (6 November 2000).  
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ends the fear of persecution causing flight.160State cessation of refugee status is termed 
‗mandated repatriation‘ although it is not well developed in international practice.161The 
UNHCR has set forth recommended criteria states can use for evaluating whether a 
fundamental change has occurred.162However, the UNHCR‘s interpretation of the 1951 
Refugee Convention obligations, while authoritative, is not binding on states.163As 
demonstrated above, the legal requirements states must satisfy to mandate repatriation 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention are not clear, and confusion exists at the intersection 
of voluntary and mandated repatriation. Since it is upon host states to determine whether 
to activate cessation clause or otherwise, the process is subject to abuse by host state 
depending on their interests. 
 
As demonstrated in the literature above, the principle of non-refoulement, is maintained 
primarily in theory rather than in practice. While non-refoulement is a well-articulated 
principle in the 1951 UN Convention and other national and regional instruments 
regarding refugees, its implementation seems to largely depend on the goodwill of 
                                                          
160 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C (5)–(6). 
161 See Susan Kneebone and Maria O‘Sullivan, Article 1 C 1951 Convention, in The 1951 Convention 
Relating To The Status Of Refugees And Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary 513 (Andreas Zimmermann ed., 
2011) (noting that ‗there is relatively little older jurisprudence on Art. 1 C, para. 5,‘ and much of the 
jurisprudence in existence concerns non-recognized refugees). 
162 See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1c(5)And 
(6)Of The 1951 Convention Relating To The Status Of Refugees,  10–12, U.N. Doc. Hcr/Gip/03/03 (Feb. 10, 
2003) [Hereinafter Guidelines On International Protection]. 
163 See J. Hathaway, The Right of States to Repatriate Former Refugees, 20 OHIO ST. J.ON DISP. RESOL. 
175, 204–06 (2005). While all states have the sovereign authority to allow any person they wish to remain on 
their territory and while it will often be humane and right to extend such generosity, this is not a matter 
fairly understood to be required by either the text or purposes of the refugee law. 
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individual states that host refugees and the prevailing circumstances and contexts in 
these states. 
 
2.5 Tripartite agreements on mass repatriation: problems and prospects 
 
According to the UNHCR, persons compelled to flee their country of origin principally to 
escape threats to their life, liberty, freedom or physical integrity must be able to call upon, 
and to receive, the protection and assistance of the international community. The purpose 
of international protection is not, however, that a refugee remains a refugee forever, but 
to ensure the individual receives renewed membership of a community and the 
restoration of national protection, either in the homeland or through integration 
elsewhere. Voluntary repatriation is usually viewed as the most desirable long-term 
solution by the refugees themselves as well as by the international community. UNHCR's 
humanitarian action in pursuit of lasting solutions to refugee problems is therefore 
oriented, first and foremost, in favour of enabling a refugee to exercise the right to return 
home in safety and with dignity164. 
 
While the refugee protection agency highlights the role of the international community 
and the refugee agency in repatriation, the principle seems to be more theoretical than 
practical. The picture on the ground may be different with refugees sometimes being 
                                                          
164 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on voluntary repatriation: International 
protection, Geneva, 1996. 
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reluctant to repatriate, claiming that the conditions back home may not be conducive for 
return. 
 
For example, despite UNHCR‘s efforts to promote the repatriation of Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan165, many refused to repatriate citing, inter alia, the inability of Taliban 
government of Afghanistan to offer them the required protection for them to be safe. As a 
result, by 2006, the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was about 2.5 million who 
were not ready to leave because of insecure life conditions, less working chances and 
many social problems in Afghanistan.  Thus, a large population was not  willing  to  leave 
Pakistan because the conditions166 in Afghanistan were not fully secure for peaceful life. 
This, therefore, implies that while the UNHCR felt that Afghanistan was safe for return, 
the refugees themselves, on the contrary, felt unsafe and insecure hence could not 
embrace the repatriation process as anticipated by the UNHCR.  
 
These contrary opinions held by the UNHCR and Afghan refugees raise the question as 
to whether the refugees were involved fully in the whole process of repatriation. As it 
appears, it is possible that refugees may refuse to repatriate not necessarily because it is 
                                                          
165 A. Alam, ‗Barriers to Repatriation of Afghan Refugees‘, International Journal of Academic Research in 
Business and Social Science, vol.2.no.3.p. 60. The first wave of Afghan refugees to Pakistan began during the 
Soviet War in the 1970‘s.Although many have returned to Afghanistan since 2002, UNHCR in 2017 reported 
that there are up to 1.3 million Afghans in Pakistan. 
166A. Bialczyk, ‗Voluntary Repatriation‘ and the Case of Afghanistan: A Critical Examination‘, Oxford, 
Refugees Studies Centre, Oxford University, Working Paper Series, 2008.The conditions in Afghanistan 
were harsh with rampant insecurity, poverty, unemployment etc. The Taliban government is also accused 
of being too weak to govern decisively. 
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unsafe to return, but because they felt they were excluded from the decision to return and 
hence have no control over, or do not own the process. The decision by many Afghan 
refugees not to return suggests that their aspirations may not have been captured during 
the decision making process. This implies that sustainable repatriation is only possible 
with the involvement of refugees. This involvement should go beyond that of ‗spectators‘ 
to being actually involved in the ‗game‘. 
 
After several Tripartite Agreements between the Afghanistan government(s), Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan and UNHCR regarding the voluntary repatriation of Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan, at the latest Tripartite Commission meeting signed on 11 March, 
2015 in Islamabad, Pakistan provided for a more active role for the refugees in the 
repatriation process. For instance, all the three parties of the Tripartite Agreement, inter 
alia: 
 
Underlined the importance of ensuring the inclusion of returnees into the 
new reform agenda of Afghanistan, its social policy and development 
processes at local, provincial and national sector levels: inter alia by 
facilitating their access to National Priority Programs, the National 
Solidarity Program, growth and job creation plans as well as by prioritizing 
community-based (bottom-up) investments benefiting both returnees and 
local communities in areas of return.167 
 
 
                                                          
167 Conclusions of the 25th Tripartite Commission Meeting held in Islamabad, Pakistan on 11th March 
2015.p.1 
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The protracted refugee crisis in Pakistan, where Afghan refugees have sought refuge in 
Pakistan for at least 30 years, has seen the tripartite parties go beyond just calling for 
voluntary repatriation, but ensuring that returnees are included in the reform agenda of 
Afghanistan in all levels and sectors. 
 
In the case of Burundi, many of the refugees from the previous 1972 caseload, especially 
those who had lost relatives, bitterly complained that they were duped by the 
international community into believing that it had been safe for them to return to 
Burundi.168 Unlike the Afghan refugees, the Burundian refugees seem to have been 
unaware of the state of unsafety and insecurity in Burundi before choosing to repatriate. 
This may have been occasioned by lack of information regarding their country of origin 
which led to the regrettable decision to repatriate. Such instances may lead to ‗recycled‘ 
refugees where refugees decide to go back to the refugee camps because of difficult 
circumstances at home. In another instance, following the first tripartite agreement of July 
24, 2003169, repatriation of some Rwandan refugees from Uganda took place. However, by 
August 2004, nearly 700 out of 2,000 repatriated refugees returned to Uganda citing 
persecution170 in Rwanda. These recycled refugees argued that they had been repatriated 
                                                          
168 International Crisis Group Report of 25 November 1999, ‗Burundi Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor 
to the Burundi Peace Process‘ p.3 
169 Tripartite Agreement signed between UNHCR, Government of Uganda and Rwanda on voluntary 
repatriation of up to 26000 Rwandan refugees in Uganda. 
170D. Williams, and Jesuit Refugee Service, ‗Is Rwanda Safe? An inquiry into the reluctance of Rwandan 
refugee community to repatriate‘, 16 August 2004, p.6 
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against their will due to push factors and threats171 from the Government of Uganda. 
These examples are indications of a glaring difference of opinion between the refugees 
and the tripartite signatories regarding the perception of safety and physical security at 
home. 
 
It is worth noting that no repatriation is facilitated by UNHCR without Tripartite 
Agreements of the concerned countries i.e. either the home country of the refugee, the 
first country of asylum or any other country of asylum. Repatriation is the most common 
form of permanent solution to refugee problems besides local integration and 
resettlement. Local integration largely depends on the compatibility of refugees with the 
host population and the willingness of the host state to integrate them. Many host states 
in Africa and beyond have not embraced local integration as it is perceived as too delicate 
and a factor that could complicate domestic political, economic and social systems. 
Resettlement on the other hand may be a better option to many refugees but only few 
refugees(less than 1%) of all refugees globally may benefit from being resettled in a third 
country. For instance, between 1999-2009some 810,000  refugees  were  resettled,  
compared  to  9.6  million  refugees  who  were  able  to repatriate.172 Considering that 
59.5 million people were forced to flee their homes by end of 2014, up from 51.2 million a 
                                                          
171 C. Karooma, ‗Reluctant to Return? The Primacy of Social Networks in the repatriation of Rwandan 
refugees in Uganda, Oxford, Refugees Studies Centre, Working Paper series no. 103, 2014. 
172 UNHCR, Global Trends, 2009. 
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year earlier173, repatriation remains the only most viable solution when dealing with such 
large populations. 
 
While repatriation to home countries is often regarded as the best and most practiced 
form of permanent solution to refugee settlement, the timing of this is mostly contested. 
The question of whether home is now safe and conducive for return is always debatable. 
This is made even more complex since many refugee states in Africa will always consider 
repatriation as a permanent settlement even when conditions that led to the flight have 
not yet changed. As far as Rutinwa is concerned: 
 
African States have become less committed to asylum. Instead of opening 
their doors to persons fearing harm in their own States, African countries 
now prefer refugees to receive protection in ‗safe zones‘ or similar areas 
within their countries of origin. African States now routinely reject refugees 
at the frontier or return them to their countries of origin even if the 
conditions from which they have fled still persist. Refugees who manage to 
enter and remain in host countries receive ‗pseudo-asylum‘. Their physical 
security, dignity and material safety are not guaranteed. As for solutions, 
African States are less inclined to grant local settlement or resettlement 
opportunities to refugees. What they seem to prefer is repatriation at the 
earliest opportunity, regardless of the situation in the countries of origin.174 
 
The questions, in terms of this dissertation, include: Is the timing right for the repatriation 
of Somali refugees to their home country Somalia? What are the indicators that this is 
indeed the right time? Are refugees willing and ready to repatriate back home? How will 
                                                          
173 UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014. 
174 B. Rutinwa, The End of Asylum? The Changing Nature of Refugee Policies in Africa, New Issues in Refugee 
Research, Research Paper No. 5, Geneva, UNHCR, May 1999, 2, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0c34.html (last visited 11 Aug. 2010). 
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Somalia, Kenya and the UNHCR ensure a successful repatriation? How were refugee 
perceptions (if at all they were gathered) incorporated into the Tripartite agreement? 
How can refugee centered approaches on repatriation be applied more broadly in Africa? 
Kenya has expressed fear regarding the long-term hosting of Somali refugees, with 
increasing calls for the exploration of available options towards permanent settlement of 
Somali refugees. 
 
Despite the rhetoric assuring refugees that Mogadishu is secure and the Government of 
Kenya being keen to rid Garissa of its inconvenient guests, Dadaab‘s refugees are still 
reluctant to leave. The reasons for this vary, but most still feel it is too unsafe to return175. 
Others feel there are more opportunities in Kenya, or simply hold no ties to their 
―homeland‖, having been born or raised in the camp176.It is interesting though, that both 
the refugees and the host state cite their security fears; for Kenya, the presence of refugees 
poses a security threat (especially because of the porous Kenya-Somalia border) while for 
many refugees one of the greatest impediments to repatriation is the fear and insecurity 
                                                          
175Abdallah, Interviewed by Peter Kirui, 27th September 2016,Dagahaley camp(Dadaab),A1. He rejected the 
thought that Somalia was safe for return, arguing that ‗More violence is experienced in Somalia, no clear 
information about the situation‘. Abdallah shares this views with thousands of refugees in Dadaab refugee 
camp 
176 Hussein, Interviewed by Peter Kirui, 27th September 2016, Dagahaley camp, C1.He asserted that he was 
not going to Somalia because, ‗I am among those who came in 1991 at a tender age. I do not have home to 
go back to‘. 
C. Kamau, &J. Fox , ‗The Dadaab Dilemma: a Study on Livelihood Activities and Opportunities for Dadaab 
Refugees‘ Itermedia Development Consultants Report of August 2013 commissioned by Danish Refugee 
Council (DRC) 
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inside Somalia177. Apart from security, many host states complain that refugees compete 
with locals for scarce resources such as land, jobs and environmental resources (e.g. 
water, rangeland or firewood), and overwhelm existing infrastructure such as schools, 
housing and health facilities. These concerns underpin the state's rationale for keeping 
refugees in camps, where they can be assisted and managed by international refugee 
agencies178. 
 
The quest for permanent settlement of refugees is indeed more pressing in Kenya than in 
any other country in Africa. According to the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR), as of mid 2013, UNHCR recorded Kenya as hosting the majority of 
refugees in the East and Horn of Africa region with 550,506 refugees. In the Southern 
African region, South Africa hosted the majority of refugees at 65,233. In Central Africa 
and the Great Lakes region, the Democratic Republic of Congo hosted the highest 
number at 183,244 while in the West African region; Liberia hosted the majority of 
refugees standing at 58,852179. 
 
The fact that Kenya hosts the highest number of refugees in Africa does not only justify 
the need for the proposed study but the urgency too of finding a lasting settlement 
                                                          
177Omar, Interviewed by Peter Kirui, 27th September 2016, Dagahaley camp, J1. Omar maintained that, 
‗Somalia is full of gang militia, no place for non combatants like me‘. 
178K. Jacobsen, ‗Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African State-building‘, The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 , 2002, p.580. 
179United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Global trends report 2012. Geneva, Switzerland: Division 
of Programme Support and Management, 2013. 
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solution for refugees in cases of protracted conflicts. Given that repatriation remains the 
optimum solution to refugee problems, especially when dealing with large numbers of 
refugees, there is evidently a need to better understand past repatriation experiences and 
the problems that have been generated by repatriation processes180. Although repatriation 
has been termed as the optimum solution when dealing with large numbers, other 
researchers note that ‗what is being promoted as the most desirable solution to refugee 
crises is poorly understood social and spatial phenomena‘.181 
 
 
2.6 Existing Gaps in the literature on effective repatriation. 
 
Perhaps Harrel-Bond is one of the first writers on repatriation to call for more research182 
regarding the most conducive circumstances for a successful repatriation. He notes that 
research is especially urgent to test the assumption which has been the basis for the 
policy of promoting repatriation183.According to him, in the  formulation  of this policy 
                                                          
180J. Rogge and J. Akol, ‗Repatriation: Its Role in Resolving Africa's Refugee Dilemma‘ 
 International Migration Review, Vol. 23, No. 2 , 1989 p. 190. 
181J. Bascom, ‗The Dynamics of Refugee Repatriation: The Case of Eritreans in Eastern Sudan‘, in W.T.S. 
Gould and A.M. Findlay (eds.) Population, Migration and the Changing World Order(New York: John Wiley 
and Sons,1994), p.226 See also Norwegian Government, Department of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs, 
Refugees and Repatriation: Our Current Knowledge on the Subject (Oslo, May 1994). 
The study states at p.5: ‗Even if repatriation has come more and more in focus, there is lack of conceptual 
and empirical knowledge about the issue, especially in regard to why the refugees return and which factors 
influence their decision‘ 
182B. Harrell-Bond, ‗Repatriation: Under What Conditions Is It The Most Desirable Solution For Refugees? 
An Agenda For Research‘, African Studies Review, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1989, p.42 
183B. Harrell-Bond, ‗Repatriation: Under what Conditions is it the most Desirable Solution for Refugees? An 
Agenda for Research‘, African Studies Review, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1989, p.42 
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there  is  little  evidence  to suggest  that refugees have first  been consulted,  either on an 
international or on a local level. Arrangements to ensure that, before making  a decision  
to repatriate,  refugees have  access  to  sources  of information concerning conditions  in 
their  home country (which they can  consider credible),  have been unsatisfactory. In 
some cases, this right has even been denied184. 
 
A more serious  obstacle  to the development of the study of forced migration  is  a 
disturbing  tendency for many  of those  who have begun to publish on refugee issues  to 
place an uncritical  reliance  on the  statements,  position  papers and  other  literature 
produced  by humanitarian agencies, despite the glaring absence  of findings from 
independent field  research  which are  needed  to substantiate185  them.  As a result, these 
have been incorporated into  academic writing and publications, and  researchers  have 
given them credibility rather than questioning or examining the assumptions and  articles  
of faith  that  dominate  the  refugee  regime. The dissertation will contribute in 
highlighting repatriation processes and actors in Dadaab refugee camp. The voices of 
individual refugees are comprehensively discussed to allow a bottom-up approach to the 
refugee situation in Dadaab. 
 
                                                          
184B. Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 
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185B. Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, 
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Perhaps the ideas of Harrel-Bond regarding the need to get views from individual 
refugees, UNHCR agency staff on the ground, local host community members and 
government officials manning the refugee camps could have been based on an 
assumption that there could be glaring differences of opinion between the situation in the 
refugee camps and the reports gathered by mainstream agencies purporting to represent 
refugees in those camps. More reliable information could be obtained through 
independent field research where information is obtained from refugee stakeholders on 
the ground. The repatriation debate, among other refugee issues, therefore, should not be 
left to states and other international bodies alone, but refugees and host communities, 
too, must be brought on board. This will ensure that the voices of the masses (refugees) 
are heard from among the elites (governments and international agencies) who, in most 
cases, make decisions on behalf of refugees. Refugees, in most cases, feel isolated in the 
Tripartite Agreements. Such feelings of isolation of refugees in the Tripartite Agreement 
were captured by one camp staff member at Kibondo in Tanzania: 
 
Refugees are still fearful of refoulement. The initiation of the organised repatriation 
program occurred simultaneously when rations to the camps were cut due to transport 
problems. This caused many refugees to think that the repatriation was forced. The 
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refugees have told the camp staff that they do not understand why they were not 
included   as participants in the Tripartite Agreement.186 
 
The challenges of implementing the tripartite repatriation agreements call for a more 
refugee-centered initiative on repatriation characterized by sincere participation, 
consultation and inclusion. The study endeavours to not only fill this gap and contribute 
to this missing body of knowledge but to also suggest a more refugee centered approach 
to repatriation even when tripartite agreements do not exist. 
 
Thus, a notable vacuum in the literature is the missing voice of refugees regarding their 
role in the tripartite agreements. Most tripartite agreements seem to be more reactive than 
proactive in having a more sustainable repatriation programme. Many protracted 
conflicts, for instance, lack a sustained programme of meaningful repatriation where the 
returnee is facilitated to integrate and participate in the daily process of rebuilding the 
nation. 
 
Because of the missing link in the active repatriation process centered on the refugees 
themselves, most of the so called voluntary repatriation could be premature repatriation 
                                                          
186 International Crisis Group Report of 25 November 1999, ‗Burundi Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor 
to the Burundi Peace Process‘, p.10 
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with devastating results. Barry Stein187 argues that premature repatriation comes when 
both the country of origin and the refugees are not ready for it, and the conditions at 
home have not changed sufficiently to pull the refugees home. In this case, neither the 
refugees nor their homeland are reconciled or ready for the return. Consequently, 
premature returnees are pushed188 out by threats, attack, and expulsion rather than 
pulled home by peace and safety. 
 
Besides the lack of refugee voices in the repatriation processes, literature challenging the 
refugee regimes are scarce. As this study suggests, it is time that focus shifted to 
reviewing the whole refugee regime that was drafted to address the post-World War II 
refugee crisis, then perceived as a temporary problem. The 21stCentury realities have 
changed as refugee situations continue to be more protracted and complex, and involving 
larger number of refugees. The fact that most literature seems to focus on the plight of 
refugees and not the reasons for their plight is also explored in the study. 
 
While many tripartite agreements provide for the physical security of refugees upon 
return, and their access to previous property that they owned,189 the ability of the state to 
actually enforce these provisions is often more of an assumption rather than a reality. 
                                                          
187 B. Stein, ‗Refugee Repatriation, Return and Refoulement during conflict‘, Promoting Democracy, Human 
Rights and Reintegration in Post-conflict Societies, USAID 1997, p.4. 
188 B. Stein, ‗Refugee Repatriation, Return and Refoulement during conflict‘, Promoting Democracy, Human 
Rights and Reintegration in Post-conflict Societies, USAID 1997, p.4. 
189 See clause 6 of the Tripartite Agreement on the voluntary repatriation of refugees from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo living in the United Republic of Tanzania signed on 20th January,2005. 
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Most post-conflict governments are normally too weak to enforce such rights and in most 
cases the returnees soon realize that their lives and property could be in danger, a 
situation similar to, or worse than what necessitated the flight in the first place. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of refugees as the blueprint of the global refugee regime. I have examined the 
limited scope of the 1951UN Convention and the subsequent 1967 protocol that expanded 
its mandate. The Organization of African Unity Convention, Governing Specific Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969 is also explored as an African domestication of the 
1951 UN Convention. I argue that the refugee regime is outdated and limited in scope as 
it overlooks other causes of refugees fleeing life-threatening circumstances, for instance 
social and economic exclusion. 
 
I also traced the antagonistic relationship between Kenya and Somalia that dates back to 
the early 1960‘s. Somalia‘s desire to have NFD/NEP unified with Somalia, and the 
subsequent resistance to this from Kenya is also examined. The current refugee crises in 
Dadaab brings to the fore the tense relationship between Kenya and Somalia that is 
particularly protracted given the porous vast border between the two countries. Kenya 
has often blamed Somali refugees in Kenya as supporting military groups from Somalia 
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in launching attacks in Kenya. These, however, remain allegations without substantial 
evidence being provided. 
 
The challenge of implementing the 1951 UN Convention principle of non-refoulement is 
also extensively discussed in this chapter. I conclude that the principle of non-refoulement 
remains theoretical, as in practice the UNHCR does not have the power to dictate to host 
states on matters of refugees on their soil. In terms of the challenges of mass repatriation 
through tripartite agreements, I maintain that many tripartite agreements are not as a 
result of intensive and extensive consultation with refugees, but are mostly determined 
by few policy makers. This top-down approach by refugee actors (host state, home 
country and UNHCR) is criticized. 
 
Finally, in this chapter, I discussed the existing gaps in the literature. Most reports on 
refugees are by humanitarian workers and organizations and not by independent 
academic researchers. Researchers may then utilize these sources to make claims. 
However, many reports do not capture individual refugee voices on repatriation but tend 
to rely on experts who are in charge of decision making, and remain top-down 
approaches.  
 
In the next chapter - chapter three - I look at the interests and perceptions of the 
governments of Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR regarding safety and security inside 
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Somalia. Perceptions of individual refugees are also examined. These perceptions are 
paramount as it forms the basis of the repatriation debate after the signing of the 
Tripartite Agreement. Although perceptions do not suggest generalization, their 
uniqueness helps us to see trends that may be useful in understanding the complex 
refugee phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INTERESTS AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF KENYA AND 
SOMALIA, UNHCR AND REFUGEES ON THE SAFETY OF SOMALIA 
3.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the interests and subsequent perceptions of the 
governments of Kenya and Somalia, the UNHCR and refugees on the safety of Somalia as 
a pre-requisite for repatriation. Because interests are varied and complex among actors, 
the divergence of these interests among refugees, UNHCR , GoK and Somalia helps us 
understand the complex nature of repatriation politics. The interests of actors discussed 
as established in the study are therefore not deterministic but fluid and dynamic. None of 
these can be said to be dominant over the others at any given time.   
While these perceptions may not portray the ‗actual‘ state of safety and security in 
Somalia, it is, nevertheless, informs decision-making of refugees as to whether to return 
or not. It is also worth noting that the perceptions of various parties are largely informed 
by their embedded interests so much so that the perceived ‗actual‘ safety or unsafety of 
Somalia, means very little as interests override perceptions. Perceptions also differ from 
one actor to another. 
Kenya, as host state, is interested in securing its borders even if that means pressurizing 
refugees to repatriate and regardless of security situation at home. Somalia on its part is 
concerned with the return of its citizens from exile when they are already grappling with 
lots of domestic problems, especially insecurity. The UNHCR as a refugee protection 
agency is interested in refugee welfare and dignity while in exile and may be less 
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concerned with the specifics of the security situation in the home country. Refugees on 
their part are concerned with their safety and dignity whether at home or in exile. These 
myriad embedded interests of various parties make repatriation a complex process. 
Interests are therefore important to understanding the perceived safety, or otherwise, as a 
precondition for repatriation. The interests of the Government of Kenya, Somalia, the 
UNHCR and refugees are largely going to inform their perceptions as a rationale to either 
justify repatriation or to criticize it. In any case, Somalia is a failed state and the larger 
portion is inaccessible. There is almost no government control to give room to any 
objective empirical finding on its state of safety and security or otherwise. Information of 
what really happens in Somalia is therefore scarce to the Government of Kenya, Somali 
Federal Government(SFG)the UNHCR and refugees and all have had to make their own 
judgments based on a number of activities that may capture the media headlines and 
from state and non-state actors who also have little and mostly unverifiable information. 
Consequently, parties interested in refugee repatriation have had to rely largely on their 
interests in their push for or against repatriation regardless of whether they think Somalia 
is safe(or not) to warrant such an action. 
Regarding positions of the Government of Kenya and SFG on refugees, it is worth noting 
that they are mainly influenced by what is popular with their citizens. For instance, 
because of the perception that Somali refugees are a burden and a threat to security, it is 
popular among Kenyans. Consequently, the Government of Kenya is likely to push for 
repatriation especially in an electioneering period to gain political mileage. This has made 
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the issue of Somali refugees as a security threat in Kenya become a key election issue.190 
On the other hand, while Somali citizens are interested in a stable and secure Somalia, 
some Somalia government officials, perhaps benefitting from the failed state, have been 
accused of blocking ‗efforts to revive an effective central government.‘191 
Before delving into the whole debate of the perception of safety and security in Somalia 
as a pre-requisite for repatriation, it may be necessary to, first, understand why most host 
states in the recent years prefer repatriation as solution to refugee problem as opposed to 
integration and resettlement. According to Chimni192, resettlement was the predominant 
solution after World War II and until 1985, when there was a shift towards repatriation as 
the preferred solution. This shift occurred after the Cold War, as Western countries began 
to promote repatriation when the number of asylum seekers arriving from the Global 
South increased and there was no longer a labour shortage or the same political motives 
to resettle refugees193. In Africa, this also shifted in the late 1980s and the 1990s when 
many African host states no longer supported local integration and began to more 
                                                          
190Amnesty International, No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced. AFR 52/001/2014. 
London: UK. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-home-2014.pdf 
[Accessed 20th April 2017] 
See also Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. Hasty repatriation: Kenya’s attempt to send Somali refugees 
home,Mogadishu,2013,p.3.Retrieved from //www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/HIPS_Hasty_Repatriation_ENGLISH.pdf[Accessed 20th April 2016] 
191K. Menkhaus,  ‗Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of 
Coping‘, International Security, vol.31, no.3, 2007,p.75. 
192B. Chimni,  ‗From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: Towards a critical history of durable solutions 
to refugee problems‘, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.23, no.1, 2004, pp.55-73 
193B. Chimni,  ‗From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: Towards a critical history of durable solutions 
to refugee problems‘, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.23, no.1, 2004, pp.55-73 
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strongly favour repatriation.194Calls for repatriation intensified when the number of 
refugees seeking asylum significantly increased.195. The previous ‗open door policy‘ many 
African states had towards refugees ceased to exist.196  Bradley describes the focus on 
repatriation as ‗a definitive change in the structure of the international refugee system‘197, 
motivated by the interests of host and donor states, as well as states of origin.198 
While there is no doubt that repatriation, as stated above, has become the most preferred 
solution by stakeholders, and especially the host state, some scholars have been critical of 
this shift towards repatriation and the subsequent impact of this on refugee protection.199 
Takahashi200 even cautions that repatriation has in fact taken priority over refugee 
protection. 
                                                          
194B. Rutinwa, ‗The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa‘, Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, vol.21, no.1, 2002, pp.12-41.  
195B. Rutinwa, ‗The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa‘, Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, vol.21, no.1, 2002, pp.12-41.  
196B. Rutinwa, ‗The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa‘, Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, vol.21, no.1, 2002, p.12. 
197M. Bradley, Refugee repatriation: Justice, responsibility and redress. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013, p.8. 
198B. Harrell-Bond, ‗Repatriation: Under what conditions is it the most desirable solution for refugees? An 
agenda for research‘, African Studies Review, vol.32, no.1, 1989, p.62. 
199K. Long, Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee 
repatriation, 2013,PDES/2013/14. Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation 
Service. 
B. Chimni, ‗From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: Towards a critical history of durable solutions to 
refugee problems‘, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.23, no.1, 2004, pp.55-73. 
B. Chimni, ‗The meaning of words and the role of UNHCR in voluntary repatriation‘, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, vol.5, no.3, 1993, pp. 442–460. 
S. Takahashi, ‗The UNHCR handbook on voluntary repatriation: The emphasis of return over protection‘,   
International Journal of Refugee Law, vol.9, no.4, 1997, pp.593-612. 
200S. Takahashi, ‗The UNHCR handbook on voluntary repatriation: The emphasis of return over protection‘,   
International Journal of Refugee Law, vol.9, no.4, 1997, pp.593-612. 
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Today, states in the Global South, Kenya included, which are the primary hosts for 
refugees globally, largely continue to restrict local integration. This is unlikely to change 
without increased donor support and burden sharing.201 Moreover, ‗affluent countries 
lack the incentive and domestic support necessary to resuscitate large-scale resettlement 
programmes‘202. Repatriation, the process by which a refugee returns to their country of 
origin, continues to be the most preferred and promoted solution in the international 
refugee regime.203As a result, repatriation is now considered crucial and the only realistic 
solution for the majority204 of refugees. This is largely due to the self-interests of key 
stakeholders including: states of origin, host and donor states, and the UNHCR. For the 
UNHCR to promote repatriation there are ‗essential preconditions‘ that have to be met. 
These include: improved conditions in the country of origin in order for refugees to 
return in ‗safety and dignity‘, ‗voluntariness‘ of return, guarantee or sufficient assurances 
                                                          
201M. Bradley, Refugee repatriation: Justice, responsibility and redress. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2013, p.8. 
202 To qualify, there is now a new European Agenda on Migration under review by the European 
Commission in order to improve the management of migration in Europe. One recommendation that the 
Commission adopted is for member states to resettle 20,000 people from outside the European Union over 
two years (EU) as identified by UNHCR, with financial support from the European Union (European 
Commission, 2015, May 27).See M. Bradley, Refugee repatriation: Justice, responsibility and redress. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.8. 
203 This dissertation will use the definition of refugee regime outlined by Scalettaris  as ‗the institutions, 
legal instruments and norms composing the institutional framework which regulates the management of 
refugees.‘ See G. Scalettaris, ‗Refugee Studies and the international refugee regime: a reflection on a 
desirable separation‘, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.26, no.3, 2007,p.49. 
204M. Bradley, Refugee repatriation: Justice, responsibility and redress. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2013, p.1. 
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by the country of origin for the safety of returning refugees, access by the UNHCR to 
refugees and returnees, and, finally, a formal agreement between the involved parties.205 
3.0.1 Refugees as a political problem to host states 
The idea of refugees being perceived as a security threat is not a novel idea in refugee 
situations. Gil Loescher and Ann Dull, for instance, stresses the need to not only see 
refugees as a humanitarian problem but also as a political problem particularly in terms 
of security. 
Too often refugees are perceived as a matter for international charity 
organizations, and not as a political and security problem yet refugee problems are 
in fact intensely political. The presence of refugees accelerates existing internal 
conflicts in the host countries. During the 1980‘s for example, the proliferation of 
arms following the influx of three million Afghans contributed to a resurgence of 
Pathan conquest in Pakistan. Elsewhere, Palestinian refugees upset delicate 
domestic balances in Lebanon and Jordan.206 
 
The idea by Gil Loescher and Ann Dull  that refugees should be seen not only as a 
humanitarian concern but more so as apolitical and security problem is supported by 
Myron Weiner who thinks that refugees may pose considerable political and security 
risks for host governments as they are a political force for their country of residence, and 
the way they react to the politics of host country, and their political relationship with the 
country of origin, have become important factors in influencing relations between the 
                                                          
205United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on voluntary repatriation: International 
protection, Geneva, UNHCR, 1996.para 3.1 
 
206 G. Loescher and A. Dull, The Global Refugee Crisis: a reference handbook, Santa Barbara, Calif,ABC-
CIIO,1994,p.7. 
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sending and receiving countries.207As a result host states, finds themselves in a dilemma 
between a humanitarian concern for refugees, and a realization that refugees can be a 
source of tension between locals and refugees and their respective African states.208. 
As argued by Weiner209 and Loescher210 above, refugees may pose considerable political 
and security risks to the country of residence. In Dadaab for instance, most refugees and 
Kenyan Somalis interviewed said security has deteriorated within the camps and its 
environs over the past few months. Many reported sporadic cases of rape, night-time 
raids, allegedly, by Kenyan security services and occasional killings. An atmosphere of 
fear is spreading through the camps as international aid agencies limit their activities 
significantly. The majority of refugees claimed that they don‘t trust the Kenyan security 
forces alleging that they are the main culprits of insecurity in the camps. The Kenyan 
police in the camp deny these allegations and instead blame ‗Al Shabaab sleeper cells and 
sympathizers‘ for the growing insecurity.211 While the Government of Kenya has not 
tabled concrete evidence to proof that Somali refugees could be contributing to the recent 
terror attacks in the country, Kenyan police officers operating in the camps continue to be 
                                                          
207 See M. Weiner, ‗Migration and Development in the Gulf‘, Population and Development Review, Vol.8. No. 
11, March 1982, pp.11 – 36.  
208T. Hovet, ‗Boundary disputes and tensions as a cause of refugees,‘ in Refugee South of the Sahara Hugh C. 
Brooks and Yassin El-ayouty(eds), Connecticut, Negro Universities Press,1970, p.29.  
209M. Weiner, ‗Migration and Development in the Gulf‘, Population and Development Review, Vol.8. no. 11, 
March 1982, pp.11 – 36. 
210G. Loescher, and A. Dull, The Global Refugee Crisis: a reference handbook, Santa Barbara, Calif,ABC-
CIIO,1994,p.7  
211Interview with Kenya police officials – Dadaab, August 2016(For anonymity police requested that dates 
of interview should not be captured because of the sensitivity of the matter) 
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targeted since December 2011 with Improvised Explosive Devices212 being reported 
across the camps making the Dadaab situation very complex. It is thought either the Al 
Shabaab213 or their sympathizers are involved in the planning and or execution of these 
attacks seen as largely reprisal for the invasion of Somalia by the KDF in mid-October214, 
2011. 
 
After seemingly shifting their attention from attacking the Kenyan police in the refugee 
camps, the terrorist element moved their battle to Nairobi, the capital city. Between 18 
November and 19 December 2012, there were five separate grenade attacks in Eastleigh, 
killing 16 people and injuring 42, including Kenyan-Somali MP Yusuf Hassan.215 The 
                                                          
212 Most attacks in the Dadaab refugee camps involve the use of IED‘s. For news of such cases see 
www.standardmedia.co.ke/mobile/?articleID=2000048578&story_title=Policeman%20dies,%two%20others
%20injured%20in%20Hagadera%20blast%20/business/; www.nation.co.ke/counties,Shabaab-suspects-
arrested-Dadaab/-/110787/2890378/-/25qdw9z/-/index.html  Accessed on 27th January 2016 
213Al Shabaab (the Movement for Youth Jihadists) is a militant organization based in Somalia. It became 
popular in 2012 when it pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda, an Islamist organization founded by Osama bin 
Laden in 1988.Al Shabaab fights for establishment of a Somali government under strict Islamic Sharia Law 
and considers any other governments not based in Islamic Law as ‗infidel‘. As a result, Al Shabaab has been 
fighting to topple the foreign-backed  Somalia Federal Government(SFG).For details about Al Shabaab see 
S. Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia: The history and ideology of militant Islamic group, 2005-2012 London, Hurst 
and Co., 2013. 
214 KDF pursued Al Shabaab inside Somalia from mid-October, 2011 after Government of Kenya blamed the 
terror group of cross border violations including abduction of foreign tourists, attacks on civilians and 
government installations. After the invasion, Al Shabaab intensified attacks inside Kenyan soils that has 
claimed lives of hundreds of civilians and security forces. For details see Yusuf, M., ‗Kenya, Somali 
Refugees Exchange Blame for Attacks‘, Voice of America, 21 December 2012, www.voanews.com/a/kenya-
somali-refugees-exchange-blame-for-attacks/1569769.html [Accessed 27 November 2017]. 
S. Lauren, Repatriation as a Controversial Concept: The Case of Somali Refugees in Kenya. Research paper 
supervised by Professor Delphine Nakache, School of International Development and Global Studies, 
University of Ottawa, July 2015. 
S. Allison, ‗World‘s largest refugee camp scapegoated in wake of Garissa attack‘, The Guardian, 14th April, 
2015.Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/kenya-garissa-dadaab-
scapegoat-al-shabaab[Accessed 27 November 2016]. 
215 Yussuf Hassan is a Kenyan Member of Parliament representing Kamukunji constituency in Nairobi. He 
experienced serious injuries after an Improvised Explosive Device hit his entourage in Nairobi. Al Shabaab 
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attack on 18 November, targeting a public service vehicle, led to widespread rioting and 
violent reprisals against civilians of Somali origin.216 While the refugees have vehemently 
denied involvement in terrorist activities, the Government of Kenya has often pointed an 
accusing finger at the Dadaab camp as a planning and training ground for terror 
elements.217 Consequently, the Government of Kenya seems to have the support of the 
majority of Kenyans making repatriation a popular decision.218 Critics of this government 
position on the other hand feel that the Government of Kenya is simply using refugees as 
scapegoats for a failed security system.219 
 
Apart from posing security threats to the host state, refugees also strain relations between 
the state of origin and the state providing asylum. The strained relations could therefore 
advance to aggression between the countries involved if not carefully handled. For 
instance, relations between Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi were strained between 1994 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
was blamed for the attack as they are known to attack government installations and officials using firearms 
and explosives. See www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000163842/kamukunji-mp-yusuf-hassan-recounts-
traumatic-journey-to-recovery-after-terror-attack[Accessed 27 November 2016]. 
216Aljazeera, ‗Kenyans riot against ethnic Somalis‘, Aljazeera – November 2012  
http://www.aljazeera.com/ 
news/africa/2012/11/2012112021333440883.html 
217The rhetoric of Somali refugees as a security threat is more the perception of Somali refugees as a threat 
rather than evidence based claims that refugees are the cause of insecurity. See J. Milner, Refugees, the state 
and the politics of asylum in Africa, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
218 Principal Secretary for Interior Dr. Karanja Kibicho in an official statement of Government of Kenya 
explaining why the Government of Kenya must repatriate thousands of Somali refugees in Kenya. He 
maintained that, ‗As a country with limited resources, facing an existential terrorist threat, we can no longer 
allow our people to bear the brunt of the International Community‘s weakening obligations to the 
refugees‘. Available at: www.interior.go.ke/index.php./2015-02-28-06-43-54/news/99-ps-karanja-kibicho-
explains-why-the-government--is-shutting-down-refugee-camps[Accessed 30th January, 2018]. 
219In fact, Somali refugees in Kenya have little to do with the recent terrorist attacks and Somalis have 
become a scapegoat by politicians. See Heritage Institute for Policy Studies(HIPS),Hasty repatriation: Kenya’s 
attempt to send Somali refugees home, Mogadishu, HIPS, 2013.Retrieved fromwww.heritageinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/HIPS_Hasty_Repatriation_ENGLISH.pdf[Accessed 10thJanuary, 2018] 
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and 1995 when Tanzania hosted thousands of refugees fleeing the genocide in Rwanda220 
and chaos in Burundi.221 This was captured by sentiments of the then Tanzania‘s Minister 
for Foreign Affairs as follows: 
The presence of refugees is a source of tension in the relations between 
Tanzania and Burundi and to a certain extent Rwanda, arising from 
suspicions that the refugees are regrouping and training in warfare for 
attacking the countries of origin.222 
 
It is therefore clear that even in a fully functioning and peaceful state such as Tanzania, 
the geo-political stakes inherent in a refugee situation are such that the security of camps 
and border areas cannot be reduced to a mere question of law enforcement.223 
Kenya thus is not the only country purporting that refugees are a threat to its national 
security. There are no studies that have established that refugees have a high affinity to 
crime or violence compared to the citizens. The claim by many host states that refugees 
are a threat to their ‗national‘ security seems to be a more general way of scapegoating as 
                                                          
220J. Mwakasege, The Impact of Refugees on Host Communities: The case of Kasulu, Ngara and Karagwe. A Report 
of an Oxfam Sponsored Research Project, presented at the International Workshop on Refugee Crisis in the 
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223 Canadian Council for Refugees, Preserving the Civilian Character of Refugee Camps: Lessons from Kigoma 
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these claims have never been accompanied by legal actions that can secure convictions in 
courts of law. In fact refugees have always sought justice in courts224 whenever they face 
blanket harassment and condemnation from state machinery and have often won. 
It is evident that the host country and refugees often mistrust each other with host states 
fearing that hosting refugees may adversely affect them politically. Even though refugees 
are welcomed by host states, the reception in most cases is cold and full of suspicion.225 
Host countries have become reluctant to host refugees because of the fear that the 
refugees are no longer a short-term challenge, as earlier thought in the 1940s during the 
Second World War. The unquestionable assumption in the 1940‘s was that refugees were 
in their host countries temporarily and that they would go back to their home countries 
as soon as the Second World War ended. As a result, they received an immense 
sympathy. For instance, when Palestinian refugees began flooding into their 
neighbouring Arab states as of spring of 1948 they received a warm welcome. The 
prolonged refugee stay however put undue strain on already fragile economies and 
attitudes in the host countries began to shift.226 
The end of Cold War seemed to have ushered in an era where refugee sympathy and 
hospitality began to wane: 
                                                          
224S. Ndonga, ‗Court overturns order to register refugees in camps‘, 26th July, 2013, Capital News. Retrieved 
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As has often been remarked, with the end of the Cold War, the political and 
ideological value attaching to refugees has waned. The attachment to 
upholding refugees‘ rights which may have previously characterized the 
approach to asylum is in fierce competition with tendencies towards the 
most restrictive and minimalist legal regimes, policies and practices ...It is 
difficult to expect that these trends will not be observed in Africa, where the 
underlying social and economic constraints are even more compelling. 
Indeed, the tendency to emulate these trends is said by some already to be 
in evidence.227 
 
The other reported political problem that states face when hosting refugees is the 
perennial conflict between refugees and the host community. Kirui and Mwaruvie, while 
writing on the dilemma of hosting Somali refugee in Kenya, assert that: 
In Dadaab for example, the Kenyan Somalis feel the refugees are given 
special attention than them because they receive assistance from 
humanitarian organization like UNHCR and other NGO‟s. Refugees are 
given food, medical attention, and education among other social services. 
Majority of Kenyan Somalis cannot afford this and therefore view the 
refugees (who are also Somalis) as enemies who are taking ‗Milk and 
Honey‘ while they starve in their motherland.228 
 
Interestingly, this kind of hostile relationship between the local Somali refugee hosting 
community in Dadaab refugee camp is also replicated in Kakuma229 refugee camp. In 
Kakuma: 
                                                          
227UNHCR, ‗Issues and Challenges in International Protection in Africa‘, Special Issue, International Journal 
of Refugee Law, 55, at pp. 69-70 
228P. Kirui,  andJ. Mwaruvie,  ‗ The Dilemma of hosting refugees: A focus on the insecurity in North-eastern 
Kenya‘, International Journal of Business and Social Sciences, vol.3.no.8,2012,pp.164 
229Kakuma refugee camp is located in North-western Kenya hosting mainly Sudanese refugees. The 
Sudanese refugees fled the civil war in Sudan and currently the civil war that threatens the young state of 
South Sudan. 
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While refugees receive international aid, the Turkana (who are just as poor) 
do not. Unfortunately, this causes an imbalance that has resulted in the host 
community feeling hostile and blaming their problems on refugees. It also 
raises fundamental questions about human rights and equality since, in this 
case, the refugees who receive free shelter, food, firewood and healthcare, 
have better conditions than their hosts.230 
 
Similarly, in Chad and Darfur, ‗where there are large congregations of displaced persons 
in an arid environment, there are huge demands on the scarce local water resources and 
this gives rise to friction with the local communities.‘231 In Ghana, Liberian refugees are 
widely perceived by Ghanaians as the cause of recent armed robberies and wife stealing. 
In addition, the Ghanaian populations negatively portray Liberians claiming they engage 
in illegal activities such as prostitution, drugs robbery and gambling.232 These allegations 
are however more about scapegoating and of ‗othering ‘ as an excuse for their current 
impoverishment. In Iran, the Iranian government claims that illegal Afghans pose threats 
to its national security especially given their possible contact with insurgents and narcotic 
traffickers near the Afghan border.233 In all these cases, the assumption is that refugees 
are a burden to the host state and involved in illegal activities; an assumption that is 
lacking in both merit and substance. 
                                                          
230E. Aukot, ‗It is better to be a Refugee than a Turkana in Kakuma: Revisiting the Relationship between 
Hosts and Refugees in Kenya, ‘Global Movements for Refugees and Migrant Rights,Vol.21, no.3,2003,74. 
231A. Cronin.et al., ‗A Review of water and sanitation provision in refugee camps in association with 
selected health and nutritional indicators-the need for integrated service provision, ‘Journal of Water and 
Health, vol. 6,2008,p.1  
232G. Porter, et al., ‗Linkage between Livelihood Opportunities and Refugee-Host Relations: Learning from 
the Experience of Liberian Camp-based Refugees in Ghana‘, Journal of Refugees Studies vol.21,2008,p.2  
233B. Koepke, The Situation of Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran Nine Years After the Overthrow of the Taliban 
Regime in Afghanistan, Washington, D.C., Middle East Institute, 2011,p. 2.  
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However, Oroub El-Abed differs with such assumptions often held by populations and 
host governments that refugees are of no help to the host government but a burden. She 
asserts that refugees can be of benefit to the host governments if they are allowed to work 
unhindered and become productive members of the society. She however admits that 
most governments have been reluctant to incorporate refugees in their national 
systems.234 A good example in support of Oroub-El-Abed‘s argument is that of 
Palestinian refugees who have been integrated with the Egyptians to an extent that they 
are virtually undistinguishable.235 In this case therefore Palestinian refugees in Egypt are 
no longer perceived as a security threat by Egyptians. 
3.1 The evolving refugee policy in Kenya: from laissez-faire to restrictive 
Before discussing Kenya‘s perception on the safety of Somalia as a pre-condition for 
repatriation, it is paramount to briefly highlight how the Government of Kenya has been 
changing her refugee policy with a bias towards a more restrictive approach. While it is 
important to limit ourselves to the objective of the study as to the perception of 
Government of Kenya on the safety of Somalia, we must remember that states tend to 
consider their national interests first before any international obligations. Although weak 
states might seek to appease international community to bolster its legitimacy, it is an 
exception rather than the rule. This in essence means that understanding Kenya‘s refugee 
policy helps explain the perception of Kenya on the safety of Somalia. If, for instance, 
                                                          
234O. El-Abed, Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948. Ontario: Co-Published by Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, Washington DC and International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2009, p.70. 
235B. Laurie, ‗Nassir‘s Egypt and the Re-emergence of the Palestinian National Movement‘, Journal of 
Palestinian Studies,vol.17, no.2 ,winter1988,p.85  
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Kenya considers Somali refugees as a burden, then she will push for their repatriation, 
regardless of whether Somalia is perceived as safe or otherwise, as a way of easing the 
burden. In any case, a positive attitude towards refugees may generally make host states 
reluctant to push for repatriation and especially if they consider refugees as productive 
members of the society. 
Kenya‘s refugee policies have changed considerably, from a relatively laissez-faire 
approach, to that of increasing restrictions and containment. From 1963 to 1989, there 
were relatively few refugees in the country, with only up to 15,000 at any given 
point.236The Kenyan government had an open asylum policy and refugees could move 
and settle freely within the country, and they had the right to work.237The government 
also did not have an established national refugee policy or a legal framework in place 
prior to 2006, although an Eligibility Committee238, which included representatives of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, the Immigration Department and observers from the UNHCR, 
                                                          
236P. Kagwanja, ‗Strengthening local relief capacity in Kenya: Challenges and prospects‘ In M.K Juma & A. 
Suhrke (Eds.), Eroding local capacity: International humanitarian action in Africa, Sweden, Nordic Africa 
Institute, 2002, pp. 94. 
237E. Freudenthaler,  ‗Refugee rights in Kenya between theory and practice‘,  
Vienna Journal of African Studies, Vol.12, no. 23, 2012, pp. 107-133. 
Milner, J., Refugees, the state and the politics of asylum in Africa,  London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
 
238The Eligibility Committee was an ad hoc committee that vetted and scrutinized applications to determine 
whether one qualified to be granted refugee status. See Wagacha, J. & Guiney, J., ‗The plight of urban 
refugees in Nairobi, Kenya‘ in Hollenbach, D. (Ed). Refugee Rights: Ethics, Advocacy, and Africa, Washington, 
DC, Georgetown University Press, 2008, pp. 92-101. 
Human Rights Watch, Hidden in plain view: Refugees living without protection in Nairobi and Kampala, 
2002.Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/11/21/hidden-plain-view [accessed 12 January 
2016]. 
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conducted refugee status determination (RSD) interviews on an individual basis.239An 
initial shift in Kenyan policy towards refugees was sparked by a severe increase of 
asylum seekers from neighbouring countries. This included approximately 300,000 
Somalis who fled to Kenya from 1991 to 1993240, after the fall of the Siad Barre regime and 
ensuing civil war. The Government of Kenya adopted a general encampment policy241 
and justified this approach due to the magnitude of refugees seeking asylum in Kenya, 
but, as we discuss further, other factors were at play.242 The Kenyan government and its 
citizens started developing negative views of refugees, which led to increasing 
xenophobia.243 While the leadership of refugee assistance was assumed by international 
agencies and NGOs244, the Government of Kenya began to retake control of refugee 
management with the enactment of Refugee Act245of 2006,that also created a Department 
                                                          
239J. Wagacha, &J. Guiney, ‗The plight of urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya‘ in Hollenbach, D. (Ed). Refugee 
Rights: Ethics, Advocacy, and Africa, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2008, pp. 92-101. 
Human Rights Watch, Hidden in plain view: Refugees living without protection in Nairobi and Kampala, 
2002.Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/11/21/hidden-plain-view [accessed 12 January 
2016]. 
240A. Kumar, Human rights: Global perspective, New Delhi, Sarup & Sons, 2002,p.163 
241 Kenya Refugee Act No.13 of 2006.Before this Refugee Act was enacted, Kenya assumed an unwritten 
policy of encampment where refugee movement was restricted to the ‗camps‘ as their ‗designated area‘ and 
were not allowed to move outside the designated areas without express permission from government 
official especially from ministries Interior and migration. 
242J. Milner, Refugees, the state and the politics of asylum in Africa,  London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009,p.90 
243G. Loescher, &J. Milner,  ‗The long road home: Protracted refugee situations in Africa‘, Survival, vol.47, 
no. 2, 2005,p.154 
Campbell, E., Formalizing the informal economy: Somali refugee and migrant trade networks in Nairobi. Geneva, 
Switzerland, Global Commission on International Migration, 2005,p.5 
244P.Kagwanja, ‗Strengthening local relief capacity in Kenya: Challenges and prospects‘ In M.K Juma & A. 
Suhrke (Eds.), Eroding local capacity: International humanitarian action in Africa, Sweden, Nordic Africa 
Institute, 2002, pp. 94-115.  
 
245Kenya Refugee Act No.13 of 2006.Available at 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/RefugeeAct_No13of2006.pdf[Accessed 31st 
January,2018] 
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of Refugee Affairs246 (DRA). Although in theory this Refugee Act implements the 1951 
Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 OAU Convention, this did not translate 
in practice.247The Government of Kenya took a more restrictive approach to refugee 
management than the UNHCR had, by implementing a relocation directive248 in 
December 2012, which ended all urban refugee operations249 and ordered refugees to 
relocate to the designated camps. This restrictive approach has been informed by Kenya‘s 
negative perception of Somalis and has been shaped by both historical and contemporary 
factors. The Government of Kenya has been pressuring for the repatriation of Somali 
refugees. The Kenyan government has propagated the idea of Somali refugees as a 
‗burden‘ and a ‗security threat‘ in order to justify their actions in the name of national 
security. Responding to questions on one popular TV station in Kenya regarding the 
perceived premature push for repatriation of Somali refugees by Government of Kenya, 
the Interior Principal Secretary maintained that, ‗Nobody should lecture us about 
refugees, we have hosted them for about 25 years, we continue to host them, we are not 
                                                          
246Kenya Refugee Act No.13 of 2006, Clause 6(1). 
247S. Pavanello, Elhawary, E., & Pantullano, S., Hidden and exposed: Urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya ,HPG 
Working Paper, London, Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute, 2010,p.15. 
248See Office of the President, Relocation of Urban Refugees to Officially Designated Camps, 16 January 
2013 
In December 2012, Kenya‘s Department of Refugee Affairs issued a statement that all refugees in urban 
centres must go to the camps. In January 2013, a letter was issued from the Office of the President stating 
that 
18,000 refugees should be rounded up, held in Thika football stadium near Nairobi, and then transferred to 
the camps, a first step towards repatriation. 
249Refugees were initially allowed to reside in Kenyan urban areas as long as they could afford to sustain 
themselves. The relocation directive by Department of Refugee Affairs also banned any existing such 
arrangements insisting that all refugees should reside in designated camps in North-eastern 
Kenya(Dadaab) or North-western Kenya(Kakuma). Seehttps://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/21/kenya-
dont-force-55000-refugees-camps[Accessed 31st January, 2018]. 
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talking about closing Kakuma, because it doesn‘t pose as much threat to our national 
security as much as Dadaab is causing‘250. This hard line stance by a government official 
is an indication of the shifting paradigm in refugee policy from a welcoming to a more 
restrictive approach. However, this has not occurred in a vacuum, as there are historical 
factors, which have also played a role in Kenya‘s increasingly restrictive refugee policies 
leading up to, and following, the signing of the Tripartite Agreement. 
The restrictive approach adopted by Kenya seems to be a new trend that many countries 
are now adopting. In the extreme, huge influxes of refugees fleeing conflict in Syria have 
literally compelled many European countries to close their borders in a bid to discourage 
many millions of refugees from flowing to Europe.251 Others have even argued that the 
in(famous) Brexit vote that saw Britain withdraw from the European Union may have 
partly been informed by the feeling among the Britons to want to control their borders 
from refugees and other migrants.252 Though to a larger extent a politicized matter during 
the Brexit referendum, the United Kingdom Independence Party(UKIP) leader, Nigel 
Farage, may have appropriated the fear of mass refugees entering the UK by 
                                                          
250 The interior PS While responding to a K24 journalist at the 9pm News bulletin on 11th May, 2016.He was 
responding to accusations leveled against the Government of Kenya by the KNCHR and UNHCR that the 
government‘s decision to repatriate the Somali refugees was against human rights and the general refugee 
law. 
251 ‗The European Union and the migration Crisis‘, Available at 
http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/migration-crisis/en/[Accessed 31st January 2018] 
252It is generally perceived that the migrant crisis in Europe especially since 2015 may have created a 
conducive political environment for those advocating for a Brexit so as to have more control of their 
borders unlike while in the EU bloc where they are bound by the blocs decision to open their borders. UKIP 
leader Nigel Farage during the Brexit vote had used an October 2015 photograph of hundreds of refugees 
crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border for a ‗Vote Leave‘ campaign poster emblazoned with the words: 
‗Breaking Point‘, The report by Kristy Siegfried is Available at 
www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/06/27what-does-brexit-mean-refugees [Accessed on 20th September 
2016]. 
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campaigning for Brexit in order to, ‗break free of the EU and take back control of our 
border‘.253Many countries, therefore, are adopting a more restrictive approach to 
refugees-a clear indication that they are no longer welcome. 
3.1.1 Negative historical perceptions of the Government of Kenya towards Somalis. 
 
Kenya has had a history of mistrust and suspicion with Somalia since her independence 
in 1963 when Somalia claimed part of Kenyan territory to form a unified Somalia.254 This 
led to the shifta255wars between 1963 and 1967, whereby ethnic Somalis in North Eastern 
Province began guerrilla warfare in order to separate from Kenya. Although the shifta 
wars ended with the signing of an agreement256 in 1967, in the 1980s, the Kenyan 
government continued to carry out operations in North Eastern Province to remove any 
remaining shifta ‗elements‘. As a result, ‗All Somalis were portrayed as a threat, and their 
repression was justified on grounds of nation security‘.257Consequently, the Government 
of Kenya has historically had a ‗conflictual‘ relationship with the then North Eastern 
Province258(formerly Northern Frontier District) in Kenya, where there has been a 
                                                          
253 This statement was appropriated by UKIP leader Nigel Farage during the Brexit vote. He had used an 
October 2015 photograph of hundreds of refugees crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border for a Vote Leave 
campaign poster emblazoned with the words: ‗Breaking Point‘. The report  by Kristy Siegfried is Available 
at www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/06/27what-does-brexit-mean-refugees[Accessed on 20th September 
2016]. 
254J. Milner, Refugees, the state and the politics of asylum in Africa,  London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009,p.102. 
255J. Milner,  Refugees, the state and the politics of asylum in Africa,  London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009,p.102 
256‗Arusha Agreement on Ending of Kenya-Somali Border Hostilities. Somali-Ethiopian Agreement‘, 
Keesing‘s Record of World Events(Formerly Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives) vol.13, November 
1967.p.22386 
257J. Milner, Refugees, the state and the politics of asylum in Africa, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009,p.102 
258 North Eastern province (before 2010 Constitution of Kenya) comprises of the current Garissa, Wajir and 
Mandera Counties. This region was called the Northern Frontier District in colonial Kenya and was 
generally under a curfew and was regarded as a dangerous region because of bandits and general impunity 
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significant population of ethnic-Somalis.259This stems back to the ‗scramble for Africa‘260 
where colonial powers drew borders and divided the Somali people into five parts, with 
one such part being North Eastern Province, Kenya. The Somali state called for the 
inhabitants of the North-eastern Province, then called the Northern Frontier District to 
secede from Kenya and join Somalia, Djibouti and parts of the Ethiopian Ogaden to form 
‗Greater Somalia‘.261This may have sowed the mistrust between Somalis and Kenyans, 
and may have contributed to Kenya‘s restrictive approach towards Somali refugees. 
Consequently, from independence in 1963 until 1992, the North-Eastern Province, 
bordering Somalia, where the Dadaab refugee camp is located, was placed under a state 
of emergency.262 
 
3.1.2 Perception of the Government of Kenya towards Somali refugees as security 
threat 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
in the region. With the adoption of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the NEP was divided into the above 
three counties. 
259J. Milner, Refugees, the state and the politics of asylum in Africa,  London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009,p.101 
260The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 marked the climax of the European competition for territory in 
Africa, a process commonly known as the Scramble for Africa. During the 1870s and early 1880s European 
nations such as Great Britain, France, and Germany began looking to Africa for natural resources for their 
growing industrial sectors as well as a potential market for the goods these factories produced. See 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-9780195337709-e-
0467[Accessed 31st January 2018] 
261A. Abdi,  ‗Refugees, Gender-Based Violence and Resistance: A Case Study of Refugee Women in Kenya‘, 
Women, Migration, and Citizenship: making local, national and transnational connections, Oxford, Ashgate, 2006, 
pp. 231-250 
262A. Abdi,  ‗Refugees, Gender-Based Violence and Resistance: A Case Study of Refugee Women in Kenya‘, 
Women, Migration, and Citizenship: making local, national and transnational connections, Oxford, Ashgate, 2006, 
pp. 231-250 
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Somali refugees are primarily hosted in Dadaab Refugee Camp263, which began operation 
between 1991 and 1992, and is located only 100km from the Somali-Kenyan border in 
Garissa County, North Eastern Province (NEP), Kenya. Conflict in Somalia started when 
tyrant Mohammed Siad Barre was ousted in 1991. Inter – clan conflicts that followed gave 
way in early 2007 to an Islamic insurgency – prompted by Ethiopian invasion – which as 
of 2009 killed an estimated 18,000 civilians.264 
The presence of Somali refugees in Dadaab in northern Kenya seems to have legitimized 
the perceived fear that refugees could be more of a political and security problem as 
much as of humanitarian concern. According to Garissa District Development Plan 
(GDDP) 1994-1996, the influx of refugees into the district resulted in insecurity as 
‗sophisticated weaponry found their way into the district‘265 through the porous Kenya-
Somalia border. The assumption here is that militants sneak in weapons into Kenyan 
refugee camps in the guise of being refugees. Consequently, ‗banditry, cattle rustling and 
general violence‘266 in the district increased and hence adversely affecting the supervision 
of development programmes.267 
 
                                                          
263 Although usually referred to as Dadaab Refugee Camp, this refugee camp complex is comprised of 
multiple camps that surround UNHCR‘s sub-office in the town of Dadaab.The major camps that make the 
Dadaab complex are Hagadera, Ifo and Dagahaley 
264 http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/features/article  
265See Republic of Kenya, Garissa District Development Plan (1994-1996), Nairobi, Government printer,p.81. 
266See Republic of Kenya, Garissa District Development Plan (1994-1996), Nairobi, Government printer,p.59. 
267 See Republic of Kenya, Garissa District Development Plan (1994-1996), Nairobi, Government 
printer,p.81.The former  Garissa District hosts Dadaab refugee camps and is currently referred to as Garissa 
County following the promulgation of the constitution in 2010 that changed administrative names and 
boundaries 
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This narrative by the Government of Kenya on the insecurity caused by the refugees is 
further noted by the GDDP report of 2002-2008 which notes, in part, that Dadaab and 
Jarajila divisions are a bit insecure compared to others because of the presence of refugees 
in Jarajila and Dadaab, which has made the divisions adjacent to be insecure.268 Besides 
that, the GDDP report (2008-2012) on insecurity posed by the refugee settlement in 
Dadaab accuses the refugees of destroying the environment and of being a major cause of 
insecurity in the adjacent divisions.269 These reports, however, seem to lack evidence and 
substance and are more general in nature. 
Recently in an interview with the National Television on May 11, 2016, the Principal 
Secretary (PS) for Interior270 Dr. Karanja Kibicho, while responding to News Anchor Eric 
Njoka argued that, ‗we are not talking about closing Kakuma because it doesn‘t pose as 
much threat to our national security as much as Dadaab is causing‘271. He said that,  
The six hundred thousand refugees in this country are not all 
terrorists…but the existence of the camp has provided sufficient 
environment for cells that harbor terrorists who continue causing harm to 
our country.272 
                                                          
268 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Garissa District Development Plan 2002-2008, 
Nairobi, Government Printer, p.16.  
269 Republic of Kenya, Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of State for Planning, National Development 
and Vision 2030,Garissa District Development Plan 2008-2012, (Nairobi: Government Printer), 30.  
270 This is the Ministry of Internal Security whose portfolio includes that of refugees in Kenya. 
271 The Principal Secretary(PS) Dr.KaranjaKibicho while responding to an interview with Eric Njoka on 11th 
May, 2016 at the K24 TV Studios. The PS was explaining the position of the Government of Kenya 
concerning her decision to close Dadaab refugee camps citing the threat to national security that militants 
in the camp poses. 
272 The Principal Secretary (PS) Dr.Karanja Kibicho while responding to an interview with Eric Njoka on 
11th May, 2016 at the K24 TV Studios.The PS was explaining the position of the Government of Kenya 
concerning her decision to close Dadaab refugee camps citing the threat to national security that militants 
in the camp poses. 
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Reiterating the position of the Government of Kenya to close down Dadaab refugee 
camp, the Interior CS, Joseph Nkaissery asserted that, ‗the decision to close Dadaab camp 
is final‘.273This depicts arrogance and unilateral decisions of the Government of Kenya 
when dealing with Somali refugees. Such tough statements by the government have 
become more of a ‗knee-jerk‘ reaction to failing security systems and have often been 
successfully challenged in courts.274 In February 2017, Kenyan High Court judge, Justice 
John Motivo, suspended the Government of Kenya decision to close down Dadaab 
refugee camps terming it ‗discriminative‘.275 
 
3.1.3 Rationale for the push for repatriation by Government of Kenya since 2011. 
 
The increasingly restrictive refugee regime of the Kenyan government and the current 
repatriation efforts are as a result of the perception of Somali refugees as a national 
security threat. The perception of Somalis in Kenya as a security threat became 
particularly heightened after multiple attacks in Kenya by Al Shabaab. These attacks 
occurred more frequently after Kenya sent troops into Somalia in 2011 as part of Operation 
                                                          
273 Cabinet Secretary (CS) Joseph Nkaissery while receiving a report by the task force constituted on 11th 
May 2016 to recommend the best way the Government of Kenya was to carry out the repatriation of Somali 
refugee. The CS was addressing the press on 31st May 2016.This was aired at NTV on 31st May 2016. 
274S. Ndonga, ‗Court overturns order to register refugees in camps‘, 26th July, 2013, Capital News. Retrieved 
from http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/07/court-overturns-order-to-register-refugees-in-
camps/[Accessed 28th March 2015]. 
275‗Kenya vows to appeal verdict blocking Dadaab camp closure‘, Daily Nation, 9th February, 2017, 
Available at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/High-Court-cancels-closure-of-Dabaab/1056-3806030-
7enmgdz/index.html[Accessed 28th March 2015]. 
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Linda Nchi276, a Swahili for ‗Operation protect  country‘ with Al Shabaab promising 
retaliation, threatening attacks on Nairobi and to bring war to Kenya.277 It seems clear 
that the threat by Al Shabaab was real, as one Amnesty International report argues that: 
Since then, Kenya has experienced an increase in security incidents including 
bombings and attacks using hand-grenades and improvised explosive devices. 
Many have taken place in north-eastern Kenya, including in the Dadaab refugee 
camps, as well as in Nairobi, particularly in Eastleigh, home to more than 100,000 
Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees and asylum-seekers. These attacks have 
resulted in dozens of deaths and hundreds injured. On 21 September 2013, Al 
Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack in Nairobi‘s Westgate shopping mall 
which lasted for four days, killing 67 people and injuring more than 200 others.278 
 
To capture the embedded Government of Kenya‘s perception towards refugees as a 
‗source of terrorism‘, the then Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Coordination of National 
Government279, Joseph Ole Lenku, said: ‗some of these refugees have abused our 
hospitality and kindness to plan and launch terror attacks from the safety of refugee 
camps. This cannot and shall not be allowed to continue anymore‘.280One Member of 
Parliament described Kenya‘s refugee camps as ‗a nursery for terrorists‘.281 Mr. Lenku 
                                                          
276Operation ‗Linda Nchi‘ is the codename for a co-ordinated military operation between the Kenyan military 
and the Somali military that began on 16 October 2011, when troops from Kenya crossed the border into the 
conflict zones of southern Somalia. Kenya had accused Al Shabaab of violating its border and kidnapping 
foreign tourists in her soils although it made it clear that Kenya war not at war with Somalia as a country. 
‗Linda nchi‘ is a Swahili word meaning ‗protect our country‘.See Migue, T., Military Diplomacy:A Case Study 
of Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia(2011-2012), A Research Project Submitted in Partial fulfillment of the 
Degree of Master of Arts in International Studies,University of Nairobi, May, 2013. 
277BBC News, Somali militants Al-Shabab threaten Kenya retaliation, 17 October 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15342091, [Accessed 14th December,2013]. 
278 See Amnesty International Report, No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced, London, 
Amnesty International, 2014. [Accessed 19th December,2015] 
279This is the Ministry of Internal Security whose portfolio includes that of refugees in Kenya 
280Official: Some refugees plan attacks from Kenya, http://news.yahoo.com/official-refugeesplan- 
attacks-kenya-125845448.html [Accessed 19th December,2015] 
281See MP calls for closure of Dadaab Refugee Camp, 30 September 2013, 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000094572, [Accessed 14th December, 2013]. 
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and the MP were reacting to the Westgate Mall attack on the 21st September 2013.It is this 
concern that led Kenya to seek a legal framework that would pave way for the 
repatriation of Somali refugees within the international refugee regime282-the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to status of Refugees. The active military engagement of Kenya in 
Somalia since mid-October 2011 in hot pursuit283 of Al Shabaab militants it had accused of 
violating her borders marked the turning point in Kenya‘s long standing policy of non-
aggression. While Kenya made it clear that it was not at war with Somalia, the presence 
of Kenyan soldiers in Somalia appears to signal a new chapter of heightened 
militarization between Kenya and the Somalia-based militia, Al Shabaab. 
 
While there is no documented evidence indicating that refugees are involved in terror 
activities, it is evident that the Al Shabaab terror cells and sympathizers have encroached 
upon the Dadaab camps. This is because there are recorded terror activities284 in Dadaab 
camps but which may not directly involve refugees. Terror cells may hide in the camp 
from where they  plan and launch attacks.  
                                                          
282 Although there are many instruments regarding refugee affairs nationally and regionally, the UN 1951 
Convention Relating to Status of Refugees is the blue print policy document as it was adopted by UN. 
Many countries and regions domesticate their refugee laws based on the provisions of this document. See 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, States parties to the 1951 convention relation to the status of 
refugees and the 1967 protocol, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html [Accessed 24th 
April, 2015]. 
283T. Migue, Military Diplomacy: A Case Study of Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia (2011-2012), A Research 
Project Submitted in Partial fulfillment of the Degree of Master of Arts in International Studies, University 
of Nairobi, May, 2013. 
 
284 https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2011/12/4ef1ec326/twin-blasts-dadaab-raise-concerns-
worsening-security.html 
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Following the escalating terror attacks, with some allegedly being traced to the Dadaab 
refugee camp, a tripartite agreement was signed between the governments of Somalia 
and Kenya and the UNHCR on 10thNovember 2013 following months of negotiations to 
pave way for voluntary repatriation. The agreement establishes the framework governing 
the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees over the next three years.285 It is on the basis 
of this TA that the Government of Kenya has maintained that the Dadaab camps should 
be closed by 30th November 2016, three years into the TA. A pilot phase was to take place 
from January to June 2014. During that time, an estimated 10,000 Somali refugees in 
Kenya were to be supported to return to Luuq in Gedo region, Baidoa in Bay region, and 
Kismayu in Lower Juba region.286 
 
As expected, repatriation has had mixed results. Based on statistics from UNHCR, 
72,712287 refugees had been repatriated between 2014 and 22nd December, 2017.This is a 
relatively low number as it is less than 20% of the target 500,000 Somali refugees based in 
Dadaab. Those willing to repatriate are either airlifted or transported by road in a 
UNHCR and Government of Kenya partnership and given a reinstallation stipend of 
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USD 600288.Returnees in Somalia are also supported by UNHCR and other NGO‘s289, like 
the America Refugee Committee, who provide training on life skills, build capacity in 
livelihoods and may provide limited financial support for startup ventures. There are 
reports, however, that most returnees ‗have found it difficult to secure reliable food, 
health care and shelter, and Hassan, like 75 other families, are affected by ongoing land 
disputes in Kismayo‘.290 This brings to question the sustainability of the repatriation 
process. 
 
In response to the string of attacks, the Government of Kenya had earlier on 13 December 
2012, through Kenya‘s Department of Refugee Affairs, announced an intention to 
implement a forced encampment policy. All 55,000 urban refugees were to move to the 
refugee camps in the north of the country. It was stated that ‗due to this unbearable and 
uncontrollable threat to national security, the government has decided to put in place a 
structure encampment policy.’291 This was later cited by the government as a first step 
towards full repatriation.292 
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290M. Yusuf,  ‗Returning Somali Refugees Find it Hard to Build New Lives‘, Voice of America News, 18th 
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In January 2013, the Kenyan legal aid organization Kituo Cha Sheria293filed a petition with 
the High Court in Nairobi challenging the constitutionality of the Government of Kenya 
plan of restricting all refugees, including urban refugees,  to the camps. On 26 July 2013, 
the High Court quashed the plan on the basis that forcing all refugees to camps would 
violate their dignity as well as numerous other rights under Kenyan law, such as their 
freedom of movement. The Court stated that ‗The aggressive pursuit of such a policy may 
have the effect of constructively repatriating urban refugees back to the countries from 
which they had fled.‘294 It further stated that ‗the implementation of the policy may well 
lead to a situation that forces some of the petitioners to leave the country for fear of 
proceeding to camps or being exposed to conditions that affect their welfare 
negatively.’295 
 
The judgment by the High Court on 26 July 2013 that annulled the forced encampment 
policy on refugees, as directed by the Government of Kenya was no doubt a relief to 
many refugees. This relief judgement came even after refugee registration and other 
refugee operations in urban areas were halted and refugees were expected to relocate to 
the designated refugee camps as per the government‘s directive296 in December, 2012. It 
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seem clear that legal hurdles and independent judiciary are the only impediments that 
hinder the Government of Kenya‘s more restrictive approach to Somali refugees as an 
initial step towards massive repatriation. The Government of Kenya justified its calls for 
Somali refugees to repatriate to ‗safe areas‘ in Somalia in 2012, prior to the signing of the 
Tripartite Agreement, due to its security concerns as well as the unsustainable burden on 
Kenya.297 
Politicians and, at times, the media have linked Somali refugees to the terrorist group Al 
Shabaab, thus portraying Somali refugees as a major security threat. ‗Operation Usalama 
Watch‘298, an anti-terrorist security operation that began in March 2014, resulted in the 
arrest and detention of Kenyan citizens of Somali ethnicity, the transfer of refugees from 
urban areas to refugee camps, and the deportation of Somalis to Somalia. Amnesty 
International  concludes that it appears to be ‗a pretext for the blanket targeting of the 
Somali community‘299.Gerry Simpson, a senior refugee researcher at Human Rights 
Watch, at the time, protested that, ‗Scapegoating and abusing Somalis for heinous attacks 
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by unknown people is not going to protect Kenyans, Somalis, or anyone else against more 
attacks‘300.The Government of Kenya used national security concerns to justify these 
actions, probably because, as Burns puts it ‗Kenya is in a position where it would rather 
assert its national security than honour humanitarianism because it is convinced it can no 
longer do both‘.301 
 
While the Government of Kenya has often cited the insecurity caused by the terror group, 
Al Shabaab as the main reason behind her restrictive approach to Somali refugees, a 
review of a few years before the KDF incursion into Somalia and the subsequent reprisal 
attacks by Al Shabaab, shows that this move by the Government of Kenya may have been 
premeditated. This is because there have been restrictions on the registration of refugees 
since January 2007 when the government of Kenya closed the country‘s 682km border 
with Somalia, and the main transit centre in Liboi.302This was occasioned by clashes near 
the Kenyan border with Islamist militias being pursued by Ethiopian and Somali troops. 
Then Kenyan Foreign Affairs minister Raphael Tuju explained that the border was closed 
because, ‗We are not able to ascertain whether these people are genuine refugees or 
fighters and therefore its best that they remain in Somalia‘.303 In October 2011, Kenya‘s 
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Department of Refugee Affairs stopped all registration of refugees in Dadaab.304 The 
Department of Refugee Affairs‘ on 13 December 2012 ordered the suspension of all 
registration for asylum-seekers and refugees in urban centres.305 The decision was later 
challenged in court and the order was lifted.306 
 
More recently, the Government of Kenya announced that Dadaab Refugee Camp would 
be closed within three months, after an attack by Al Shabaab at Garissa307 University in 
April 2015.According to the government, failure to do so would result in the government 
relocating refugees themselves. However, this was not the first time that Kenyan 
government officials have called for Dadaab Refugee Camp to be closed and for Somali 
refugees to repatriate. It did so in 1996, 2012, and 2016. Indeed, refugee issues have been 
politicized in Kenya and it is interesting to note that 1996, 2012 and 2016 are years 
preceding a general election in Kenya. Although these decisions to close the camps were 
not fully implemented, it led to the UNHCR closing two refugee camps including Utange 
Refugee Camp, located near the coastal city of Mombasa, in 1996.308These ‗threats‘ are 
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also evidently used as leverage or ‗blackmail‘309 by the Kenyan government to further 
negotiate with, and seek adequate refugee funding from the international community 
before containment and return of Somali refugees. Due to Kenya‘s strategic importance in 
the region, the Kenyan government has been subjected to additional pressures by the 
international community to fight terrorism.310This however, does not justify the 
government‘s disregard for refugees‘ rights. The rhetoric of Somali refugees as a security 
threat is more the perception of Somali refugees as a threat rather than evidence based 
claims that refugees are the cause of insecurity.311In fact, Somali refugees in Kenya have 
little to do with the recent terrorist attacks and Somalis have become a scapegoat by 
politicians.312This was observed in response to the Kenyan government‘s relocation 
directive in 2012, whereby Justice David Majanja313 ruled, the first time it was challenged 
in court, that the state had not shown how refugees in urban areas were the primary 
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source of insecurity.314Furthermore, the issue of Somali refugees as a security threat in 
Kenya became a top issue during elections315and was used by politicians to benefit their 
own campaigns. Support for repatriation of Somali refugees is perceived to be popular 
among the Kenya electorate hence often cited as rhetoric for political 
mobilization.316According to a high-level panel during a meeting of the High 
Commissioners Global Initiative on Somali Refugees (GISR), the rhetoric linking refugees 
to terrorism is ‗often unwarranted‘.317While little evidence has been forthcoming to 
support their claim, the Government of Kenya has insisted that Dadaab refugee camps 
has been used as a hideout by terror elements hence the decision to close it down. This 
position has been maintained by senior government officials both in national and 
international forums. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New 
York for instance, Kenya‘s Deputy President318 defended the Government of Kenya 
position to shutdown Dadaab refugee camp arguing that,  
More recently, the Dadaab refugee complex has lost its humanitarian 
character and has been appropriated by terrorists and their agents, 
transforming it into a centre for radicalization, terrorist training, planning 
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and launching of attacks. It is also a hub for illicit movements of small arms 
and light weapons.319 
 
However, this narrative by the Government of Kenya has not gone unchallenged by 
Somali refugees, and their supporters, who have maintained that no refugee has been 
arrested for terror related activities insisting that the Government of Kenya is using the 
refugees as scapegoats for a failed security system. One such refugee interviewee who 
protested the ‗blanket‘ condemnation of refugees is ‗Rashid‘320.When asked about the 
relationship of refugees to terror related activities, he maintains that, ‗Refugees have 
nothing to do with this thing (terrorism), because up to now, there is no a refugee caught 
on these issues of terror‘.321 Kenya‘s government on her part insists that the mastermind 
of the Garissa University attack, Mohamed Mohamud, alias Gamadhere, where 148 
Students were killed, ‗had networks in Dadaab refugee camp‘.322 
The perceived improvement in the security situation in parts of Somalia following the 
establishment of the new administration, and because of the presence of African Union 
Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and Kenyan troops has heightened the calls for 
repatriation. Links between the presence of refugees and security threats in Kenya 
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continue to be made, contributing to hardening attitudes towards Somalis in Kenya, and 
increasing pressure for repatriation.323 
 
3.1.4 Refugees as a burden 
Many host states perceive refugees as a burden that should be done away with as soon as 
possible. Nothing captures the fatigue of the refugees host states in Africa more than the 
joint AU-UNHCR statement made, as the African continent marked three decades since 
the establishment of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. In their eyes, the Convention is 
favourably counterpoised to a situation otherwise bemoaned ‗with profound concern‘ 
because: 
...thirty years after the adoption of the OAU Convention, the Continent is 
still afflicted by the plight of over four million refugees on the continent and 
several times that number of displaced people inside their countries caused 
by socio-economic and political factors including, in particular, conflicts, 
political violence and instability. This situation is unhealthy and 
unacceptable. Such a large number of refugees and internally displaced 
persons pose a heavy burden on OAU Member States already saddled with 
tremendous security, social and economic hardships. We are concerned 
with evident compassion fatigue within and outside the continent which is 
undermining the very principle which guided the founding fathers in 
framing the OAU Refugee Convention.324 
 
                                                          
323Amnesty International, ‗Kenya must not return Somali Refugees‘, 1 October 2013.Available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/10/kenya-somalia-refugees/ [Accessed 1st February, 
2018]. 
324Joint Statement by Dr. Ahmed Salim Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU and Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the OAU Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa, Addis Ababa and Geneva, 10 September 1999. 
117 
 
The positioning of refugees as a ‗heavy burden‘ upon African states by the 1969 OAU 
Convention on its 30th anniversary came only four years after Tanzania closed its borders 
with Burundi and Rwanda. This took place on 31 December 1995, as refugees were 
entering its territory. Her Minister for Foreign Affairs325 later explaining, ‗we are saying 
enough is enough. Let refugees go home and no more should come‘326. 
 
Even though the 1969 OAU Convention envisaged the concept of burden sharing in order 
to lighten the burden of host states, these host states in the Global South, including those 
in Africa, continues to perceive refugees as an economic burden, constraining already 
limited resources.327In establishing the 1969 Convention, burden-sharing is a central 
theme, with sub-article (4) of Article II stipulating that: 
 
Where a member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to 
refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States 
and through the OAU and such Member States shall in the spirit of African 
solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measures to 
lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum.328 
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Despite the provision for appeal in the spirit of burden-sharing envisaged in sub-article 
(4) of Article II, there has been no corresponding success in implementing it and turning 
burden-sharing into reality.329This is because the concept of ‗burden sharing‘ is based on 
the goodwill of member states that may not necessarily help to lessen the burden of the 
refugee hosting state. This causes resentment towards refugees by the local population 
and as a result, refugees are often incorrectly blamed for economic 
hardships.330Furthermore, because the international community is not sharing the refugee 
burden equally and donor support for protracted refugee situations tends to decrease 
over time, host states are unwilling to find local solutions to these situations.331Currently, 
86% of refugees are hosted in developing countries332. Thus, many host states feel as 
though they have an unfair burden333 and are often resentful of this. As a result, host 
states generally support repatriation in order to relieve the burden of hosting refugees. 
 
Generally, refugees are perceived as a ‗burden‘, economically, socially, politically, to the 
host country. Kenya is no exception to this perceived ‗burden‘ as host state to thousands 
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of refugees and has often cited it as a basis for its restrictive policies towards 
refugees.334Prior to the large influxes of Somali refugees in the 1990s, refugees were 
generally not perceived as a major security threat335, and were mainly seen as 
contributing to the economy336. However, after the number of refugees significantly 
increased in the 1990s, the state began to see refugees as not its responsibility337, hostility 
towards refugees began to grow as they were viewed as constraining the country‘s 
resources as well as being considered less skilled and poorer than refugees in previous 
decades.338Furthermore, because protracted refugee situations receive less attention from 
actors in the international refugee regime, donor support for Somali refugees in Kenya 
also decreased after the initial refugee emergency in the early 1990s339. International 
refugee law and partners tend to look at refugees as ‗emergencies‘ and tend to reduce 
funding when situations become protracted. Protracted refugee situations are those 
unresolved beyond five years and reduced funding or support from donors seem to 
suggest that ‗you have overstayed and you should go back home‘. UNHCR admits that 
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shorted of funds affect protracted refugee situations as ‗all the attention goes to new 
cases‘340.This seems to support the argument of by Harrell-Bond who asserts that: 
The donor governments-which exercise the greatest power over refugee 
policy have become increasingly frustrated over the growing cost of 
supporting the budget of this organization and have been seeking a means 
of reducing their obligations. In their efforts to find ways to reduce costs, 
the promotion of repatriation has been seized upon as the appropriate 
solution.341 
 
Furthermore, Kenya‘s internal crises have exasperated the view of refugees as a burden. 
The influxes of the 1990s coincided with conflict that took on an ethnic character within 
Kenya that resulted in almost half a million internally displaced Kenyans342. Kenya‘s 
economic situation at the time further compounded the situation. Moreover, post-election 
violence in 2007 led to inter-ethnic conflicts that left thousands of people displaced343, 
some of who are still so. The country also experienced a drought in September 2009, 
which left millions of Kenyans reliant on emergency food aid.344Burns observes that ‗it is 
difficult for Kenyans to want to help their neighbours when they seem unable to help 
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groups were aligned to particular political parties hence the violence largely blamed on the then ruling 
party, Kenya African National Unity(KANU).See also Kagwanja, P., ‗Strengthening local relief capacity in 
Kenya: Challenges and prospects‘ In M.K Juma & A. Suhrke (Eds.), Eroding local capacity: International 
humanitarian action in Africa, Sweden, Nordic Africa Institute, 2002, p. 94 
343Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, Hasty repatriation: Kenya’s attempt to send Somali refugees home. 
Mogadishu, HIPS, 2013, p.10, Retrieved from //www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/HIPS_Hasty_Repatriation_ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed 1st February, 2018] 
344A. Burns,  ‗Feeling the pinch: Kenya, Al Shabaab and East Africa‘s refugee crisis‘, Refugee, vol. 27, no.1, 
2010,p.11 
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themselves.‘345 Consequently, when Kenya is in a time of crisis, it contributes to a 
negative view of Somali refugees as a liability. This negative perception of refugees made 
Kenyan refugee policies ‗increasingly popular with the voting public‘346, and 
consequently, the government of Kenya did not receive significant opposition from its 
citizens when implementing restrictive policies for refugees. 
Even as the Government of Kenya declared her intentions to close down the Dadaab 
camps by November 2016, it kept lamenting the heavy burden it had to shoulder for 25 
years while hosting thousands of Somali refugees. Speaking during the UNGA in New 
York on the 19th of September 2016, the Kenyan Deputy President William Ruto347 
criticized the international community who had failed to support 10 developing 
countries, Kenya included, who host about 86% of world‘s 22 million refugees. He 
observed that, ‗nothing can better demonstrate the failure of international burden-sharing 
than this reality‘.348 
Although the Government of Kenya has framed Somali refugees as a burden, the 
presence of refugees in Dadaab has brought benefits to the North Eastern Province, 
                                                          
345A. Burns,  ‗Feeling the pinch: Kenya, Al Shabaab and East Africa‘s refugee crisis‘, Refugee, vol. 27, no.1, 
2010,p.11 
346G. Loescher,  &J. Milner,  ‗The long road home: Protracted refugee situations in Africa‘, Survival, vol.47, 
no. 2, 2005, p.154 
347Deputy president William Ruto is the First Deputy president of the Republic of Kenya, under the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010.He came to power in 2013 after successfully winning an election as a running 
mate to President Uhuru Kenya in a coalition arrangement between The National Alliance (TNA) and 
United Republican Party (URP). 
348 Deputy President Press Service on 19th September 2016.The Deputy President was addressing the UNGA 
on matters of refugees while simultaneously explaining why the Government of Kenya had to close the 
Dadaab complex. Available at www.nation.co.ke/news/kenya-faults-rich-nations-over-refugee-
crises/1056-3387248-151hgnq/index.html. [Accessed on 19th September 2016]. 
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which has long been considered an impoverished region in Kenya. The presence of 
NGOs349 and the UNHCR has contributed to improved infrastructure and social 
services350. Thus, while hosting such a large population of refugees does put pressure on 
limited resources, it is also argued that the benefits to the region are greater than the 
costs, which include increased employment opportunities, commerce, social and health 
services, and new boreholes.351Other scholars have also argued that refugees can be of 
benefit to the host governments if they are allowed to work unhindered and become 
productive members of the society352,and that Somali  refugees in diaspora(those resettled 
in developed countries) can play a key role in providing aid towards refugees.353 
Jacobsen354has also observed that refugee resources may help develop areas of the 
country, increase the welfare of citizens, and extend the bureaucratic reach of the state. 
The benefits of refugee assistance persist after refugees repatriate or are relocated, and 
resources such as buildings and transportation equipment are turned over to the local 
                                                          
349 There are many NGO‘s dealing with various essential services like provision and distribution of food, 
water, health, education, livelihoods among others. Among the notable NGO‘s include CARE-Kenya, 
Oxfam, Handicap International, Windle Trust Kenya among others. UN agencies like World Food 
Programme (WFP), United Nation‘s Children Emergency Fund(UNICEF), International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) among others are also active in the refugee camps. 
350Pérouse de Montclos, A. and P. Kagwanja, ‗Refugee camps or cities? The socio-economic dynamics of the 
Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya‘, Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.13, no.2, 2000, p.206 
351United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, EPAU, Evaluation of the Dadaab firewood project, Kenya. 
EPAU/2001/08. Geneva, Switzerland, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, 2001,p.20. 
352O. El Abed has argued that refugees are as productive as free citizens if granted the opportunity. She was 
writing on Palestinian refugees in Egypt who had become integrated that they were barely 
undistinguishable. See El-Abed, O., Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948. Ontario: Co-Published by 
Institute for Palestinian Studies, Washington DC and Internatinal Develoment Research Centre Ottawa, 
2009. 
353C. Horst, ‗A Monopoly on Assistance: International aid to Refugee Camps and the Neglected role of the 
Somali diaspora‘, Africa Spectrum, Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs at GIGA, vol.43, no. 1, 2008, pp.121-
131. 
354K. Jacobsen,  ‗Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African State building‘, The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press vol.40, no.4, 2002, p. 578 
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community. After the Mozambican repatriation from Malawi was completed in 1995, the 
UNHCR handed over refugee facilities including schools, clinics and vehicles worth $35 
million to the Malawi government, which also requested $78 million from the UNHCR 
for reforestation to offset the deforestation resulting from the refugee presence.355The 
clean-up of camps and rehabilitation of the environment is usually funded by 
international agencies and implemented in cooperation with the local community. For 
example, in southern Guinea in late 2000, after Sierra Leonean refugees were relocated 
away from the border to escape rebel cross-border raids, the World Food Programme 
worked with locals to clean up some seventy-four former camps in the 'Parrot's Beak' 
area. A second phase of the project launched in November 2001 and funded by the US 
government, involved rehabilitating the environment in refugee hosting areas, and 
promoting environmentally sound food security.356Under the project, some 7700 refugees 
and people from nearby communities have received rice, ground nuts and maize seeds as 
well as hoes and machetes. Trees are being planted in former camps as well as existing 
ones. The project also entails helping local people near the camps to plant perennials such 
as coffee trees and oil palms. However, there is a big gap between available funding and 
the amounts needed to repair the damage. 
                                                          
355Although Malawi did not receive the money directly, UNHCR closed most of its 20 field offices 
throughout the country by the end of the year and handed over more than 1,500 development and 
reintegration projects worth $80 million to the Mozambican government. Available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8bc6a.html [Accessed 1st February, 2018] See also World Refugee 
Survey 1996, p.57. 
356 IRIN, ‗Guinea: IRIN Focus on efforts to rehabilitate the environment‘, 3rd June, 2002, Available at 
https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea/guinea-irin-focus-efforts-rehabilitate-environment [Accessed 1st 
February 2018] 
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It is evident that refugees are generally ‗labeled‘ as a burden by several host states. 
However, as discussed above, these claims though weighty, may be exaggerated by host 
states. Indeed, refugees, just like ordinary citizens, can be useful to host states if given a 
chance to contribute to the wellbeing of the society. 
3.2. The position of the Federal Government of Somalia on Repatriation 
 
As in the case of Kenya, the FGS supports repatriation, not based on whether they 
perceive Somalia as safe but rather on the basis of how that process will help promote the 
agenda of the FGS. In this case, regardless of the conditions at home, it is envisaged that 
Somalia will support any efforts to bring the Somali refugees back home as this will help 
send a message that the government is legitimate, accepted and that people (including 
the refugees), state and non-state actors, stand in support. This legitimacy is important as 
it will help the Somali citizens support efforts by FGS to reconstruct the state. Legitimacy 
on the international front will also help in mobilizing resources required for the 
reconstruction of the state including that of resettling returnees (former refugees) in 
safety and dignity. 
 Unfortunately, majority of Somali refugees interviewed have no understanding on the 
working and functions of government. Many indeed are uneducated and could not even 
understand why government of Somalia would support repatriation yet conditions at 
home have not significantly improved. The support of repatriation of Somali refugees by 
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Somalia government is therefore an elitist decision and may not necessarily reflect the 
position of majority Somali refugees in Dadaab. 
Many power holders in refugee countries of origin will tend to support repatriation 
regardless of the perceived or real safety and security threats in the home countries as a 
way of legitimizing their regime. The FGS is not an exception. By signing the TA with 
Kenya and the UNHCR on 10th November 2013, the FGS in essence was agreeing to 
receive Somali refugees back home. 
There are many reasons that could have informed Somalia‘s support for repatriation 
despite the several concerns it has raised about when and how the exercise should have 
been carried out. 
3.2.1 The need to inspire confidence and legitimacy at home 
 
The FGS may have endorsed repatriation of Somali refugees as a way of seeking 
acceptance at home. This is especially crucial in the sense that the Al Shabaab militia has 
been struggling to topple the western backed government. To the FGS, the repatriation of 
Somali refugees from Kenya would imply that the FGS is accepted by the local Somalis to 
the extent that those who had fled are now coming back. 
Returnees, therefore, will be going back on the basis of acknowledging the existing 
system of government as the defender of life and property. The fact that returnees will be 
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willing to accept the protection of the state in itself legitimizes the governing system 
within the state and the role of the transitional authorities as legitimate. 
When Kenya announced her plan to close down the camp by end of 2016, the FGS came 
out in support of the programme although it raised an issue with the short time allowed, 
advocating for a more a staggered process to avoid a rush. The request was granted by 
the Government of Kenya as it agreed on 21st August 2016 to promote repatriation as the 
security situation improves in Somalia.357 The Government of Kenya had maintained that 
its military had ‗pacified‘358 sections of Somalia hence it was conducive for repatriation, 
even as Somalia builds its own capacity to maintain law and order. It was also presumed 
that the presence of close to 20,000 military men under AMISOM has created a situation 
of relative peace and security in Somalia359. 
Clanism has been a basis of conflict among the Somali community that is homogenous. 
Many militias since 1991 have been organized along clan lines. While it is true that not all 
of the diaspora have relinquished tribal or clan-based interests360, their return to Somalia 
may signal a new era as they try to practice what they have learned abroad. The Somali 
diaspora, including refugees from Kenya and other countries, are more experienced and 
exposed to other cultures and may tend to be more accommodative and liberal. Having 
                                                          
357E. Buchanan, Kenya softens its position on Dadaab refugee camp closures and refugee repatriation to 
Somalia. Availbale at www.ibtimes.co.uk/ngos-welcome-kenya-decision-keep-dadaab-refugee-camp-open-
1577383Accessed on 23/09/2016. 
358S. Agnon, ‗Kenyan‘s asked to support KDF‘s mission in stabilizing Somalia, keeping country safe‘, 
23rdMay, 2016, Available at  https://intelligencebriefs.com/kenyans-urged-to-support-kdfs-mission-in-
stabilizing-somalia-keeping-country-safe/ [Accessed 1st February 2018] 
359http://www.unhcr.org/561627e39.pdf [Accessed 1st February, 2018] 
360Chatham House, British government consultation with the UK-based Somali diaspora. 8 February 2012. 
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lived in countries with functional governments and where the rule of law is observed, the 
Somali diaspora may contribute to the entrenchment of alternative organizational values 
in Somalia in the post war reconstruction process. 
 
With the mandate of the transitional government ending in 2018, refugees will have a 
major role in the post war reconstruction process upon return. Having been in exile for 
many years, refugees will have a wealth of experience on functional government systems 
and will tend to value the peace that they have enjoyed in exile and may want that 
replicated at home. Some refugees too are highly skilled and educated and have the 
capacity to spearhead the reconstruction process. 
 
3.2.2 Promote confidence levels and legitimacy among the Somali diaspora 
The Somali diaspora has played a major role in the reconstruction of Somalia through 
remittances. Financial remittances, which constitute the highest portion of contributions 
so far, can be central to Somalia‘s reconstruction as they can enhance financial economic 
survival, community stabilization and economic activities in the absence of effective state 
institutions.361 According to the UNDP report on remittances, the amount of money being 
sent to support community relief and development is significant; indeed, in some places 
it is the only assistance available.362 
 
                                                          
361Hoehne et al, Somali and Ethiopian diasporic engagement for peace in the Horn of Africa. 
362Hammond et al, Cash and compassion: The role of Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-building 
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Considering such an immense contribution by the Somali diaspora, the return of refugees 
will enhance these remittances as they are partly the beneficiaries of such remittances. 
The confidence of the Somali diaspora will in turn encourage Somalis abroad to come 
home and rebuild their state. Studies indicate that a number of displaced people and their 
communities have apparently shown an interest in returning to their areas of origin: a 
study recently carried out in Kenya and Somalia found that 31% of refugees surveyed in 
the Dadaab refugee camps said that they would return to Somalia.363Throughout 2013 to 
2016 properties development in Somalia has been on the rise with no indications of 
slowing down soon. Somali diaspora have been returning to Somalia, particularly to 
Mogadishu, to reclaim land and seek business opportunities.364 
 
3.2.3 Promote legitimacy and improve the confidence level in the international 
community 
As a government that is struggling to gain control of a nation that is under the Al 
Shabaab militia, the FGS finds repatriation a good tool for a symbolic triumph against the 
militia. The returnees will therefore strengthen the reputation of the FGS internationally 
while simultaneously weakening the Al Shabaab militia and other rebels. 
 
                                                          
363Danish Refugee Council, Durable Solutions: Perspectives of Somali Refugees Living in Kenyan and 
Ethiopian Camps and Selected Communities of Return, 2013, p 35 / 36. 
364Refugees International, ‗When Push Comes to Shove: Displaced Somalis Under Threat., 
07.11.13.Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/when-push-comes-shove-displaced-somalis-
under-threat [Accessed 2nd February, 2018] 
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Though merely symbolic, the return of Somali refugees has a huge impact upon shaping 
the way in which the Somali government engages with other countries in the world. 
Perceptions of legitimacy and improved confidence, factors that are in part contributed to 
by the returnees, will help the FGS enter into development concessions and partnerships 
with other countries and promote more cooperation. The diplomatic influence of the FGS 
will substantially increase as its bargaining power increases. 
Improved diplomatic influence of Somalia will symbolically help it regain its footing in 
the global world where multi-lateral agreements form the basis of improved trade as a 
result of reduced tariffs and non-tariff barriers. It will help create good perceptions of 
Somalia as a partner in development and prosperity as opposed to that of anarchy and 
statelessness. 
Besides the benefits diplomatically, return of Somali refugees will help attract Foreign 
Direct Investment in Somalia. This is paramount to help in the reconstruction of the 
ruined economy, creating jobs and in stabilizing the currency. 
3.2.4 Why home countries push for returns: An example of Rwanda 
In the case of Rwanda, since 2002, the government of Rwanda (GoR) has exerted pressure 
on most of the governments hosting its nationals within the Great Lakes Region and in 
Africa as a whole to sign tripartite agreements to implement return.365This is because of a 
                                                          
365Refugee Law Project, International Refugee Rights Initiative and Social Science Research Council, ‗A 
Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda‘, Citizenship and displacement in the Great Lakes working 
paper No.4, June, 2010. International Refugee Rights Initiative. 
Availableat:http://www.refugeerights.org/Publications/Papers/2010/10_08_30_Dangerous_Impasse.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2015]. 
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desire to see refugees return and take part in rebuilding their country, as well as to ensure 
the protection of vital security and justice issues which flow from Rwanda‘s history of 
genocide. Rwandan strategies include push factors such as a ban on cultivation and a 
reduction of food rations, the forced repatriations of October 2007 and July 2010366have 
been put in place to force367 Rwandan refugees to return. In 2011, UNHCR recommended 
the invocation of cessation clause scheduled for implementation on 30th June 2013 but 
was later postponed to 31st December 2017368, and its implementation369 is yet to be fully 
realized. Some of the returns so far conducted in line with tripartite agreements have 
been characterized by the use of force, threats, deceit and coercion370. Indeed, a report by 
International Refugee Rights Initiative and Social Science Research Council, titled  ‗A Dangerous Impasse: 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
366Cessation of refugee status is provided for in both the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU 
Convention – although the basis upon which a declaration of cessation can be made is described in broader 
terms in the latter Convention. (Article 1C of the 1951 UN Convention and article I(4) of the 1969 OAU 
Convention.) 
Refugee Law Project, International Refugee Rights Initiative and Social Science Research Council, ‗A 
Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda‘, Citizenship and displacement in the Great Lakes working 
paper No.4, June, 2010. International Refugee Rights Initiative. 
Availableat:http://www.refugeerights.org/Publications/Papers/2010/10_08_30_Dangerous_Impasse.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2015]. Harrell Bond, B. Cessation Clause Uganda Style, Keynote Speech Delivered at 
the Northwestern University Conference on Human Rights, January23, Working Paper 11-001, January 
367Involuntary return of refugees can also amount to a violation of the principle of the jus cogens principle of 
non-refoulement which prohibits states from ―expelling or returning a refugee to the frontiers of territories 
where he or she would be exposed to persecution‖. (Article 33, 1951 Refugee Convention.) Non–refoulement 
can occur as a result of direct action by a state or as a result of indirect measures, such as cuts in food 
rations, anti-refugee rhetoric, harassment by the local administration etc, which leave refugees with little 
choice but to repatriate. 
368Email Communication with the Principal Protection Officer, Office of the Prime Minister on 20th October 
2016. 
369J. Kanamugire,  ‗African countries in a fix as Rwanda refugee status end‘, The East African, 20thJanuary, 
2018.Available at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Rwanda-refugee-status-ends-/2558-4271610-
w74qg5z/index.html[Accessed 3rd February 2018] 
370International Refugee Rights Initiative and Social Science Research Council, ‗A Dangerous Impasse: 
Rwandan Refugees in Uganda‘, Citizenship and displacement in the Great Lakes working paper No.4, June, 2010. 
International Refugee Rights Initiative. 
Availableat:http://www.refugeerights.org/Publications/Papers/2010/10_08_30_Dangerous_Impasse.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2017]. 
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Rwandan Refugees in Uganda‘,  warn that ‗the current repatriation exercise is voluntary, in 
reality strong push factors are being created that refugees interpret as amounting to force, 
force that they see as emanating from both the government of Uganda‘371. Despite these 
pressures, a number of Rwandan refugees have stayed put. In addition, new asylum 
seekers and former repatriates (recyclers) continue to be registered as new arrivals, 
having made their way back to Uganda.372 
 
3.3.0 Perceptions of the UNHCR and partner agencies on the safety of Somalia 
 
3.3.1 Perceptions of the UNHCR 
The response of the UNHCR, and the international community in general373, to Kenya‘s 
push for repatriation of Somali refugees is that they do not perceive Somalia as safe for 
return. Reacting to Kenya‘s position on May 6th 2016, that refugees must return, the 
UNHCR in a press release posted on their website on 9th May 2016, maintained that,  
                                                          
371International Refugee Rights Initiative and Social Science Research Council, ‗A Dangerous Impasse: 
Rwandan Refugees in Uganda‘, Citizenship and displacement in the Great Lakes working paper No.4, June, 2010, 
pp.19-20. 
Availableat:http://www.refugeerights.org/Publications/Papers/2010/10_08_30_Dangerous_Impasse.pdf 
[Accessed 2ndFebruary 2018]. 
372A. Avenir, Over One Million Rwandan Refugees Face Forced Repatriation from Uganda, 16 May 2010, available 
at: http://www.afriqueavenir.org/en/2010/05/16/over-one-million-rwandan-refugees-face-forced-
repatriation-from-uganda/ [Accessed 21 March 2011]. 
373 The United Nations and the European Union expressed safety concerns in Somalia when the 
Government of Kenya insisted that Somali refugees must repatriate. The EU and the UN send high level 
delegations to meet President Uhuru Kenyatta in a bid to convince him to rescind his decision to close 
Dadaab refugee camps. The UN and EU represent several countries. See Kelley, K., ‗UN Security Council 
coming to Kenya to press Uhuru on refugees‘, 18th May, 2016. Available at 
https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Top-UN-diplomats-coming-to-Kenya-over-Dadaab/1056-3208854-
up6txtz/index.html [Accessed 3rd February, 2018] 
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It is with profound concern that the UNHCR takes note of this 
announcement. The safety of thousands of Somalis, South Sudanese and 
others has hinged on Kenya‘s generosity and willingness to be a leading 
beacon in the region for international protection. Tragically, the situations in 
Somali and South Sudan that cause people to flee are still unresolved 
today.374 
 
Even though the UNHCR may not have agreed with the opinion of Kenya that Somalia is 
safe for return, it insisted that the process should be voluntary and with no specific 
timelines, perhaps to protect refugees from undue pressure to repatriate. After assurance 
from president Uhuru Kenyatta, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees noted 
that, ‗I was very happy to hear the president say emphatically that any solution-and 
repatriation is obviously the best solution-has to be conducted in a manner that is 
humane, dignified, safe and respects international law and principles‘375. 
According to the UNHCR, returns can only be considered voluntary if positive pull 
factors in the country of origin‘ are the ‗overriding element in the refugees‘ decision to 
return rather than possible push-factors. Push factors include human rights abuses, and 
when refugees are ‗subjected to pressures and restrictions and confined to closed 
camps.‘376The vast majority of returnees to Somalia, it may be argued, may not meet the 
                                                          
374 UNHCR reacting to the Government of Kenya‘sannouncement on 6th May 2016 that it was planning to 
close Dadaab refugee camps, hosting approximately 400,000 Somali refugees, and to repatriate Somali 
refugees forthwith. Available atwww.unhcr.org/new/press/2016/5/57308e616/unhcr-appeals-kenya-
decision-end-refugee-hosting.html[Accessed 10th July, 2016.] 
375 UNHCR Fillipo Grandi, speaking after meeting President Uhuru Kenyatta on 12th June, 2016. The 
Kenyan president assured the UNHCR that international laws and principles would be considered during 
the repatriation. 
376UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation, International Protection, 1996, 2.3. 
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criteria for voluntary return because when refugees feel they have no option but to return 
to their country of origin, this can amount to forced return.377 
 
3.3.2 Perceptions of the UNSC as a UNHCR partner agency 
In this section, I discuss the condition of physical security in Somalia as reported by 
various security actors including the UNSC and NGO‘s. These reports are important 
because repatriation works on the assumption that security conditions at home must have 
improved. While the researcher was unable to empirically collect data in Somalia because 
of logistical, security and financial constraints, it is reported that civilians in south and 
central Somalia persistently face insecurity and risk being targeted for grave human 
rights abuses. These include, for instance, indiscriminate and targeted violence, including 
rape and murder, as well as extortion.378 Although it is unclear who is responsible for 
attacks on civilians in all circumstances, it is widely believed that all parties to the 
conflict, including the SNAF379 and allied militia, as well as Al Shabaab, carry out such 
attacks. AMISOM, Ethiopian and Kenyan forces have also been responsible for attacks 
that have killed and injured civilians, including and as a result of violations of 
international humanitarian law (IHL).380 
                                                          
377J. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, 2005, p. 464. 
378 Amnesty International (2014a:16). No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced. AFR 
52/001/2014. London: UK. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-
home-2014.pdf  
379 Somali National Armed Forces(SNAF).Somali national army was one of the strongest military in Africa 
before the 1991 coup of President Siad 
Barre.Seehttps://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/somalia/personnel.htm [Accessed 2 February, 
2018] 
380For more information see: Amnesty International, Returns to south and central Somalia: a violation of 
international law, 15 May 2013. 
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Although it is  difficult to monitor the impact of the conflict on civilians, given limited 
access to many parts of south and central Somalia, and the ongoing absence of a system 
to track civilian casualties381,it is generally agreed that violence of every kind is still 
rampant. The conflict is characterized by violations of international humanitarian lawand 
human rights abuses by all sides in conflict, and civilians often fall victim. For example, 
the port town of Kismayu saw intense clan-based fighting in June 2013 over a 
longstanding dispute382as well as disagreements over the creation of a semi-autonomous 
state, Jubaland.383One incident alone resulted in the reported deaths of at least 70 civilians 
with hundreds more wounded.384 At least 18 of those said to be killed were children.385 
On 17 November 2013, at least 25 people were killed when heavy fighting broke out 
between government forces and local armed militia in Lower Shabelle region in an area 
                                                          
381Security Council resolution 2036 (2012) commended the commitment of AMISOM to establish a Civilian 
Casualty, Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) to track and investigate incidents of civilian 
harm, and provide compensation when required. The cell has yet to be established. 
382The rift between the Marehan and Ogaden clans over control of Juba land and Kismayu . It demonstrates 
how these sub-clans struggle for power, yet both support the Darod for the 
larger control of the Somalia government. It is important to note that the Harti sub-clans including the 
Majerten control Puntland.[Interview of Somali refugees at Dadaab camps, 12th November 2016]See also 
International Training Programme for Conflict Management, ‗Clan and State Politics‘, International 
Commentary Vol. IX no. 34, 2013,pp.15-16. 
383Jubaland is semi-autonomous region where Kismayu is located. The control of Juba land is therefore 
necessary for one to control the strategic port city of Kismayu , the biggest port city in Somalia. 
Human Rights Watch, Somalia: Civilians Killed in Kismayo Clashes, 26 June 2013, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/25/somalia-civilians-killed-kismayo-clashes[Accessed18.12.15]. See 
also International Training Programme for Conflict Management, ‗Clan and State Politics‘, International 
Commentary Vol. IX no. 34, 2013,p.16 
384UN, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 3 September 2013, S/2013/521, para 17. 
385UN, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 3 September 2013, S/2013/521, para 41. 
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known as Km 50.386 On 13 December 2013, further clan based fighting broke out across 
Lower Shabelle region killing at least 10 people and injuring dozens others.387 
 
Reports indicate that schools and hospitals continue to be targeted, and while challenges 
in access make it difficult to determine the extent, the UN has identified 72 attacks on 
schools and 12 on hospitals in 2012, and verified seven attacks on schools between 
January and March 2013.388 On 15 January 2013, six children were killed when AMISOM 
accidentally fired at a madrasa (Islamic school) in Lego, Lower Shabelle.389The worst 
single bomb in Somalia‘s history hit a Somali hotel on 14th October 2017,killing at least 
hundreds390 people, raising questions on future stability prospects for a country that was 
seemingly stabilizing. 
 
Unlawful killings continue to take place with frequency. Reportedly, killings by the 
SNAF are often as a result of weak command control and discipline, while Al Shabaab 
continue to cause civilian harm through an indiscriminate use of weapons, as well as 
                                                          
386See http://allafrica.com/stories/201311170308.html for further details [accessed 18 December 2015]. 
387Reports to Amnesty International, 16 Dec 2015, on file. 
388UN, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 
(2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013, S/2013/413, Annex 8.1, para 14 and 17. 
389UN, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 
(2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013, S/2013/413, para 139. See also UNSC, Report of the Secretary General on 
Somalia, 3 September 2013.AMISOM may have mistaken the children for Al Shabaab. 
390 ‗Somalia: Atleast 230 dead in Mogadishu blast‘, BBC, 16thOctober, 2017. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41621660 [Accessed 3rd February 2018].See also  Nor, O., and 
Gray, J., ‗Mogadishu bombings kill ‗unprecedented number of civilians‘, CNN News, 16th October, 
2017.Available at https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/15/africa/somalia-mogadishu-
blast/index.html[Accessed 3rd February 2018] 
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targeted killings.391Unlawful attacks on civilians are particularly common on main 
transport routes. Men, sometimes wearing government uniforms, have reportedly fired 
on transport vehicles, often killing or injuring civilian passengers.392 
 
Despite the presence of AMISOM in Somalia, Al Shabaab, although weakened, continue 
to reign terror on civilians and even make daring raids393on foreign militaries under 
AMISOM, such as the Kenya Defence Forces. Security in Mogadishu and surrounding 
cities has been improving considerably since Al Shabaab fighters were dislodged from 
these regions by coalition of AMISOM and SNAF forces. Somalia‘s capital city has not 
seen running battles for months. Business vibrancy is slowly but steadily returning.394The 
prevailing sense of optimism has prompted thousands of refugees in Kenya and diaspora 
Somalis elsewhere to return home. Still, normalcy is an elusive prospect. Suicide 
bombings, targeted assassinations and sporadic clashes between Al Shabaab fighters and 
Somali government security forces remain common, with the worst single suicide 
                                                          
391UN, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 
(2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013, S/2013/413, para 139. See also UNSC, Report of the Secretary General on 
Somalia, 3 September 2013, para 133. 
392Amnesty International., No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced,p.17,AFR 
52/001/2014,London, Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-home-
2014.pdf [Accessed 3rd February 2017] 
393 For instance, the Al Shabaab ambushed a Kenyan military base in El-Adde in Somalia reportedly killing 
several KDF soldiers on the morning of 15 January2016.This bloody attack was carried as headlines in 
Kenya‘s popular newspapers on the 16th January 2016.The Standard, for instance, carried the headline 
‗Bloody battle for KDF troops‘. This attack on the KDF camp in Somalia could be a justification that Somalia 
is still too dangerous for any meaningful repatriation. 
394Ali, L., ‗‘Mogadishu is like Manhattan‘: Somalis return home to accelerate progress‘, Guardian – 
January2013 http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/jan/11/mogadishu-manhattan-
somalis-returnprogress 
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bombing in Somalia claiming hundreds on 14thOctober, 2017395. Despite significant losses, 
Al Shabaab fighters still control a large swath of land in southern Somalia.396 That makes 
most refugees nervous and uncertain about returning to Somalia. According to a study 
report by Heritage Institute for Policy Studies titled Hasty Return, only 6% of those 
interviewed in Kenya said they are prepared to return home immediately. 63% said they 
considered Somalia their home and are willing to return if conditions continue to 
improve, and more regions are recovered from Al Shabaab fighters. 20% said they were 
not willing to return to Somalia because the conditions under which they fled 
remain.397This implies that by the time the Tripartite Agreement for return was signed in 
November 10th2013, majority refugees were considering returning to Somalia in the 
future if physical safety conditions improved and Al Shabaab was defeated. 
 
In sum, the UN and international organizations operating in Somalia have recognized 
that conditions are not yet conducive for the return of Somali refugees.398 Indeed several 
reports399by UN and NGO‘s have warned of the security situation in Somalia at the 
                                                          
395O. Nor, and J. Gray,  ‗Mogadishu bombings kill ‗unprecedented number of civilians‘, CNN News, 16th 
October, 2017.Available at https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/15/africa/somalia-mogadishu-
blast/index.html[Accessed 3rd February 2018] 
396As early February, Al Shabaab controls much of Middle Shabelle, parts of Lower Shabelle, almost all of 
Galgaduud, Bakool, Gedo and Middle Juba regions. 
397Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, Hasty repatriation: Kenya’s attempt to send Somali refugees home. 
Mogadishu, HIPS, 2013, p.19 Retrieved from //www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/HIPS_Hasty_Repatriation_ENGLISH.pdf 
 
398UNOCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin, September 2013. 
399UN Security Council (UNSC), Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 8 January 2016, S/2016/27, 
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present time, expressing concern about the current conditions in Somalia and noting, 
among others, the following: 
(i)There remains a large presence of local and national militias contributing to local 
insecurity; 
(ii)There is not sufficient protection for returnees; 
(iii)There has been a surge of human rights violations including gender-based sexual 
violence; 
(iv)A large influx of refugees being returned will likely destabilize the situation in 
Somalia and undermine the fragile authority of the government; 
(v)The new government does not have the capacity to provide assistance to returning 
refugees; 
(vi)The situation in Somalia remains fluid – there are many unknowns such as whether 
AMISOM‘s mandate will be renewed and if so, for how long; 
(vii)While the situation has stabilized in Mogadishu, it is remains extremely difficult for 
NGOs and international agencies to operate in southern Somalia; 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5698a0b64.html, para. 12. According to the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, 
in February 2016 ‗Somalia was once again among the deadliest countries for civilians, with 107 killed‘, Tony 
Blair Faith Foundation, Global Extremism in February 2016, 
http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Extremism%20Monitor%2002.16.pdf, p. 3. In 
January 2016 Somalia ‗saw more incidents related to violent extremism than any other country‘. Tony Blair 
Faith Foundation, Global Extremism in January 2016, 
http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/reports-analysis/report/global-extremism-
january-2016, pp. 7-8. ‗The volatile security situation has deteriorated since the beginning of the year [2015], 
making the delivery of assistance and protection services to people in need 
even more dangerous‘, OCHA, 2016 Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview, 25 November 2016, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/somalia/document/2016-somalia-humanitarian-
needs-overview p. 11. In January 2016.[Accessed 4thFebruary 2018] 
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(viii)Corruption remains rampant400. 
3.3.3 Sexual violence 
Several international agencies have reported that rape and other forms of sexual violence 
against women and girls is endemic in Somalia,401 particularly in settlements and camps 
for displaced people.402Most perpetrators are reportedly armed, and many allegedly wear 
the uniforms of government security forces.403According to the UN, 800 cases of rape and 
other forms of sexual violence were reported in Mogadishu and surrounding areas 
between January and July 2013.404As a result of the type of genital mutilation practiced by 
many Somalis405, which involves sewing up the genitalia, rape victims may literally be cut 
open by their assailants, using daggers or bayonets. The degree of physical pain and 
psychological trauma inflicted by such experiences requires no elaboration.406Curiously, 
the Dadaab camps in northeastern Kenya, where the refugees have gone to seek refuge 
have also reported sexual violence within and around the camps. While such forms of 
                                                          
400Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, Hasty repatriation: Kenya’s attempt to send Somali refugees home. 
Mogadishu, HIPS, 2013, p.24. Retrieved from //www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/HIPS_Hasty_Repatriation_ENGLISH.pdf 
401UN, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 
(2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013, S/2013/413, para 139. See also UNSC, Report of the Secretary General on 
Somalia, 3 September 2013, para 42. 
402For more information see: Amnesty International, Rape and Sexual Violence in Somalia: an ongoing 
epidemic, 30 August 2013. 
403UNSC, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 3 September 2013, para 42; Amnesty International, 
Rape and Sexual Violence in Somalia: an ongoing epidemic, 30 August 2013. 
404UNOCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin, July 2013. 
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406 Somalis undergo FGM that involves the sewing of the genitalia. Rape in such a case means the victim 
suffers immense pain and psychological torture of unimaginable magnitude. See also Jeff Crisp titled A 
State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya's Refugee Camps,2000,p.606 
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insecurity have remained largely hidden from external view, the problem of sexual 
violence (especially rape) in the three camps around Dadaab has attracted a substantial 
amount of international attention.407 
 
Protesting why she will not return to Somalia, Interviewee Farhia, a young woman aged 
20, whose sentiments represents many, laments that ‗There are lots of war casualties in 
Somalia. Other safety issues are impunity and forced marriage‘408. Perhaps aware of what 
awaits her in Somalia, she is concerned that she may be given out in marriage against her 
wish-a culture acceptable among the Somalis in Somalia. Though Somalis in Kenya may 
practice the same, they will do as covertly as it is illegal. 
3.4.0 Individual perceptions of Somali refugees on the safety in Somalia 
The concerns of refugees about the safety of Somalia as a precondition for repatriation is 
best understood by looking at the rationale behind their decision either to return or not. 
This is because those unwilling to return generally regard Somalia as unsafe. Those 
willing to return if conditions improve are of the view that Somalia, though not safe now, 
may soon improve allowing for the conditions that will allow409 them to return. Although 
not willing to return at the time, Mohamed indicated he does not mind returning home in 
future if conditions at home allow. On the other hand, those willing to return consider 
                                                          
407See Human Rights Watch, Seeking Refuge, Finding T error: The widespread rape o f Somali women 
refugees in north-eastern Kenya (New York, 1993); Africa Rights, The Nightmare Continues. Abuses 
against Somali refugees in Kenya (London, 1993); Binaifer Nowrojee, Target for Retribution (Human Rights 
Watch, New York, 1997). 
408Interview with Farhia, Dadaab, 24/8/2016. 
409 Interview with Mohamed on 24th August 2016. 
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Somalia safe to return or are simply tired of being refugees and would return regardless 
of the conditions at home410. Idris, my interviewee, complained that the conditions in 
Dadaab, and pressure by Government of Kenya to return leaves them with no option but 
to return regardless of conditions at home. 
While the study deliberately avoided reducing the refugee repatriation debate into 
numerical data, it may just be important to note that of the 15 refugees interviewed, only 
2 perceived Somalia as safe. A detailed analysis of their perceptions will be discussed in 
chapter 5 while exploring the idea of inclusivity. These perceptions of refugees on the 
safety of Somalia are discussed in further detail below based upon the fieldwork findings. 
3.4.1 Refugees unwilling to return: Somalia too insecure for habitation 
The individual perceptions of refugees concerning the safety of Somalia as a pre-
condition for repatriation is very important if repatriation is to be actualized. It, however, 
appears that not all refugees are enthusiastic about returning to Somalia. According to 
one such refugee: 
The only person who wants to go back to Somalia is doing so to go from the 
worst to the worst. If your motherland is that way, and here in Kenya we‘re 
chased all the time, what can we do? I left Dadaab because of insecurity. 
Now in Nairobi there are security problems here too. It is too bad to be a 
Somali. But my dream is nothing about Somalia.411 
 
                                                          
410 Interview with Idris on 24th August 2016 
411Ayaan, a refugee, 31, from Gedo region and who had recently fled Dadaab for Nairobi in search for better 
opportunities. She dismissed any future plans to relocate to Somalia. 
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The sentiments expressed by Ayaan above are echoed by another refugee who not only 
views Somalia as too risky in terms of security, but also considers Kenya as equally 
unsecure for refugees. According to him: 
The problem is there is no security in Somalia. Mogadishu is not safe, even the 
government can‘t protect themselves. So the question is, can the Somali 
government protect the Somali people? No, it can‘t. Even in Kenya we are not 
protected. So how can the Somali government protect us?412 
 
 
Because of the proximity to Kenya-Somali porous border, Dadaab refugee camps also 
experience insecurity. This leaves Somali refugees caught in a cycle where they are not 
safe in either situation.  
 
Explaining his opinion, Omar wondered how a government that cannot withstand the 
militia can protect its citizens. Salah Omar‘s view is similar to that of Salah, a refugee in 
Dagahaley camp in Dadaab. Asked whether he thought Somalia was now safe for return, 
he simply wondered how one can return to Somalia where ‗Central government is weak 
and corrupt and there is no peace and stability’413. This perception of Salah Omar is 
corroborated by that of Ismael who is not considering repatriation because ‗Somalia 
government  is weak and most parts of Somalia are under militia control‘414Refugees 
therefore do not view Somalia as safe for repatriation. 
 
                                                          
412 Omar, 43, a refugee in Dadaab, argues that there is no way the Government of Somalia that is struggling 
with instability can guarantee the civilians much needed security. 
413Interview with Salah Omar, a refugee, at Dagahaley camp in Dadaab, 24/04/2016 
414Interview with Ismael, a refugee, at Dagahaley camp,24/8/2016. 
143 
 
Refugees are in a dire situation in Kenya and see the financial assistance for repatriation 
as a necessary form of survival or use the opportunity of assistance for repatriation to test 
the conditions in Somalia because the information of the happenings there are scanty. 
Asked on what she thought about the organized repatriation, Josephine, a young 
Sudanese refugee said, ‗for me, I think many Somali refugees are just opting to 
temporarily return to Somalia in order to benefit from the repatriation financial and 
material assistance from UNHCR only to return after a few weeks or months citing 
insecurity‘.415 She claims she knows a number of refugees who took the offer only to 
return. Josephine‘s view, though from a Sudanese refugee, illustrates the general 
perceptions and dynamics of refugees to the process of repatriation. It appears some 
refugees may have taken the offer of a repatriation package as a way of piloting the 
possibility of relocating to Somalia. 
 
Although a majority of refugees cited insecurity in Somalia as the reason they are 
unwilling to return, a considerable number admit that there is very little reliable 
information from Somalia to that effect. It appears this lack of information has made 
many Somali refugees assume that this is as a result of insecurity in Somalia. Asked about 
her thoughts about the security in Somalia, a refugee, Ali, believed that there is ‗More 
violence experienced in Somalia, no clear information about the situation‘416. Ali‘s 
perception seems to have been informed by the little or lack of information about the 
                                                          
415 Josephine was the only non-Somali refugee respondent. As a Sudanese refugee, her perception of the 
repatriation process may be termed as ‗objective‘ as it is from a non-partisan party. 
416 Interview with Ali, a refugee, at Dagahaley refugee camp in Dadaab on 24/8/2016 
144 
 
actual security situation in Somalia. The lack of reliable information about Somalia is 
confirmed by Abdi who lamented that ‗I cannot repatriate because no one knows what 
actually happens at home security wise‘.417 It is therefore evident that lack of or scanty 
information about the situation in Somalia is hindering the repatriation process as 
refugees cannot make any informed decision regarding return. 
3.4.2 Willing to return if conditions improve 
While some refugees may choose to take up the UNHCR offer for repatriation and risk, at 
least for some time, others like 50-year old Mihiya who has been a refugee for 25 years, 
cannot make such an attempt and simply say, ‗I want to go back. It is my motherland but, 
because of the current security situation, I cannot go back‘.418 UN officials say some of the 
main complaints by those who had returned were about lack of schooling or adequate 
shelter, after leaving a camp where basic needs were met.419This implies that refugees 
perceive socio-economic conditions at home as equally important as the security 
situation. As stated by Hogan420, an essential part of any refugee information system is 
the returnees who report back to the refugees in exile about the conditions at home. The 
information returned by these repatriates is often considered by the refugees to be the 
most reliable of all possible information sources because they have been refugees 
themselves. Returnees understand what kind of information is most valued by those still 
                                                          
417 Interview with Abdi, a refugee, at Dagahaley refugee camp in Dadaab on 24/8/2016 
418 Reuters, Daily Nation, online accessed at mobile.nation.co.ke/news/UN-repatriate-Somalis-Dadaab/-
/1950946/3043828/-/format/xhtml/-/sfq99qz/-/index.html on 22 January, 2016. 
419 E. Blair, Reuters, ‗UN Agency eyes 50,000 Somalis returning from Kenyan camp‘Reuters Accessed at 
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420Hogan, M., ‗Quest for Living Space: Repatriation Efforts among Assisted Displacees in South-Central 
Sudan‘ in Cuny, Barry Stein and Pat Reed(eds.) Repatriation during Conflict in Africa and Asia, Dallas, Texas, 
Center for the Study of Societies in Crisis, 1992,pp. 38I-427. 
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in exile.421It appears refugees have a lack of trust in some of the institutions (government 
and non-state agencies) relying moreover on fellow refugees who have experienced the 
same as themselves. Refugees tend to rely, on their networks422 as the most important 
feature for information flow and support systems. 
3.4.3 Refugee involuntary returns 
Some refugees, whom expressed frustrations about life as a refugee in Kenya, also 
consider returning to Somalia even if conditions at home have not improved. A critical 
analysis of their perceptions indicate that it is more as a result of push factors in Kenya 
and not necessarily because of pull factors in Somalia. One such refugee, Abdullahi, 
thinks he will take up repatriation after all, ‗food security in the camps is inadequate. 
Insecurity in camp is deteriorating too‘.423Abdullahi was responding to a question on 
whether he would take up repatriation. He seemed to prefer Somalia over Kenya because 
he termed the current life in the camp as unbearable. It is thus evident that the conditions 
at the camps are very difficult and refugees do not have enough to eat. This, obviously, 
also puts into question the quality, as in nutrition, of the food rations at Dadaab refugee 
camps. The food is limited and the diet not varied. 
 
The argument by Abdullahi is not unusual. In the report of 14th September 2016, HRW 
condemned the Government of Kenya and the UNHCR accusing them of coercing Somali 
                                                          
421M. Hogan, ‗Quest for Living Space: Repatriation Efforts among Assisted Displacees in South-Central 
Sudan‘ in Cuny, Barry Stein and Pat Reed(eds.) Repatriation during Conflict in Africa and Asia, Dallas, Texas, 
Center for the Study of Societies in Crisis, 1992,p.423 
422J. Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, Second Edition , Cambridge, Polity 2009. 
423 A refugee in Dadaab responding to a question on whether he would take up repatriation. He seemed to 
prefer Somalia over Kenya because he termed the current life in the camp as unbearable. August 02, 2016. 
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refugees to return to Somalia. Another refugee, Sahra, a 42-year-old woman from Hiraan 
region who has signed up for return to Somalia is quoted in the HRW report as saying, 
‗It‘s not the right time for us to go back. But every day the Kenyan government is telling 
us that we have to go, and UNHCR is not giving us any different information…I said I 
will go back as we have no other option.‘424 Bill Frelick, refugee rights director at HRW, 
condemned the Government of Kenya for what he say is involuntary return of Somali 
refugees. He lamented that, 
‗The Kenyan authorities are not giving Somali refugees a real choice between 
staying and leaving, and the UN refugee agency isn‘t giving people accurate 
information about security conditions in Somalia…there is no way these returns 
can be considered voluntary‘425. 
 
The UNHCR, Government of Kenya and Somalia would later, through a joint 
communiqué, dismiss the report as ‗misinformation‘ and ‗negative publicity‘426 of the 
repatriation process. It appears the three Tripartite Parties were unwilling to admit that 
they have been overseeing a process that is ‗involuntary‘, contrary to the provisions of the 
international refugee laws.  
                                                          
424 HRW Report released on 14th September 2016.The UNHCR, Government of Kenya and Somalia would 
later dismiss the report as ‗misinformation‘ and ‗negative publicity‘ of the repatriation process. Report 
available at:  
www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/14kenya-involuntary-refugee-returns-somalia 
425 HRW Report released on 14th September 2016.The UNHCR, Government of Kenya and Somalia would 
later dismiss the report as ‗misinformation‘ and ‗negative publicity‘ of the repatriation process. Report 
available at:  
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repatriation-of-refugees/1056-3385964-8o7rjj/index.htmlAccessed on 18th September 2016. 
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3.4.4 Willing to return because conditions have improved 
Despite the fear that Somalia is still too insecure for habitation, there are refugees who 
feel that Somalia is safe and are willing to return. Hodan, a refugee in Dadaab who 
signed up for repatriation is eager to go back home. She says, ‗I am very excited about 
going home. I have decided to go and nobody forced me‘427.Whereas Hodan is not sure of 
what exactly awaits her in Somalia, she remains optimistic that peace will prevail and she 
will have a part in contributing to the reconstruction of her homeland. 
 
Those who were willing to return because they believed Somalia was now safe had other 
different concerns. Among them is the challenge of restoring their rights to, for example, 
land ownership. In theory returning refugees must have access to land or a means of 
sustaining a livelihood. Returning refugees should be treated with respect and fully 
accepted by their national authorities, including through the full restoration of their 
rights.428In practice, however, reports indicate that the return of refugees, has resulted in 
increased pressure over land access and disputes over land ownership rights. Perhaps the 
greatest challenge that the returnees will have to contend with is recognition of their right 
to land and access to that right. 
 
It is hoped that the returnees will have access to all rights due to other citizens in order to 
make the repatriation exercise sustainable. The opportunities in the post conflict Somalia 
                                                          
427NTV Television News,5th May 2016 
428 UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation, International Protection, 1996, 2.4. 
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are great and with them come an equal challenge on how to ensure this without 
degenerating into another resource related conflict. 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
In this his chapter I explored different perceptions of the Tripartite parties and refugees 
about the security situation in Somalia as a prerequisite for return. The Government of 
Kenya has insisted that Somalia is relatively ‗safe‘ for return of thousands of Somali 
refugees. The Government of Kenya has pressurized refugees to return, sometimes 
threatening to close down the refugees and forcefully repatriate them. Albeit without 
evidence; it has blamed refugees for increased insecurity and terrorist attacks in Kenya. 
Kenya has claimed that some terror elements hide within the refugee camps as they plan 
to launch attacks on Kenya - an assertion that too lack substance as evidence shows that 
many refugees accused of these allegations have often been acquitted by the courts. This 
seems to be more of a ‗smear campaign‘ against refugees to serve Kenyan interests. 
 
The Somali Federal Government is also interested in the positive legitimacy credit it is 
likely to receive locally and internationally by welcoming refugees from exile. It is 
however grappling with weak governance structures in the face of a resurgent Al 
Shabaab militia that seeks to topple it. Returnees also complicate local politics and 
threaten the relative calm in Somalia as returnees and locals fight over rights to land and 
other resources. 
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The UNHCR on the other hand seeks to protect refugee welfare without antagonizing the 
host state and state of origin. The fact that refugees are a political issue leaves the 
UNHCR with very limited options and is compelled to work within what is allowed by 
the host state. Reduced funding to UNHCR puts UNHCR in a fix as states adopt a more 
restrictive approach to hosting refugees. 
 
Refugees, perhaps aware of this predicament, are forced to rely on their networks and 
judgment to either return or remain in the camps amidst dwindling UNHCR support to 
stay in the camps. Although the majority of Somali refugees in Dadaab cite insecurity in 
Somalia as a reason not to return, they admit they have limited options. The situation is 
dire. Because refugees cannot directly make decisions regarding return, a preserve of the 
elites, they are forced to creatively bear the consequences of such decisions. The fact that 
the Government of Kenya, SFG and UNHCR arrived at and signed the Tripartite 
Agreement despite refugee perceptions of the in(security) in Somalia implies that the 
elites utilized these systems for many different and competing interests. This is in line 
with elite theory where a few privileged individuals or organizations make decisions on 
behalf of the masses. Aware of these embedded interests, refugees rely on their own 
networks to verify information about Somalia and make independent decisions regarding 
return. 
In the next chapter, chapter four, I explore the responsibilities of the Tripartite Agreement 
before, during and after the repatriation process. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF KENYA, SOMALIA AND THE UNHCR IN 
REPATRIATION 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter explores and examines the roles and responsibilities of the Kenya-Somalia 
UNHCR (tripartite parties) in ensuring successful voluntary repatriation of Somali 
refugees and in promoting stability and security in the region. The Tripartite Agreement 
signed between Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR on 10th November 2013 envisaged 
certain responsibilities among the tripartite parties. This was in order to achieve the 
objective of the agreement to provide ‗a legal framework for the safe and dignified 
voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees from the Republic of Kenya and their 
reintegration in the Federal Republic of Somalia.‘429 Since Somali refugees came to Kenya 
in 1991, the government of Kenya has rejected possibility of integrating Somali refugees. 
This is because Somalis are viewed as security threat in Kenya as will be discussed 
further in chapter 3. 
 
Implicit in the discourse, promoting voluntary repatriation in the 1990‘s, is the notion that 
the return to the country of origin is the most ―natural‖ outcome of exile and, as such, it is 
also the least problematic solution.430Increasingly established as the most viable solution 
                                                          
429 This is according to article 2 of the Tripartite Agreement signed between The Government of The 
Republic of Kenya, the Government of The Federal Republic ff Somalia and The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees Governing the Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees Living in Kenya. 
430M. Eastmond, Reconstruction and the Politics of Homecoming: Repatriation of Refugees in Cambodia, Working 
Paper no. 1, Department of Social Anthropology , Göteborg University, April 2002, p.2 
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for refugees, repatriation has come to be designated by the international community of 
states and the UNHCR as the ideal solution to the global refugee problem431and 
especially when dealing with large numbers of refugees. 
 
This, however, does not imply that repatriation is workable or straight forward as the 
most preferred solution to the refugee problem. In fact, the few in-depth or ethnographic 
studies focusing on repatriation (most of them from African contexts) suggest that far 
from being a simple solution, return is often a complex process and the outcome is far 
from given.432The problem is both political and perceptual. It is political in the sense that 
repatriation seem to be less problematic politically as refugees return to their original 
place. The perception of return presupposes a less politically complex route for many 
actors hence the view that is the most appropriate or preferred. In essence, however, 
repatriation is dynamic and complex and not simplistic as it may sound. Indeed, Bradley 
has noted that it is important to further research on repatriation as it has not received a 
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2004, pp.55-73. Omata, N.,  ‗Struggling to Find Durable Solutions: Liberian Refugees in Ghana‘, New Issues 
in Refugee Research, Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 
 Research Paper no.234, 2012. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (1996). Handbook on 
voluntary repatriation: International protection. Geneva, Switzerland, UNHCR. Takahashi, S., ‗The UNHCR 
handbook on voluntary repatriation: The emphasis of return over protection‘, International Journal of Refugee 
Law, vol.9, no.4, 1997, pp.593-612. 
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adequate attention from researchers. This is despite a significant shift433 of policy on 
refugees towards repatriation as the preferred solution. This preference of repatriation 
comes with a series of implications for refugees who may not be able to challenge this 
move. 
 
The international refugee regime is operating at a challenging time as the absolute 
number of refugees worldwide has significantly increased, as well as the incidences and 
length of protracted refugee situations (PRS)434. At the end of 2014, 14.4 million refugees 
were under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees435. Of 
this number, 6.4 million were in a protracted situation 436.Protracted (prolonged) refugee 
situations are refugee problems unresolved within 5 years. The Somali refugees in 
Dadaab, Kenya, are a classical example of a protracted refugee situation that has taken 27 
years and remains unresolved. Protracted refugee situations pose many hardships for 
refugees as they ‗find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their 
                                                          
433M. Bradley, Refugee repatriation: Justice, responsibility and redress. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013,p.8 
434 A PRS is understood in this dissertation as a situation when refugees are in exile for five or more years 
after being displaced and a durable solution is not imminently possible (UNHCR, Excom, 2009).   
435United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global trends report 2014. Geneva, Switzerland, Division 
of Programme Support and Management, 2015,p.2 
This number excludes Palestinian refugees who are under the protection of the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA).   
436 This statistic uses the definition of a PRS as ‗a situation in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same 
nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in a given asylum country‘ (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 8).   
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lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and 
psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile.‘437 
The OAU Convention may be credited with having been the first international 
instrument to codify, in treaty terms, the principles on the voluntary repatriation of 
refugees. The relevant provisions are contained in Article V which states that: 
1. The essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no 
refugee shall be repatriated against his will. 
2. The country of asylum, in collaboration with the country of origin, shall make adequate 
arrangements for the safe return of refugees who request repatriation. 
3. The country of origin, on receiving back refugees, shall facilitate their resettlement and 
grant them the full rights and privileges of nationals of the country and subject them to 
the same obligations. 
4. Refugees who voluntarily return to their country shall in no way be penalized for 
having left it for any of the reasons giving rise to refugee situations. Whenever necessary, 
an appeal shall be made through national information media and through the 
Administrative Secretary General of the OAU, inviting refugees to return home and 
giving assurance that the new circumstances prevailing in the country of origin will 
enable them to return without risk and to take up a normal and peaceful life without fear 
of being disturbed or punished and that the text of such appeal should be given to 
refugees and clearly explained to them by their country of asylum. 
                                                          
437United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‗Protracted refugee situations', Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, vol.24, no. 1, 2005, p.150. 
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5. Refugees who freely decide to return to their homeland as a result of such assurance or 
their own initiative shall be given every possible assistance by the country of asylum, the 
country of origin, voluntary agencies and international and inter-governmental 
organizations to facilitate their return438. 
 
While it is worthwhile to appreciate that the provisions of the OAU Convention are 
comprehensive, to a large extent its implementation is dependent on the good-will of 
individual states. The dynamics of individual refugee situations, the nature and extent of 
conflict, the interests of the state of origin, the interests of the host state and those of the 
international organizations led by the UN refugee agency influence the manner and the 
processes involved in the implementation of the repatriation provisions. Compromise is 
therefore common with all parties lobbying in order to protect their interests as far as 
possible. 
 
In the case under study, the Government of Kenya, SFG and the UNHCR signed a 
Tripartite Agreement on 10th November 2013 which was to be a roadmap for the 
voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees. It has however emerged that the Tripartite 
parties read from a ‗different script‘439 when it came to interpretation of the TA as they 
could not agree on the appropriate time to execute massive returns considering the 
                                                          
438OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Adopted on 10 September 1969 
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. CAB/LEG/24.3. It entered into force on 20 June 1974. 
439K. Kelley, ‗UNHCR re-emphasizes stance on mode of repatriation of refugees‘, Daily Nation, 19th 
September, 2016.Available at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/UN-responds-to-claims-of-forceful-
repatriation-of-refugees/1056-3385964-format-xhtml-nvrxmaz/index.html[Accessed 6th February, 2018] 
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volatile in(security)situation in Somalia. While Kenya preferred a massive repatriation 
that could have seen Dadaab closed by end of May 2017440, the UNHCR preferred a more 
staggered voluntary repatriation with no ‗time-bounds‘441. As the findings from 
interviews of various stakeholders suggest, the whole process of repatriation is a complex 
one and its dynamics cannot be merely confined to the contents of the Tripartite 
Agreement. 
 
The UNHCR has pursued three durable solutions for refugees in the form of integration, 
resettlement and repatriation. These may in practice be implemented as Development 
through Local Integration (DLI), Resettlement, and the 4R‘s: repatriation, reintegration, 
rehabilitation, reconstruction.442 The first is integration where refugees integrate with 
local communities in the host state. This requires the willingness of refugees to integrate 
and the permission from the host state to do so. It works better when refugees and locals 
share many similar characteristics such as language and religion among others. Second, a 
durable solution is resettlement where refugees are resettled in a ‗third‘ country. This 
means the refugee is neither returning to the home country (first country from which they 
fled) nor integrate in the host state(second country that they fled to).Instead, a willing 
country(third country) offers to grant them asylum, which may, or not, include an offer of 
                                                          
440 ‗Kenyan closure of Dadaab refugee camp blocked by high court‘, BBC, 9th February, 2017.Available 
athttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38917681[Accessed 6th February, 2018] 
441K. Kelley, ‗UNHCR re-emphasizes stance on mode of repatriation of refugees‘, Daily Nation, 19th 
September, 2016.Available at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/UN-responds-to-claims-of-forceful-
repatriation-of-refugees/1056-3385964-format-xhtml-nvrxmaz/index.html[Accessed 6th February, 2018] 
442United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Framework for durable solutions for refugees and persons of 
concern, Geneva, Core Group on Durable Solutions, 2003. 
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citizenship. Statistics indicate that very few refugees (about 1%) benefit from resettlement 
in a third country and resettlement is considered a ‗rare solution to refugee crises‘443. The 
UNHCR report indicates that there ‗were 17.2 million refugees of concern to UNHCR 
around the world at the end of 2016, but less than one per cent were resettled that 
year‘444.The third durable solution is repatriation where refugees return to their home 
country voluntarily. However, solutions are not easily achievable as they are largely 
dependent on the conditions in the countries of origin, affected by the policies of asylum 
and donor states, and the level of burden sharing.445 
 
In essence therefore, the TA of 10th November 2013 is just the beginning of a long process 
of seeking a permanent solution to Somali refugees in Kenya and may not be signaling 
the end of the Somali refugee problem in Kenya. While the parties to the TA committed 
to the fulfillment of certain obligations as per the TA, the realization of these 
commitments remains elusive and has often been a source of a diplomatic incident 
among various stakeholders in the refugee regime. 
 
                                                          
443M. Bradley, Refugee repatriation: Justice, responsibility and redress. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013,p.1 
444http://www.unhcr.org/resettlement.html[Accessed 6th February, 2018] 
445 Although the definition of burden sharing has changed over time, it generally refers to financial 
assistance and the resettlement of refugees to a third country, from often low-income countries that 
disproportionately carry the burden of hosting refugees (Boswell, 2003).  This may also include material 
and financial assistance to host states meant to ease the ‗burden‘ they are shouldering as a result of hosting 
refugees. 
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This chapter explores the obligations of the parties in the TA, through the views of 
various stakeholders on the ground in order to examine the ideal roles of various parties 
as envisaged in the TA viz a viz the reality of such commitments in practice. 
 
4.1 Role and responsibility of Kenya in repatriation 
According to the general principles of international law, states are obliged to protect all 
the individuals living within their national boundaries.446 The prime responsibility for the 
protection of refugees thus lies with the country in which the refugees are present. The 
role of the UNHCR is, therefore, complementary to the protection that states are 
supposed to provide to the refugees involved.447 
 
In the case of Kenya, the need to abide by the international instruments governing the 
various aspects of refugees is legally supported by the constitution. Significantly, Article 
2 (5) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 states that the general rules of international law 
shall form part of the law of Kenya. Article 2(6) then states that any treaty or convention 
ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law448. However, it is arguable whether treaties 
relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms are self-executing, as another 
constitutional provision requires the State to legislate international obligations in respect 
                                                          
446M. Weiner, ‗Ethics, National Sovereignty and the Control of Immigration‘ , International Migration Review, 
vol.30, no.1,p. 171 
447A. Fortin, The Meaning of 'Protection' in the Refugee Definition, 12 International Journal Of Refugee Law 569 
(2000). 
448 The Constitution of Kenya(2010),Article 2(5) &2(6) 
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of human rights and fundamental freedoms.449 Thus, the Government of Kenya may use 
this opportunity to legislate on refugee matters to serve their interests. It appears the 
manner in which states domesticate the international refugee law through national 
legislation ends up overshadowing the ideal provisions of the international refugee 
regime. 
 
Kenya, for instance, has maintained that, ‗the Government of Kenya is not forcing any 
refugees to return‘450. On the other hand, it has insisted that, ‗there comes a time when we 
must think primarily about the security of our people…that time is now.‘451 While Kenya 
would want to be seen to be fulfilling her international obligations concerning refugees 
by not wanting to forcefully eject refugees, it still maintains that the obligation can be 
waived when her national security is threatened. Such comments are not surprising as 
Black and Koser452argue, repatriation has become a political issue and therefore the 
motivations of stakeholders need to be scrutinized, including host and home 
governments and the international community453.For instance, although evidently not in 
                                                          
449Article 21(4) of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) provides that: ‗The State shall enact and implement 
legislation to fulfill its international obligations in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.‘ 
450 Interior CS on refugee repatriation as aired by NTV on 5th May 2016.He was shielding the Government 
of Kenya‘s position from critics who interpreted the repatriation campaign by the government as 
amounting to forced repatriation. 
451 The Interior CS while announcing the government of Kenya‘s position to close down Dadaab refugee 
camps citing Kenya‘s national security and by implication the role the camp plays in fuelling terrorism and 
insecurity. 
452R. Black, R. and K. Koser, The End of the Refugee Cycle? Oxford, Berghahn, 1999, p.3. 
453 R. Black, R. and K. Koser, The End of the Refugee Cycle? Oxford, Berghahn, 1999, p.3. 
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the best interest of refugees, host states often prefer rapid repatriation, irrespective of the 
conditions in the state of origin.454 
 
Host states might pressure for premature and forced repatriation if their concerns 
surrounding hosting refugees are not resolved, which could negatively impact the 
institutions and peace building efforts in the state of origin455.Milner further highlights 
that premature repatriation may be promoted when donor and host states have self-
interests456 in doing so. This type of repatriation, however, is not a durable solution for 
protracted refugee situations as the factors that caused refugees to flee still exist and the 
preconditions for repatriation have not been met457.The biggest challenge to the 
proposition by Milner is the fact that those pushing for or against repatriation may not 
agree on whether the conditions that necessitated the flight have changed. The question is 
what constitutes a premature return? This is important as those pushing for return, in this 
case Kenya, will justify why they think conditions at home have changed to allow for 
return while those against will imply the conditions have remained unchanged and hence 
defend the need for refugees to continue enjoying international protection. 
 
                                                          
454B. Rutinwa, ‗The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa‘, Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, vol.21, no.1, 2002, p.13. See also  G. Stein, Refugee repatriation, return, and refoulement during 
conflict, 1997. 
455J. Milner, ‗Refugees and the regional dynamics of peace building‘, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.28, no.1, 
2009, p.17 
456 J. Milner, ‗Refugees and the regional dynamics of peace building‘, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.28, no.1, 
2009, p.26 
457 J. Milner, ‗Refugees and the regional dynamics of peace building‘, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.28, no.1, 
2009, p.26 
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Furthermore, many premature returns can also be attributed to a failure by the 
international community to protect and assist refugees458.  Long also draws attention to 
the fact that states, rather than UNHCR, ‗are liable to take the most draconian measures 
in order to promote repatriation‘459.Kenya has, from May 2016, strongly indicated that the 
time for hosting Somali refugees in Kenya has run out and that the focus should now be 
in repatriating them. According to President Kenyatta, it was time to focus on ‗post 
conflict reconstruction in Somalia and to ensuring a safe and humane repatriation of 
refugees.‘460 He however maintained that Kenya was committed to her obligations under 
international law even in the process of repatriating Somali refugees. 
 
Considering that focus has shifted from resettlement to repatriation at the end of the Cold 
War, repatriation, the process by which a refugee returns to their country of origin, 
continues to be the most preferred and promoted solution in the international refugee 
                                                          
458G. Stein, Refugee repatriation, return, and refoulement during conflict, 1997,p.13 
459K. Long, Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee 
repatriation. PDES/2013/14, Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013,p.21 
 
460 President Kenyatta speaking at state house Nairobi while hosting president Erdogan of Turkey on 22nd 
June, 2016.At the time, Turkey was also under pressure after opening her borders to about 2 million 
refugees fleeing the Syrian conflict and seeking refuge in Europe. Turkey had also closed her borders 
following the refugee mass influx. Available at http://www.president.go.ke/2016/06/02/press-briefing-
by-his-excellency-hon-uhuru-kenyatta-c-g-h-president-and-commander-in-chief-of-the-defence-forces-of-
the-republic-of-kenya-during-kenya-turkey-bilateral-talks-at-state-house-n/ [Accessed 7th February 2018] 
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regime.461Refugee regimes are the institutions, legal instruments and norms composing 
the institutional framework which regulates the management of refugees. 
 
In the Cold War era, the recognition of persecution, or provision of asylum, was mainly 
used as a means to illustrate the failure of ‗Communist regimes.‘462 Today, however, with 
the changes in the current political climate, repatriation is considered to be the most 
viable solution to the refugee crises.463 Given the fact that today the most distinctive 
feature of the refugee problem is the ever-increasing reluctance of potential asylum and 
resettlement countries to fulfill their international obligations, it should not be surprising 
that repatriation has been heavily emphasized as the paramount solution to this 
problem.464The refugee regime seems to have been overtaken by the heavy burden of 
having to host refugees for many years, an aspect the 1951 UN Convention never 
contemplated at the time of its ratification. 
 
Kenya has been generously providing asylum for hundreds of thousands of refugees 
from across the region. Few countries in Africa can claim to have as flexible and as 
accommodating an asylum regime as Kenya has made available to those escaping 
                                                          
461 This paper will use the definition of refugee regime outlined by Scalettaris (2007, p. 49), as ‗the 
institutions, legal instruments and norms composing the institutional framework which regulates the 
management of refugees.‘ 
462K.E. Mahoney and P. Mahoney(eds.)Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century A Global Challenge, 627 vol. 
2, London, 1993, 627.; see also G. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path , Oxford , 
2001,p.7. 
463See Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, Repatriation: Under What Conditions is it the Most Desirable Solution For 
Refugees? An Agenda for Research, African Studies Review, vol. 32. no. 1, 1989. 
464See Garvey, supra note 3, at 182-183; Charles B. Keely, ‗The International Refugee Regime(s):The End of 
the Cold War Matters‘, International Migration Review vol.35,no. 1.,2001,p.306 
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persecution or war in neighbouring states. Amongst these, Somalis have figured 
prominently: for over twenty years, Somali civilians have been fleeing the conflict that 
has gripped much of their country. The world‘s biggest refugee camp, hosting the largest 
Somali population outside Somalia, is in Dadaab in North Eastern Kenya, a group of five 
settlements that have been home to refugees since 1991.Kenya, albeit facing domestic 
pressure from citizens and politicians to repatriate Somali refugees, should be assisted by 
the international community so as not to bear this problem alone. In fact, the UNHCR has 
proposed that: 
While the long-term confinement of refugees to camps and closed 
settlements is a severe restriction of their rights, it is important to 
acknowledge the concerns of host states as well. Receiving countries need 
help to overcome the political and economic obstacles that prevent them 
from finding alternatives to confining refugees within camps. These states 
need to be assisted and encouraged to allow refugees greater freedom of 
movement, access to social services and the right to earn a living. In this 
context, the two key concepts set out in the Framework for Durable 
Solutions are Development Assistance for Refugees and Development 
through Local Integration. Both recognize that refugees need not inevitably 
be perceived as a burden but could, in the right circumstances, be agents of 
development.465 
 
 
Article 24 of the TA provides the roles and obligations of Kenya in the voluntary 
repatriation as follows: 
 
 i. Facilitate sensitization of refugees on voluntary repatriation; 
                                                          
465‗Rethinking durable solutions‘, The State of World’s Refugee. Available at 
https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/rethinkingdurablesolutionsrefugees.pdf[Accessed on 14th 
January 2016]. 
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ii. Facilitate access by UNHCR to Somali refugees wherever they may be in Kenya so as to 
implement the voluntary repatriation programme provided for in this Agreement; 
iii. Issue and or validate documentation in respect of births, marriages, divorces, 
adoptions, deaths or other legal status as well as educational credentials in 
acknowledgement of academic or vocational skills obtained by refugees in Kenya; 
iv. Simplify immigration formalities and procedures to facilitate exit from Kenya in 
accordance with applicable national law; 
v. Facilitate ‗go and see‘ visits of refugees to areas of intended return, and ‗come and tell‘ 
visits by Somali Federal or local authorities as provided for under Article 15 of this 
Agreement; 
vi. Exempt all goods of the returnees, their personal effects or communal property, 
including household and electronic items, food and livestock from customs and duties or 
taxes which would otherwise apply; 
vii. Simplify and expedite health formalities and requirements to the extent feasible in 
accordance with the law in the interest of facilitating easy exit from Kenya of the 
repatriating refugees; 
viii. Provide security escorts for the repatriation convoys, the staff of the Parties and the 
implementing partners engaged in the operation in Kenya; 
ix. Facilitate the joint registration with UNHCR of Somali refugees wishing to voluntarily 
repatriate and; 
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x. The Government of Kenya shall continue to provide protection and assistance to all 
refugees until durable solutions are attained in accordance with national and 
international law466. 
 
While the TA seems to be comprehensive in terms of the responsibilities of Kenya in the 
repatriation process, senior Government of Kenya officials interviewed for this 
dissertation remained evasive on the actual responsibility of Kenya and instead chose to 
limit Kenya‘s role in repatriation, as that of providing logistical support during 
repatriation, security, management and control and resource mobilization for 
resettlement of returnees. Asked what was to be the role of the taskforce established by 
the Internal Security Cabinet Secretary, the Principal Secretary responded, ‗Mainly is to 
draw the roadmap to closure, what are the logistical issues that need to be addressed, 
what are the costs involved, what are the security requirements and deployments 
required…but mainly we require of them a timetable to closure‘467. These four areas can 
be seen as essential services that could actualize the repatriation process. It is not lost to 
anyone that what is envisaged in the TA as the role of Kenya goes beyond these four 
basic responsibilities acknowledged by the Government of Kenya. Kenya seems to be 
keen on her roles and responsibilities in the short term, in order to facilitate the massive 
repatriation, but appears less bothered as to whether Somalia is safe for returnees so as to 
                                                          
466This is what is provided for in Article 24 of the Tripartite agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Kenya, the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
governing the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya, Signed10th November 2013 
467 Interior(Internal Security) Principal Secretary Dr. Karanja Kibicho while responding to a question on 
what was to be the role of the taskforce established by the Government of Kenya to facilitate repatriation. 
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ensure a sustainable repatriation process. This is because a rushed repatriation process, 
without due diligence on the safety and dignity of returnees in Somalia, may cause the 
returnees to flee again making the process unsustainable. 
 
4.1.1 Establish logistics 
The Government of Kenya, upon announcing her intentions to repatriate Somali refugees 
must put in place a comprehensive logistical system to support the repatriation. The 
logistical details entail the pre-repatriation, repatriation and post-repatriation phases. The 
first two squarely fall within Kenya‘s jurisdiction while the post-repatriation phase is 
mainly the responsibility of Somalia. 
 
Although Kenya provided security and bus transport to repatriating refugees, they are 
accused of ―dumping‖468 refugees at the Kenya-Somalia border. Complaints are rife that 
refugees are literally squatting469. 
 
                                                          
468 A. Hamer, ‗Kenya accused of 'dumping' Somali refugees back over the border with no support ‗ 20th 
October, 2016 Available at  
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/20/kenya-accused-of-dumping-somali-refugees-back-
over-the-border-with-no-support [Accessed 15th March, 2019] 
469 A. Hamer, ‗Kenya accused of 'dumping' Somali refugees back over the border with no support ‗ 20th 
October, 2016 Available at  
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/20/kenya-accused-of-dumping-somali-refugees-back-
over-the-border-with-no-support [Accessed 15th March, 2019] 
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4.1.2 Provide security 
Article 12(2) of the TA provides that ‗The Government of the Republic of Kenya shall be 
responsible for the safety and security of repatriating refugees while within Kenyan 
territory, according to national and international law‘470. This in essence means that 
refugees are under the protection of the Government of Kenya until they cross the border 
to Somalia after which the responsibility is transferred to the Federal Government of 
Somalia. 
 
Interestingly, the case of Somali refugees in Kenya is complex and paradoxical. While the 
Government of Kenya is ideally supposed to be protecting the ‗vulnerable‘ refugees, in 
reality it is pushing for their repatriation, ostensibly for causing insecurity and 
threatening her national security instead. While the actual role of refugees in terror 
activities in Kenya remain speculative and blurred, the Government of Kenya has 
maintained that they have facts and statistics that support their assertion. The Deputy 
President, William Ruto, while attending a humanitarian summit in Turkey for instance 
said that, ‗when we say the refugee camp poses an existential security threat to Kenya, we 
have facts, we have figures and we can demonstrate that that indeed is the case‘471.The 
                                                          
470Article 12(2) of the Tripartite agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Somalia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees governing the voluntary 
repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya, Signed 10th November 2013 
471 The Deputy President speaking at the sidelines of the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, Turkey 
on 23 May 2016. The Deputy President and his team had sought to lobby the international community to 
support Kenya in her bid to repatriate Somali refugees from world‘s largest refugee camp, Dadaab. This 
speech was captured by many Kenyan and international media outlets. 
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refugees472 refuted claims that they are responsible for the terror attacks on Kenya. 
Refugee partners (defenders), also denied these claims that refugees engage in terror 
activities often citing that in fact the mastermind of the Garissa University attack was the 
son of a Chief, a Kenyan government official473. 
 
Despite accusations towards a section of the Somali refugees by the Government of 
Kenya, the Kenyan government has the obligation of protecting all refugees within her 
borders. Indeed with support and coordination from UNHCR, the GoK provides round 
the clock security in the vast Dadaab camps and has police stations and posts across the 
refugee camp. This remains an obligation both prior to, and during, repatriation. 
 
4.1.3 Refugee management and control 
Among the responsibilities given to the task force to oversee the implementation of 
closing down Dadaab refugee camps was that of establishing a system of refugee 
                                                          
472 A focus group discussion with refugee representatives at Dadaab refugee camp on 12thNovember 
2017.They refuted claims that refugee support and engage in terrorism. 
473 One of the mastermind of the Garissa University attack, in which 148 university students were killed, 
was a son of Kenya government official-A Chief(in charge of a location-‗location administrator‘. His father 
had already reported his suspicious son to government security officials but this, too, could not deter him 
(and his accomplices) from staging one of the deadliest terror attacks in Kenya that received global 
condemnation. Those defending refugees often remind the Government of Kenya that the enemy could be 
within (Kenyan citizens) and not necessarily external (foreigners-refugees). See A. Laing, ‗One of Garissa 
attack gunmen was ‗government official's son‘ and ‗bright law student‘, The Telegraph, 5th April, 2015. 
Available  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/11517049/One-
of-Garissa-attack-gunmen-was-government-officials-son-and-bright-law-student.html [Accessed 8th 
February, 2018] 
Agence France-Presse, ‗one of Garissa attackers identified‘, Daily Nation, 5th April, 2015, Available at 
https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Garissa-Attack-Al-Shabaab-Gunmen-Abdirahim-Abdullahi/1056-
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management and control prior to and during the repatriation exercise. According to one 
Government of Kenya official, verification and transit centers are established through 
which refugee identity is verified before being given the repatriation package to help 
refugees rebuild their lives back in Somalia. Considering the vast porous border between 
Kenya and Somalia, transit centers in specific point of exit were also to be demarcated to 
facilitate the repatriation process. 
4.1.4 Resource mobilization 
Repatriation is an expensive venture especially when dealing with large numbers. This is 
the scenario in Kenya for the case of Somali refugees as she anticipates repatriating about 
half a million Somali refugees. Article 8 of the TA envisages the role of Kenya and other 
parties to the TA as that of mobilizing resources for the ‗voluntary and organized · 
repatriation of Somali refugees and the reintegration of Somali returnees‘474. 
 
Kenya has sought to lead the way for repatriation by setting aside 10 million dollars 
(Kenya shillings 1 billion)475 in a bid to lobby the international community to help raise 
the close to 200 million dollars (20 billion Kenya shillings)476 supposedly required to 
successfully complete the repatriation exercise. While various players have pledged or 
indicated an intention to contribute towards repatriation exercise, the colossal amount 
                                                          
474Article 8(II) of the Tripartite agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Somalia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees governing the voluntary 
repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya, Signed 10th November 2013 
475http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ktnnews/index.php?videoID=2000107801&video_title=kenyan-
government-pledges-1-billion-shillings-towards-repatriation-of-dadaab-refugees[Accessed on 10th August 
2016]. 
476http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/06/24/repatriation-of-dadaab-refugees-to-cost 
sh20bn_c1374341. [Accessed on 10th August, 2016]. 
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required is yet to be realized477. Many partners also tended to have a ‗wait and see‘ 
attitude before deciding to put their money into the repatriation exercise. It appears many 
would want to see the outcome of the first cohort to be repatriated before determining 
whether the repatriation process is likely to be successful and sustainable, so as to avoid 
recycled refugees. Indeed by end of 2017, the process of repatriating Somali refugees had 
slowed because of ‗lack of resources, insecurity in Somalia and opposition by human 
rights groups‘478. Others still may have been hopeful that the Government of Kenya could 
rescind its decision to close down the camps hence delayed or suspended their funding 
support for repatriation of Somali refugees. 
 
While Kenya has maintained that, this time, it is serious in shutting down the Dadaab 
refugee complex, critics have argued that this threat to close down the camps could be the 
Government of Kenya‘s strategy to attract international attention and lobby for more 
funds to support her financial burden as it keeps the camp open. The accusation of 
Government of Kenya was raised by Former National Assembly Deputy Speaker, Farah 
Maalim, who accused the state ‗of blackmailing the international community for more 
funding in the latest threat to repatriate thousands of refugees from Kenya‘479.This is a 
                                                          
477‗Funding Crisis could delay repatriation of Somali refugees‘, Mogadishu Center for Research and Studies5th 
July, 2016. Available at  http://mogadishucenter.com/English/2016/07/05/funding-crisis-could-delay-
repatriation-of-somalia-refugees/ [Accessed 8th February, 2018] 
478 F. Oluoch, ‗Efforts to lower refugee numbers run into challenges‘, Relief Web, 30th August 2017. 
Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/efforts-lower-refugee-numbers-run-challenges [Accessed 
8th February, 2018] 
479A. Hajir, ‗State accused of blackmail in refugee repatriation standoff‘, Daily Nation, 15th May, 
2016.Available  at  https://mobile.nation.co.ke/counties/refugee-repatriation-standoff/1950480-3204312-
12ymkelz/index.html [Accessed 8th February, 2018] 
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claim that the Government of Kenya has vehemently denied insisting that no amount of 
money from donor community would make Kenya change her position on repatriation of 
Somali refugees480. The PS was explaining the position of the Government of Kenya 
concerning her decision to close Dadaab refugee camps citing the threat to national 
security that militants in the camp poses. The camp has remained open at the time of 
compiling this dissertation despite the many closure deadlines set by the Government of 
Kenya.  
 
4.1.5 Role of Kenya in induced repatriation 
While parties to the TA ‗agree that the decision of the refugees to repatriate shall be based 
on their freely expressed wish and their relevant knowledge of the conditions within the 
country of origin and the areas of return‘481, Kenya has always signaled that Somali 
refugees may have to repatriate regardless of the conditions in Somalia.482Although 
Kenya has been issuing statements that may be construed to mean threats that support 
involuntary repatriation since the 1990‘s, it has never, in the strict sense, carried out these 
                                                          
480 Dr. Karanja Kibicho, Principal Secretary of Interior ministry responding to claims that the Government 
of Kenya was blackmailing the international community over refugees so as to get more funding. He was 
responding to an in an interview with Eric Njoka on 11th May, 2016 at the K24 TV Studios. The PS was 
explaining the position of the Government of Kenya concerning her decision to close Dadaab refugee 
camps citing the threat to national security that militants in the camp poses. 
481 Article 10(2) of the Tripartite Agreement between Kenya, Somalia and UNHCR 
482 After the Westgate attack in Nairobi on 21 September 2013 and the Garissa University terror attack on 
2nd Aril 2015 in which more than 200 people were killed, the Government of Kenya maintained that cells of 
the Somali refugees in Dadaab could have been linked to the attack(s).Consequently, the Government of 
Kenya asserted that the time for repatriation of Somali refugees had come with timelines of three months or 
so being mentioned. 
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threats until 2014483. After the Westgate attack in Nairobi on 21 September 2013 and the 
Garissa University terror attack on 2nd April 2015 in which more than 200 people were 
killed, the Government of Kenya maintained that cells of the Somali refugees in Dadaab 
could have been linked to the attack(s)484. Consequently, the Government of Kenya 
asserted that the time for repatriation of Somali refugees had come. Speaking at the time, 
Kenya‘s Deputy President William Ruto maintained that, ‗We have asked the UNHCR to 
relocate the refugees in three months, failure to which we shall relocate them 
ourselves…the way America changed after 9/11 is the way Kenya will change after 
Garissa university attack‘485 
 
However, the announcement by the Government of Kenya in May 2016 that it was 
planning to repatriate Somali refugees by 30th November 2016 could have signaled a new 
era of a refugee regime in Kenya. Unlike previous pronouncements by the predecessor 
governments, the Government of Kenya seem to have been serious and campaigns to 
close down the Dadaab camps soon started in earnest with thousands of Somali refugees 
repatriating to Somalia. Records from the UNHCR show that about 75000 refugees have 
                                                          
483Kenya intensified its restrictive approach to Somali refugees from 2014.Like the USA 9/11 attack that 
changed USA approach to security, Kenya‘s apathy to Somali refugees worsened especially after it emerged 
that one of the West Gate terror (21stSeptember 2013) masterminds once lived at Dadaab refugee camps. 
Since then the Government of Kenya and the general population have viewed the Somalis with suspicion. 
484‗West Gate attack: MP‘s to call for refugee camps to close‘, BBC, 30th September 2013. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24339508 [Accessed 8th February, 2018] 
485 D. Miriri, ‗Kenya demand UN removes massive Somali refugee camp‘, Reuters,11th April, 2015 Available 
at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-attacks/kenya-demands-u-n-removes-massive-somali-
refugee-camp-idUSKBN0N20DQ20150411 [Accessed 8th February, 2018] 
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repatriated between 2014 and end of 2017486.While many of these may have repatriated 
voluntarily, a significant number may have involuntarily repatriated after the 
Government of Kenya threatened to shut down the refugee camp. It remains to be seen 
whether the camp will actually be closed down and how sustainable the massive 
repatriation exercise will be. This bold move by the Government of Kenya, which has 
attracted both support487and criticism488 from various state and non -state actors489, is not 
a new phenomenon. Kenya seems to have learnt from various countries that at some 
point repatriated refugees, involuntarily disregarding the principle of non refoulement that 
prohibits coerced or forceful repatriations. 
 
For instance, since the signing of a tripartite agreement between the governments of 
Burundi and Tanzania, and the UNHCR, all of those who fled Burundi for Tanzania in 
the 1990s have been coming under increasing pressure to return.490 In August 2012, the 
government of Tanzania, with the support of UNHCR and the cooperation of the 
government of Burundi, paved the way to legally deport those who continued to resist 
                                                          
486http://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/12/Voluntary-Repatriation-Analysis-15-
December-2017.pdf [Accessed 8th February, 2018] 
487B. Wafula, ‗69% of Kenyans support repatriation of Somali refugees-IPSOS‘, Citizen Television, 17th 
November, 2018.Available https://citizentv.co.ke/news/69-of-kenyans-support-repatriation-of-somali-
refugees-ipsos-149163/ [Accessed 8thFebruary, 2018] 
488Aljazeera, ‘Kenya's plan to shut Dadaab refugee camp criticized’, 3rd June, 2016. Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/dadaab-refugee-camp-somalia-diplomat- [Accessed 8th 
February, 2018] 
489Human Rights Watch, ‗Kenya: Protect Somalis facing conflict, abuses, drought‘, 23rd March, 2017. 
Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/23/kenya-protect-somalis-facing-conflict-abuses-
drought[Accessed 8th February, 2018] 
490 See IRRI and Rema Ministries, ‗Resisting Repatriation: Burundian Refugees Struggling to Stay in 
Tanzania,‘ September 2011; and the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration and IRRI, ‗I Don‘t Know 
Where to go: Burundian Refugees in Tanzania under Pressure to Leave,‘ September 2009.   
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voluntary repatriation. They did this through the invocation of cessation, one of the 
mechanisms in refugee law through which refugee status can be withdrawn in certain 
circumstances, and through the conduct of individual assessments to determine whether 
the refugees continued to require international protection. At the end of the assessment, 
38,050 were declared to have lost their refugee status.491 Having lost the refugee status, 
finally, at the end of October 2012 the Tanzanian army moved in and started to load the 
now former refugees onto trucks and take them to Burundi.492 When to invoke the 
cessation clause remains a controversial subject as it eventually paves the way for what 
can be termed as ‗legal involuntary repatriation‘. 
 
However, there are risks involved when involuntary repatriation is practiced by a host 
state. A part from going against the international refugee instruments that safeguard 
against forced return, such coerced repatriations could worsen conditions in the home 
country (as a result of intense conflict) and may even lead to the massive influx of 
refugees (Andersen 1996:206).Host countries, including Kenya, should only support the 
repatriation of Somali refugees when such actions lead to sustainable returns in Somalia 
so as not to produce another refugee influx. This argument is supported by the views of 
some refugees in Dadaab who, as some put it, thought that the Tripartite Parties had 
                                                          
491 Figure according to the government of Tanzania, ‗The Government of Tanzania Determined to Close 
Mtabila Refugee Camp in Kigoma,‘ not dated, available at 
http://www.moha.go.tz/index.php/component/content/article/82-news-and-events/181-the-
government-of-tanzania-determined-to-close-mtabila-refugee-camp-in-kigoma.   
492 Lucy Hovil and Theodore Mbazumutima, ‗Tanzania‘s  Mtabila camp is finally closed,‘ Pambazuka 
News, 13 December 2012, available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/85766.   
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failed because ‗returnees repatriated to areas controlled by militia may be recruited into 
militia army‘493and that ‗Some repatriates came back to the camps because of insecurity in 
Somalia‘. This could worsen conflict and lead to more refugee influx. 
 
Even after signing the TA on 10th November 2013, as a roadmap for voluntary 
repatriation of refugees, the Government of Kenya seems to be piling pressure on Somali 
refugees in Dadaab to repatriate in what may amount to involuntary repatriation 
contrary to the provisions of the TA494. Responding to a question from Parliament‘s 
Administration and National Security Committee member Mohamed Diriye (Wajir 
South), Interior Cabinet Secretary Joseph Nkaissery claimed that Somali refugees in 
Dadaab were ready to repatriate but UN agencies and NGO‘s were frustrating efforts to 
repatriate them. He maintained that, ‗There are big wars there; otherwise many refugees 
are willing to go back, but the NGOs are not interested because they make a lot of money 
in the process‘.495  The Interior CS would later ask the National Assembly‘s Security and 
Administration Committee to help the government in its efforts to send the refugees at 
Dadaab back home. In that Committee, he was quoted to have argued that ‗We need to 
move, many Somalis want to go back home, but they are held back by NGOs. If this 
committee can come up and demand timelines, then the government can 
                                                          
493 Interview with Hassan, a Somali refugee at Hagadera, Dadaab refugee camp 12th February, 2017. 
494Article 10 of Tripartite agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Somalia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees governing the voluntary 
repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya, Signed 10th November 2013 
495 Jacob Ng‘etich ‗UN agencies frustrating repatriation of refugees, says Joseph Nkaissery‘, The Standard  
available at: www.standardmedia.co.ke/mobile/article/2000194281/un-agencies-frustrating-repatriation-
of-refugees-says-joseph-nkaissery[Accessed on 9th January 2016] 
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move‘.496Although late Cabinet Secretary Joseph Nkaissery seemed to blame the NGOs 
for the reluctance of refugees to repatriate, it is clear that the refugees themselves could 
be opposing the move to repatriate if one considers the dire security situation in Somalia. 
Mr. Nkaissery reported that the Government of Kenya, Somalia and Jubaland region 
administration (in Somalia) had identified 1000 hectares to build a refugee camp inside 
Somalia. He further noted that, ‗The UN and other agencies have set aside sh. 10.5 billion 
for the construction of a refugee camp that can accommodate 50,000 people near Ras 
Kamboni. The building will include schools, health facilities and an airport.‘497 It 
therefore appears that while the Government of Kenya is pushing for repatriation in the 
shortest time possible, the UN agencies and NGO‘s, are keen on how and when the whole 
process should be carried out. They are skeptical because they may not be convinced that 
the security situation in Somalia will guarantee a safe and dignified return. Aware of the 
volatile situation in Somalia, the UNHCR and NGOs fear that sending back Somali 
refugees en mass may create an even more complex humanitarian crisis. 
 
Kenya‘s push to repatriate Somali refugees from Dadaab camps seem to have moved a 
notch higher in May2016 when the Government of Kenya disbanded the Department of 
                                                          
496 Interior CS Joseph Nkaissery appearing before a parliamentary committee on Security and 
Administration. His comments ‗NGOs holding back Somali refugees, Interior CS Joseph Nkaissery says‘,  
Available at: www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/3107724/-/q458ybz/-/index.html 
Accessed on 15th April, 2016 
 
497 Jacob Ng‘etich ‗UN agencies frustrating repatriation of refugees, says Joseph Nkaissery‘, The Standard  
available at: www.standardmedia.co.ke/mobile/article/2000194281/un-agencies-frustrating-repatriation-
of-refugees-says-joseph-nkaissery  Accessed on 9th January 2016 
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Refugee Affairs claiming that the time for hosting Somali refugees was over and that 
efforts should now be geared towards the process of repatriating them. Making the 
revelation during a press briefing, the Interior CS Joseph Nkaissery maintained that, ‗For 
reasons of pressing national security, the government of the Republic of Kenya has 
commenced the exercise of closing Dadaab Refugee Complex‘.498 This position of 
government has, however, attracted criticism from a section of scholars like Philip 
Nyinguro, a political scientist and lecturer at the University of Nairobi. According to him, 
‗The closure of Dadaab sounds like one of those populist ad hoc decisions that the 
government of the day makes to please a section of the day‘s power brokers. The 
underlying issue here is Kenya‘s complete lack of a consistent policy on how to deal with 
its refugee numbers‘.499 Other commentators like Muthuma Mathiu seem to suggest that 
the attack on Kenyan troops in El Adde, Somalia on 15th January 2016 was a game 
changer for Kenyan-Somali relations500,that may have informed Kenya‘s decision to 
repatriate Somali refugees, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. It appears the 
Government of Kenya realized that the security problems facing Somalia are deep rooted 
and not even the presence of Kenya Defence Forces could change this reality. The 
UNHCR on the other hand, perhaps not wanting to engage the Government of Kenya in 
a political contest over repatriation, simply insisted that the repatriation process to 
                                                          
498D. Wesangula,   ‗Why closure of Dadaab demands more than government decision‘, The Standard on 
Sunday, May 15,2016.p9 
499D. Wesangula,  ‗Why closure of Dadaab demands more than government decision‘, The Standard on 
Sunday, May 15, 2016.p9 
500M. Mutuma, ‗Now is the right time to settle question of Somali‘s refugees‘, Daily Nation, Friday 
13,2016.p14 
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Somalia must be voluntary.501Many state and non-state actors have never agreed on 
whether Somalia is safe to warrant the repatriation of Somali refugees and the closure of 
Dadaab refugee camps502.Refugees too remain skeptical of the security situation in 
Somalia with some vowing never to step into Somalia503.There is simply no concurrence 
of the security situation in Somalia making it problematic to determine whether it is(not) 
the right time to repatriate. 
 
 
 
                                                          
501 See  Andrian Edward ‗Kenya: Repatriation process to Somalia starting, must be voluntary‘, available 
at:www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&skip=54&docid=52948a7d9&query=somalia 
[Accessed on 16th September,2016] 
502B. Wafula, ‗69% of Kenyans support repatriation of Somali refugees-IPSOS‘, CitizenTV, 17th November, 
2018.Available https://citizentv.co.ke/news/69-of-kenyans-support-repatriation-of-somali-refugees-ipsos-
149163/ [Accessed 8th February, 2018] 
Aljazeera, ‘Kenya's plan to shut Dadaab refugee camp criticised’, 3rd June, 2016. Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/dadaab-refugee-camp-somalia-diplomat- [Accessed 8th 
February, 2018] 
Human Rights Watch, ‗Kenya: Protect Somalis facing conflict, abuses, drought‘, 23rd March, 2017. Available 
at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/23/kenya-protect-somalis-facing-conflict-abuses-
drought[Accessed 8th February, 2018] 
503 Interview with Ali Omar at Dagahaley refugee camp on 24th November 2016 
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An aerial photo showing the market section of the Hagadera camp in Dadaab, May 8, 2015. This is one of 
the camps in Dadaab. Such camps, Kenya government maintains, is what breed terrorists. Photo: 
Reuters/Thomas Mukoya. 
 
 
In mid-September 2016, a few months into the ‗voluntary‘ repatriation exercise, a Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) report accused Kenya of abandoning repatriated refugees. The 
report quotes a woman who, after repatriating to Somalia in January 2015, had to find her 
way to Dadaab camps after finding Somalia inhabitable due to insecurity. According to 
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the report, on arrival, the woman was denied registration by Kenyan authorities‘504.The 
report further argues that: 
 
 Kenya‘s repatriation program for Somali refugees, fuelled by fear and 
misinformation, does not meet international standards for voluntary refugee 
return…The Kenyan authorities are not giving Somali refugees a real choice 
between staying and leaving, and the UN refugee agency isn‘t giving people 
accurate information about security conditions in Somalia505. 
 
 
The UNHCR seem to be under pressure from the displacement crises across the world 
with an ‗unprecedented 65.6 million people around the world have been forced from 
home‘506. Among them are nearly 22.5 million507 refugees, over half of whom are under 
the age of 18. These huge figures coupled with diminishing funding may have stretched 
the capacity of the UNHCR and creates a situation where it is unable to discharge its 
mandate fully. The fact that large parts of remote Somalia are inaccessible and security 
volatile has hindered organizations like UNHCR and others from getting accurate 
information about Somalia. The federal government of Somalia is also too weak and lacks 
sufficient capacity to provide adequate information too. 
 
                                                          
504 https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/13/kenya-abandoning-somali-refugees 
[Accessed on 16th September, 2016] 
505Human Rights Watch, Kenya: Involuntary Refugee Returns to Somalia, 2016.Available at: 
www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/14kenya-involuntary-refugee-returns-somalia.  [Accessed on 18th 
September, 2016.] 
506http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html [Accessed 9th February 2018] 
507http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html[Accessed 9th February 2018] 
180 
 
 Commenting on the hastened repatriation exercise, the same report argues, a Kenya 
government official in Dadaab observed that ‗If we send 1,000 people home under the 
voluntary repatriation agreement but we then register 1,000 new arrivals, we would not 
get the job done‘.508 However the Government of Kenya refuted the report by HRW 
reaffirming her commitment to close down Dadaab refugee camps by 30th November 
2016.Responding to the claims by HRW, Interior Principal Secretary Dr. Karanja Kibicho 
noted that, ‗These people are voluntarily going home (Somalia)‘.509 This is despite reports 
that sections of refugee leaders are opposed to the repatriation and complained of 
intimidation by Government of Kenya officials to those opposed to repatriation. One 
leader lamented that, ‗When I tried to tell the official that people can‘t go back, that it is 
not safe as he suggests, he pointed his finger at me and told me to sit down‘.510Analysis of 
interviews shows that refugees are uncertain about repatriation because of fears about 
their safety and security in Somalia. Of 15 refugee respondents in Dadaab, only 2 of the 
refugees perceived Somalia as safe. The majority felt that Somalia was unsafe because 
‗Fighting is going on in Somalia‘, ‗parts of the country still under terror groups‘, and that 
the ‗Somalia government is weak‘511, among many similar responses. The findings also 
indicate that the two refugee respondents who perceived Somalia as ‗safe‘ for return were 
                                                          
508https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/13/kenya-abandoning-somali-refugees 
Accessed on 16th September,2016 
509www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000216117/kenya-denies-abuse-of-refugees-in-push-to-close-somali-
camp/?pageNo=2 
Accessed on 16th September 2016 
510www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000216117/kenya-denies-abuse-of-refugees-in-push-to-close-somali-
camp/?pageNo=2 
511 Responses of Dadaab refugees on the perceived safety of Somalia. Data collected in 29thAugust 
2016.They were responding on the reasons why they perceived Somalia as unsafe for return. 
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informed by the fact that the conditions at the refugee camps were deteriorating and 
suggested that refugees have no other alternative apart from repatriating to ‗safe‘ 
Somalia. Asked whether they thought Somalia was safe, they replied in the affirmative 
with reason being because, ‗Many refugees go to Somalia to do business‘ and that ‗after 
all, food security in the camps is inadequate and security in the camp is deteriorating 
too‘.512 While the reports of booming businesses in Somalia may be a positive pull factor 
for some, it does not in essence mean that Somalia is habitable, free from conflict and a 
place in which the human security needs of refugee returnees can be met. 
 
The deteriorating security in Dadaab camp is a negative push factor that could be 
pushing refugees to repatriate regardless of the conditions at home. The deteriorating 
security situation in the camps is like a double-edged sword for refugees who face 
general violence and criminality from the sprawling congested settlement and also live in 
fear of the Government of Kenya crackdown on refugees who are treated with suspicion 
of being terrorists. 
 
4.2 Role of Somalia in repatriation 
It is estimated that approximately one million Somalis are living outside Somalia, across 
many countries of the developed world, as well as in camps in Ethiopia and 
                                                          
512 Responses of Dadaab refugees on   the perceived safety of Somalia. Data collected on 29thAugust 
2016.The views of these respondents indicate that refugees may perceive Somalia as safe based on the 
implied opportunities it could provide but not necessarily because of an objective security assessment. 
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Kenya.513Noting the plight of Somali refugees residing in north-eastern Kenya, then 
Presidents Mwai Kibaki of Kenya and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia, pledged to 
‗work together and with the international community to come up with modalities for 
their orderly return to Somalia to rebuild their lives and participate in the development of 
their motherland.‘514 Before meeting President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President Mwai 
Kibaki, had earlier in May 2012, requested the assistance of the international community 
to assist in the relocation of Somali refugees to recovered areas in southern Somalia.515 
President Kibaki added that the Dadaab camps were unsustainable and that they were 
draining national resources. In order to carry this out, the Government of Kenya required 
the co-operation of the international community and Somalia, in order to receive the 
refugees who would voluntarily return. 
 
Even with the mounting pressure from Kenya for a speedy repatriation of Somali 
refugees, the government of Somalia has been hesitant to allow the massive return of 
refugees fearing it could destabilize the already volatile situation at home. Consequently, 
warnings have been sounded that increased pressure on fragile services as a result of 
increased population numbers due to return movements from neighbouring countries 
                                                          
513H. Sheikh, and Healy, S. .Somalia’s missing million: The Somali diaspora and its role in development. UNDP, 
2009 Somalia. 
514http://sunatimes.com/articles/2479/Presidents-of-Kenya-and-Somalia-Joint-Communique 21 st 
December, 2012. [Accessed on 15 June 2016].  
Abdi, M., ‗Presidents of Kenya and Somalia Joint Communiqué‘, Network Alshahid – December 2012 
http://english.alshahid.net/archives/34032?utm_source=Alshahid&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaig
n=Feed%3A+AlshahidNetwork+%28Alshahid+Network%29 
515 Sabahi online, ‗Kibaki requests aid for refugee repatriation‘ Sabahi online - May 2012 
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/05/03/newsbrief-04 
[Accessed on 15 June 2016] 
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could lead to tensions with local communities and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP‘s) 
living in the affected areas.516 Similarly, increased competition over land and property 
could trigger further conflicts and insecurity.517 
 
Responding to Kenya‘s decision to repatriate Somali refugees by November 2016, the 
Somali Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke lamented that: 
 
We want our refugees back. Definitely…but we don‘t want Kenya to push [out] 
refugees at this stage in time, because it can create much more insecurity if these 
refugees are just kind of thrown out, with nothing on the civil society end. These 
are youth-they can join radical groups and create more instability for the two 
countries518. 
 
According to him, Kenya‘s intense calls for repatriation may have been politically 
motivated in the context of the Kenyan election in 2017, the decision to close the Dadaab 
                                                          
516UNHCR, Action Plan 2016-2017, Integrated Action Plan for Sustainable Return and Reintegration of Somali 
Refugees from Kenya to Somalia, October 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/561e54069.html, pp. 40, 44, 50. See 
also, UNHCR, Yemen Situation: Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan Overview, October - December 2015 
/ January - December 2016 (Preliminary estimates), 5 October 
2015,http://www.refworld.org/docid/561378d24.html. Returnees from Kenya who were interviewed by 
Justice Forum and the International Commission of Jurists reported that they were living as IDPs after their 
return to Mogadishu in 2014. They reported experiencing difficult living conditions, with insufficient access 
to food and water, overcrowding, no access to education for their children, as well as concerns relating to 
insecurity. Some also reported living in fear of being profiled as a member of Al Shabaab by government 
forces. Justice Forum and International Commission of Jurists, Dignity Denied: Somali Refugees Expelled from 
Kenya in 2014, 4 September 2015, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/565da2fba.html, pp. 15, 22, 25, 28, 33, 40. 
517The increasing number of returnees has reportedly already led to an increase in the number of disputes 
over land and property, as well as an increasing number of forced evictions and relocations of IDPs. 
NRC/IDMC, Somalia: Over a Million IDPs Need Support for Local Solutions, 18 March 2015, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/550fcb244.html, pp. 9-11. See also Legal Action Worldwide and 
Norwegian Refugee Council, Housing, Land and Property in Somalia, Persons of Concern in Somaliland and 
South-Central Somalia, October 2014,http://www.refworld.org/docid/565da3ed4.html, pp. 27-29, 36-37. 
518 Somali PM was responding to the Washington Post on 15th June, 2016. Available at: 
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/06/15/Somalias-prime-minister-we-don‘t-
want-kenya-to-push-out-refugees/ 
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camps being popular among many Kenyans. Refugee repatriation has been a hot political 
tool that presidential aspirants have not hesitated to utilize whenever an election 
approaches with calls for repatriation often increasing towards an election during  the 
President Moi‘s , Kibaki‘s and now the Kenyatta‘s regimes. 
 
Unlike the PM Omar, H.E Hassan Sheikh Mohamud President of the Federal Republic of 
Somalia while on an official visit to Kenya from 6th-8th June 2016 visited Dadaab camps 
and iterated his support for the repatriation process. In a joint communiqué between 
Kenya and Somalia, He assured Somali refugees that the government of Somalia is 
committed to receive them back home to participate in the process of state building, 
peace building and national reconciliation. He reassured them that the repatriation will 
be orderly, humane and dignified as per the Tripartite Agreement and also expressed 
deep gratitude for the generosity and hospitality of Kenyans for hosting his people for the 
past quarter of a century.519 
 
According to Bradley states of origin (like Somalia in this case) may encourage and use 
repatriation to enhance their perceived, if not actual, legitimacy, in post-conflict 
                                                          
519 President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia while on an official 
visit to Kenya from 6th-8th June 2016.He had been invited by president Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya as an 
attempt by Kenya to mobilize and lobby the international community to support Kenya‘s push for 
repatriation of Somali refugees. The official communiqué is available at: 
http://www.president.go.ke/2016/06/08/joint-communique-of-the-republic-of-kenya-and-federal-
republic-of-somalia/  [Accessed on 23/08/2016]. 
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situations520. This is because states of origin view refugees as ‗highly politicized symbols‘ 
and their return is in essence, a public statement that there is no longer the fear of 
persecution.521. Bradley argues that often times during the initial stages of a peace 
process, refugees are pushed to return even though conditions are not yet suitable, 
because repatriation is considered an important part of peace-building522. 
 
An interesting example of a state of origin‘s motives for encouraging their citizens to 
return is the Rwandan government after the genocide in 1994. The Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) government strongly advocated that the country was safe for refugees to 
repatriate and viewed their return as necessary in order to rebuild the country and gain 
legitimacy as a new government.523The fact that refugees were not repatriating on their 
own, prior to being forced to do so, was seen as an embarrassment by the 
government.524Although obviously inaccurate, the government went so far as to assert 
                                                          
520M. Bradley, ‗Rethinking refugeehood: Statelessness, repatriation, and refugee agency‘, Review of 
International Studies, vol.40, no.1, 2014, p.114.  
521 L. Hammond,  ‗Voluntary‘ repatriation and reintegration. In Fiddian-Qasmiyah, G. Loescher, K. Long & 
N. Sigona (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2014, p.508 
522M. Bradley,  ‗Rethinking refugeehood: Statelessness, repatriation, and refugee agency‘, Review of 
International Studies, vol.40, no.1, 2014, p.113 
523B. Whitaker,  Changing priorities in refugee protection: The Rwandan repatriation from Tanzania, Washington, 
DC, Department of Political Science George Washington University, Working Paper No.53, 2002,p.8 
524B. Whitaker,  Changing priorities in refugee protection: The Rwandan repatriation from Tanzania, Washington, 
DC, Department of Political Science George Washington University, Working Paper No.53, 2002,p.8 
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that refugees who did not return were participants in the genocide and were avoiding 
being held accountable for their actions.525 
 
Even though the Somali Federal Government (SFG) may be willing to facilitate 
repatriation of Somali refugees as a way of legitimizing their government, especially in 
the eyes of the international community, it is evident that within Somalia there are 
spoilers who may not want the government to stabilize for their own perceived selfish 
interests. The activities of these spoilers are well captured by professor Menkhaus when 
he contends that: 
 
In Somalia, some spoilers have successfully undermined peace accords to 
perpetuate armed conflict; others have acted only to undercut local efforts 
to improve law and order and reduce criminality; still others support peace 
building and the reduction of crime, but block efforts to revive an effective 
central government. The latter category includes many businesspeople who 
need a predictable, safe, and peaceful environment in which to conduct 
commercial activities, but who fear that a revived central government will 
become repressive and predatory at their expense. The history of the state in 
Somalia gives this category of state-building spoilers legitimate cause for 
concern526. 
 
 
                                                          
525 K. Long, Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee 
repatriation. PDES/2013/14. Geneva, Switzerland, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 
2013,p.13 
526K. Menkhaus, ‗Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of 
Coping‘, International Security, vol.31, no.3, 2007, pp.75-76. 
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Indeed, as captured by Professor Menkhaus, several actors within Somalia have spoiled 
the state-building process despite the immense support that such an initiative has 
received from the international community. The Somali Federal Government (SFG) 
control in Somalia is weak527. Somali military and police lack professional training and 
sophisticated weaponry and there is accusation of widespread corruption528.This has 
reduced the capacity of the government to bring Somalia under control and Al Shabaab 
has exploited these loopholes to promote lawlessness in Somalia. Consequently, the 
country has a reputation for lawlessness, insecurity and high levels of rape and other 
forms of sexual violence.529 
 
With respect to states of origin, and in this case Somalia, 4Rs concept of repatriation, 
reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction focus on improving the sustainability of 
repatriation. It does this by fostering the capacities and institutional partnerships 
necessary to ensure the smooth transition from emergency relief to long-term 
development. Its premise is that repatriation must involve more than transferring 
refugees across the border; rather, it must strive to create an environment conducive to a 
sustainable return. To succeed in this task, it must nurture partnerships with a range of 
government and development actors. As stipulated by UNHCR‘s Executive Committee in 
                                                          
527Somali military and police are weak as they lack professional training and sophisticated weaponry 
528Reuters, ‗US suspends aid to Somalia‘s battered military over graft‘, The Star, 14th December 2017. 
https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/12/14/us-suspends-aid-to-somalias-battered-military-over-
graft_c1685316 [Accessed 9th February 2018] 
529UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 3 September 2013, para 42; Report of 
the Secretary-General on Somalia, 31 January 2013, para 12. 
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2004, it is crucial to ensure that appropriate levels of security, social services and 
economic opportunity are available to returnees.530 
 
The UNHCR argues that: 
The 4Rs concept is now fairly uncontroversial. It simply combines the notion of 
voluntary repatriation with the idea of post-conflict reconstruction. The latter has 
been part of mainstream development discourse since the late 1990s. States of 
origin rarely pose objections to return, while asylum states are keen to emphasize 
it as the ideal durable solution. For their part, donor states often have specific 
economic and political interests in reconstruction. As a consequence, major 
development agencies already have mechanisms focusing on post-conflict 
reconstruction. Almost everyone is receptive to the idea; the challenge is to build a 
framework for institutional collaboration to ensure smooth implementation.531 
 
Based on the above statement, the UNHCR emphasizes that because states of origin 
rarely pose objections for return, repatriation seem to be the most feasible especially 
when dealing with large numbers of refugees. The 4R‘s (repatriation, reintegration, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction) concept developed by UNHCR focuses on improving 
the sustainability of repatriation. After repatriation, refugees should reintegrate with 
fellow citizens. Because some refugees may have been in exile for long, they should be 
rehabilitated so as to fit the current dynamics of his/her country of origin. This will then 
help refugees participate fully in the reconstruction in the post-conflict period. 
 
                                                          
530UNHCR, ‗Conclusion on Legal Safety Issues in the Context of Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees‘, 
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 101 (LV)–2004, 8 October 2004. 
531 UNHCR/S.Hopper/2003 Rethinking Repatriation. The State of World’s Refugee. Available at 
https://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/retl   [Accessed  on 14th January 2016] 
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Donor states play an integral role in the reconstruction process and have both economic 
and political interests. Donor states during reconstruction may be looking at the 
economic prospects of say trade, agriculture, exploration etc and tend to align their 
reconstruction support towards possible bilateral or multilateral agreements that could 
benefit both countries. Donor states and the post-conflict state should therefore strive to 
build a framework for institutional collaboration to ensure smooth implementation so as 
to achieve the set goals. 
 
4.2.1 Provide security for returnees in Somalia. 
 
The TA envisages that ‗The Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia shall be 
responsible for the safety and security of the returnees once within the territory of 
Somalia in accordance with National and International Law‘532. It enumerates her roles 
and obligations in Article 25 of the TA as follows: 
 
i. Facilitate the safe, dignified and sustainable return; 
ii. Ensure return and reintegration without fear of harassment, intimidation, 
persecution, discrimination, prosecution or any punitive measures whatsoever on 
account of having left, or remained outside Somalia; 
iii. Create conditions conducive to sustainable return and reintegration of 
returnees; 
                                                          
532 Article 12(3) of the Tripartite Agreement, 10th November, 2013. 
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iv. Guarantee that all Somali refugees living in Kenya wishing to return to Somalia, 
shall be able to do so without any legal or other hindrances, and that any of their 
family members who are non-Somali citizens should be able to join them for the 
purposes of maintaining family unity, and have their residence status expedited 
subject to national law; 
v. Simplify formalities for the return of refugees and facilitate the entry of all their 
goods, including of commercial nature or quantity, personal and household effects 
free from any customs and excise duties or taxes. Controls and inspections at the 
entry point will be carried out expeditiously, with due respect to the dignity and 
basic human rights of the returnees; 
vi. Take all necessary measures to allow returnees to settle in their areas of origin 
or any other part of the country of their choice. In addition, ensure freedom of 
movement of the returnees as provided for in the country's national legislation and 
in accordance with international human rights standards; 
vii. Commit to promote durable peace and national reconciliation; 
viii Establish fair and accessible procedures to settle any claims that the returnees 
may make for restitution of lands or other property left behind when they were 
forced to flee; 
ix. Ensure that the returnees shall enjoy property ownership and protection 
acquired upon return, in' accordance with the national laws; 
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x. Recognize the legality of births, adoptions, deaths, marriages or divorces which 
may have taken place during asylum as read together with Article 24 (III); 
xi. Recognize as appropriate and in accordance with 'applicable national law, 
certifications, qualifications and skills obtained from recognized institutions while 
residing in Kenya; 
xii. Issue to the returnees all documents necessary for the exercise and enjoyment 
of their respective legal rights such as passports, personal identification 
documents, birth, death, marriage certificates and land title deeds; 
xiii. Facilitate the issuance of new documents or the replacement of those lost in 
the course of displacement without imposing unduly restrictive or prohibitive 
conditions, costs or delays; 
xiv. Facilitate all the activities of UNHCR relating to the repatriation operation 
provided for in this Agreement including granting free and unhindered access to 
UNHCR officials to the returnees, accompanying the returnees to Somalia, 
conducting effective monitoring of their legal, physical and material situation and 
to make appropriate interventions; 
xv. Facilitate the reintegration of the returnees and their enjoyment of all the social, 
economic, civil, cultural: and political rights provided for in the laws of the 
country, including fair and equal access to public services; 
xvi. Facilitate the movement into and within its territory of the staff of UNHCR 
and its partners and ensure that vehicles, relief goods and equipment required for 
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use in implementing the voluntary repatriation and reintegration of the returnees 
can be brought into and used in the country free of duty, customs or other charges; 
xvii. Ensure the safety 'and security of the returnees; including when in transit in 
Somalia while proceeding to their final destinations; 
xviii. Guarantee the safety and security of the staff of UNHCR and partners 
engaged -in the repatriation and reintegration operation and; 
xix. Facilitate ‗go and see‘ visits by refugee to areas of intended return, and ‗come 
and tell‘ visits by Somali Federal or local authorities as provided for under 
Article.15 of this Agreement533. 
 
While the TA clearly stipulates the responsibility of the government of Somalia in helping 
Somali refugee returnees settle in Somalia, questions abound as to whether it has the 
capacity to carry out these functions as envisaged in the TA.A recent UNHCR updates 
report indicates that the security agencies in particular lack the capacity to carry out their 
functions effectively-It has been reported that the police and security forces lack 
capacity.534 Civilian authorities do not maintain effective control over the security 
                                                          
533Article 25 of  the Tripartite agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Somalia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees governing the voluntary 
repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya, Signed 10th November 2013 
534‗In the cities from which Al Shabaab has been driven away, law and order has decreased. The police 
associated with SFG or their allies, lack the capacity and the integrity needed to be able to function.‘ Lifos 
(Swedish Migration Board), Security Situation in Southern and Central Somalia, 29 April 2015 (in Swedish, 
with a summary in English), 
http://Lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentSummaryId=34553(hereafter: Lifos, Security 
Situation in Somalia). ‗Police were generally ineffective‘, United States Department of State, 2015 Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices - Somalia, 13 April 2016, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5716120a8.html. 
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forces.535 Police officers and members of the military are reported to be responsible for 
serious human rights violations, including killings, rape and extortion of civilians.536 It 
therefore appears that the SFG will only be able to carry out her responsibilities if and 
when it has capacity to do so, and this is currently lacking. The SFG should be given 
ample time to develop capacity of these security agencies to promote a seamless 
transition and adaptation of returnees from exile. 
 
4.2.2 Promote national development, security and humanitarian assistance programs 
The TA proposes that order to enhance sustainable repatriation and reintegration of 
returnees the Tripartite Parties, and especially Somalia, are expected to advocate for the 
strengthening and expansion of national development, security and humanitarian 
assistance programs, focusing wherever possible on local community development in key 
areas of return.537After repatriation, the TA envisages a scenario where the programmes 
that were being offered at the Dadaab camps in Kenya are duplicated and may be 
enhanced in Somalia. This works on the premise that the donor community will come in 
handy to finance and facilitate the implementation of such humanitarian programs. It is 
worth noting that apart from insecurity in Somalia, the reasons that some interviewees 
that are refugees cited in explaining their unwillingness to return was largely to do with 
lack of social services like education and health facilities in Somalia.  
                                                          
535United States Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Somalia, 13 April 
2016,http://www.refworld.org/docid/5716120a8.html. ‗The Monitoring Group also received allegations 
against regional security forces outside the control of the SFG. 
536 Lifos, Security Situation in Somalia. 
537 Article 12(4) of the Tripartite Agreement 
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Developing social services and empowering communities to participate fully in the post-
war reconstruction will require a lot of financial and technical support from donor states 
and agencies. As indicated, it is clear that refugees not only consider (in)security as a 
factor before determining to not(return), but the prospects of a dignified life in the future 
guaranteed by health facilities and education, among others. Indeed, one can argue that 
developing these social facilities prior to repatriation may be good enough ‗pull factors‘ 
that will see refugees return voluntarily. 
 
4.3The role and responsibility of the UNHCR in repatriation 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner (UNHCR) was established by the 
General Assembly538 as a subsidiary organization to be concerned with refugee 
protection. The main role of the UNHCR, as outlined in the UNHCR Statute, is to provide 
‗international protection‘ for refugees and ‗to seek permanent solutions to the problem of 
refugees by assisting governments, in cooperation with NGOs and other international 
organizations, to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their 
assimilation within new national communities‘.539 
 
                                                          
538See Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of 1950, U.N. G.A. Res. 
428 (V) (Dec. 14, 1950)[hereinafter the ‗UNHCR Statute‘] available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_unhcr.htm. 
539Chapter 1 of the UNHCR Statute; see also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law 7 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1996. 
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Although the principal mandate of the UNHCR is to provide international protection, it 
can expand to in-country protection as well. This is particularly true when the UNHCR 
becomes involved in the voluntary repatriation of refugees or when it assists refugee 
groups, where there are also mixed populations or people who are in refugee-like 
conditions.540 Normally the traditional mandate of the UNHCR is limited to refugees as 
defined by the Convention and does not extend to internally-displaced persons or other 
displaced persons that do not fall within the definition of a refugee. However, the role of 
the UNHCR, in accordance with paragraph 9 of the Statute, may be expanded by the 
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).541 Currently the 
UNHCR is extensively involved in conflict-torn countries, providing assistance and 
protection, to the extent possible, to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and to other 
displaced persons.542 
 
Generally, the UNHCR's involvement with the internally displaced has often been in the 
context of the voluntary repatriation of refugees, where return movements and 
                                                          
540Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. (Apr. 
11) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/4/ 1835.pdf; see also ECOSOC resolution 1705 (LIII), (27 
July 1972). 
541In 1957, the General Assembly first authorized the High Commissioner to 'use its good offices' to assist 
people who did not fall within the Refugee Convention's refugee definition. U.N. G.A. Res. 1167 (XII), 
Chinese Refugees In Hong Kong (Nov. 26, 1957). With regards to internally displaced persons, the first 
reference to the expansion of the UNHCR's mandate came in 1972. 
See U.N.G.A. Res. 2958 (XXVII), Assistance to Sudanese Refugees Returning from Abroad, (Dec. 12, 1972; see 
also Goodwin-Gill, supra note 8, at 11. 
542IDPs are defined as ‗persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee or leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflicts, internal strife or systematic violations of human 
rights, and who have not crossed and internationally recognized state border.‘ Luke T. Lee, ‗The Refugee 
Convention and Internally Displaced Persons‘, International Journal of Refugee Law,Vol.13, no.3, 2001, pp.363-
366 
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rehabilitation/reintegration programs have included both returning refugees and 
displaced persons in circumstances where it was neither reasonable nor feasible to treat 
the two differently.543 After the late 1980s, however, the UNHCR has taken on different 
responsibilities -- it has become more active in countries of refugee origin by granting 
humanitarian aid, monitoring human rights violations and trying to prevent the flow of 
refugees.544 Today, the UNHCR's role has been expanded so that it covers both the 
victims of war and gross human rights violations, as well as people who have not crossed 
an international border. In this regard, one scholar has noted that the ‗UNHCR's role has 
changed so much that it now officially provides assistance even to those who are not 
displaced.‘545 
 
A summary of the UNHCR‘s mandate for voluntary repatriation, as derived from the 
1951 Convention, is as follows: 
 
(i)Verify the voluntary character of refugee repatriation; 
(ii)Promote the creation of conditions that is conductive to voluntary return in safety and 
with dignity; 
                                                          
543Geoff Gilbert, ‗Rights, Legitimate Expectations, Needs and Responsibilities: UNHCR and the New World 
Order‘, International Journal of Refugee Law,1998, p.355 (citing UNHCR, UNHCR Strategy Towards 2000, 
para. 1 and 5 (1996). 
544See P. Kourula, ‗The UNHCR Note on International Protection You Won't See‘, International Journal f 
Refugee Law, vol.9.no.2,1997,p,267 
545M. Barutciski, ‗A Critical View on UNHCR's Mandate Dilemmas‘, International Journal of Refugee Law, 
vol.14.no2, 2002.p.365-381. 
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(iii)Promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees once conditions are conducive to 
return; 
(iv)Facilitate the voluntary return of refugees when it is taking place spontaneously, even 
if conditions are not conducive to return; 
(v)Organize, in cooperation with NGOs and other agencies, the transportation and 
reception of returnees, provided that such arrangements are necessary to protect their 
interests and well-being; 
(vi)Monitor the status of returnees in their country of origin and intervene on their behalf 
if necessary; 
(vii)Undertake activities in support of national legal and judicial capacity building to help 
states address causes of refugee movements; 
(viii)Raise funds from the donor community in order to assist governments by providing 
active support to repatriation and reintegration programmes; 
(ix)Act as a catalyst for medium and long-term rehabilitation assistance provided by 
NGOs, specialized development agencies and bilateral donors546. 
 
In the case of Somali refugees in Kenya, legal local integration is not currently considered 
an option. This is because Kenya‘s policy towards Somali refugees has always been one of 
encampment with an expectation that refugees would eventually return to Somalia when 
conditions change or when such a move is inevitable. Third country resettlement is also 
                                                          
5461951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of refugees 
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out of reach to the majority of Somali refugees in Dadaab especially considering the 
estimates that indicate that less than 1%547of all refugees globally benefit from this scheme 
that is often termed as ‗rare solution to refugee crisis548‘The influx of refugees from Syria 
and other Middle Eastern countries to European countries is also straining any possibility 
of sustained resettlement programmes for Somali refugees, with many European 
countries adopting more restrictive policies towards refugees. This has been worsened by 
the rise of Islamic extremist groups who may have set their bases in the now refugee 
producing countries or by the perceptions of European public and media about this. A 
part from the burden associated with hosting refugees, many would-be refugee host 
countries now fear the infiltration of terror extremist elements among the fleeing refugees 
and, hence, prefer to enforce restrictive policies on the refugee entry points. President 
Trump of the USA, for instance, has made various attempts to restrict movement of 
refugees especially from the Middle East with his administration claiming ‗The security 
and safety of the American people is our chief concern.‘549 Some have termed his ban on 
refugees as a ‗Muslim‘ ban as it targeted especially countries with Muslim majority 
namely Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen550. 
 
                                                          
547M. Bradley, Refugee repatriation: Justice, responsibility and redress, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University 
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548 M. Bradley, Refugee repatriation: Justice, responsibility and redress, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University 
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549L. Koran, ‗Trump administration dramatically scales back refugee admissions‘, CNN,27th September 
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550 ‗Trump's executive order: Who does travel ban affect?‘, BBC, 10th February, 2017. Available 
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In Europe, the refugee crisis was unprecedented with 1 million551 refugees fleeing the 
Syrian conflict entering Europe in 2015. Apart from being perceived as an economic 
burden to Europe, these refugees are perceived as ‗rats and terrorists‘552 by sections of 
European population and media. Aware of the risks such thousands of refugee 
immigrants pose, Europe now is grappling with seeking long-term answers to refugee 
crises553. 
 
In all these refugee crises, the UNHCR considers repatriation as the preferred durable 
solution and the one that is the most realistic for the largest554 number of refugees, like 
the current refugee crisis in Europe. Even though the UNHCR continues to promote the 
other two durable solutions, resettlement and local integration, they serve less refugees as 
durable solutions. This is because resettlement and integration depend on the goodwill of 
prospective host states and host states to take in refugees respectively. Because refugees 
are a political issue, most (to-be) host states avoid the complexities of hosting them in the 
long-term, partly for fear of backlash from its citizens. However, UNHCR‘s preference for 
repatriation can only be partially explained by this limited impact of local integration and 
                                                          
551‗Migrant crisis: One million enter Europe in 2015‘, 22nd December, 
2015.Availablehttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35158769 [Accessed 10th February, 2018]. 
552D. Brown, ‗Offended by the Daily Mail's cartoon of refugees and rats? Fine – but you don‘t have a right to 
censor it‘, Independent, 17th November, 2015.Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/offended-
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553S. Tisdall, ‗Divided Europe seeks a long-term answer to a refugee crisis that needs a solution now‘, The 
Guardian, 23rd July, 2017.Available athttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/22/divided-europe-
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554United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Global trends report 2012, Geneva, Switzerland, Division 
of Programme Support and Management., 2013.p 17 
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resettlement. The literature is critical of the UNHCR, as host and donor state pressures, as 
well as self-interests, have served as motives for UNHCR‘s participation and promotion 
of repatriation. According to Takahashi, the ‗UNHCR, in particular, has played a 
disappointing role, giving undue emphasis to repatriation as the goal to be achieved.‘555 
Consequently, this has at times averted focus from UNHCR‘s protection mandate. 
Because UNHCR depends on funding from various states to fund refugee operations, the 
UNHCR finds itself caught between the need to protect refugee interests and that of not 
antagonizing various states (donors).Since funding of UNHCR depends on the 
willingness of states to contribute, it must strive to balance the interests of various states 
and those of refugees. Refugee interests may, however, easily suffer as UNHCR is 
dependent on the state parties and not vice versa. In this arrangement, it is ultimately the 
refugees, whose voices are less heard. 
The UNHCR declared the 1990s as ‗the decade of voluntary repatriation‘, and not only 
adopted repatriation as the primary solution but also began to initiate returns rather than 
previously just supporting them.556Although the UNHCR might assert that its more 
active role in promoting voluntary repatriation efforts was what refugees wanted, 
UNHCR‘s success began to be based on showing how many refugees had 
                                                          
555 S. Takahashi, ‗The UNHCR handbook on voluntary repatriation: The emphasis of return over 
protection‘,  International Journal of Refugee Law, vol.9, no.4, 1997, p.595 
556K. Long, Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee 
repatriation, PDES/2013/14, Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Oxford, Oxford 
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repatriated.557This implies that the UNHCR was likely getting pressure from the donors 
(mostly states) and who demanded to see results in the form of how many refugees had 
repatriated. It should be observed, nonetheless, that because of the overwhelming 
number of displaced persons, the UNHCR increasingly found itself under pressure to 
repatriate thousands of refugees to avoid its capacity being overstretched. 
The UNHCR is by nature a ‗state-centric‘ organization as it is an agency of the United 
Nations (UN), an international governmental organization (IGO) that is made up of 
member states. Thus, throughout UNHCR‘s history and until today, states have been the 
principal actors in the international refugee regime558.The UNHCR is not only impacted 
by states‘ policies, but it is ‗totally dependent‘ on donor states to fund its operations.559As 
a result, donor states have significantly influenced the organization.560UNHCR's funding 
mechanism differs from that of the United Nation‘s, as member states are not required to 
provide assistance to the UNHCR. Therefore, there is no automatic allocation of funds for 
the organization, rendering it reliant on voluntary contributions.561Consequently, without 
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an autonomous and consistent source of funding, the UNHCR is constrained in its ability 
to respond to refugee crises and to fulfill its mandate of refugee 
protection.562Furthermore, host governments, as sovereign states, determine the extent to 
which the UNHCR can operate within their country. Kenya, thus, determines the extent 
UNHCR operates at the Dadaab refugee camps. They determine who to grant refugee 
status to and who to deny this status from. They determine the entry of refugees to the 
country at their borders. Indeed, the UNHCR operates according to the laws of Kenya 
regarding refugee management. Questions regarding the extent of the conformity of 
refugee law in Kenya to that of the international refugee law are debatable. Somali 
refugees therefore have to operate according to the dictates of the Kenyan government 
even though they are under the protection of UNHCR as Persons of Concern(POC).POC 
to UNHCR include refugees, returnees, stateless people, the internally displaced and 
asylum-seekers. In fact, Kenya as a sovereign state may choose when to cease refugee 
status by invoking the cessation clause. Refugees are at the mercy of the host state and 
enjoy the refugee status at the will of the host state. Consequently, UNHCR‘s ‗ activities 
and evolution have been defined and, at times, constrained by the interests of states 
within the global refugee regime‘563.Consequently, 
In regards to the UNHCR, it is argued by many critics that the organization 
has never been able to act independently, as it is a creation of governments. 
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Donor governments exercise the greatest power over refugee policy and 
have become increasingly frustrated with the increasing cost of supporting 
the budget of the organization. These governments are therefore interested 
in seeking means of reducing their obligations, one such method is the 
promotion of repatriation as the appropriate solution. The returnee 
programs organized by the UNHCR are cheaper and much shorter in length 
compared to the assistance programs offered in the host countries564.  
 
 
Ironically, the host countries which formerly set themselves up as ‗human rights 
monitors‘ evidently have an interest in reducing the numbers of refugees within their 
borders.565Because of the weaknesses of UNHCR, especially regarding the inability to 
restraint from the influence of donor states, scholars like Haycock have argued that ‗the 
organization lacks the necessary freedom of action to genuinely represent the interests of 
refugees, especially when these interests do not coincide with those of the states 
supporting it‘566. 
 
Host and donor states‘ interests have been a significant factor in the preference for 
repatriation over other durable solutions. Repatriation is the preference of host states due 
to the fact that host states perceive refugees more negatively than positively, and for 
donor states, with one reason being that it is less expensive than care and maintenance 
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Agenda for Research‘, African Studies Review vol.32,no.1,1989,p 
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programs567.Moreover, because of host and donor state pressure, there are times when 
the UNHCR has facilitated repatriation even when the conditions in countries of origin 
were not yet peaceful, and the organization has been heavily criticized for this568.In some 
cases, the UNHCR enforced involuntary repatriation programmes in order to show its 
relevance to states.569The examples of Rohingya refugees in Myanmar and Rwandan 
refugees in Tanzania will be discussed in detail in this chapter (see 4.3.4.1 and 4.3.4.2 
respectively) as classical examples of compromised returns. 
In the case of Somali refugees, Article 26 of the TA provides that the role of UNHCR in 
voluntary repatriation is as follows: 
i. Verify and assure the free and voluntary nature of the decisions made by the refugees 
to repatriate, in keeping with its mandate and shall have access to the refugees so as to 
discharge these and other responsibilities as per this Agreement; 
ii. Facilitate the safe and dignified character of the repatriation by ensuring that it is 
carried out in accordance with national and International law; 
iii. Organize and facilitate in collaboration with the Parties, awareness raising activities, 
dissemination of relevant information with regard to the voluntary repatriation to 
Somalia and on family reunification procedures in and outside Somalia; 
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S. Takahashi, ‗The UNHCR handbook on voluntary repatriation: The emphasis of return over protection‘,  
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iv. Establish offices, deploy staff and carry out activities along the main return routes in 
Kenya and areas of return in Somalia to implement the repatriation in safety and dignity 
of the refugees and promote their reintegration; 
v. Ensure that the vulnerable group of refugees and returnees are protected and their 
fundamental rights are respected in accordance with applicable international and 
national legal standards; 
vi. Monitor the situation of all refugees in Kenya in cooperation with the Government of 
Kenya, supervise their continued enjoyment of asylum as provided for by national and 
international law; 
vii. Mobilize and allocate resources for the purpose of the implementation of this 
Agreement; 
viii. Assist and coordinate in collaboration with partners the ongoing protection and 
assistance programs, the voluntary repatriation and reintegration activities in Kenya and 
Somalia; 
ix. Verify and assure the progress of the reintegration process of returnees to Somalia in 
cooperation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia and 
x. Have access to the returnees during the reintegration process in accordance with this 
Agreement.570. 
 
                                                          
570Article 26 of Tripartite agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of the 
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4.3.1 The UNHCR as resource mobilizer 
After signing the TA with Kenya and Somalia on 10 November 2013, the UNHCR 
embarked on a mission to promote ‗voluntary‘ repatriation of Somali refugees from 
Dadaab, Kenya. This was followed by a call to the international community to provide 
funds to facilitate the repatriation. In January 2016, for instance, the UNHCR, through its 
representative to Kenya, Raouf Mazou, announced a planned repatriation of 50,000 
Somali refugees in 2016 costing millions of dollars.571 To achieve this, the UNHCR rallied 
many stakeholders to fund the repatriation exercise although the number was not 
achieved as the UNHCR latest report indicates that only 75000572 refugees repatriated 
between 2014 and the end of 2017, an average of 20,000 repatriations per year. While it 
was not clear how much other partners would raise and spent on repatriation, the 
European Union was already committing 77 million Euros573 on humanitarian aid at the 
Horn of Africa in 2016. 
 
After all, the Preamble to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention recognizes the need for 
international cooperation in order to achieve durable solutions. It states that ‗considering 
that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries . . . a 
satisfactory solution of a problem . . . cannot therefore be achieved without international 
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cooperation‘.574Over time, UNHCR has increasingly faced funding shortages, partly as a 
result of the ever increasing no of refugees. The bid by Kenya to raise 20 billion Kenya 
shillings(200million US dollars) to aid in the repatriation of about 500, 000 Somali 
refugees was not realized even after Kenya pledged 1 billion575 Kenyan shillings(10 
million US dollars) to the kitty. Kenya‘s support to UNHCR in raising funds for 
repatriation indicates that UNHCR by itself has no capacity to mobilize the funds it need 
for its programmes, hence cannot fully realize its mandate. 
 
4.3.2 The UNHCR as custodian of refugee rights and dignity 
 
Despite the pressure from the Government of Kenya, the UNHCR has remained steadfast 
in advocating for refugee rights and dignity. While avoiding contradiction with the 
Government of Kenya, and the politics surrounding repatriation of Somali refugees, the 
UN refugee agency has maintained that refugees should only be repatriated in a humane 
and dignified manner and only to safe and secure areas in Somalia. On May 9, 2016 via its 
website, the Geneva based UNHCR called on the Government of Kenya to ‗reconsider its 
recent announcement that it intends to end the hosting of refugees.‘576The UNHCR was 
reacting to the Ministry of Interior in Kenya that had on May 6, 2016 made the statement 
                                                          
574The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Preamble, para. 4. 
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that it would stop577 hosting refugees citing an economic, security and environmental 
burden of hosting thousands of Somali refugees. In the statement the UNHCR, observed 
that,  
In light of this, and because of the potentially devastating consequences for 
hundreds of thousands of people that premature ending of refugee hosting would 
have, UNHCR is calling on the Government of Kenya to reconsider its decision 
and to avoid any action that might be at odds with its international obligations 
towards people needing sanctuary from danger and persecution.578 
 
While visiting the Dadaab refugee camps in mid-June 2016, the UNHCR High 
Commissioner for Refugees Fillipo Grande, reassured the Somali refugees that they will 
only be repatriated to areas in Somalia with some semblance of government and that the 
UNHCR will not be party to the hasty process of repatriating refugees. As a result only 
33,213579  repatriated in 2016 despite pressure by the Government of Kenya. 
 
4.3.3 Debate on threshold dynamics of what constitutes (in) voluntary repatriation 
Although voluntary repatriation is not mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention per se, 
the concept stems from the principle of non-refoulement, found in Article 33 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, which stipulates that states must not ‗expel or return a refugee in any 
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manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion‘580.The voluntariness of return is an important factor in the 
sustainability of return581however in practice, the term ‗voluntary‘ is used in order to 
validate premature and politically advantageous returns582. Furthermore, if refugees are 
involuntarily returned to a country that is not yet secure, they are likely to become 
internally displaced583 or to flee once again, as was the case in the involuntary return of 
the Rohingya to Myanmar leading to a vicious recycle of refugees. This is where refugees 
return to home country only to flee again. 
The concept and the practical application of the voluntariness of repatriation have been 
widely debated by scholars. The UNHCR‘s handbook on voluntary repatriation outlines 
that,  
As a general rule, UNHCR should be convinced that the positive pull-factors in the 
country of origin are an overriding element in the refugees' decision to return 
rather than possible push-factors in the host country or negative pull-factors, such 
as threats to property, in the home country584. 
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However, the literature is often critical of the UNHCR‘s participation in refugee 
movements. Although states play a key role in this process, the UNHCR is the lead 
agency that has the responsibility to ensure refugee protection, assess the voluntariness of 
repatriation, and to promote it once the conditions allow for refugees to return in safety 
and with dignity. The UNHCR acts as a facilitator in this process and works with other 
actors such as governments and NGOs.585However, ‗few issues have proved more 
controversial in practice for the organization than the UNHCR‘s involvement in 
repatriation operations.‘586Once repatriation was accepted and promoted as a key durable 
solution, a trend towards the participation of the UNHCR in involuntary repatriation 
movements occurred in the 1990s. The UNHCR developed new terms to classify certain 
repatriation movements, which in practice, constituted involuntary repatriation. The 
concept of ‗safe return‘ was introduced in 1993, and ‗imposed return‘ in 1996.587 
The notion of ‗safe return‘ focused on the safety of return rather than the voluntariness of 
repatriation. This initially arose when it was being debated in the international refugee 
regime as to whether it was the voluntary nature or the safety of return that complied 
with the principle of non-refoulement, since the principle of voluntary repatriation was 
only stipulated in the Statute of the UNHCR and not in the 1951 Refugee 
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Convention.588Therefore, it was argued that repatriation could be promoted if the 
conditions in the country of origin were deemed safe. The UNHCR also worked at this 
time to reformulate the understanding of repatriation, so that greater importance could 
be placed on the safety of the return, based on the UNHCR‘s assessment, rather than on 
refugees‘ decision to return home.589This occurred at time of an ‗emerging new paradigm 
which emphasized quick solutions‘ to refugeehood590, and thus was favored by both the 
UNHCR and states as it balanced protecting refugees while also finding a solution.591The 
notion of ‗imposed return‘ signifies that refugees are forcibly returned to less than ideal 
conditions in their country of origin.592The UNHCR introduced imposed return when it 
acknowledged that involuntary repatriation was in fact occurring and that exceptions 
needed to be made to the standard of voluntary repatriation593. This was based on the 
idea that the standard of voluntary repatriation needed to be ‗contextualized‘594, when 
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asylum was ‗unsustainable‘595, and refugees had no other solution than to repatriate 
when host countries were adamant on their return. The UNHCR vindicated its 
participation in accepting involuntary return in some cases, as the organization was faced 
with ‗a limited number of options, none of which is fully consistent with the principles 
which the organization is mandated to uphold‘596However, rather than withdraw from an 
operation, it is argued that this would help safeguard the UNHCR‘s participation in 
returns, and thus relevance, as the UNHCR did not have to ensure that returns were 
voluntary.597 
In a nutshell, the exceptions made to the standard of voluntary repatriation illustrate that 
the voluntary nature of repatriation is not always given priority in practice. 
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4.3.4Voluntary repatriation compromised 
In the 1990s, the UNHCR began to participate in involuntary repatriation movements. At 
times, the UNHCR's interests were comparable to donor and host states‘ rather than those 
of refugees. Two prominent cases clearly exemplify the use of the UNHCR‘s notions of 
‗safe return‘ and ‗imposed return‘. The first was in 1994 with the return of the Rohingyas 
to Burma (now Myanmar) from Bangladesh and the second was the return of Rwandans 
from Tanzania in 1996.598These two cases show how the UNHCR disregarded the 
principle of voluntary repatriation in order to rapidly achieve a solution. 
4.3.4.1 Repatriation of Rohingya from Bangladesh to Myanmar in 1994: Example 1 of 
induced return  
 
The first was in 1994 with the return of the Rohingyas to Burma (now Myanmar) from 
Bangladesh and the second was the return of Rwandans from Tanzania in 1996.599In the 
first case, approximately 250,000 Rohingya fled from Myanmar to Bangladesh between 
1991 and 1992, due to a repressive regime.600 However, from 1993 and 1997, 
approximately 236,000 refugees were repatriated to Myanmar601 yet, both Myanmar and 
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Bangladesh have not acceded the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 
Protocol.602According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the Government of Bangladesh 
began to forcefully repatriate refugees shortly after their arrival, without UNHCR‘s 
participation or support603.  Initially, the Government of Bangladesh prevented the 
UNHCR from accessing refugees, however, the UNHCR later signed a memorandum 
with Myanmar and Bangladesh in order to reinstate their presence in the camps ‗in 
exchange for its involvement in the ‗promotion‘ of voluntary repatriation to ‗safe‘ 
conditions in Myanmar‘604  Although a controversial decision, this allowed UNHCR to 
have access, albeit limited, to refugees who had returned and in 1994, UNHCR began the 
repatriation process.605 UNHCR was criticized for not being able to prevent human rights 
abuses from occurring in the refugee camps.606 According to Human Rights Watch, 
Rohingya were returned to a state where the cause of their flight had not been resolved 
and thus ‗the cycle of exodus‘ did not end after refugees were returned607. 
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Approximately 10,000 new asylum seekers fled to Bangladesh by the end of May 1996, 
and at the same time, the UNHCR was completing the repatriation operation of refugees 
who had fled as the result of the Burmese military in 1992 and 1993608. Until today, 
Rohingya in Myanmar face human rights abuses including discrimination, unjustified 
arrests, torture, and death while in custody.609Moreover, from June 2012 to June 2014, 
UNHCR estimates that more than 86,000 people fled Myanmar, the majority being 
Rohingya.610In 2015, thousands of Rohingya continued to flee Myanmar by boat as the 
result of ongoing persecution. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand turned away boats 
carrying Rohingya, which garnered international attention. In turn, these countries 
announced they would no longer push back these boats on the condition that they were 
resettled or repatriated within a year611. The Rohingya refugee crisis has remained 
unresolved to the extent that it attracted the attention of Catholic church leader, Pope 
Francis who visited them and called that they be respected612.It is evident that 
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repatriation was not a durable solution for Rohingya refugees, who until today, continue 
to flee in search of refuge. 
The case of the Rohingya refugees show that coerced or forced return do not work and 
may trigger a wave of conflict and suffering and results to a new cycle of refugees. Just 
like the Rohingya, Somali refugees in Kenya are facing mounting pressure to return when 
conditions at home have not substantially improved. The fact that UNHCR gives consent 
for return does not in itself suggest that the return is voluntary. 
4.3.4.2 Return of Rwandan refugees from Tanzania in 1996: Example 2 of induced 
return 
 
The second case of the return of Rwandan refugees from Tanzania in 1996 also raised 
questions as to UNHCR‘s participation in the involuntary return of refugees. The 
UNHCR and the Government of Tanzania released a statement on December 5th, 1996, 
that Rwandan refugees were expected to return home by the end of the month.613 The 
UNHCR encouraged refugees to prepare to return and advocated that Rwanda was now 
safe614. The UNHCR‘s participation in the return proved to be very controversial and 
received criticism from NGOs and human rights organizations615.Although the return of 
Rwandans occurred at a tremulous time it is argued to have contributed to further 
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615S. Lauren, Repatriation as a Controversial Concept: The Case of Somali Refugees in Kenya. Research paper 
supervised by Professor Delphine Nakache, School of International Development and Global Studies, 
University of Ottawa, July 2015,p.21 
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guerrilla activity616, the Rwandan government assured that the country was safe for 
return and promised the Tanzanian government that refugees would not be killed upon 
returning home.617Moreover, after a visit to Rwanda by Amnesty International in 
November 1996, the organization raised caution on the number of ongoing human rights 
abuses including arbitrary arrests, overcrowding in detention centers, and 
‗disappearances‘618.Findings by the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR) 
discovered returnees faced a series of human rights abuses and were mistreated in 
detention centers and during interrogations.619 
The return of both Rwandan and Rohingya refugees highlights two of the most obvious 
examples of the UNHCR‘s participation in involuntary repatriation movements in the 
1990s. As previously outlined, it is important to respect the voluntary nature of return, as 
there are negative implications for refugees‘ protection when they are forced to return. 
The failed repatriation of the Rohingya and Rwandan may have been contributed to by 
the fact that, ‗nearly all governments of the world are becoming increasingly restrictive 
toward refugees and are interpreting international refugee law as it suits them‘.620This in 
                                                          
616 G. Stein, Refugee repatriation, return, and refoulement during conflict, 1997. Retrieved from 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacd092.pdf [Accessed on 23 April 2017 
617Whitaker, B., Changing priorities in refugee protection: The Rwandan repatriation from Tanzania, Washington, 
DC, Department of Political Science George Washington University, Working Paper No.53, 2002, p.7 
618Amnesty International, ‗Rwanda: Human rights overlooked in mass repatriation‘ Amnesty International, 
14thJanuary, 1997, p.1.Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/002/1997/en/ 
{Accessed 10th February, 2018] 
619 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian 
Agenda, New York, Oxford University Press. 
620B. Harrell-Bond, ‗Repatriation: Under what conditions is it the most desirable solution for refugees? An 
agenda for research‘, African Studies Review, vol.32, no.1, 1989, p. 44 
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practice may mean that a refugee host state can insist that the circumstances that led to 
the refugee flight have since changed and hence justify voluntary repatriation. 
 
Consequently, the ‗UNHCR‘s concern to appear useful to donors in an increasingly 
competitive humanitarian marketplace – and in which other actors were not burdened by 
a mandate to protect as well as assist – played an evident part in the move to downgrade 
voluntariness as a corollary to repatriation.621 Additionally, because the UNHCR is state-
centric (a point that is discussed above) organisation, it has been hesitant to promote 
refugee representation in the repatriation process.622This is because, as discussed above, 
the UNHCR is keen not to upset the donors (mostly states) who support their 
programmes.  
According to some UNHCR staff, it is a challenge to ensure the principle of voluntariness 
when states have a political interest in the return of refugees and other solutions are not 
viable. Thus, premature returns to countries, which are not yet stable or where a regime 
continues to persecute individuals, are inevitable.623Finally, the UNHCR‘s attitude 
towards spontaneous returns has impacted the organization‘s decision to promote 
organized repatriation movements. A spontaneous return is when a refugee decides to 
                                                          
621K. Long, Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee 
repatriation, PDES/2013/14, Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013,p.26 
622 K. Long, Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee 
repatriation, PDES/2013/14, Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013,p.18 
623 K. Long, Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee 
repatriation, PDES/2013/14, Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013,p7. 
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return to their country of origin by their own volition, without UNHCR support, as 
opposed to an organized return that is facilitated and assisted by the UNHCR. Long 
argues that the UNHCR has an ‗ambiguous attitude to spontaneous returns‘624, as this 
type of repatriation makes facilitating and monitoring more difficult for the agency. 
Spontaneous returns are more logistically complicated for the UNHCR due to issues such 
as the control of the financial aspect of reintegration and verifying that refugees are 
‗processed out‘625of the refugee system626. Therefore, when refugees begin to return 
spontaneously, the UNHCR has used this to justify facilitating repatriation, irrespective 
of the factors that caused refugees to return. 
The examples of Rohingya and Rwandan refugees indicate that although UNHCR is 
expected to be a custodian of refugee welfare, it is not immune to pressures from state 
actors. Faced with no alternatives, the UNHCR has sometimes turned a blind eye on the 
voluntariness of repatriation for fear of further upsetting host states already burdened by 
refugees. 
 
 
                                                          
624 K. Long, Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee 
repatriation, PDES/2013/14, Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013,p.17 
625Refugee clearance is processing out of refugees from refugee status after resettling/returning. 
626 K. Long, Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee 
repatriation, PDES/2013/14, Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013,p.17 
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4.3.4.2 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has mainly focused on the role of the governments of Kenya, Somalia and 
UNHCR as envisaged by the TA. As discussed above, however, the TA signed on 
10thNovember 2013 has faced numerous challenges regarding its implementation. 
According to the TA, the government of Kenya should provide security for refugees 
while in Kenya, help supply logistics for return, and manage and control refugees during 
return. I also discussed the role of the government of Kenya in supporting what can be 
termed as induced return. The threat by the government of Kenya to close down Dadaab 
refugee camp has been cited as amounting to coercing refugees to return and denying 
them a free choice not to repatriate. 
The TA tasks the government of Somalia with providing refugees with security upon 
return. It should also promote national development and create an environment for 
humanitarian assistance. The UNHCR on the other hand should mobilize resources to 
support the repatriation process. The TA expects the UNHCR to be the custodian of 
refugee rights during repatriation. 
While the TA envisages a voluntary repatriation exercise, the Government of Kenya has 
been accused of coercing Somali refugees to return. In her defense, the Government of 
Kenya claim that Somalia is now ‗safe‘ for return and accuses UNHCR of wanting Somali 
refugees to continue staying in Kenya even when conditions at home have improved. 
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SFG has opposed massive repatriation of Somali refugees preferring a staggered system 
so as to allow it welcome refugees at home in a safe and dignified manner. 
Members of the TA do not seem to agree on the un(safety) of Somalia, they differ on how 
best to implement repatriation as discussed in this chapter. I argue that it is evident that 
although signatories of the TA agreed in principle about voluntary repatriation of Somali 
refugees, they have differed greatly about how the actual implementation of repatriation 
should be carried out.  
The refugees, who are not directly represented in the TA, its representation by UNHCR 
notwithstanding, are left behind as conflicting interests of actors take center stage. The 
TA in theory seems to be far removed from practice and only refugees themselves 
understand this reality. Refugees interests as Persons of Concern to the UNHCR should 
be paramount and should supersede individual interest of members of the TA. 
In sum, the UNHCR has adopted and promoted repatriation above other durable 
solutions for refugees, largely due to host state pressure and in order to remain an 
important actor in the international refugee regime by appeasing donor states. Even 
though the UNHCR is greatly constrained by states to act independently due to the 
structure of the organization‘s funding mechanism, to view the UNHCR as a passive 
actor, controlled by states, would not be a truly accurate representation of the 
organization. The UNHCR has shown agency and acted independently at different times 
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throughout its history.627With respect to durable solutions, the UNHCR often exerts what 
pressure it can in order to find solutions for refugees. This is observed in the recent case 
of Syrian refugees, where the UNHCR successfully pressed for states to increase their 
resettlement quotas.628This exemplifies that the UNHCR does have political weight, even 
if limited, to influence donor states. The UNHCR should continue to exert what influence 
it can in order to encourage donor governments to share the responsibility of refugees 
more equally. This could ease the burden on host states in the Global South and 
potentially be used as a leverage to negotiate with host states when they pressure for 
refugees to return. In relation to the UNHCR‘s contested and self-interested role in 
repatriation, it is important to recognize here that the organization is dealing with highly 
complex situations and its autonomy to act is often constrained by host states‘ policies 
and donor states‘ interests. Therefore, as we discuss further, even though the 
organization is supposed to remain non-political, as per the Statute629 of the UNHCR, this 
is difficult as refugee situations are inherently political and the organization therefore 
                                                          
627G. Loescher, ‗The UNHCR and world politics: State interests vs. institutional autonomy‘, International 
Migration Review, vol. 35. No. 1, 2001, pp. 33-56. 
628In 2017 UNHCR resettled  65,084, while 2016 recorded highest resettlements at 126, 291.As of May 2015, 
87, 350 places were made available and 61,948 of these were pledged since 2013 (UNHCR, 2015, May 13). In 
Canada, for example, the Canadian government increased the number of Syrian refugees to be resettled 
from 1,300 places allocated in 2013, to an additional 10,000, announced in 2015 (UNHCR, 2015, May 13; 
Mas, 2015, January 7). This new commitment was in response to the UNHCR‘s global appeal for the 
resettlement of 100,00 Syrian refugees (Mas, 2015, January 7), and occurred after a visit from the UNHCR 
High Commissioner António  Guterres in May of 2014, who urged Canada to increase its quota (UNHCR 
Canada, 2014).   
629Statute of the office of UNHCR, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 428(v) of 14thDecember 
1950 
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finds itself ‗out of its depth and faced with security and political issues that it has neither 
the mandate nor the resources to deal with‘630. 
In the next chapter, chapter five, I explore the extent of Somali refugee involvement, 
inclusivity and participation in repatriation processes and other selected cases across the 
world. It will seek to explore the subject of repatriation from refugee voices that seem to 
be overshadowed by the structured representation through UNHCR.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
630G. Loescher, ‗UNHCR and the erosion of refugee protection‘, Forced Migration Review, no.10, pp28-30. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
REFUGEES IN DECISION MAKING: DO THEIR VOICES MATTER? 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate challenges associated with the tripartite voluntary 
repatriation agreement of Somali refugees, even as the repatriation exercise is at its initial 
stages, with a view to examine the extent of refugee-centered initiatives, inclusivity and 
participation in the repatriation process. While a number of repatriations may have been 
successful and sustainable, many of the repatriations have had many challenges hence 
raising the question as to whether any intervention, especially regarding the role of 
refugees in repatriation, were taken into account in such repatriation processes. This 
chapter is premised on the fact that only refugee repatriations that are refugee driven and 
owned are going to be sustainable in the long run. The ways in which refugees are 
involved in the pre-repatriation negotiations, the actual repatriation exercise and the 
post-repatriation phase is crucial in ensuring that the actual causes of the forced flight are 
addressed. This is essential to avoid a scenario where returnees are to flee again in a 
perpetual cycle that recycles refugees. 
In the last thirty years voluntary repatriation has increased in importance as a way to deal 
with the increasing flows of refugees in the world. In 1992 the United Nations High 
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Sadako Ogata, declared a decade631 of voluntary 
repatriation and there have been some major returns of refugees since then to 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa and 
Rwanda. However, despite such progress, from 1986 to 1994 the total number of refugees 
globally increased from an estimated 10 million to 23 million632. In Africa, by the end of 
2016, there were an estimated 19.6 million forcibly displaced and stateless individuals, 
including 5.1 million refugees and 11.1 million internally displaced persons 
(IDP‘s).633These estimates include only those who have crossed international borders and 
are eligible for refugee status. Despite the decade of repatriation campaigns by the 
UNHCR, refugee numbers have continued to increase. As at 2017, UNHCR situational 
update indicates that, ‗The scale of organized or spontaneous repatriation movements 
which began or continued in 2017 mainly to Burundi, Côte d‘Ivoire, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan, did not match the scale of new 
displacement across borders‘634. As a result, the number of refugees in Africa is estimated 
to have increased by at least half a million in the first semester of 2017635. 
                                                          
631J. Crisp and K. Long, ‗Safe and voluntary refugee repatriation: From principle to practice‘, Journal on 
Migration and  Human Security, vol.4.no.3, 2016,p.144 
632B. Stein, F.C.  Cuny F.C. and P. Reed, Refugee Repatriation during Conflict: a new conventional wisdom, 1995, 
Papers from the CSSC conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 1992, Centre for the Study of Societies 
in Crisis, Dallas, TX. 
These estimates include only those who have crossed international borders and are eligible for refugee 
status. 
633 Update Africa- Executive Committee of the High Comissiomer‘s Programme, Standing Committee, 71st 
Meeting, 13th March, 2018. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/5a9fdc2d7.pdf[Accessed 13th April, 2018] 
634Update Africa- Executive Committee of the High Comissiomer‘s Programme, Standing Committee, 71st 
Meeting, 13th March, 2018. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/5a9fdc2d7.pdf[Accessed 13th April, 2018] 
635 Update Africa- Executive Committee of the High Comissiomer‘s Programme, Standing Committee, 71st 
Meeting, 13th March, 2018. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/5a9fdc2d7.pdf[Accessed 13th April, 2018] 
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.  
New conflicts have replaced old, returning refugees have displaced new ones (especially 
in Rwanda) and old refugees have returned to exile (such as in Angola with the 
resumption of the war in 1992636. The increasing difficulties of dealing with such 
staggering numbers of refugees have increased the impetus of the search for durable 
solutions to their plight. In general, three solutions are seen as both desirable and 
durable: voluntary repatriation to the country of origin; permanent settlement in the 
country of first asylum (integration); and in a third country with permanent residence 
status637. None of these is easily achieved and voluntary repatriation has come to be seen 
by governments, international organizations and many academics as the optimum 
solution, both in terms of sustainability and feasibility638.While it is generally agreeable 
that repatriation is the best solution when dealing with large numbers of refugees; 
refugee involvement in repatriation process has been questioned. In some instances, 
decisions to repatriate had been arrived at despite the refugee protesting such decisions. 
It appears that the rights of refugee communities to make decisions have been assumed 
by the refugee ‗elite experts‘ who, in international forums, have not always represented 
                                                          
636 A. Pereira, ‗The neglected tragedy: The return to war in Angola‘, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
vol.32.no 1, 1994,pp1-28 
637UNHCR, ‗Information on UNHCR Resettlement‘, Available at http://www.unhcr.org/information-on-
unhcr-resettlement.html[Accessed on 13th April, 2018] 
638J. Rogge, ‗Repatriation of Refugees‘, in Allen, T and Morsink, S. (Eds.), When Refugees go Home, 
UNRISD, Geneva and James Currey, London, 1994. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Voluntary Repatriation: Principles and Guidelines for Action, 
Inter-office memo no. 5, 10/2/87, 1987. 
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the best interests of refugees. It is from this perspective that the chapter explores the 
actual participation of refugees in matters regarding resettlement in general and 
repatriation in particular. 
 
For instance, the governments‘ of Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR seem to agree that it is 
now time for voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees. However, as this study would 
find out in subsequent discussions, an overwhelming majority of Somali refugee 
interview participants, about 80%, still feel that Somalia is unsafe for return hence are 
unwilling to return. As it would emerge in this study, the decision to push for ‗voluntary‘ 
repatriation of Somali refugees by the Government of Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR 
may have just been a decision of few ‗expert elites‘. Indeed their decision to repatriate 
thousands of Somali refugees may be far removed from the position of a majority of 
Somali refugees in Dadaab, who think it is not yet time to repatriate because of the 
current unfavourable conditions in Somalia. In this case the UNHCR, which serves as the 
protection agency for refugees, may not have sufficiently represented the views of the 
majority of Somali refugees as a signatory to the Tripartite Agreement in 2013. In fact the 
UNHCR admitted that Somali refugees in Dadaab were repatriating to Somalia because 
of threats and pressure from Kenyan security officials.639 According to one UNHCR 
official in Dadaab, ‗many those who filled in the repatriation forms have shown that they 
                                                          
639M. Hassan, ‗UN: Somali refugees leaving Kenya due to threats, pressure‘, 25th August 2016. Available at 
https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-refugees-leaving-kenya-due-to-threats-and-pressure-un-
says/3480706.html[Accessed 13th April 2018] 
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are returning because of threatening rhetoric by Kenyan regional security officials who 
recently visited the camp‘640. 
 
This mismatch between the perspectives of refugees and their representatives through the 
UNHCR suggests that refugee views may have been set aside in part or as a whole, when 
the decision to repatriate was arrived at and the TA signed in 2013.The premise here is 
that refugee participation and inclusion in decisions regarding repatriation will 
ultimately determine whether the repatriation will be sustainable or lead to recycled 
refugees-refugees who repatriate only to flee in search of asylum again. In the case of 
Somali refugees in Kenya, the repatriation exercise could only be feasible if individual 
refugees consider the decision to repatriate as being one which is refugee-centered and 
one meant to protect their interests. A refugee-centered decision is one that considers a 
majority refugee opinion as paramount in the repatriation process. As it stands, it is 
disputable whether the current repatriation push by the Government of Kenya is centered 
on the interests of refugees or anchored in Kenya‘s interests of securing the Kenya-Somali 
border. 
  
                                                          
640 M. Hassan, ‗UN: Somali refugees leaving Kenya due to threats, pressure‘, 25th August 2016. Available at 
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5.1 I don’t want to go: The ‘unheard’ voices of refugees in organized repatriations 
While ideally the UNHCR is expected to protect the interests of refugees, the prevailing 
circumstances under which the refugee agency operates, makes its mandate difficult or 
sometimes impossible to carry out. This is because the pressure from various 
stakeholders may lead to decisions that are not consensual and that may not necessarily 
favour the refugees. One scholar for instance argues that: 
…repatriation is often not a consensual concept because it frequently does 
not serve refugees for two principal reasons. First, host states, UNHCR, and 
states of origin, promote repatriation as the best solution for refugees due to 
political and self-interested motives. Second, repatriation movements are 
not always voluntary, even though non-refoulement is a core principle of the 
1951 Refugee Convention (UNHCR, 1951). Consequently, other ‗durable‘ 
solutions are not being found for refugees due to a strong focus on 
repatriation as the most preferred solution641.  
 
The above argument by Stanley Lauren indicates that although tripartite agreements can 
be reached and implemented, it does not necessarily mean that there was consensus. This 
view is backed by the empirical findings of this dissertation as applied to Dadaab refugee 
camps comprising Hagadera, Ifo and Dagahaley. 
Somali refugees seem to have been side stepped by elite decision makers who sealed their 
fate through TA regarding repatriation. Asked, for instance, whether they were aware of 
the tripartite agreement signed between Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR on voluntary 
repatriation, many (11 of 15 respondents), 73.33% simply said ‗no‘. Describing their lack 
                                                          
641 S. Lauren, Repatriation as a Controversial Concept: The Case of Somali Refugees in Kenya. Research paper 
supervised by Professor Delphine Nakache, School of International Development and Global Studies, 
University of Ottawa, July 2015, p.9 
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of knowledge of the TA, some could just say ‗no, I have never had of anything like that‘. 
These finding reaffirms the findings of a study by MSF in the months of July and August 
2016 that indicated that an ‗overwhelming‘ number of refugees in Dadaab, 8 in every 
10642,said there was no security in Somalia and consequently would not return to Somalia. 
This report questioned the nature of repatriation of Somali refugees terming it ‗inhumane 
and irresponsible‘. It appears the unwillingness of Somali refugees to repatriate, mainly 
for security reasons, stood out in the study to the extent that MSF titled their study report 
Dadaab to Somalia: Pushed Back into Peril. The fact that the report‘s title uses the word 
‗push‘ is in itself an indication that the process was not really voluntary as it was not as a 
result of the ‗pull‘ factors in Somalia. In what appears like calling for more support from 
the donor community to sustain refugees in Kenya, MSF proposes that ‗Funding from 
donor countries needs to be directed to proving sustained assistance in the country of 
refuge, not to supporting what will essentially be a forced return to a warzone‘643. While 
many state and non-state actors644 have proposed the former, the Government of Kenya 
                                                          
642 A report by MSF titled Dadaab to Somalia: Pushed Back into Peril. The study was carried out in Dadaab 
during the months of July and August 2016 sampled 838 respondents and was released in October 2016. 
The report coincided with a time when the Government of Kenya was rallying for the support of the 
international community in its bid to mobilize the resources for repatriation.  
643‗Kenya, Dadaab: Return of refugees to Somalia in current conditions ‗inhumane and irresponsible‘, 13 th 
October, 2016. 
http://www.msf.org/en/article/kenya-dadaab-return-refugees-somalia-current-conditions-inhumane-
and-irresponsible[Accessed 12th April 2018] 
644They include Human Rights Groups like Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) among others. 
Seehttps://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/12/somalia-refugees-pressured-to-leave-dadaab-
return-to-insecurity-drought-and-hunger/ 21st December, 2017[Accessed 13th April, 2018] 
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has insisted on the latter. The UNHCR has maintained that there is no deadline attached 
to the Tripartite Agreement645. 
 
The minority of refugees (27%) who were aware of the tripartite agreement negotiations 
expressed their opposition to the planned repatriation campaign. One refugee respondent 
acknowledged that he was aware of the tripartite agreement but, ‗I opposed the 
agreement‘. Another refugee laments that it is regrettable that the agreement was signed 
despite her ‗campaigning against the agreement‘. In another instance, the refugee 
respondent admits that he is aware of the tripartite agreement but ‗Only got the news 
from the media and disseminated‘. The responses therefore indicate that the tripartite 
agreement signed on the 10th of November 2013 was concluded with little input from the 
refugees from Dadaab. This is because a majority of the refugees (73%) were not aware of 
the existence of any such agreement. When prompted further on whether they were 
aware of the tripartite agreement, one, without much thought simply responded that ‗No, 
I think this was done by leaders only‘. Others opposed to the agreement argued that they 
were not aware of the agreement and that, ‗Many protested after the approval‘ or that 
                                                          
645UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Tripartite Agreement Between the Government of the 
Republic of Kenya, the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees Governing the Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees Living in Kenya, 2013, 10 November 
2013,http://www.refworld.org/docid/5285e0294.html[Accessed 10th May, 2017]. 
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‗Participation was very low‘646.This empirical findings are supported by the Nation 
Television survey that concluded that a majority of refugees are unwilling to repatriate 
due to security concerns in Somalia647.The fact that a majority of the Somali refugees in 
the camps did not know of its existence or its terms partly explains why they were 
against the provisions of the tripartite agreement. The reference of insecurity in Somalia, 
as a reason behind reluctance to repatriate implies that refugees were not adequately 
consulted regarding their repatriation. It is therefore suffice to argue that refugee active 
participation and inclusiveness was not considered with the weight it deserved as the 
agreement was signed regardless of the sentiments of the dissenting majority. 
 
The Cambridge dictionary defines participation as ‗the fact that you take part or become 
involved in something‘648.If as a majority refugees are not aware of the existence and or 
contents of the TA then refugee involvement must have been minimal, if at all. This in 
essence significantly reduces their influence on the decision as to whether to repatriate or 
not. Indeed political theorists claim that ‗all individuals ought to have an appropriately 
equal opportunity to influence decision-making processes‘.649Can it be argued that Somali 
refugees in Dadaab were given an appropriately equal opportunity to determine the 
                                                          
646 These were interview responses in Dadaab camps between August 1 and 30th August 2016.This was at a 
time that the tripartite agreement was being implemented as refugee ‗voluntarily‘ returned through the 
assistance of the Tripartite Parties. 
647www.rckkenya.org/v2/ntv-kenya-many-refugees--not-ready-to-return-to-somalia/ 
Accessed on 25th November 20116 
648https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/participation[Accessed 16thApril, 2018] 
649S. Verba, N. Nie and J. Kim, Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
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repatriation process? The fact that the majority barely understands the provisions of the 
TA suggests that there was no such opportunity. One can argue that Somali refugees, just 
like other refugees elsewhere, may not have had an opportunity to be fully involved in 
decision making processes regarding repatriation. Even though the UNHCR is apolitical, 
it often finds itself amidst political players and faces pressures from the host state and the 
state of origin. For the purposes of this dissertation, I adopt the praxialist approach to 
refugee participation in decision making. 
 
In such a case, this raises the questions of who owns the repatriation exercise and for 
whom is it being carried out? Should repatriation be a top-down process or a bottom-up 
one, or another model altogether? Unless the answers to these questions are sought, the 
repatriation process will be flawed and untenable. If the repatriation exercise takes place 
under the current many voices of dissent among the refugees, then Kenya is likely to 
have ‗recycled‘ refugees in the future-a situation where returnees flee again to their 
country of asylum. This is bound to happen when conditions at home have not 
significantly improved to allow for safe and dignified return. 
 
This therefore implies that although the state and non-state actors are busy mobilizing for 
resources for the repatriation exercise, many of the refugees (73%) were neither aware of 
the TA nor its implications. While the voluntariness of repatriation has been a key 
principle of refugee protection in theory, in practice, involuntary repatriation occurred 
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and was approved by UNHCR under certain circumstances in the 1990s650. This had 
negative implications for refugees as the principle of non-refoulement was 
compromised.651The question is: does the failure of the UNHCR to actively engage the 
refugees in the process of repatriation suggest its predetermined decision to repatriate 
them? As the case studies, cited in chapter four of this dissertation, show regarding the 
involuntary repatriation of Rohingya from Bangladesh to Myanmar in 1994 and the 
return of Rwandan refugees from Tanzania in 1996, this is a worrying trend. It is evident 
that while in principle the refugee regime envisages repatriation as voluntary, this may 
not be the case in practice. UNHCR is not immune to pressures from host states who 
essentially determine who to grant asylum. 
Repatriation, therefore, may take place even if a majority of the refugees feel unsafe to 
return home. The empirical finding in Dadaab confirms that the actual decision makers 
on refugee matters are other refugee actors and not really refugees. Asked on whether 
they believed Somalia was safe for return, a majority, 87% of the refugee thought that it 
was not safe. This in essence means that this group of refugees is not ready for 
repatriation. This study, that took place in August 2016, in the midst of a campaign to 
repatriate, shows that the process was carried out despite the feeling of a majority of the 
                                                          
650K. Long, Back to where you once belonged: A historical review of UNHCR policy and practice on refugee 
repatriation, PDES/2013/14, Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013. 
B. Chimni, ‗From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: Towards a critical history of durable solutions to 
refugee problems‘, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.23, no.1, 2004, pp.55-73. 
651Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention on the Status of a Refugee. 
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refugees that felt the time to return had not yet to come. The table below is a summary of 
their thoughts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
236 
 
 
The UNHCR in its global report of 2008 states its objective as ‗to help States fulfill their 
obligation to protect asylum-seekers, refugees, stateless people, internally displaced 
persons (IDPs)and returnees‘652.Since UNHCR is a states‘ creation, it is only natural that it 
will most likely serve the interests of those states. Perhaps it is worth explaining, though 
briefly, why one needs to cast to doubt UNHCR as the refugee ‗protection‘ agency. First, 
                                                          
652UNHCR, ‗International Protection‘, 2008, p.1 Available at http://www.unhcr.org/4a2d16e22.pdf 
[Accessed 14th April, 2018] 
TABLE1: TABLE SHOWING SUMMARY OF REFUGEE THOUGHTS 
A1 No. More violence experienced in Somalia, no 
clear information about the situation. 
Many think so, but no clear information on the 
situation at home. 
B1 No. There are lots of war casualties. other 
safety issues are impunity, forced marriage. 
This a general view held by UNHCR, Kenya 
etc…but nevertheless they seem to blindly promote 
repatriation. 
C1 I am among those who came in 1991.I do not 
have a home to go back to. 
This is a commonly held view, refugees have no 
place (home)to return to. 
D1 No. prevailing insecurity. Because they are homeless. 
E1 Yes. After all food security in the camps is 
inadequate. Insecurity in camp is deteriorating 
too. 
Many think Somalia could be an option to consider. 
F1 No. Central government is weak and corrupt, 
no peace and stability. 
Yes…because the Al Shabaab destabilize Somalia. 
G1 No. Somalia is insecure. Yeah…the recent attack and death of KDF in 
Somalia is testimony of situation. 
H1 NO. Somalia government is weak...most parts 
of Somalia under militia control 
Yes…there is a long way before peace is restored. 
I1 No. Ongoing war in Somalia...not conducive 
for repatriation. 
Yeah…some returnees were complaining for lack of 
shelter, food, clothing in Somalia. 
J1 No…Somalia is full of gang militia…no place 
for non-combatants. 
Yes…refugees are wondering ‗why are we being 
taken back and there is no proper security?‘ 
K1 No. Somalia government is unstable and 
cannot safeguard the rights of citizens. 
Yes...think Somalia is full of moral decadence. 
L1 No. There is war in the country. Everybody knows what is going on in Somalia. 
M1 No. Parts of the country still under terror 
groups. 
Many think militia still controls many parts of 
Somalia. 
N1 No. Fighting is going on in Somalia and is not 
safe for repatriation. 
Everyone (UN, Kenya, refugees) is aware of the 
instability of Somalia. 
O1 Yes. Many refugees go to Somalia to do 
business. 
Many people have business contacts etc with 
Somalia. 
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the UNHCR is a creation of states, and hence mandated by states. This implies that states 
have a significant influence on UNHCR decisions. Secondly, there is a generally 
increasing donor fatigue653, especially regarding the billions of dollars required to sustain 
refugees in camps and to protect them in protracted situations. Responding on the Somali 
refugees‘ protracted situation, a senior UNHCR envoy lamented that there was ‗growing 
hopelessness as their displacement drags on for decades and donors become fatigued‘654. 
Considering that states and non-state actors lobby for their interests, including on matters 
of repatriation, it is only fair and logical to involve the refugees themselves before such 
serious decisions are made. This should not in any way be construed to mean that the 
presence of refugees in the negotiation table will in any way be overlapping the functions 
and responsibilities of UNHCR as the UN refugee agency in charge of protecting the 
refugees.  In other words, the fact that legislators make laws on behalf of the electorate 
does not mean that the electorate by themselves cannot push for particular legislation to 
be enacted. 
Mark Malloch-Brown, as quoted by Harrell-Bond(1989),points out the glaring gaps in 
refugee decision making where the voices of refugees were neglected and, instead, 
                                                          
653UNHCR, ‗Growing hopelessness‘ grips ‗forgotten‘ Somali refugees, warns UNHCR‘, 9th January 2017. 
Available at  http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2017/1/58738b174/growing-hopelessness-grips-
forgotten-somali-refugees-warns-unhcr.html [Accessed 14th April, 2018] 
654 UNHCR, ‗Growing hopelessness‘ grips ‗forgotten‘ Somali refugees, warns UNHCR‘, 9th January 2017. 
Available at  http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2017/1/58738b174/growing-hopelessness-grips-
forgotten-somali-refugees-warns-unhcr.html [Accessed 14th April, 2018] 
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decision-making  was delegated to ‗experts‘ to make decisions on their behalf. He argues 
that: 
I would hope that experts will never again have the effrontery to sit down 
together to discuss refugees without refugees being present, but I doubt it. 
Refugee work remains, perhaps, the last bastion of the ultra-paternalistic 
approach to aid and development. It is hard to think of another area where 
the blinkered nonsense of the ‗we know what's best for them‘ approach 
survives so unchallenged.655 
 
 
Malloch-Brown‘s critique of the common view held by international organizations that 
seem not to consider the voice and position of the ordinary refugees especially on crucial 
matters like the decision to return. The refugee regime can only make good refugee 
decisions and policies if they get the facts from the real world (of refugees). After all‗[I]f 
lawyers want to play a role in creating good laws, they must step out of their law libraries 
into the [real world], which is [one of] the [primary] source[s] of the information they 
need to build a truly legitimate formal legal system. [Then], reformers can get a sense of 
what they need to do to create a self-enforcing legal system‘.656 
 
There is adequate literature to suggest that even when refugees are not ready for 
repatriation, host governments and the UNHCR, often after signing Tripartite 
                                                          
655B. Harrell-Bond, ‗Repatriation: Under what conditions is it the most desirable solution for refugees? An 
agenda for research‘, African Studies Review, vol.32, no.1, 1989, p. 41 
 
656P. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere, 
London, Blackswan, 2001, p198. 
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Agreements, will nevertheless carry out such repatriations657.Indeed, during the 
repatriation decade, one UNHCR official bluntly put it: ‗it is quite clear that a large 
proportion of the world's recent returnees have repatriated under some form of 
duress‘.658 Such repatriations have, however, proved unsustainable over the long term 
and have created more complexities as a result of returnees fleeing the conflict zones 
again. In one such instance, Tanzania‘s Minister for Home Affairs, Shamsi V. Nahodha, 
complained at the May 2011 Tripartite Meeting659 that Burundian refugees did not 
appreciate Tanzania for hosting them after many Burundian refugees had declined to 
take up the offer to repatriate. According to him: 
 
[the] United Republic of Tanzania has demonstrated a clear commitment in 
the dispensation of international obligation. It would seem logical therefore 
for Mtabila refugees to reciprocate this generosity of the host country by 
returning home. Instead, these refugees have defied all calls to return home 
and have become insensitive to the generosity accorded to them.660 
 
                                                          
657B. Chimni, ‗From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: towards a critical history of durable solutions 
to refugee problem‘, Working Paper no 2, 1999. See also UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: A 
Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1997. 
658 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1997, p. 147. 
659https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/full_report_79.pdf[Accessed 16th April, 2018] 
Opening Remarks Delivered by the Minister for Home Affairs Hon. Shamsi V. Nahodha, (MP) at the 15th 
Meeting of the Tripartite Commission on the Repatriation of Burundian Refugees from Tanzania, Dar es 
Salaam, 25th May 2011 
660https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/full_report_79.pdf 
Opening Remarks Delivered by the Minister for Home Affairs Hon. Shamsi V. Nahodha, (MP) at the 15th 
Meeting of the Tripartite Commission on the Repatriation of Burundian Refugees from Tanzania, Dar es 
Salaam, 25th May 2011, on file with IRRI. 
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The minister‘s reaction was as a result of frustration that the end of the civil war in 
Burundi has not resulted in the dutiful return of all refugees. The Minister‘s statement 
also reflects a broader regional expectation that the end of conflicts should lead to 
universal repatriation. 
 
Refugees returning in such coerced circumstances are more likely to be victims of 
violence upon return. This not only increases the chance that the returnee will flee again, 
either to the previous country of asylum or to another, but also makes it difficult for 
refugees to cope, acclimatize and to assimilate in his or her home country upon return. 
 
While the UNHCR has remained an active refugee protection agency, the organization 
seems to be overburdened by the protracted conflicts that have resulted in refugees 
spending decades in refugee camps in host states. Consequently, the UNHCR is of the 
opinion that long stays by refugees in the camps ends up eroding and undermining the 
very refugee life that such camps were meant to protect. This is because the aim of 
UNHCR in establishing refugee camps is to protect the dignity of the life of refugees in 
the short term. Protracted conflicts mean refugees overstay in camps yet camps have 
limitations and are not designed for long term stays. Camps are only meant to provide 
essential life services for refugees. According to the UNHCR: 
 
If it is true that camps save lives in the emergency phase, it is also true that, as the 
years go by, they progressively waste these same lives. A refugee may be able to 
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receive assistance, but is prevented from enjoying those rights – for example, to 
freedom of movement, employment, and in some cases, education – that would 
enable him or her to become a productive member of a society661. 
 
It is such overstaying in the refugee camps that may have informed the position of the 
UNHCR to support repatriation efforts, even when the security in the country of origin is 
still questionable. After all not all refugees agree on whether to classify Somalia as ‗safe‘ 
or ‗unsafe‘ as this depends on several other factors such as the part of Somalia that is 
being referred to and whom is safe or unsafe. This is because refugees will most likely 
feel safe if they repatriate to areas inhabited by their clansmen and unsafe if they 
repatriated to areas occupied by other clans. This is because the civil war in homogenous 
Somalia is fought along clan lines. Consequently, clan mates feel safe when they settle 
together as opposed to being resettled on areas perceived as with others. Indeed 
repatriation today is only possible to areas inhabited by the repatriates‘ own 
clans662.There is however no consensus from one refugee to another, Government of 
Kenya, UNHCR and Somalia as to whether to pronounce Somalia as safe and hence to 
endorse the repatriation process in totality, or as unsafe and hence to reject the rationale 
of the repatriation exercise in its entirety. It is conceivable that such disparities in opinion 
may have informed the signing of the Tripartite Agreement on 10th November 2013 so as 
                                                          
661UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High Commissioners Programme, Standing Committee 30th 
Meeting, EC/54/SC/CRP.14,p.3, 10 June 2004 
662J.W. Olesen, Report on Fact-Finding Mission to North East and North West Somalia 
(Somaliland), Danish Immigration Service, Copenhagen, 1996 
J.W. Olesen, Report on the Nordic Fact-finding Mission to Mogadishu, Somalia, Udlændingestyrelsen/Statens 
Invandrerverk, Copenhagen, 1998. 
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to allow individual refugees to determine whether to repatriate or not depending on their 
own informed choice. 
 
There is no guarantee that even the UNHCR can genuinely represent refugee interests 
when dealing with states. This implies that refugees‘ feelings, thoughts and perspectives 
may not be seriously considered before rolling out repatriation programmes. While the 
decision to repatriate or otherwise has a direct impact on the lives of refugees, the 
significance of this has not earned refugees a voice at the decision making table. Refugee 
sentiments may not be effectively represented by UNHCR, a states‘ creation, that may not 
be willing to upset its masters. While refugees should have a veto power on matters of 
repatriation, this power seem to be the preserve of the country of origin and country of 
refuge with the UNHCR playing a ceremonial role. For instance, in the case of Burundian 
refugees, as cited by former Tanzanian Home Affairs minister Shamsi V. Nahodha, the 
Tanzanian government was contemplating invoking the cessation663 clause hence 
consequently terminating the refugee status of Burundians in Tanzania. This in turn 
made refugees illegal immigrants paving the way for forceful repatriation and or 
deportation. 
                                                          
663See article 1C of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; and article I(4) of the OAU 
Refugee Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. The term cessation 
refers to the revocation or cancellation of refugee status provided for under Article 1(C) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. The cessation clause can apply following actions taken by a refugee (such as return) or as 
applicable to this group when an individual ‗can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with 
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the 
protection of the country of his nationality.‘ (UNCHR Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of 
Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (the ‗Ceased Circumstances Clauses‘) UN doc no, HCR/GIP/03/03 10 February 2003. 
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There are a number of reasons cited by refugees as to why they were reluctant to return 
to their home country. Some refugees cited insecurity in Somalia as a result of clan militia 
and terror groups like Al Shabaab664.Some respondents also cited the weakness of the 
Somalia government and argued that it cannot guarantee security. Responding on the 
imminent repatriation, one Somali refugee at Ifo camp lamented ‗why are we being taken 
back and there is no proper security in Somalia665? A majority of young adults, apart from 
security concerns, protested the lack of social services and opportunities in Somalia. In 
the words of one such refugee, ‗some returnees were complaining for lack of shelter, 
food, clothing in Somalia‘666.Until these and other reasons are addressed, refugees will 
always ignore calls from the ‗experts‘ to repatriate and when forced to repatriate under 
duress, such repatriations will be unsustainable. For instance, studies have indicated that, 
‗Given the choice, nearly half of Somali refugees interviewed in camps would prefer to 
move to a third country, a third would return to Somalia and small numbers would 
integrate locally. Yet, if conditions were conducive in Somalia, more than half would 
consider returning.‘667 Many refugees opine that guaranteed security in Somalia, 
availability of social services especially education and health and opportunities for 
livelihoods as factors they consider before return. It is the individual perception of 
                                                          
664 Ali, 23, Interview at Dagahaley refugee camp 24thNovember 2016. 
665 Omar 35, Interview at Ifo refugee camp, 25th November 2016. 
666 Abdullahi, 27, Interview at Ifo refugee camp, 25th November 2016 
667Catherine-Lune Grayson, Andre Epstein and Emily Coles , ‗Durable Solutions Perspectives of Somali 
Refugees‘ 2013.The project was supported by the Sean Deveruxe Human Rights Organisation, the Somali 
Children Welfare and Rights Watch in Baidoa and the Gedo Social Development Organisation. 
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refugees concerning repatriation, resettlement in a third country and of local integration 
that ultimately determines their choice of options. Failure to capture refugee aspirations 
in the quest for a permanent solution to the refugee problem not only delays the solution 
but actually worsens the personal suffering of refugees. The international community that 
has to grapple with the refugee problem for longer will also be burdened for long as it 
provides various essential services to the refugees while in exile. 
 
Returns that take place under pressure from host governments - particularly the 1996 
return of Rwandan refugees hosted by Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo, or 
DRC) and Tanzania - have raised fresh questions about the degree of voluntariness and 
the role of compulsion in ‗imposed return‘.668 Moreover, what may arguably have been 
premature repatriations to the former Yugoslav republics and Afghanistan in the early 
2000s has renewed debate on sustainable reintegration and its relationship to post-conflict 
reconstruction. The pressure on refugees to repatriate seems to have intensified since the 
1980‘s when many refugees tended to move from poor to richer countries, hence creating 
an impression that they were migrants fleeing poverty and seeking resettlement in 
wealthy nations.669 The main difference between an economic migrant and a political 
asylum seeker is that ‗the economic migrant uses asylum channels to seek economic 
improvement. In contrast, the legitimate asylum seeker only migrates to flee politically 
                                                          
668G. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. 
669B. S. Chimni, ‗From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable 
Solutions to Refugee Problems‘, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 2, UNHCR, Geneva, 
1999. 
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inspired persecution‘670.Additionally, the economic migrant is viewed as migrating out of 
personal preference and the potential for economic gain, rather than out of necessity 
inspired by persecution or life-threatening circumstance.671While there are a significant 
number of economic asylum seekers, the majorities are those fleeing conflict and or 
persecution and genuinely seek protection from host states. While the international 
refugee regime does not recognize economic migrants as refugees, some economic 
migrants are faced with imminent death and starvation if they do not flee. For instance, 
several Somalis entered Kenya as refugees fleeing from the famine672 of 2011 that ravaged 
Somalia. 
 
Refugees in Dadaab had diverse opinions concerning the voluntary repatriation that was 
being advocated for by UNHCR, Government of Kenya and Somalia. When asked what 
she thought about organized repatriation, Josephine, a young Sudanese refugee stated, 
‗For me, I think many Somali refugees are just opting to temporarily return to Somalia in 
order to benefit from the repatriation financial and material assistance from UNHCR only 
to return after a few weeks or months citing insecurity‘673. Josephine claimed she knows a 
                                                          
670Dobe, Kuljeet, S. ‗Asylum is the new immigration: The refugee as economic migranthttp://www.spr-
consilio.com/asylumm.html for an example of this debate 
671W. Adelson, ‗Economic migrants as political asylum seekers in  the United Kingdom: crafting the 
difference‘, The Michigan Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 1, Summer ,2004,p.1 
672The Guardian, ‗Somalia has been through famine before-but this time is different‘ 12th August 2011. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/12/somalia-famine-refugee-kenya[Accessed 17th April, 
2018] 
BBC News, ‗Somalia famine ‗killed 260,000 people‘ 2nd May, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-22380352[Accessed 17th April, 2018] 
673 Interview with Josephine Daniel, 19, a Sudanese refugee at Dagahaley refugee camp since 2001. 16th 
November, 2016, Dagahaley refugee camp, Dadaab. 
246 
 
number of refugees who took the offer only to return shortly thereafter. Josephine argued 
that she has had such several cases where Somali refugees repatriate only to be back in 
the camps in a few weeks or months time. Josephine would later call me informing me 
that they were successful in the resettlement interviews and were scheduled, together 
with rest of the family in Dadaab, to relocate to Australia - they departed in November 
2016. Unlike in the camps, Josephine and her family could now live a life of freedom and 
hope abroad. It is this hope of resettlement in the developed world that has kept many 
refugees resilient in the camps and reluctant to take up repatriation or integration into the 
local host community. 
 
Principally, refugees should not be driven to repatriate by inadequate or deteriorating 
security and living conditions in the refugee camps, but should return when they deem 
conditions conducive in their country of origin. This is however not always the case. 
Some 5,200 refugees returned to Somalia by their own means in March and April 2012, 
according to UNHCR‘s Somalia population movement tracking (PMT) system. It has 
been repeatedly noted that a large number of refugees repatriated from Kenya to Somalia 
in 1993-94 because of the insecurity and deteriorating conditions in the camps, and not 
because conditions were conducive in Somalia.674Forced returns would be indefensible. 
Likewise, refugees should not be driven to repatriate by inadequate or deteriorating 
                                                          
674 S. Collin,  ‗An Analysis of the Voluntariness of Refugee Repatriation in Africa‘,  University of Manitoba, 
1996,pp13-15 
 S. Waldron and A. Naima, ‗Somali Refugees in the Horn of Africa‘, In Studies on emergencies and disaster 
relief: Refugee Studies Programme, University of Oxford, 199, pp89-97 
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security and living conditions in the refugee camps, but should return when they deem 
conditions conducive in their country of origin675. 
 
Recent repatriation of Somali refugees from Dadaab following the signing of the TA in 
2013 has raised questions of voluntariness in repatriation. The concept of the 
voluntariness of refugee repatriations and how refugees are proactively involved in the 
process of organized repatriations is debatable. In January 2016,for example, the UNHCR 
representative to Kenya, Raouf Mazou, while commenting on repatriation of Somali 
refugees in Kenya  was quoted as saying ‗We are trying to plan for a possible 50,000 
people(returning) in 2016‘.676 It is debatable as to whether ‗we‘ in his statement above 
actually involves the refugees or the other stakeholders mainly UNHCR, Government of 
Kenya and Somalia. The possibility that refugees may not be directly involved in the 
process is high, especially considering that the previous targets of 2015 were not achieved 
because many refugees were uncomfortable with the circumstances in Somalia.677Many 
Somali refugees who opted not to return cite security as a major worry, the lack of 
                                                          
675DRC, ‗Durable solutions: Perspectives of Somali Refugees Living in Kenyan and Ethiopian Camps and 
Selected Communities of Return‘,  https://drc.ngo/media/1311894/durable-solutions-perspectives-of-
somali-refugees-2013.pdf 
676 Reuter, Daily Nation, online accessed at mobile.nation.co.ke/news/UN-repatriate-Somalis-Dadaab/-
/1950946/3043828/-/format/xhtml/-/sfq99qz/-/index.html on 22 January, 2016. 
677 Reuter, Daily Nation, online accessed at mobile.nation.co.ke/news/UN-repatriate-Somalis-Dadaab/-
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livelihoods and social services especially education and health678.Others also cited rights 
to own land as a major impediment to their return.679 
 
Refugees‘ effective involvement in repatriation decision processes is eroded especially 
when this is delegated to refugee agencies alone as custodians of refugee welfare and 
interests. Consequently, it is not at all clear at which level of analysis refugees‘ actions are 
supposed to be voluntary; if an individual within a household is not willing to return but 
the whole household as a unit returns, is that repatriation wholly voluntary? The 
UNHCR upholds the ‗voluntary and individual character of repatriation‘ at all 
times.680The individual and voluntary nature of repatriation is however challenged when 
some family members endorse it while others reject it. There is, as ever, a continuum 
between voluntary and involuntary repatriation; how much pressure can be exerted 
before repatriation becomes involuntary? In extreme cases, such as in the case Rwandan 
refugee camps in Kibumba, Zaire in 1996, the refugee camp was blockaded by Zaire 
soldiers in order to prompt returns.681 Interestingly, one UNHCR official at the time had 
hoped that ‗this will kick off more voluntary repatriations‘.682The understanding of the 
                                                          
678Interview  with Duale at Dagahaley camp, 16th November 2016 
679 Interview with Maalim at Ifo camp, 17th November 2016 
680United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Voluntary Repatriation: Principles and Guidelines for 
Action, Inter-office memo no. 5, 10/2/87, 1987. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Conclusion No 40 (XXXVI) Voluntary Repatriation, 
UNHCR, 1985, Executive Committee 36th Session. 
681O. Bakewell, ‗Refugee repatriation in Africa: towards a theoretical framework?‘, Occasional Paper , 
04/96,  University of Bath, July 1996, p.11 
682The Guardian, 14th February 1996 
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meaning of voluntary, as indicating some degree of choice on the part of refugees, can be 
undermined as it becomes a label for activities to make them more palatable683. 
 
5.1.1. ‘They’ decided we must go: Voluntary repatriation as induced return 
Because voluntary repatriation is often praised as the ultimate solution to refugee 
problem especially when dealing with masses of refugees, many actors in the refugee 
regime, prefer and support it. This is perceived as an indicator of success in the pursuit of 
permanent solution to refugee problem. The refugees, as a result, may find themselves 
isolated from the views of the refugee actors, the UNHCR, the states of origin and the 
host states. The views of the majority of refugees (non elites) are soon taken over by the 
minority state and none state actors (elites).Though the refugee actors are a minority, they 
are in charge of the decision making process regarding repatriation and any other 
decision affecting the refugees. The worrying trend is that available literature has shown 
that many top-down efforts to revive the central government in Somalia have been 
unsuccessful, partly due to the failure of the experts to consult the ordinary Somali 
people684. 
                                                          
683O. Bakewell, ‗Refugee repatriation in Africa: towards a theoretical framework?‘, Occasional Paper , 
04/96,  University of Bath, July 1996, p.11. 
For example, a UNHCR spokesperson was quoted as hoping that Rwandan refugees in Kibumba camp in 
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While a repeated failure of top-down efforts to revive Somalia‘s central government must 
not obscure the significant success of governance-building efforts within some local 
Somali communities685, this must serve as a warning to the experts that a failure to 
involve Somalis in Somalia (and the diaspora) in the reconstruction efforts of Somalia 
may not produce sustainable results. Supporting and campaigning for return, especially 
among young refugees who were born in exile may be a difficult task, as they do not have 
any memories of their home country. In this case, Somalia seems like a strange foreign 
land to the young Somalis who have known no other place to call home except the 
Dadaab refugee camps. The situation is such that a Somali refugee born in Dadaab in 
1991 is now 27 years old and possibly married with children or a graduate if they had an 
opportunity to study. This in essence means the refugee is rooted in exile and may be 
feeling more at home while in exile than in the country of origin. This was the case for 
many Liberian refugees who after spending many years in Ghana came to consider 
Liberia a ‗strange place‘ and ‗foreign country‘.686The Liberian refugees, now returnees, 
just like the young Somali returnee counterparts were finding it difficult to adapt to the 
life in their original home country. 
 
In the midst of the many voices advocating their support for voluntary repatriation, the 
real players in the repatriation process, the refugees, soon find themselves overwhelmed 
                                                          
685 Ken Menkhaus ‗Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building and the Politics of 
Coping‘. International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3,Winter 2006/07, p. 7 
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by the interests of the refugee actors who demand that they should voluntarily return 
because it is now safe to do so. According to one refugee respondent, ‗The Tripartite 
Agreement is full of individual interests not necessarily in favour of refugees.‘687 While 
supporters of repatriation paint a picture of a potential and optimistic Somalia this is, 
however, followed by difficult and sometimes unbearable conditions that refugees are 
subjected to upon return. According to Hawo, 42, a refugee in Hagadera camp, Somalia is 
lawless. According to her, ‗the information we hear about Somalia is two: you either die 
or you get rich‘688.Corruption and impunity has made others rich as they oppress the 
weak. It is also reported that government control in some areas is weak, and it has a 
reputation for lawlessness, and insecurity and high levels of rape and other forms of 
sexual violence.689 Moreover, a Human Rights Watch report690 of 2017 cites sexual 
violence and other forms of violence meted on civilians as rampant in Somalia. 
 
Perhaps the statement by one Liberian refugee may illustrate what it means for the 
interests of refugees to be overridden by the state and non-state actors in the refugee 
regime: 
I think repatriation is not for everyone. At least, it didn‘t work for me at all. 
In Ghana, I was not worried about my daily life so I could somehow 
visualize my future in a positive way … But in Liberia, I first have to secure 
                                                          
687 Interview at Dagahaley camp, Dadaab 26th August 2016. 
688Amnesty International, ‗No place like home‘, 2014, p.29 
689UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 3 September 2013, para 42; Report of 
the Secretary-General on Somalia, 31 January 2013, para. 12. 
690Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/somalia[Accessed 
18th April 2018] 
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daily basics like food and shelter … it is very hard for me to think about my 
future here.691 
 
With the globally shared view of Liberia‘s recovered stability after 2003, the UN refugee 
agency centralized its focus on residual refugees‘ repatriation to Liberia. Between 
2004and 2007, the UNHCR organized a large-scale repatriation promotion programme 
for residual Liberians in the sub-region and encouraged their return to their country of 
origin. However, many Liberian refugees had not yet become prepared to return to the 
precarious political and economic situation in Liberia and had chosen to remain in Ghana 
even with very little assistance.692 . After some refugees remained in Ghana and later 
rejected the offer of local integration, the Government of Ghana through the Minister of 
the Interior requested all Liberians to go back to Liberia.693 
 
Empirical findings on Somali refugees in Kenya seem to be similar to the situation of 
Liberian refugees in Ghana in the early 2000s. While the main refugee actors, the 
Government of Kenya, SFG and the UNHCR are busy mobilizing funds from the 
                                                          
691 Female returnee to Liberia from Ghana. Under the repatriation pressure from the host Government 
(Ghana) and UNHCR, about 10,000 Liberian refugees at Buduburam refugee settlement (in Ghana) 
repatriated to Liberia between April 2008 and March 2009. For further details see N. Omata, N. (2011) 
Repatriation is not for everyone‘: the life and livelihoods of former refugees in Liberia. New Issue in Refugee 
Research, Research Paper No. 213. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
 
692S. Agblorti, ‗Refugee integration in Ghana: the host community‘s perspective‘, 
UNHCR Working Paper No. 203, 2011, p.5 
693Government of Ghana, ‗Press Statement by the Hon. Kwamena Bartels, MP, and Minister for the Interior, 
on the Demonstration by Liberian Refugees at the Buduburam refugee camp‘, Tuesday 11 March 2008. 
Available at: allafrica.com/stories/200804020536.html [Accessed 20 February 2016] 
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international community to support the eminent repatriation, the Somali refugees in 
Dadaab seem ignorant of the implication of such a fund drive. The response by one such 
refugee, Ali, when asked what he thought about repatriation under the TA was simply, 
‗No, I am not aware (of the TA).I think this was done by the leaders only. Ordinary 
refugees were not involved‘. Prompted further on whether other refugees participated or 
were aware of the same, Ali‘s response is short and precise: ‗I think they did not 
participate because they are unwilling to return‘694. Despite this the Government of 
Kenya had insisted that Dadaab camp should close by 30th November 2016695 although it 
later extended the dead line by six months696and beyond that. A Constitutional Division 
of a High Court in Nairobi however ruled in February 2017 that it was illegal for the 
Government of Kenya to close the Dadaab camp. The judge ruled that, 
 A declaration be and is hereby issued decreeing that the directive by the 3rd and 
4th respondents to forcefully repatriate refugees based at Dadaab refugee camp or 
anywhere in Kenya is a violation of article 2(5) and 2(6) of the constitution and 
Kenya‘s International legal obligation under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organization of Africa Unity Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees in Africa, hence the said directive is 
null and void697. 
 
Since the ruling was issued, the Government of Kenya has not made further directions 
regarding the timelines for closure. 
                                                          
694 Interview with Ali, a refugee, 24, 16th November 2016 
695www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000203740/dadaab-refugee-camp-to-be-closed-by-november-says-
nkaissery 
696www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000223661/kenya-postpones-closur-of-dadaab-refugee-camp-by-six-
months 
697Ruling by Justice John Mativo, Constitutional Petition no.227 of 2016, p.35 Available at 
http://kituochasheria.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Dadaab-Closure-Judgment-1.pdf[Accessed 
19th April 2018] 
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The World Food Programme (WFP) would later warn that thousands of Somali refugees 
in Dadaab camps risk starvation as a result of what they termed as a severe funding 
shortage‘698.The WFP warned that ‗Without an urgent response from other donors, we 
will completely run out of food for more than 400,000 in Dadaab and Kakuma at the end 
of February‘.699 While the WFP blamed no one for the funding shortage they are facing in 
Dadaab, one may argue that this may have been instigated by calls from the Government 
of Kenya to the international community to channel their financial resources to the 
repatriation process instead of continually funding refugees in the 25 year-old refugee 
camp, the Dadaab complex, that was facing imminent closure from the Government of 
Kenya over security concerns. A Human Rights Watch researcher at the time challenged 
UN and governments to ‗do more than merely extend its deadline, which would violate 
refugees‘ rights if enforced‘.700 
 
Refugee input and opinion is very essential for a sustainable repatriation. Interviews 
among Somali refugees in Daadab, for instance, indicate that most Somali refugees will 
feel safer when living among his/her clansmen. Clanism therefore plays a major role in 
the general feeling of safety and belonging among the Somali refugees. According to one 
                                                          
698B. Moseti, ‗WFP halves food rations to 400000 refugees in Kenya. Daily Nation 
www.nation.co.ke/news/WFP-halves-food-rations-to-400000-refugees-in-Dadaab--Kakuma/1056-3476960-
1123rs0z/ 
699B. Moseti, ‗WFP halves food rations to 400, 000 refugees in Kenya’. Daily Nation 
www.nation.co.ke/news/WFP-halves-food-rations-to-400000-refugees-in-Dadaab--Kakuma/1056-3476960-
1123rs0z/ 
700K. Kelley, ‗UN: Be flexible on Dadaab deadline‘, Daily Nation Friday 18, 2016.p11. 
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Abdalla, ‗I feel safe when among my people (clan), clan is better that government‘. 
According to him, he prefers to settle among his clan members even if that means settling 
in areas controlled by the Al Shabaab militia than to settle in areas perceived to be safe 
and under government control but inhabited by members of a different clan. Clanism is 
therefore a big issue and stakeholders ought to consider this even when planning for 
repatriation. The question is how can the refugee agency, UNHCR, consider such a 
concern by the refugees when they are hardly involved in genuine dialogue that is 
refugee centered? Who, between the refugees and the tripartite parties, actually 
understands the genesis of and the solution to the protracted conflict in Somalia? There is 
no doubt that Somali refugees better understand their predicament at home and as such 
should be given a platform to be part of the solutions. Interviews and interactions with 
refugees in Dadaab suggest that refugees trust their own friends and relatives regarding 
information about Somalia. While UNHCR may furnish refugees with information about 
Somalia, many are critical of this and would verify from their own sources. 
 
Even though a negotiated Tripartite Agreement on voluntary repatriation was signed on 
the 10th November 2013 between Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR, the refugees in their 
personal capacities are either unaware of such a document or were not involved, even if 
indirectly, in its inception and adoption. In many cases, the signatories of the Tripartite 
Agreement and the refugees seldom had a common opinion on when and how the 
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repatriation was to be carried out. In what could amount to exclusion of refugee 
sentiments on matters of repatriation, one respondent lamented that, 
‗Somalia is currently not in a position to take care of itself, and so the decision to 
move the refugees back to Somalia only means exposing them to imminent danger. 
I am afraid to go back because there is no life and no hope there‘701 
 
Despite such sentiments, the Government of Kenya insists that Somalia is relatively safe 
for return and that NGO‘s are hindering the repatriation process because of their own 
interests-of working in Dadaab refugee camps and earning big salaries702 among other 
benefits. The Government of Kenya argues that refugees could be more concerned with 
the lack of livelihood opportunities and basic services in Somalia and not necessarily only 
on the fear of their physical security. The MSF report may back the Government of Kenya 
claim as one refugee respondent observes that, ‗I have been a refugee in Dadaab for the 
last 24 years. I have had many opportunities; including having my children in school, free 
healthcare, maximum security‘.703 From this refugee‘s response, it appears the 
opportunities in Dadaab and the lack of them in Somalia is the main reason some 
refugees could be reluctant to return. The Government of Kenya has however argued that 
no matter how long refugees wish to stay in the camps the time of return will surely 
                                                          
701 A report by MSF titled ‗Dadaab to Somalia: Pushed Back into Peril‘. The study, carried out in Dadaab 
during the months of July and August 2016, sampled 838 respondents and was released in October 
2016.The sentiments of the quote indicate that either the views of the refugees were not represented well 
when the decision to repatriate refugees was arrived at or such sentiments were ignored. The findings in 
this thesis too indicate that up to 80% of Somali refugees were not ready or unwilling to return citing 
insecurity in Somalia and the lack of basic services like health and education 
702 This was the response of Interior Ministry spokesperson while rejecting the MSF report that Somalia is 
unsafe for return and that more than 80%of Somalis are unwilling to return. 
www.nation.co.ke/news/Govt-refutes-MSF-report-on-Dadaab-refugees/1056-3416606-x8ppj1z/ 
703 A report by MSF titled ‗Dadaab to Somalia: Pushed Back into Peril‘ October 2016. 
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come-that time is now, and the earlier the better for the refugees. While various state and 
non-state actors pull and push in opposite directions, one fact is for sure, there is little 
engagement with refugee communities on matters of repatriation. The elites, the tripartite 
parties, have taken over the process and the interests of the refugees are overshadowed 
by the powerful actors. 
 
The Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation stresses the importance of the voluntary character 
of repatriation and defines it in relation to conditions in the country of origin (calling for 
an informed decision)and the situation in the country of asylum(permitting a free 
choice).704 The UNHCR therefore anticipates that there should be ‗pull factors‘ in the 
country of origin and there should be no ‗push factors‘ in the country of asylum. It is 
therefore crucial to analyze these criteria and their application in the context of return to 
Somalia to shed light on the way these principles as developed in the Handbook, are used 
in practice, and the meaning for refugees in relation to their decision-making process.  
The UNHCR Handbook emphasizes the need to supply refugees with information about 
the circumstances in the country of origin in order to enable refugees to make informed 
decisions and, consequently, to exercise their freedom of choice as to whether to return or 
not. For illustration purposes, the case of Afghan refugees is highlighted in order to draw 
                                                          
704United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on voluntary repatriation: International 
protection, Geneva, UNHCR, 1996, 2.3 
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lessons for the current repatriation crises of Somali refugees in Kenya. In the Afghan case, 
the extent of ‗informed decision‘ in order to facilitate the ‗choice‘ to return or otherwise 
shall be briefly discussed as a precursor to the on-going repatriation process of Somali 
refugees from Kenya. The need for refugees to have objective information on the situation 
at home as a basis for deciding whether to return or not was seriously cast into doubt in 
the case of the repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan. The case of the 
Afghan refugees helps us to understand the trends in organized repatriation with lots of 
lessons to derive in the case of Somali refugees. 
In many cases it seems clear that refugees are keen to return to their homes as soon as 
possible but the fact that the majority make their own way, regardless of assistance 
offered by governments or international agencies, suggests that such policies have been 
developed with too little regard for the refugees‘ motivations (for example see discussion 
on Mozambique in Wilson and Nunes.705 In other cases, where there is little enthusiasm 
for repatriation, such as for many Eritreans in Sudan706, it seems the options for refugees 
are likely to be blocked until repatriation is the only path open. Ideally refugees should 
opt for either local integration or permanent resettlement in a third country. Studies have, 
however, indicated that refugees who are under pressure to repatriate are unlikely to 
                                                          
705K. Wilson  and J. Nunes , ‗Repatriation to Mozambique: Refugee initiative 
and agency planning in Milange District 1988-91‘, in Allen and Morsink (eds.), When Refugees Go Home, 
Geneva, UNISD, 1994, p.173 
706J. Bascom,  ‗The Dynamics of Refugee Repatriation: the Case of Eritreans in Eastern Sudan‘, in Gould 
W.T.S. and Findlay A.M. (eds.), Population Migration and the Changing World Order, Sussex, UK, Wiley, 1994, 
pp.225-248 
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remain in their home countries. One such case is that of Burundian refugees who, after 
considerable pressure, left Tanzania for their home country, Burundi. 
 
 A small number of Burundian refugees and asylum seekers who fled into a 
second phase of exile, despite having been considered to be no longer in need of 
protection as refugees in Tanzania. As former refugees living in Tanzania‘s 
Mtabila refugee camp, they were forcibly returned to Burundi (or left in advance) 
at the end of 2012. Unable to find security in Burundi, a number of them fled once 
more, this time to Uganda‘s Nakivale refugee settlement in Isingiro district. Here, 
as asylum seekers in a new cycle of exile, they report that they are eking out a 
precarious living, without adequate access to humanitarian assistance and with 
little confidence that their claims for protection will be successful.707 
 
As in the case of Burundians above, premature repatriation led to devastating effects not 
only to the asylum seeker but also to the whole process of a permanent solution to the 
refugee problem. 
 
The language of repatriation (as a durable solution) suggests that when the refugees have 
returned there will be a time when they have resettled and their problems will be over: 
their history comes to an end. Yet, the durable solution appears to be to relieve the 
international community of a responsibility, rather than to permanently resolve the 
challenges faced by refugees. In fact studies708 have detailed the challenges awaiting 
                                                          
707 A report by International Refugee Rights Initiative (13th November 2013) titled ‗From refugee to returnee 
to asylum seeker: Burundian refugees struggle to find protection in the Great Lakes Region‘. The report was 
based on interviews conducted in Nakivale settlement in Uganda and discussions of the findings with the 
government of Uganda and UNHCR. Report available at  http://reliefweb.int/report/united-republic-
tanzania/refugee-returnee-asylum-seeker-burundian-refugees-struggle-find 
708G. Kibreab, ‗Citizenship Rights and Repatriation of Refugees‘, International Migration Review, New York, 
The Center for Migration Studies of New York Vol. 37, No. 1, 2003, pp.24-73. 
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refugees upon return. This point to the fact that repatriation may not work for all 
refugees, especially those who have much to lose by repatriation after many years in 
exile.709 Also, it is important to recognize that repatriation is a process, rather than an 
activity, which has no neat end.710The report of the 1992 symposium in Addis Ababa on 
the mass voluntary return of refugees said of the refugee repatriation over the 
Sudan/Uganda border, that: 
 
‗to focus, in such a case, on a single movement of people, in one direction and at 
one particular point in time, would be to give a false, but comforting, impression 
that one is dealing with a simple and well circumscribed event rather than with a 
complex and untidy process‘711 
 
It is therefore evident that repatriation is not a mere movement of refugees to their 
country of origin. It is a complex process that must involve all interested parties who 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
K. Jacobsen, The Economic Life of Refugees. Bloomfield, CT, Kumarian Press, 2005, pp.9-10. 
N. Omata, ‗Struggling to Find Durable Solutions: Liberian Refugees in Ghana‘, New Issues in Refugee 
Research, Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Research Paper No.234, 2012, p.1 
K. Long, Home Alone? A Review of the Relationship between Repatriation, Mobility and Durable Solutions for 
Refugees, Geneva, Policy development and evaluation service, UNHCR, 2010,p.27 
709Repatriation might entail significant losses, notably in terms of livelihood, educational opportunities and 
access to basic services. This is worsened by many years in exile that make return and reintegration 
processes more difficult because of the need to adopt a new lifestyle altogether. For instance, many young 
educated adults at Dadaab camps expressed fear that their investment of many years in education may not 
count the moment they return as there are neither educational opportunities in Somalia nor what they 
termed as ‗meaningful employment opportunities‘. 
710B. Stein, F.C.  Cunyand P. Reed, Refugee Repatriation during Conflict: a new conventional wisdom, 1995, 
Papers from the CSSC conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 1992, Centre for the Study of Societies 
in Crisis, Dallas, TX. 
T. Ranger, ‗Studying Repatriation as Part of African Social History‘, in Allen T. and Morsink H. (Eds), When 
Refugees Go Home, UNRISD, London, James Currey , 1994. 
711UNRISD, Refugees Returning Home, Report of the Symposium for the Horn of Africa on social and 
economic aspects of mass voluntary return movements of refugees, Addis Ababa September 1992, UNRISD, 
Geneva, 1993, p.4. 
261 
 
must understand that for repatriation to be successful refugees must agree and be part of 
the repatriation process. 
 
In this subtheme of induced returns, I have maintained that failure to fully involve 
refugees in the repatriation process simply compounds the problem as it increases the 
chances that returnees will flee again. I have also discussed what constitutes voluntary 
repatriation and argued that what may be termed as voluntary may actually be induced 
return. I have maintained that for return to be truly voluntary it must be devoid of ‗push 
factors‘ from the country of asylum and be solely driven by ‗pull factors‘ in the country of 
origin and the desire to freely return. 
 
5.1.2 Voluntariness in practice: The case of Afghan and Rwandan returnees 
 Afghan refugees were voluntarily repatriated under the guidance of the UNHCR who, 
then, termed the sheer numbers of Afghans opting to return as ―triumphs‖712. It termed 
the repatriation programme as a ‗remarkable operation‘ which provided for a ‗solution to 
what had seemed an intractable refugee situation‘.713This perhaps is a good example to 
illustrate the fact that many planned refugee repatriations do not consult ordinary 
                                                          
712UNHCR ‗Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan 2005‘ (online) Data Management Unit, Branch Office 
Islamabad: UNHCR. Available from: 
<http://www.unhcr.org.pk/publications/Annual%20Report%202005.pdf> [Accessed 15 February 
2008].See also: repository.forcedmigration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:5058[Accessed 20/02/2018] 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‗Protracted refugee situations', Refugee Survey Quarterly, 
vol.24, no. 1, 2005, pp.150-161. 
713UNHCR, ‗The State of the World's Refugees 2006 - Chapter 6 Rethinking durable solutions: Box 6.2 
Afghanistan - a complex transition‘, p.144. Available at  https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/state-
worlds-refugees-2006-chapter-6-rethinking-durable-solutions-box-62[Accessed 20 February, 2018] 
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refugees or merely consult ‗ceremonially‘ while adhering to planned repatriation 
decisions. It is only after dissenting opinion by refugees starts emerging with often 
completely different perspective of the ‗true‘ picture of circumstances at home that one 
realizes that genuine consultation was not made. 
In the much praised case of the repatriation of Afghan refugees, however, a few months 
into the repatriation programme, increasing ambiguity set in regarding the reality of this 
success story in the field. The success story seemed short-lived because the realities in 
Afghanistan suggested that returnees faced harsh life conditions in a war-torn country. 
Given Afghanistan‘s history of more than 25 years of war and violence, the country was 
characterized by extreme levels of insecurity as well as economic, political and social 
instability. As a result, many refugees who returned to Afghanistan found it difficult to 
survive in their home areas and were having to consider returning to the country of 
asylum or becoming internally displaced.714 
Therefore, given the prevailing claims by the UNHCR that voluntary repatriation to 
Afghanistan was a success story despite the unsatisfactory reality of return, pertinent 
questions emerge about the practice of voluntary repatriation, like the one asked by 
Bialczyk below: 
Would refugees voluntarily decide to return to such poor conditions? To 
what extent and in which ways are refugees involved as stakeholders in 
                                                          
714D. Turton  and P. Marsden, ‘Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return to Afghanistan‘, 
Issues Paper Series, Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), p.5.Available from: 
<http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=330> [Accessed 29 
January, 2016]. 
263 
 
these processes, especially in the case of Afghanistan? Who ultimately 
decides about voluntary repatriation, refugees or other actors?715 
 
Bialczyk716as quoted above was able to interrogate facts on the ground that seems to 
challenge the view that the repatriation of Afghan refugee was a success story. The 
repatriation process of Somali refugee is work in progress. While the extent of the 
implication is yet to be fully experienced, preliminary findings indicate returnees could 
be experiencing difficulties similar to those of the Afghan returnees. The case of Rwandan 
refugees in Uganda being voluntarily repatriated to Rwanda and the later adoption of 
forceful repatriation in October 2007 and July 2010717indicates the use of various means to 
either coerce or persuade the refugees to repatriate. Some of the returns, conducted in line 
with tripartite agreements, have been characterised by the use of force, threats, deceit and 
coercion.718Despite these pressures, a number of Rwandan refugees have stayed put. In 
addition, new asylum seekers and former repatriates (recyclers) continue to be registered 
as new arrivals, having made their way back to Uganda.719 
                                                          
715A. Bialczyk, ‗Voluntary Repatriation‘ and the case of Afghanistan: A Critical Examination‘. Working Paper 
Series, Oxford University, Refugee Studies Centre, 2008, p 2 
716A. Bialczyk, ‗Voluntary Repatriation‘ and the case of Afghanistan: A Critical Examination‘. Working Paper 
Series, Oxford University, Refugee Studies Centre, 2008, p 2 
717C. Korooma, ‗Reluctant to return? The primacy of social networks in the repatriation of Rwandan 
refugees in Uganda‘, Working Paper Series No. 103, 2014, p.12 
718Human Rights Watch, Tanzania/Uganda: Prevent Forced Return of Refugees, 19 June 2009. Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/19/tanzaniauganda-prevent-forced-return-refugees [accessed 12 
January 2016]. 
719Rwanda News Agency, ‗One Million Rwandan Refugees Face Forced Repatriation from Uganda’ 17th May, 
2010, Available at  http://rnanews.com/regional/3372-over-1000000-rwandan-refugees-face-forced-
repatriation-from-uganda[Accessed 20th February, 2018] See also Avenir, A., Over One Million Rwandan 
Refugees Face Forced Repatriation from Uganda, 16 May 2010, available at: 
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The majority of these Rwandans have in common an unwillingness and/or reluctance to 
return to Rwanda despite campaigns conducted to encourage their repatriation. As 
explained previously, a myriad of factors for their reluctance have been categorised as 
either pertaining to conditions at home or conditions in exile, among which are social 
networks that have been found to play a crucial role in influencing their choice to 
return.720Although Korooma attributes the reluctance of Rwandan refugees to return to 
several pull factors in Uganda, it is only reasonable for actors advocating for repatriation 
to ensure that there are enough pull factors in the home country too.  
As noted by one Ugandan official, since the repatriation process began in 2003, the 
number of Rwandan refugees in the settlements has continued to fall – from about 25,000 
to less than 9,000 now. This drop is not due to repatriation – the majorities have left to 
settle alongside their supportive personal networks in Uganda‘s communities as a coping 
mechanism and as a strategy to avoid going home.721The sense of belonging often 
associated with home ceases to apply in this case as refugees avoid return. Consequently, 
refugees frown upon the idea of home and seek to disassociate themselves from their 
origin. Regardless of the means adopted to make the refugee return, such endeavours 
may not succeed in the long run as refugees are likely to flee again. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.afriqueavenir.org/en/2010/05/16/over-one-million-rwandan-refugees-face-forced-
repatriation-from-uganda/ [accessed 21 March 2011]. 
720C. Korooma, ‗Reluctant to return? The primacy of social networks in the repatriation of Rwandan 
refugees in Uganda‘, Working Paper Series No. 103, 2014, p.12 
 
721C. Korooma, ‗Reluctant to return? The primacy of social networks in the repatriation of Rwandan 
refugees in Uganda‘, Working Paper Series No. 103, 2014,p. 13 
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Perhaps the involuntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees by Tanzania in 1996 is one 
classical example where refugee concerns and requests were ignored under the refugee 
protection agency, the UNHCR. On December 5, 1996, the Tanzanian government and the 
UNHCR issued a joint statement that read, in part, that ‗all Rwandese refugees in 
Tanzania are expected to return home by 31 December 1996.‘722 Despite the involuntary 
nature of such statement, the UNHCR was there to cement the Tanzanian government‘s 
directive: 
That same day, UNHCR distributed information sheets to refugees about 
the repatriation exercise, including the immediate suspension of economic 
and agricultural activities in the camps. The camps had been home to more 
than half a million Rwandan refugees since 1994, when they fled civil war 
and an advancing rebel army at home.723 
 
Even though Tanzania was a haven of peace in a troubled region, by 1996, it appears their 
patience724 in hosting refugees was waning. Consequently, the government of Tanzania 
could no longer pay much attention to the means by which the repatriation was carried 
out. Upon receiving the repatriation announcement, many refugees wanted extra time to 
see how the integration of returnees from Zaire would unfold within Rwanda.
725
Several 
wrote a letter to Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa requesting him to reconsider the 
                                                          
722The repatriation exercise was actually announced several days earlier by senior government officials and 
UNHCR representatives in Karagwe District, which was host to more than 100,000 Rwandan refugees.  
723B. Whitaker, Changing priorities in refugee protection: The Rwandan repatriation from Tanzania, Washington, 
DC, Department of Political Science George Washington University, Working Paper No.53, 2002, p.1 
724B. Whitaker, Changing priorities in refugee protection: The Rwandan repatriation from Tanzania, Washington, 
DC, Department of Political Science George Washington University, Working Paper No.53, 2002, p.1 
725In October and November 1996, a series of attacks on refugee camps in eastern Zaire forced roughly 
600,000 Rwandans to return to their home country.  
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December 31 deadline. As the government‘s position was firm, Rwandans sought other 
means to avoid repatriation. On the evening of December 6,726 refugees started fleeing 
camps in Karagwe district. Nearly 10,000 refugees hiked toward Uganda and Kenya, 
where they hoped to receive asylum. When questioned about their decision to flee, many 
said, ‗Death is death‘727and that they would rather face the possibility of death in 
Tanzania than what they perceived to be certain death upon return to Rwanda. 
This involuntary repatriation took place with the UNHCR‘s knowledge and approval. In 
fact, during the repatriation exercise, the UNHCR provided both financial and logistical 
assistance to the Tanzanian government. It gave the Ministry of Home Affairs more than 
$1.5 million for extra equipment and personnel expenses associated with the operation.728 
Although the perceptions by refugees that they would face imminent death upon return 
to Rwanda never really happened, there was still need to consider and even try to 
address their fears. The fact that those who returned did not face imminent death does 
not in essence mean their fears were unfounded. 
Organized repatriations in the frameworks of Tripartite Agreements therefore do not at 
all guarantee that the exercise will be voluntary. The Tripartite Agreement between 
                                                          
726Democracy in Africa, ‗Closing the camps: Kenya‘s déjà-vu politics‘, 16th May, 2016.Available at 
http://democracyinafrica.org/closing-the-camps-kenyas-deja-vu-politics/[Accessed 19th April, 2018] 
The fact that December 6 was a Friday is important, because most NGOs did not send staff to the camps on 
Saturdays. Thus, the mass exodus from the camps was not discovered by aid workers until Sunday 
morning, when Tanzanian police began to make frantic announcements over the communications radio.  
727B. Whitaker, Changing priorities in refugee protection: The Rwandan repatriation from Tanzania, Washington, 
DC, Department of Political Science George Washington University, Working Paper No.53, 2002, p.1 
728The Daily Mail, November 13, 1998 
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Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR for the repatriation of Somali refugees from Dadaab  
camps in Kenya may not be any different from the experience of Rwandan refugees in 
Tanzania in 1996.The question that one needs to ask then is what actually constitutes 
in(voluntary)repatriation in the case of organized repatriation? Does the support for 
repatriation by refugee stakeholders and a few refugees legitimize repatriation, hence 
making it voluntary? 
5.1.2.1 ‘Informed decision’ 
Information campaigns have become standard in voluntary UNHCR led repatriation 
programmes, as a crucial prerequisite ‗to help insure a free and informed choice with 
regard to return‘729. In the case of repatriation to Afghanistan, the UNHCR and its 
partners disseminated information on the situation in Afghanistan and the repatriation 
process through a mass information campaign using the BBC, Afghan radio and TV, local 
newspapers, the UNHCR website, and registration and verification centres in Pakistan 
and Iran. Most of the UNHCR reports on the repatriation programme to Afghanistan 
mentioned the existence and practice of this information campaign to emphasize 
compliance with the requirements for voluntariness730. 
According to a UNHCR survey among returnees in April and May 2004, 81 percent of the 
respondents had received the UNHCR information on the voluntary repatriation 
                                                          
729K. Lumpp,  S. Shimozawa, and P. Stromberg, ‗Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan: Key Features‘, 
Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.23, no.3, 2004, p.158 
730K. Lumpp,  Shimozawa, S. and Stromberg, P., ‗Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan: Key Features‘, 
Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.23, no.3, 2004, p.158-159 
V. Chetail, ‗Voluntary Repatriation in Public International Law: Concepts and Contents‘ Refugee Survey 
Quarterly vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 1-32. 
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programme and 55 percent stated that their decision to return to Afghanistan was 
influenced by information731 provided by the UNHCR. This is seen as a success by 
UNHCR in terms of compliance with standards set out in the Handbook on Voluntary 
Repatriation and in terms of ensuring voluntary and informed decision making on the part 
of refugees. Despite the relatively clear guidelines spelt out in the Handbook in relation to 
information provided, certain problems arise given the UNHCR‘s powerful role in 
influencing the refugees‘ decision making process.732The problem is that these 
information campaigns take place in ‗a climate in which information is open to 
manipulation – whether consciously or unconsciously – by agencies and governments 
whose interest it is to talk up return733…‘ As a result, this information can over-
emphasize the positive and downplay negative aspects of the situation in the country of 
origin, delivering inaccurate and distorted information. In the case of Afghan refugees, 
Bialczyk asserts that: 
Overall, it appears that the information campaign provides information in a 
selective, incomplete and patchy manner. Realistic information on security 
issues as well as the overall negative socio-economic and political situation 
has not been presented in these return information updates. Rather, the 
information campaign provides a sense of opportunity for refugees upon 
return.734 
                                                          
731cited in Lumpp et al. 2004, p. 158. 
732M. Walsh et al, ‗Repatriation from the European Union to Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Role of Information‘, 
in Black, R. and Koser, K. (eds.), The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction, New 
York, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1999, p.115. 
733M. Walsh et al, ‗Repatriation from the European Union to Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Role of Information‘, 
in Black, R. and Koser, K. (eds.),The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction,  New 
York, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1999,p.122 
734A. Bialczyk, ‗―Voluntary Repatriation‖ and the case of Afghanistan: A Critical Examination‘. Working 
Paper Series, Oxford University, Refugee Studies Centre, 2008, p 19 
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Consequently, many refugees, upon return found the situation on the ground different 
with one returnee lamenting ‗We wish now we hadn‘t returned; if we had known the real 
situation we wouldn‘t have come back‘735. An analysis of the role and content of the 
UNHCR‘s information campaign (undertaken to ensure ‗true‘ voluntariness) suggests 
that many Afghan refugees did not have access to accurate information when they 
voluntarily decided to return. Amnesty International pointed out that ‗returnees feel 
deceived by reports, coming from host countries and UNHCR that they could return to 
Afghanistan in safety and dignity‘736.Until 2018,Afghan returnees continued to face 
difficult post-war economic and political circumstances in Afghanistan. Persistent 
insecurity and intensified conflict continue to cause large-scale suffering and 
displacement of people throughout Afghanistan and into the neighbouring region.737 The 
influx of the returnees has strained the capacity of existing services and caused concerns 
about their ability to re-integrate and establish decent living conditions.738 
                                                          
735‗Afghanistan out of sight, out of mind: The fate of the Afghan returnees, 23rd June, 2003, Available at  
http://www.arnehansen.net/030623Amnesty-rapport%20imod%20deportation.htm [Accessed 20th 
February, 2018] cited in Amnesty International, 2003, p. 1 
 
736https://www.coursehero.com/file/p4eve08/returnees-feel-deceived-by-reports-coming-from-host-
countries-and-UNHCR-that/ [Accessed 20 February, 2018] 
737 Relief Web, ‗ECHO fact sheet-Afghanistan-March 2018‘, 21st March 2018. Available at 
https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/echo-factsheet-afghanistan-march-2018[Accessed 19th April 
2018] 
738Relief Web, ‗ECHO fact sheet-Afghanistan-March 2018‘, 21st March 2018. Available at 
https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/echo-factsheet-afghanistan-march-2018[Accessed 19th April 
2018] 
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While it was incumbent upon the Afghan refugees to exercise their freedom to choose to 
return or not, it is inconceivable that they would have chosen to return with full 
knowledge of what awaited them at home. This therefore implies that information 
received from the UNHCR was persuasive to the extent that it contemplated that return 
in safety and dignity was possible. In the case of Somali refugees in Kenya, the campaign 
for voluntary repatriation is steered by the Government of Kenya with the UNHCR 
insisting that return, regardless, must be voluntary and that it must be done in safety and 
dignity. The actual security situation in Somalia remains volatile. The latest United 
Nations Security Council observes that the, ‗overall security situation remained volatile 
across Somalia, including in Mogadishu, despite the operationalisation of the Mogadishu 
stabilization force and strengthened security measures‘739. 
Acknowledging that reliable information about the true condition at home is crucial 
before any repatriation process is promoted and implemented, UNHCR has set up a 
Return Intention Registration at the Integrated Return Help Desks740 in Dadaab to furnish 
refugees with such information. Somali refugees have difficulty in obtaining accurate 
information as to the true situation in south and central Somalia. It is not at all clear 
whether it is possible for the UNHCR to guarantee that returns can take place in safety 
and dignity.  
                                                          
739 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia  S/2017/1109 ,p.2 26th 
December 2017. 
740 UNHCR Operational update-Dadaab, Kenya, 16-28 February, 2018‘, Available at 
https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/unhcr-operational-update-dadaab-kenya-16-28-february-
2018[Accessed 19thApril, 2018] 
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Take the case of Isaac for instance: 
 
Talk of return is a big worry for the Somali community. I have lived twenty years 
here in Kenya, my children were born here, I got my wife here. How will I live my 
life in Somalia? The war is still there, we hear that innocent people are killed, some 
children still die because of the explosions, there are few schools. There is nothing 
for us there. The problem we ran from is still there, in fact the current situation is 
more difficult than before. People are killed in mosques and schools. If you wake 
in the morning, you don‘t know if you will return to your house. So it gives us 
fear. How can I take my family back to that? (Issack, 52, Eastleigh)741 
 
Indeed the experience of Isaack raises questions about whether it is dignified to repatriate 
after such a long time as 20 years or more. Should statehood be tied to one‘s state of 
birth? Is it not better to integrate refugees in the host community especially after such 
deep ties as marriage and family exist in the country of asylum? Must solutions to 
refugee be problem limited to repatriation? Refugees who have resided in an asylum 
country for many years may find it easier to integrate than to repatriate even if conditions 
at home since changed for good. 
 
The case of Somali refugees if further complicated by the fact that central Somalia and 
Southern Somalia is largely inaccessible. Given the difficulties in obtaining accurate 
information as to the true situation in south and central Somalia, repatriation should also 
be treated with extreme caution, and raises questions as to whether it is possible for the 
                                                          
741 Amnesty International Report. No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced. AFR 
52/001/2014. London, p.30Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-
home-2014.pdf [Accessed 13th May, 2016] 
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UNHCR to guarantee that returns can take place in safety and dignity at this 
time.742Consequently, most contemporary refugee populations will likely remain in exile 
for considerable periods of time, if not permanently743 It is useful, therefore, to review 
more closely the nature and prospects for repatriation in Africa, as well as look at some of 
the problems inherent in the adoption of this option in attempts to resolve Africa's 
refugee dilemma.744 
 
5.1.2.2 Free Choice? 
As mentioned above, the Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation defines the voluntary 
character of repatriation in relation to the situation in the country of asylum, permitting a 
free choice for the refugee.745However, the UNHCR very cautiously recognises:  
The issue of ‗voluntariness‘ implying an absence of any physical, psychological, or 
material pressure is, however, often clouded by the fact that for many refugees a 
decision to return is dictated by a combination of pressures due to political factors, 
security problems or material needs.746 
 
In the case of voluntary repatriation to Afghanistan, the role of Pakistan‘s and Iran‘s 
policy and practice towards Afghan refugees was and continues to be extremely 
important in relation to ‗voluntary‘ decision making. In recent years Pakistan and Iran 
have shown signs of asylum fatigue, largely due to the lack of burden-sharing by the 
                                                          
742Amnesty International, ‗No Place like home‘, London: Amnesty International, 2014, p.48 
743J. Rogge, & J. Akol,  ‗Repatriation: Its Role in Resolving Africa's Refugee Dilemma‘, International Migration 
Review, vol.23, no. 2, 1989, p.187 
744J. Rogge, & J. Akol,  ‗Repatriation: Its Role in Resolving Africa's Refugee Dilemma‘, International Migration 
Review, vol.23, no. 2, 1989, p.187 
745United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on voluntary repatriation: International 
protection, Geneva, UNHCR, Article 2.3, 1996, 
746United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on voluntary repatriation: International 
protection, Geneva, UNHCR, Article 2.3, 1996 
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international community. A Pakistani government official expressed, ‗if donors have 
donor fatigue… then we have asylum fatigue... If donors‘ patience with the Afghan 
situation has run out, then so has ours‘747. This development resulted in policies aimed at 
pushing refugees back to Afghanistan in contravention of international human rights 
standards. In addition, public hostility towards Afghan refugees increased in both 
countries.748. This general hostility on the part of authorities as well as the public, led 
many refugees to decide to repatriate. 
Cases of host countries applying a raft of measures in order to coerce the refugees to 
agree to return are common, especially since the last quarter of the 20th century when 
refugee fatigue continues to increase. On report for instance asserts that: 
 
The British Home Office has consistently and for many years resorted to 
measures that force asylum seekers to agree for voluntary repatriation. This 
has been the case as well in other European nations where Tamil asylum 
seekers have sought refuge. These include, taking away legal rights and 
welfare payments or denying basic facilities. In effect, the so-called 
‗voluntary return‘ is not voluntary.749 
 
                                                          
747United States Committee for Refugees 2001, cited in Turton and Marsden 2002, p.15 
See also ‗Global humanitarian emergencies: Trends and projections 2001-2002‘, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global%20Humanitarian%20Emergencies_2001.pdf [Accessed 
12th April, 2018] 
748Amnesty International., Afghanistan, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Fate of the Afghan Returnees, 2003. 
AIIndex: ASA 11/014/2003. P.7 
 
749European Council on Refugees and Exiles. Increasing Refugee Participation in the Field of Voluntary Return, 
2005, p.21 Available at: <http://www.ecre.org/files/ECRE%20Vol%20Ret%20Handbook%20051.pdf>. 
[Accessed 25 April, 2011]. 
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According to one project report by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE)750, repatriation can only be classified as voluntary when: 
• an individual with a legal basis for remaining in a third country has made an informed 
choice and 
• has freely consented to repatriate to their country of origin or habitual residence; and 
• has given their genuine, individual consent, without pressure of any kind; when such 
consent is elicited as a result of lack of effective protection in the host country or because 
of an imposition of sanctions, this cannot be classified as voluntary repatriation; and 
• the legal and procedural safeguards have been fully respected. 
Elizabeth Andersen, while warning European host nations against the pre-mature 
repatriation of refugees from war torn Bosnia-Herzegovina, notes that,  
‗Unless they take a longer view, these asylum states are likely to rid themselves of 
the refugee burden in the short-term, only to face another mass influx of asylum-
seekers when conflict reignites in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the not-so distant 
future.‘751 
 
Warnings by Elizabeth Andersen were not only real but could befall any other host state 
that attempts to forcefully repatriate when conditions at home are not yet conducive for 
return. 
                                                          
750 A report by ECRE titled Increasing Refugee Participation in the Field of Voluntary Return-January 2004-
May 2005.p20 
751E. Andersen, ‗The role of asylum states in promoting safe and peaceful repatriation under the Dayton 
Agreements‘, European Journal of International Law, vol.7.no.2, 1996,p 206. 
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As to whether the current campaign by the Government of Kenya meets the threshold for 
voluntary repatriation is a debatable and a contentious issue. This is because in spite of 
the provisions that envisage what constitutes a voluntary return, state and non-state 
actors, just like in any legal provision, differ in its interpretation. Kenya has insisted that 
the fact that Somalia is now considered safe for return, at least according to her, is in itself 
a motivation enough for Somali refugees to return. This position is however challenged 
by some actors like Amnesty International who argue that return to Somalia does not 
meet the criteria for voluntary return because refugees feel they have no option but to 
return to their country of origin. Hence, this amounts to forced return752. 
 
5.2 Refugees in spontaneous repatriation 
Despite the paramount role of the refugees in ensuring a successful repatriation exercise, 
whether organized or spontaneous, refugees have not been central to the negotiation and 
preparation stages of the repatriation process. This compromises the chances of success, 
especially in organized repatriations. The fact that ‗the great majority of refugees who 
return to their home do so on their own initiative, rather than by agreeing to join a formal 
repatriation plan devised under international auspices after a ‗fundamental change of the 
circumstances‘753 means that refugees ought to take a more proactive role in the 
repatriation process. Thus, refugees are called to respond to an agreement that they were 
not involved in. 
                                                          
752Hathaway, James C., The Rights of Refugees under International Law (2005), p. 464. 
753See UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: The Challenge of Protection, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1993, 
p. 107 
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One view, which aims at empowering refugees by seeing them as the main actors in the 
repatriation process, from scholars like Barry Stein and Fred Cuny, goes as far as 
repudiating the relevance of any formula for a structured repatriation regime by arguing 
that: 
The refugees are the main actors in the contemporary practice of voluntary 
repatriation. They are the main decision-makers and participate in 
determining the modalities of movement and the condition of reception. 
Refugee-induced repatriation is a self-regulating process on the refugees‘ 
own terms. The refugees apply their own criteria to their situation in exile 
and to conditions in their homeland and will return home if it is safe and 
better by their standards.754 
 
These arguments suggest that refugees will automatically repatriate when repatriation is 
the right time, as determined by conditions at home, and when refugees themselves are 
ready and willing to do so. The unwillingness of refugees to return, therefore, implies 
that in their own assessment either the reasons for the flight still exist at home or they 
have not sufficiently improved to provide a dignified life. 
 
Even though many refugees repatriate spontaneously without any repatriation plan, i.e. 
organized repatriation, this does not imply that there are no benefits attributed to 
organized repatriations. For instance, organized repatriations help outline the 
                                                          
754B. Stein and Fred C. Cuny, ‗Repatriation in a Civil War/Conflict Situation‘, paper presented at the Round 
Table Consultation on Voluntary Repatriation and UNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland, 2 to 3 June 1992, p 3. 
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responsibilities of the government in the home country so as to ensure the conditions for 
safe return. Organized returns also make it easier to monitor refugees upon return.755 
 
George Okoth-Obbo, commenting on the OAU Convention, has also argued for the need 
to incorporate ordinary refugees in the repatriation process by arguing that: 
The other point is that, within the set-up of the provisions of the 
Convention, refugees are configured principally as subjects of a repatriation 
framework being established for them by State and international actors but 
in the construction of which they themselves play no major part. We, 
however, see today many politically-charged and protracted situations 
where it is apparent that the return of refugees will require more than just 
the actions of States alone in making ‗adequate arrangements for the safe 
return of those who request repatriation.‘ A role must be provided for 
‗ordinary refugees‘ to be the architects of their own destiny not just in terms 
of the technical aspects of the repatriation, but above all in reference to the 
political issues.756 
 
 
5.3 Somali refugee perspectives on return 
While the much hyped repatriation by the Government of Kenya, the UNHCR and SFG 
seem to be gaining momentum, a study by MSF in August 2013 seems to indicate the 
contrary. In their study, MSF found out that, overall, there is a negative correlation 
between the extremely poor conditions and the intention to return; counter-intuitively, 
experiencing bad living conditions appears to weaken, rather than reinforce, the intention 
                                                          
755 G. Okoth-Obbo, ‗Thirty Years On: A Legal Review Of The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention Governing 
The Specific aspects Of Refugee Problems In Africa’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol. 20, no.1, pp.79-138, 
Published Conference Papers. 
 
756G. Okoth-Obbo,  ‗Thirty Years On: A Legal Review Of The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention Governing 
The Specific Aspects Of Refugee Problems In Africa’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.20, no. 1, 2001, p 126 
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to leave the camp and return to Somalia757.MSF‘s study shows the intention to return 
related to a number of factors and it appeared more frequently among refugees 
experiencing better living conditions in terms of security and access to water and latrines 
than among those worse off.758Dagahaley inhabitants weakened by a lack of access to 
essential services such as food, water and health care are likely not to have the material 
and inner resources allowing them to return to Somalia. On the other hand, refugees who 
are ‗well-off‘ in terms of assistance may at least consider travelling home.759 
 
Asked whether they were ready to repatriate to Somalia, the survey found that: 
a minority of refugees in the camp (14%) would be willing to repatriate to 
Somalia now. Most dream of resettlement to a third country, but this is a 
solution that reaches only a few thousand refugees per year… In urban 
centres, despite discrimination and police harassment, Somalis are finding 
ways to sustain themselves economically and to integrate.760 
 
In another study, findings by the Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK) in their report of 
2012 suggest that only a meager 14% were ready to repatriate at the time considering the 
prevailing circumstances in Somalia. The same RCK report, however, notes that while 
                                                          
757 MSF Study finding conducted in 2013 at Dagahaley camp, one of the camps that forms the Dadaab 
refugee camp. 
758http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/crisis/abusada-bianchi.pdf[ Accessed 
5th April, 2018] 
759Caroline  Abu Sa‘Da and Sergio Bianchi.  Perspectives of refugees in Dadaab on returning 
to Somalia, 2013, 88-89 
760 A Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK) report titled ‗Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of 
Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration corridor‘. A publication of the Refugee 
Consortium of Kenya with the support of the Danish Refugee Council, June 2012. 
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voluntary repatriation remains the most likely761 option for the majority of Somali 
refugees in Kenya and is the solution that the Government of Kenya is strongly 
advocating, mass return to Somalia for those in Dadaab, is unlikely to prove viable after 
such a long refugee history. It nevertheless proposes that, though peace has not returned 
to Somalia, key actors (the UNHCR, donors and the Government of Kenya) should start 
planning and budgeting for a phased voluntary return process for the coming three to 
five year period.762 
 
 A more recent study by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), conducted in the months of 
July and August 2016, and released in October indicate that a majority of refugees (86%) 
in Dagahaley (one of the camps in Dadaab complex) are unwilling to return because of 
the many security concerns763 in Somalia. Explaining her position not to return, the report 
quotes a member of the women‘s group who feared that, ‗both the militia and the Federal 
Government of Somalia might forcefully recruit the youth into the forces. My son was 
abducted in Somalia; I have three other boys and I am afraid they will be at risk if they go 
back‘.764 Amnesty International has warned that the focus on repatriation can lead to 
                                                          
761Refugee Consortium of Kenya, Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab 
refugee camps and along the migration corridor, 2012,p.12 
762Refugee Consortium of Kenya, Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab 
refugee camps and along the migration corridor, 2012, p.12 
763Médecins Sans Frontières., Dadaab to Somalia: Pushed Back into Peril, 
2016.www.msf.org/en/article/kenya-dadaab-return-refugees-somalia-current-conditions-inhumane-and-
irresponsible [Accessed November 12, 2016] 
764Médecins Sans Frontières., Dadaab to Somalia: Pushed Back into Peril, 2016,p.3 
www.msf.org/en/article/kenya-dadaab-return-refugees-somalia-current-conditions-inhumane-and-
irresponsible [Accessed November 12, 2016] 
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involuntary and premature returns that violate internationally recognized principles of 
asylum and non-refoulement, and which in themselves may lead to further human rights 
abuses and renewed violence in Somalia765. 
 
While a majority of respondents in this study were unwilling to return, it emerged that 
this decision was mainly informed by inadequate consultation with the UNHCR, 
Government of Kenya and Somalia that made many refugees consider the repatriation 
exercise a great gamble shrouded with a lot of uncertainty, and hence a majority were 
unwilling to take such a huge risk. Many, too, complained that there was very little 
reliable information on the actual state of security in Somalia as many areas of Southern 
and Central Somalia were still inaccessible. The attack766 on the KDF base in El Adde on 
15th January 2016 only worsened these fears hence the conclusion that Somalia is still too 
dangerous for return. It also entrenched the view that the militia, Al Shabaab, though 
weakened, is still a formidable force that can still mount major attacks on their targets 
both in Kenya and Somalia. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
A report by MSF titled ‗Dadaab to Somalia: Pushed Back into Peril‘. The study was carried out in Dadaab 
during the months of July and August 2016 sampled 838 respondents and was released in October 2016. 
765 Amnesty International (2014:9). No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced. AFR 
52/001/2014. London: UK. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-
home-2014.pdf  
766 This was the worst attack on a KDF base in Somalia that caused major casualties in both sides. Some 
sources have estimated the fatalities on the KDF as more than 100 soldiers while others have quoted a lesser 
number. The Government of Kenya did not give an official figure of Kenyan soldiers that were killed when 
the Al Shabaab overran their camp after attacking it with car bombs. 
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The Government of Kenya‘s plan to close Dadaab camps by end of 2016, as expected, did 
not materialize as the pace of repatriation was slow and the logistics complex. Somali 
refugees, probably aware of the unsuccessful previous pronouncements by the 
Government of Kenya to close the refugee camp, remained in the camps after 2016 with 
the Government of Kenya extending the deadline. While many have criticized such 
pronouncements as amounting to negative push factors, its implication in influencing 
mass returns could be termed as negligible. It appears negative push factors in exile do 
not necessarily influence refugees to return unless this is enforced. The encampment 
policy767that obliges the refugees to settle in designated areas (Dadaab and Kakuma) with 
restricted movements was designed to make refugee life temporary and unattractive. 
While ordinarily this should encourage returns as fast as conditions at home could allow, 
Dadaab and Kakuma have been in existence for more than two decades and the situation 
is unlikely to change. 
 
Many Somali refugees in Dadaab agree that repatriation is ultimately the most realistic 
solution to the refugee problem but differ on when this should be realized and how to 
carry it out768. Many teenagers and young adults, below 30 years, who took asylum in 
Kenya from 1991 hardly have any living memories about Somalia and consider Dadaab 
refugee camps as ‗home‘ compared to their country of origin, that some have never 
                                                          
767Republic of Kenya, Refugee Act 2006, Section 16 (2) (b) and Section 17 (f). 
768 Interview at Hagadera camp Dadaab, 17 November 2016. 
Focus Group Discussion at Dadaab UNHCR Sub-office, 18th November, 2016 
282 
 
seen.769 Student respondents attending secondary schools managed by Windle Trust 
Kenya (WTK) (all of whom are above 18 years and therefore considered adults under the 
Kenyan law) confessed that they hoped to excel in their final KCSE examinations and 
attain the minimum B (Plain) grade that guarantees refugees a scholarship to mostly 
Canadian universities and other universities in the Western world. Indeed WTK has 
offered secondary education to thousands of refugees across their six WTK-managed 
schools in Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley770. These schools offer free education including 
buying uniforms and books.  In collaboration with other partners, it has offered college 
and university scholarships771 to hundreds of refugees who managed to get a C+ grade in 
KCSE examinations772. Most beneficiaries to the scholarship are normally considered for 
resettlement773 in Western Europe, Canada, Australia and USA. It is this hope, and of 
course other opportunities brought by education, that has kept thousands of refugees in 
schools.  
 
                                                          
769 Interview, Omar, at Ifo Camp, Dadaab 14th August 2016. 
770 http://windle.org/ [Accessed 18th March, 2019] 
771 http://windle.org/scholarship_pre-requisites.html http://windle.org/ [Accessed 18th March, 2019] 
772http://windle.org/ http://windle.org/ [Accessed 18th March, 2019] 
773 Beneficiaries of resettlement in third country are not required to come back to the refugee camps as they 
are granted residence and can gain meaningful employment abroad after completion of their studies. Many 
refugees look forward to resettlement even though only a meager 1% of all refugees benefit from such 
programs. This percentage is envisaged to even be less than 1% as many Western countries shy away from 
resettlement programs and adopt a more restrictive approach to asylum seekers following the recent terror 
attacks, some of which have been attributed to refugees. Many refugees in the camps benefit from 
remittances from their friends and relatives who have settled abroad after benefitting from the resettlement 
program. 
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5.4 Contemporary asylum seekers in a global perspective 
The recent refugee influx of refugees from Iraq and Syria, to Europe in search of asylum 
has raised the refugee crises into an all new level. Many European Union counties, 
concerned with the terror threat associated with Islamic refugees and the economic and 
political dynamics associated with hosting such refugees have closed their borders, 
mostly through more restrictive refugee policies. 
 
The fact that most refugees are in developing countries774implies that the refugee problem 
was largely a problem of the developing world and marginally affected the developed 
world, as they would only resettle a number of refugees in their home countries 
depending on their assessment. Resettlement has however only benefited a few refugees 
globally-about 1% of the total number of refugees. However, the recent influx of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East and Africa to Europe indicates 
that the refugee problem is now spreading to Europe. The desperation of these asylum 
seekers is evident, considering the perilous journey they undertake in boats across the 
Mediterranean.775 According to one Cable News Network (CNN) report, ‗Eritreans want 
to escape repression or military service; Somalis flee Al Shabaab and clan warfare; 
Syrians have given up hope of returning‘.776 Unless the asylum seekers and prospective 
ones are fully engaged in finding a lasting solution, it appears the attempts by millions to 
                                                          
774F. D'Souza, The refugee dilemma : international recognition and acceptance, London, Minority Rights Group, 
1980 
775http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/21/europe/mediterranean-boat-migrants-lister/ 
776http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/21/europe/mediterranean-boat-migrants-lister/ 
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cross to Europe will continue or even increase in magnitude depending on prevailing 
circumstances in the Middle East and Africa. 
 
Because of perennial refugee problems, and restrictive policies in countries of asylum, 
especially in the developing societies of Africa, Asia and Central America, many host 
states have proposed repatriation as, arguably, the only feasible solution to the refugee 
problem but not necessarily to the problem of individual refugees.777Host states, 
however, seem to be motivated by the fact that local integration is likely to face resistance 
compared to repatriation. In supporting repatriation, host states are simply protecting 
their own interests and see the integration of refugees as political, social and economic 
burdens. This attitude should change as studies778 suggest integrated refugees can be as 
productive as any other resident if given equal opportunities. For example, study by 
Lindley779 shows that remittances from diaspora has helped refugees in Eastleigh, 
Nairobi and support their businesses and other economic ventures.  
 
In the past few years, many European countries have seen an increase in refugee influxes 
that has quickened Europe to seek a lasting solution to the refugee problem. While 
                                                          
777G. Kibreab,  ‗Citizenship Rights and Repatriation of Refugees‘, International Migration Review, New York, 
The Center for Migration Studies of New York Vol. 37, No. 1, 2003, p26 
778European Parliament, ‗Integration of refugees in Austria, Germany and Sweden: Comparative analysis‘, 
2017  Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/614200/IPOL_STU(2018)614200_EN.pdf 
[Accessed 20th April, 2018] 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/614200/IPOL_STU(2018)614200_EN.pdf 
779
 A. Lindley, A. ‗protracted displacement and remittances: the view from Eastleigh, Nairobi‘. New issues in 
refugee research, Research Paper No. 143. 
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denying refugees‘ entry at the frontiers has been termed inhumane and insensitive to the 
refugees, some countries have denied them entry in the very first instance or completely 
closed their borders.780 Closing borders and denying refugees entry781 violates 
international law governing refugee affairs. 
 
The closing of borders by many would-be host states is a signal that refugee-hosting 
fatigue is real and is getting worse by day. Perhaps rejecting refugees at the frontiers is 
worse than forcefully repatriating refugees after hosting them for some time. In this 
regard, many European countries have lost the moral authority in safeguarding the 
global interests of refugees and would perhaps, in the near future, push for change in the 
refugee regime in line with emerging refugee challenges. Otherwise, the trend set by 
Europe from2015 to 2018in the management of refugees has established a precedent 
where other countries can reject refugees at the frontier or forcefully repatriate refugees. 
It is therefore not surprising that the world would soon converge with the view to review 
the refugee regime where many states are likely to protect their interests by advocating 
for a refugee regime where the state is in control of who actually enters their borders 
without being subjected to international obligations to protect refugees. This is already 
                                                          
780News Deeply, ‗Europe‘s refugee frontier: pushbacks and border closures in Serbia‘,  24th March, 2017 
Available at https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2017/03/24/europes-refugee-frontier-
pushbacks-and-border-closures-in-serbia-2[Accessed 20th April, 2018] 
R. Rutten, ‘Why Once-Welcoming Countries in Scandinavia Closed Their Borders to Refugees’, 4th January, 
2017.Available at https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20824/why-once-welcoming-countries-in-
scandinavia-closed-their-borders-to-refugees[Accessed 20th April, 2018] 
781 K. Long, ‗No Entry: A review of UNHCR‘s response to border closures in situations of mass refugee 
influx‘, UNHCR. Available http://www.unhcr.org/4c207bd59.pdf [Accessed 20th April, 2018] 
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happening in violation of various refugee instruments that prohibit states from rejecting 
asylum seekers at the frontier. The fact most states perceive refugees as a burden rather 
than as productive individuals worsen the already restrictive refugee policies. For 
instance, in Europe and other advanced economies, immigrants have, on average, lower 
participation rates, employment rates and wages than natives,782 and restrictions prevail 
on labour market access to asylum seekers in some countries. 
 
In spite of the existing refugee instruments, desperate refugees crossing large water 
bodies with rickety boats in search of asylum abroad and their inability to receive the 
much needed protection has raised questions as to whether the needs and views of such 
asylum seekers is actually considered by the international community. This becomes a 
thorny issue especially considering that asylum seekers are not yet under the mandate of 
the UNHCR, the UN refugee protection agency. The refugee problem has become a major 
humanitarian problem for many states who are now admitting their unwillingness 
and/or inability to shoulder the refugee problem both in the short or long term. A 
refugee-centered solution is required, as it appears the international community has 
missed the point on how to comprehensively address the refugee problem. 
 
                                                          
782 See Kerr and Kerr (2011) for a review of literature on the labour integration of immigrants in general, 
and Ott Eleanor (2013) for a review of the literature on the labour market integration of resettled refugees. 
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5.5 Increasing the refugee democratic space within the UNHCR: A right to vote? 
The Kenyan experience, like many other cases highlighted previously of Afghan, 
Rohingya and Rwandese refugees, suggests that refugee views are of little consideration 
when decisions are made to repatriate or otherwise. One would therefore ask the 
fundamental question: How can one strengthen refugee participation within the UNHCR 
as a refugee protection agency? While the UNHCR cannot enforce decisions, as this is the 
mandate of the host state, it is in itself paramount that the refugees be given a voice 
within the international arena. This will ensure that the decisions arrived at by the 
UNHCR represents the sentiments and perceptions of refugees. 
 
There is probably no other democratic way of safeguarding refugee opinions apart from 
allowing refugees to vote on important decisions, like that of repatriation, within the 
UNHCR framework. Results of such votes will in effect put to rest the whole debate on 
whether refugees were voluntarily repatriated and/or whether the repatriation met the 
threshold of voluntariness. While allowing refugees to vote should not infringe on 
individual rights of refugees to voluntarily choose to repatriate or otherwise, it could be 
an important step in entrenching their views within the UNHCR. 
 
While voting ordinarily allows citizens to change (or keep) the government of the day, 
voting among refugees could help the UNHCR and the international communities make 
decisions that are refugee-centered. This will consequently legitimize any decision 
regarding refugee repatriation while in the worst case scenario ensure that their voices 
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are heard, regardless of the manner in which the repatriation is carried out. After all what 
is the rationale of refugee actors deciding when refugees should repatriate or otherwise 
when the decision to flee was made by individual refugees on the assessment of 
prevailing risk(s)? Why not allow refugees to exercise their democratic right to decide 
directly instead of allowing the UNHCR to decide, on their behalf, and then question the 
validity and reliability of their decision? Does the fact that refugees are Persons of 
Concern to the UNHCR relinquish the ability of these refugees to represent themselves 
on matters that concern them? As it stands, the fact that refugees are vulnerable people 
does not imply that they cannot be part of a solution to the problems that bedevil them. 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
There is a clear indication that there is a mismatch between the refugee perspectives and 
those of the tripartite parties on repatriation. It appears that the host state, state of origin 
and the UNHCR prepare the tripartite agreements on repatriation regardless of the 
contrary views held by refugees. Ideally, refugees as key players in matters of 
repatriation should have their views considered paramount. As it is presently, this may 
not be the case. The delegated responsibility that the UNHCR is exercising on behalf of 
the refugees seems to overshadow the voices of refugees themselves. A more refugee-
centered approach on refugee matters should be considered and allowed to thrive in 
order to promote what could be termed as home grown solutions to the refugee problem. 
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The findings in Dadaab and in other selected case studies indicate that refugee inclusivity 
in repatriation and other refugee matters are hardly taken into account when deciding on 
refugee matters. This in effect has violated the rights of refugees who are relegated to the 
periphery on matters that directly affect them. It is paradoxical that those who make the 
decision on matters of refugees are themselves not directly affected by these decisions. 
While state and none-state actors are the key agencies in the refugee regime, their 
importance is overemphasized. 
 
 I have criticized the nature of organized returns that seem to work on the premise that 
refugees should return en masse. I have criticized the fact that refugee voices seem to 
have been overshadowed especially in organized repatriations. I suggest that refugee 
democratic space within UNHCR be expanded. I have cited cases of Afghan refugees 
whose perspectives may suggest they were not fully informed of what awaited them at 
home. They simply perceived repatriation as the only option they had been given hence 
impeding their freedom to choose otherwise. Moreover, I have cited the 1996 case of 
Rwandan refugees in Tanzania as amounting to involuntary return. While what the 
refugees feared might happen to them upon return did not actually happen, their fears 
were founded and needed be respected nevertheless. 
 
Similarly, I have explored the views of Somali refugees in Dadaab whose majority are not 
ready yet to voluntarily repatriate to Somalia despite the TA to facilitate return. Indeed 
290 
 
the uptake of the voluntary repatriation return package by UNHCR has been very slow 
with only about 20%783 of refugees repatriated as at February of 2018.I maintain that 
many refugees still perceive the security situation in Somalia as volatile and hence are 
reluctant to return. 
The large number of refugees seeking entry to European countries has put potential 
European host states in dilemma between humanitarian concerns and the need to protect 
their borders for security reasons. Given this, it is probably time the refugee regime is 
changed in line with these new realities. As it is, the refugee regime is inadequate 
particularly when dealing with millions of refugees. 
I insist that any decisions touching on refugees must be refugee centered so as to have the 
legitimacy among refugees. Engaging refugees in decision making will help decision 
makers arrive at decisions that are generally acceptable to a majority of refugees. Even in 
organized repatriations, I argue that individual refugees should be allowed to make an 
informed decision and have free choice to return or otherwise. 
In chapter six, I seek to explore a refugee centered approach to repatriation that can apply 
more broadly to Africa. 
 
                                                          
783http://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/02/Voluntary-Repatriation-Analysis-2-
February-2018.pdf[Accessed 20th April, 2018] 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A REFUGEE-CENTERED APPROACH TO REPATRIATION THAT COULD APPLY 
BROADLY TO AFRICA 
 
This chapter extrapolates ways in which a refugee-centered approach to the refugee 
problem could apply more broadly to Africa. Its aim is to theorize how refugee-centered 
approaches could solve or, at least, contribute to interventions mitigating the refugee 
problem. The chapter explores several remedies that could, in the long term, help to deal 
more proactively with the refugee problem. The remedies explored are political, legal, 
economic or social in orientation. Though not conclusive, the options explored are 
expected to contribute in helping to remedy the refugee problem in the 21st century and 
beyond.  
 
While this chapter does not provide a comprehensive assessment of the conditions facing 
refugees and returnees in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, it helps provides an overview 
of refugee situations in exile and upon return. Considering that refugee situations in 
Africa have similar characteristics, in terms of causes and their protracted nature, there is 
need for a more holistic, broad and proactive approach to refugee situations in Africa. 
Otherwise, the simplistic, narrow and reactive approaches that exist and have acted as a 
stop gap measure will continue to result in unsustainable solutions. A more holistic 
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approach may include new refugee legislation, a focus on conflict prevention and the 
need to address the reasons for the flight of refugees and not just their plight in the 
countries of asylum. 
 
6.1 Why the 1951 UN Convention refugee regime must change: updating refugee law 
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee784 is generally 
regarded as the blueprint that guides laws on refugees in the world. It is on the basis of 
this Convention that refugees are considered to be Persons of Concern by the United 
Nations and therefore entitled to international protection, with the principles of non 
refoulement and voluntary repatriation being part of the provisions envisaged to cushion 
the refugees from being exposed to danger while fleeing persecution. 
 
However, there are indications in Africa, Europe, America and even Asia that it is time to 
change the legal framework by which refugee crises in the world are managed. In Kenya, 
the government has already indicated every intention to repatriate thousands of Somali 
refugees by closing down the Dadaab refugee camp. Kenya cites national security, 
threatened by Al Shabaab, as having informed this decision785. The government of 
Turkey, after admitting approximately 2 million refugees, has now closed its 
                                                          
784United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
Geneva, UNHCR, 1951. Available at www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf[Accessed 23rd April, 2018] 
785 ‗Kenya announces Dadaab refugee camp will close by November‘, www.bbc.com/nes/world-africa-
36418604 [Accessed 15th December 2016].See also S. Shams, ‗Kenya to close refugee camps amid security 
and economic concerns‘, 7th May, 2016, www.dw.com/n/kenya-to-close-refugee-camps-amid-security-and-
economic-concerns/a-19240991[Accessed 15th December 2016] 
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borders786and President Erdoğan has indicated his support for Kenya‘s decision to 
repatriate Somali refugees. Recently, the European Union has been grappling with 
thousands of refugees787, especially from Syria, and has lost the moral authority to 
reprimand those perceived as neglecting their international obligations regarding the 
protection of refugees. The refugee and immigrant crises equally affect the Americas and 
Asia. 
 
This therefore begs the question: what is the way forward? While this may not have a 
straight forward answer, it is evident that global protocols that impact on refugees must 
be changed and aligned with the realities of the 21st century. First, the 1951 UN 
Convention that currently guides the refugee regime was, at the time, made with a view 
to resettle refugees who had, at that time, fled during the Second World War. At the time, 
the premise was that the refugee crises were a temporary problem and that refugees 
would soon return to their home countries as the WW2 had ended. Although the 
subsequent 1967 Protocol and the 1969 O.A.U Convention attempts to remedy this, there 
is still room for amendment in line of new refugee realities. This is no longer the case in 
the 21st Century where most refugee situations are protracted and refugees could be in 
exile for decades. Secondly, refugees at the time fled because of persecution. What 
happens in the 21st century when we have millions of economic refugees? For instance, a 
                                                          
786 D. Alrifai, D. and  U. Uras,  ‗HRW: Turkey pushing back Syrian refugees at border‘, 24th November, 2015,  
www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/hrw-turkey-pushing-syrian-refugees-border-151123095456503.html 
[Accessed 15th December 2016] 
787 ‗Refugee Crises in Europe‘, http://.ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis [Accessed 15th December 2016] 
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larger proportion of Somali refugees in Dadaab fled Somalia between 2011-2012 
following the widespread famine788 in the horn of Africa and not necessarily because of 
direct political persecution. If a life is in danger because of persecution or because of 
famine, is there a difference to the outcome? Absolutely not, regardless of the source of 
danger, the refugee law should envisage all forms of danger and not just limit itself to 
those occasioned by political persecution. This is partly because the rights regime is 
liberal, driven by civil-political rights but not effectively by socio-economic ones. Thirdly, 
host states are more reluctant to host refugees today as compared to the late 1940s when 
most host states warmly welcomed the refugees. This has been informed by the complex 
nature that refugee situations have turned out to be-that they have tended to be more 
protracted than were previously thought as temporary problem. The protracted nature of 
the refugee problem may not have been contemplated in the mid 20th century refugee 
regime that sought to help resettle post Second World War refugees.  
 
The major problem, therefore, with the 1951 UN Convention, the roadmap of all other 
refugee regimes, is that it perceived the refugee problem as a short term problem. This is 
not currently the case as the refugee problem today is more protracted and prolonged. 
Refugees living in camps for decades is not unusual. The 1951 UN Convention was 
                                                          
788 ‗Thousands flood world‘s largest refugee camp in Kenya‘, 9th August 2011, www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-14463798 [Accessed on 10 January 2017]. See also D. McKenzie, ‗No respite for refugees facing 
famine‘, July 20th, 2011. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/07/20/kenya.somalia.drought.sarah/ [Accessed on 10 
January 2017]. The famine forced many Somalis to cross over to Kenya and ended up at Dadaab refugee 
camps. Such displacement is not as a result of persecution as contemplated under the 1951 UN Convention. 
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developed with the WW2 in mind and may not have envisaged the protracted nature of 
the 21st century conflicts that may produce thousands of refugees over a long period of 
time, often many years, with no end in sight.  
 
Like any other legal protocol, the 1951 UN Convention must evolve in order to address 
emerging issues and to be fit for purpose. As currently constituted, the Convention is 
narrow in scope and perceives the refugee problem as a ‗one off‘ single problem that 
could be addressed immediately. Protracted conflicts have turned the refugee problem 
into a more permanent problem. This has kept the refugee numbers increasing as more 
conflicts seem to emerge faster than are being solved. It is thus time to direct the 
resources of the international community to address the reasons for the flight of refugees 
and not simply their plight. National conflicts that are likely to get out of hand should be 
resolved by the international community before it is too late in order to avert the 
impending refugee influx. While states are sovereign in dealing with domestic issues, 
early intervention by the international community could help avert major conflicts that 
could otherwise uproot thousands. While the sovereignty of states needs to be respected, 
this should not be at the expense of the loss of lives and livelihoods. Prevention is, 
obviously, better than cure. 
 
While other refugee instruments such as the 1969 OAU Convention has expanded the 
definition of a refugee to include people fleeing external aggression, internal civil strife, 
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or events seriously disturbing public order789, the 1951 UN Convention emphasizes a 
well-founded fear of persecution as the basis for one to be granted asylum790.Many actors 
disagree on whether the massive influx of refugees, in millions, actually meets the 
threshold of the 1951 UN definition of a refugee. Apart from expanding the definition of a 
refugee, the 1967 Protocol791 obliges states to comply with the substantive provisions of 
the1951Convention to all persons covered by the refugee definition in Article 1, without 
any limitation of date792.The UN definition is limited as it does not include those fleeing 
famine, activities disturbing public order, economic refugees etcetera. Indeed the 1969 
OAU definition793 is broader and is closer to the reality of African refugees. 
 
Economic hardships in many parts of Africa and the Middle East has made many 
migrants flee, seeking better economic prospects abroad. This has created a perception in 
the West and the developed world that a majority of the millions of refugees seeking 
asylum in the Western world are actually economic refugees. Albeit this may not be 
entirely true, economic hardship is a reality and reason to flee. As long as life is at stake, 
there is no reason to discriminate between economic and political refugees fleeing 
                                                          
789 The Organization of African Unity Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, 10th September 1969, OAU Document CM/267/Rev.1. 
790 The 1951 UN Convention Relating to Status of Refugees,28th July 1958,United Nations Treaty,vol.189 
No.2545.p.137. 
791UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees, Available at  
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf[Accessed 23rd April, 2018] 
792 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees, Available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf[Accessed 23rd April, 2018] 
793OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects Of Refugee Problems in Africa ,Adopted on 10 
September 1969 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. CAB/LEG/24.3. It entered into force 
on 20 June 1974. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc1a682/oau-convention-
governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted.html[Accessed 23rd April, 2018] 
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persecution. The fact that their lives are in danger is reason enough to flee. After all the 
fate of them all if they don‘t flee is same-imminent death or destruction. 
 
Despite the debate of who a refugee actually is, the principle of non refoulement seems to 
be protective of the asylum seeker to the detriment of the people in the host state. While 
the intention of the principle may have been to protect the human dignity during times of 
distress, it gives the asylum seeker the ability to enter another state. This in itself denies 
the host state the opportunity to scrutinize asylum seekers at the frontier before allowing 
entry. This blanket provision may not have considered the 21st century realities where not 
everyone seeking asylum is a peace-loving individual. With the increase in terrorism and 
radicalization, one may also draw upon the non refoulement principle to access another 
country as an asylum seeker only to carry out terror related activities or crime. The more 
restrictive approaches to refugees that are adopted by host states is an indication that 
they may not be comfortable with an unrestricted entry of asylum seekers and would 
seek to restrict their activities within their boundaries as a way of ‗managing their 
perceived bad influence‘. These negative perceptions are those of their populations 
whether or not there is any basis in fact.. Many to be host states have rejected asylum 
seekers at the frontiers with asylum seekers facing dreadful treatment at the border. 
Restricted entry is often informed by the perceived fear that allowing them entry may 
make it difficult for the host states to monitor or expel them if they deemed fit. 
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Consequently, the principle of non refoulement has remained more theoretical than 
practical. 
 
There are no refugee instruments that address the reasons for the flight of refugees. The 
need to have a paradigm shift from the plight of refugees to the reasons for the flight is 
crucial because many refugee host states are becoming reluctant to host refugees. There is 
a need for the international community to assist troubled states restore peace and stability 
hence prevents potential conflict that would have produced refugees. This chapter traces 
the history of the refugee regime from the 1950‘s in order to articulate the need for a shift 
in policy and practice to address the refugee crises in the 21st century. 
 
The 1951 UN Convention was the blue print of the refugee instruments that were 
developed in the years that followed. It defines as any person ‗who, owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the 
country‘.794 Massive displacement of thousands and millions of people as a result of 
conflict has made it almost impossible for host states to welcome them. While refugee law 
condemns denial of entry for an asylum seeker in danger of persecution, its 
implementation is problematic when it involves the masses. 
                                                          
794 The 1951 UN Convention Relating to Status of Refugees,28th July 1958,United Nations Treaty,vol.189 
No.2545.p.137. 
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Aphotograph showing Syrian refugees entering Iraq on 15th August 2013.Available at 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/halt-abuse-of-syrian-refugees-rights-group-urges-cairo/[Accessed 24th 
April, 2018]. 
 
 
A similar photo was used by The United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) during the 
Brexit campaign in order to convince the electorate to leave the European Union (EU). 
The leave campaign won, effectively paving way for pulling the UK out of the EU. 
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Although at the time of writing, the United Kingdom had not officially left the European 
Union, the government had triggered Article 50 and the withdrawal date was set for 
March 29th 2019.  In the final weeks up to the March deadline, Parliament had 
reconfirmed that it intended to leave the European Union and parliamentarians voted for 
a short extension to finalise the terms of this withdrawal in the House of Commons. 
 
Critics view the refugee definition as envisaged by the 1951 UN Convention above as 
limited in scope as it overlooks other reasons that may necessitate forced migration, such 
as socio-economic rights abuses. For example, Hyndman795 argues that it was intended to 
apply primarily to refugees in post WWII Europe. Significantly, the 1951 Convention had 
minimized social and economic reasons for flight in determining the definition of a 
refugee, factors that may be more relevant in refugee-producing countries today than 
they were in post-war Europe. In Africa, for example, drought and famine may cause a 
mass exodus of economic‖ refugees as it happened in the 2011/2012 famine796 that forced 
150,000 Somalis to flee to Kenya, and whom became refugees in Dadaab. The 1951 
definition is therefore limited in scope as it did not contemplate anything beyond a direct 
fear of persecution as reasons for one to flee.  
 
                                                          
795 Hyndman, J., Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota Press, 2000, p.8. 
796 Refugee Consortium of Kenya, Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab 
refugee camps and along the migration corridor, 2012. 
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Apart from conflicts as a major contributor to forced migration, economic and social 
factors today contribute significantly to the number of world refugees. Many African and 
Syrian refugees who have fled to Europe in the recent past are perceived by the West as 
economic migrants whose flight may not have been justified by the conflict in their home 
countries. European Union (EU) Vice President Frans Timmermans supports this view 
and asserts that, ‗More than half of the people now coming to Europe come from 
countries where you can assume they have no reason whatsoever to ask for refugee 
status…more than half, 60 per cent‘.797 His claim is informed by the fact that many 
migrants are from peaceful countries in North Africa such as Morocco and Tunisia. 
 
Economic migrants have become a serious political issue to the EU that has led many to 
believe it may have contributed greatly to the success of the Brexit campaigns in July 
2016.The UK Independent Party took advantage of the influx of refugees to the EU as a 
tool to convince Britons to vote to leave the EU (apparently to gain more control of their 
borders and prevent the threats that may be posed by migrants from Africa and the 
Middle East). While some criticized the UKIP poster on immigrants terming it ‗racist‘ and 
equated it to the then Nazi798 campaigns in Germany, others viewed it as a genuine 
                                                          
797 Worley, W., ‗Six out of 10 migrants to Europe come for 'economic reasons' and are not refugees, EU Vice 
President Frans Timmermans says‘, 27th January,2016.www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/six-
out-of-10-migrants-to-europe-come-for-economic-reasons-and-are-not-refugees-eu-vice-president--
a6836306.html [Accessed on 20th January 2017] 
798 Nazi is the common English term for values like those expressed under the Nazi regime in Germany 
German history from 1933 to 1945.Racism, especially anti-Semitism, was a central feature of the regime. It 
advocated for ethnic cleansing that claimed the lives of up to six million Jews. See Goebbels, J., ‗Nazi Party‘, 
http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/nazi-party [Accessed on 20th January 2017] 
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concern about the thousands of refugees heading to Europe, estimated to have reached 
one million799 by the end of 2015. 
 
According to USA president Donald Trump for instance, ‗If they [EU countries] hadn‘t 
been forced to take in all of the refugees, so many, with all the problems it entails, I think 
that you wouldn‘t have Brexit.‘800 By supporting approximately a million refugees to 
enter the EU, Donald Trump argued that the German Chancellor Angela Merkel ‗Made 
one very catastrophic mistake and that was taking all these illegals.‘801 As soon as he 
assumed power in early 2017, Donald Trump temporarily suspended Muslims from 
seven countries802 from entering the USA, a move that was widely criticized. President 
Trump was trying to tighten USA borders from refugees and illegal immigrants, 
especially from Muslim countries that he considered ‗terror-prone‘ hence required 
‗extreme-vetting‘ before entry. Like their counterparts in other parts of the globe, the EU 
is no longer receptive to thousands of refugees who complicate the already complex 
domestic issues especially unemployment, increasing threats of terrorist attacks among 
others. 
                                                          
799Truth Revolt, ‗More than 1 Million Migrants Arrive in Europe During 2015‘, 22nd December 
2015,https://www.truthrevolt.org/news/more-1-million-migrants-arrive-europe-during-2015[Accessed on 
20th January 2017] 
800Mr. Trump was quoted as saying this while being interviewed by former UK Justice Secretary Michel 
Gove for The Times and Bild‘s Kai Diekmann, See ‗Donald Trump says Merkel made ‗catastrophic mistake‘ 
on migrants’, 16th January 2017. 
Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38632485 [Accessed on 20th January 2017] 
801 Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38632485 [Accessed on 20th January 2017] 
802D. Merica,  ‗Trump signs executive order to keep out ‗radical Islamic terrorists‘, 30th January, 2017,  
Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/trump-plans-to-sign-executive-action-on-
refugees-extreme-vetting/ [Accessed on 1st February 2017]. 
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Issues of immigrants also featured strongly in the 2016 USA elections, an indication of a 
desire for a more restrictive approach, globally, towards migrants and asylum seekers. 
The Geneva Convention of 1951, no doubt, never contemplated such a continuously 
complex refugee crisis that requires a delicate balance between humanitarian concerns 
and the political, economic and social complexities brought about by hosting thousands 
of refugees. Strong anti-immigrant sentiments by newly elected USA president, Donald 
Trump, are an indication of the growing apathy towards refugees among the world‘s 
peoples. While in theory many perceived his sentiments as contemptuous to the 
immigrants, the surprising support he marshaled during the USA elections is an 
indication that he spoke to the pressing needs of a significant number of people in the 
USA, including touching upon their perceptions of immigration. 
 
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was focused on 
millions of refugees, who, at the time, had been displaced by the Second World War that 
had ravaged Europe between 1939 and 1945.Many countries at the time sympathized and 
empathized with the refugees hence many got a warm reception in their countries of 
refuge. Though refugees were received well in their countries of asylum in the late 1940‘s 
and partly 1950‘s, this willingness was short-lived and it soon faded away with 
prolonged stays. Host countries from the last quarter of the 20th century have become 
reluctant to host refugees because of the fear that the refugees are no longer seen as a 
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short-term challenge. The unquestionable assumption in the 1940‘s was that refugees 
were in their host countries temporarily and that they would go back to their home 
countries as soon as the Second World War ended.803 As a result they received immense 
sympathy. For instance, when Palestinian refugees began flooding into neighbouring 
Arab states as of spring of 1948 they received a warm welcome. The prolonged refugee 
stay however put undue strain on already fragile economies and attitudes in the host 
countries began to shift.804As a result, the earlier responses of sincere hospitality and 
sympathy805 to refugees were soon replaced by negative perceptions such as suspicion, 
mistrust and general bad-mouthing and othering of refugees.. 
 
It is clear that over time refugees no longer receive the warm welcome they enjoyed in the 
1940s. Because the UN refugee regime has not evolved to capture the harsh refugee 
realities of the 21st century, many host states have been grappling to implement this 
refugee legislation. The provision in the refugee regime that require states to open their 
borders for asylum seekers has been violated by many states. The fact that most host 
states are reluctant to receive asylum seekers is an indication that the 1951 UN 
Convention regarding refugees is no longer tenable and has been overtaken by time. The 
1951 Convention did not envisage protracted refugee situations where millions would be 
displaced and exiled for decades. 
                                                          
803 O. El-Abed, Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948. Ontario: Co-Published by Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, Washington DC and International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2009, p.170. 
804 O. El-Abed, Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt since 1948. Ontario: Co-Published by Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, Washington DC and International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2009, p.170. 
805J. Oloka, et al, Popular Justice and Resistance Committee Courts in Uganda, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 1994. 
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According to the UNHCR: 
The principle of voluntariness is the cornerstone of international protection with 
respect to the return of refugees. While the issue of voluntary repatriation as such 
is not addressed in the 1951 Refugee Convention, it follows directly from the 
principle of non-refoulement: the involuntary return of refugees would in practice 
amount to refoulement.806 
 
This therefore implies that voluntariness must result from ‗an absence of any physical, 
psychological or material pressure‘807 . Accordingly; datelines issued by the Government 
of Kenya on the closure of Dadaab camps may be interpreted, under the Convention, to 
amount to pressure on refugees, hence making the repatriation involuntary. 
 
The protracted nature of the refugee situations especially in Africa and the Middle East 
has raised issues of refugee burden sharing by the international community. While the 
refugee regime generally envisages that the international community should support the 
refugee hosting states in order to lessen their burden, its implementation has been poor as 
it is guided by the goodwill of the international community. Bearing in mind that states 
give their national interests the first priority, many refugee host states have complained 
of the dwindling international support to cushion them from the adverse effects of 
hosting refugees. Kenya, for instance, cited both security concerns and the economic 
burden of hosting refugees as key reasons it was closing down Dadaab refugee camps in 
                                                          
806UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation, International Protection, 1996, 2.3. 
807UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation, International Protection, 1996, 2.3. 
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northeastern Kenya.808Kenya insists that the international support has been insufficient 
and faults the global community over Kenya‘s refugee burden.809 Defending Kenya‘s 
decision to close Dadaab refugee camps, Kenya‘s Deputy President (while addressing 
UNGA) lamented that,‗As we assemble here today,86%of the world‘s 22 million forced 
migrants and refugees are hosted in 10 developing countries…nothing can better 
demonstrate the failure of international burden-sharing than this reality…the framework 
designed to respond to human distress has become ineffectual‘.810 Even though the 
Deputy President fell short of calling for a review of the refugee regime, his frustrations 
were as a result of an outdated refugee regime that can no longer address emerging and 
protracted refugee situations. 
 
One way of managing the refugee crises will therefore involve a review or total overhaul 
of the refugee regime in order to allow for legal protocols that many host states will be 
able to implement without impacting their national interests, whether they be security 
related or socio-economic. Indeed, one would ask: what is the essence of having 
international law that cannot be carried out because it is not pragmatic? This is crucial 
because, in the long run, host states are only to observe international obligations, 
                                                          
808 G. Andae,   ‗Kenya to close refugee camps despite Obama, UN pleas‘, 11th May, 2016, 
www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kenya-to-close-refugee-camps/539546-3199564-o9dbj1z/index.html 
[Accessed on 25th November 2016] 
809 Deputy President Press Service,  ‗Ruto faults global community over Kenya‘s refugee burden‘, Daily 
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including that of hosting refugees, through their good will and not necessarily by rigid 
legislative coercion.  
 
The refugee regime has consequently been domesticated to varying degrees by host states 
to the extent that it has remained a mere regulation, with no serious consequences to 
those perceived to be going against the convention. International law and protocols 
pertaining to refugees has lost its legal rigour, as many host states finds themselves 
unable to comply with it because of mass refugees that complicate domestic interests.  
 
6.1.1 The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa 
 
The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, a regional 
instrument adopted by the OAU in 1969, expands the UN definition of a refugee to 
include people fleeing external aggression, internal civil strife, or events seriously 
disturbing the public order in African countries. Unlike the 1951 UN Convention, the 
OAU Refugee Convention is a legally binding instrument that explicitly covers the 
substance of voluntary repatriation. According to the convention, ‗the essentially 
voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no refugee shall be 
repatriated against his will.‘811Despite this and like many other international laws and 
protocols, its implementation is subject to national legislation and may be overlooked 
                                                          
811O.A.U Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Protection in Africa, OAU Convention, 
1969, Art. 5 (1). 
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especially when it is perceived to be contrary to the national interests of a particular host 
state. National legislation concerning refugees has also overshadowed what is envisaged 
in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. Consequently, refugee matters are increasingly 
being interpreted according to domestic refugee jurisdictions and not necessarily those of 
international or regional refugee instruments. 
 
Unlike the 1951 Convention, The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa of 1969 seem to have been formulated with a view to protecting the 
various political asylum seekers who at the time were fleeing the brutal colonial 
governments that were pursuing them. While a number of African countries had attained 
independence at the time, many were still struggling to attain full independence, and 
some were still under Portuguese rule812. Hence, there was a need by the newly 
independent African states to protect political asylum seekers from colonial and post-
colonial regimes in other African countries. In due course however, all African states 
were politically independent. 
 
                                                          
812 Countries such as Kongo, the Coastal States of West Central Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea 
Bissau were yet to attain political independence. See N. MarQueen, ‗Portuguese colonial rule‘, 6th May, 
2016, Oxford Biographies. Available at http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-
9780199846733/obo-9780199846733-0058.xml [Accessed 24th April, 2018] 
In the meantime, former French colonies had limited independence as they were considered part of France 
in the ‗French department system‘. The Structural Adjustment Programmes that followed in the 1980‘s 
meant that African countries were not fully independent after all. 
J. Barry Riddell , ‗Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa‘, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1,1992, pp. 53-68  
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Interestingly, independence of many African countries brought along a new kind of 
conflict as various factions wrangled for power within and externally through Cold War 
proxy wars. As a result, thousands of people were displaced and many sought asylum in 
exile. This trend has continued to bedevil Africa with unprecedented millions being 
displaced and forced to seek asylum in other African countries, Europe and even 
America. Although modernization813 theorists attributed the conflict to weak governance 
structures, postcolonial theorists814 claim that weak governance is also a product of the 
external intervention in the post-colonial period – and the propping up of states by the 
West, many of which were dictatorial states because they were useful Cold War proxies. 
Supported by the West or East, African colonial leaders that led the liberation struggle 
soon found themselves at the seat of power and unleashed the same brutal force to their 
antagonists who dared challenge their ideologies or actions. Proxy wars during the Cold 
War and neocolonialism in general has contributed to poor leadership in Africa. 
Consequently, Africa has continued to be the one major single source of refugees either 
fleeing civil war, famine, extreme poverty and most recently post-election related 
violence. 
 
                                                          
813 J. Matunhu, A critique of modernization and dependency theories in Africa: Critical assessment African 
Journal of History and Culture Vol. 3, no.5, pp. 65-72, June 2011 Available online at 
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While the provisions of the OAU Convention are to some degree comprehensive their 
implementation is largely dependent on the good-will of individual states. Moreover, 
many African countries although willing to host refugees, lack the capacity to do so as 
many are poor countries that can hardly meet the basic needs of their population. The 
dynamics of individual refugee situations, the nature and extent of conflict, the interests 
of the state of origin, the interests of the host state and those of the international 
organizations led by the UN refugee agency influence the manner and the processes 
involved in the implementation of the repatriation provisions. Compromise is therefore 
common with all parties lobbying in order to protect their interests as far as possible. 
 
6.2 From plight to reasons for the flight: the need to address broader root causes 
Although an updated refugee regime is necessary to tackle emerging issues pertaining to 
refugees in the 21st century, especially regarding how to handle protracted refugee 
situations, its implementation is largely dependent on the goodwill of individual states. 
With many states adopting more restrictive policies towards refugees, it appears a more 
sustainable way to prevent refugee crises is to channel available resources towards 
addressing the reasons for the flight of refugees from their home countries. This is 
paramount considering that it is virtually impossible to sustainably address the plight of 
refugees while in asylum as this is dependent on the donor community and the host state.  
 
All efforts should be geared towards preventing situations that are likely to generate 
refugees by addressing those problems before they are out of hand. Regrettably, most of 
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the conflict situations that have produced millions of refugees were left to spiral out of 
control as the international community watched as thousands were uprooted. The case of 
the Rwandan genocide815 is classical example of too late intervention by the international 
community. In fact it took until 2009 for the UN to admit its failure816 to intervene. While 
the international community is not entirely to blame for domestic conflicts, they could do 
more in terms of intervention. It appears there is a general perception among members of 
the international community that such conflicts will resolve themselves. States 
experiencing conflict, under the guise of promoting and/or protecting their sovereignty, 
have argued states should be allowed to solve their own internal problems. In some 
instances, where economic policies of the international community towards African states 
is a cause of conflict and forced migration, there is no credible intervention to be expected 
from the international community, and particularly from states that benefit from the 
African economy. Such states would argue, in a similar terminology to that of 
modernization theorists that African states should therefore focus on how to address 
their problems that may be the cause of conflict and forced migration, and stop blaming 
the international community for a lack of intervention. 
 
While direct intervention may not be the best option in most cases, the international 
community can still do a lot to prevent conflicts from degenerating into civil wars or even 
                                                          
815 F. Reyntjens, ‗Rwanda: Genocide and beyond‘, Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 9, Issue 3, 1 September 
1996, Pages 240–251, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/9.3.240[Accessed 24th April, 2018] 
816Deutsche Welle, ‗Rwanda: Why the international community looked away‘, 7th April, 2009 
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prevent inter-state conflicts that may end up generating millions of refugees as the case of 
Rwanda. Indeed the UN‘s Peace Building Commission has done a lot in strengthening 
sustainable peace in disturbed regions and in promoting sustained and predictable 
financing to promote peace.817The UN‘s Peace Building Commission has also sought to 
strengthen partnerships so as to have a comprehensive approach in peacebuilding.818 
 
There is no better way of promoting repatriation than through restoration, by restoring 
all or at least some of the privileges, rights and services enjoyed by the refugees prior to 
their displacement. This forms part of restorative justice.  
 
Restorative Justice Council819 defines restorative justice as a system that ‗brings those 
harmed by crime or conflict and those responsible for the harm into communication, 
enabling everyone affected by a particular incident to play a part in repairing the harm 
and finding a positive way forward‘820.In the criminal justice system restorative practice 
can be used anywhere to prevent conflict, build relationships and repair harm by 
                                                          
817UN, ‗Peacebuilding Commission Informal Meeting on the preparations for the High-level meeting on 
peacebuilding and sustaining peace ‗, 8th March 2018.Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/oc/Chair%20Summary-informal%20OC%20meeting%20-
%208%20March%202018.pdf[Accessed 24th April, 2018] 
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819The Restorative Justice Council is the independent third sector membership body for the field of 
restorative practice. See https://restorativejustice.org.uk/about-rjc[Accessed 24th April, 2018] 
820Restorative Justice Council , ‗What is restorative justice?‘, Available at 
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enabling people to communicate effectively and positively.821Returnees who find a 
workable restorative system at home upon return are likely to rehabilitate easily to the 
community at home. This also reduces the likelihood that they will flee again. Restoration 
of these rights and services therefore acts as pull factors that motivate the refugees to 
return to their home countries voluntarily. It is the hope of a bright future at home that 
should pull refugees to their home countries. 
 
 On the other hand, as pointed out by the UNHCR Handbook, 
 
If… their [refugee] rights are not recognized, if they are subjected to pressures and 
restrictions and confined to closed camps, they may choose to return, but this is 
not an act of free will. As a general rule, UNHCR should be convinced that the 
positive pull-factors in the country of origin are an overriding element in the 
refugees' decision to return rather than possible push-factors in the host country or 
negative pull-factors, such as threats to property, in the home country.822 
 
The only acceptable pull factors at home should be positive. Negative pull factors at 
home, such as threats to property or rights, or abuse of relatives, may force refugees to 
repatriate it is hardly voluntary. Negative pull factors at home and adverse push factors 
in exile both lead to premature repatriation. For sustained repatriation, refugees must be 
informed of the restored rule of law and the ability to enjoy their rights as they did prior 
to the conflict. 
 
                                                          
821 Restorative Justice Council , ‗What is restorative justice?‘, Available at 
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Addressing the reasons for the flight of thousands of Somali refugees is a long and 
complex process. Indeed, it is naive for anyone to assume that state building in Somalia is 
an easy task even with the necessary international support. Menkhaus, while writing on 
‗Governance without Government‘ in Somalia has, for instance, argued that the 
prolonged and complete collapse of Somalia‘s central government has produced a 
uniquely difficult context for state revival.823 This is because, according to him, delayed 
external action to revive and support failing states only compounds the difficulty of state 
building later on. Indeed, states that have remained stateless for a relatively prolonged 
period of time find it difficult to reconstruct the state machinery-it is like trying to 
reconstruct an unsecured crime scene that has been abandoned for a long time with 
potential evidence watered down by time and space. This is perhaps why the Somalia 
Conference held in May 2013824expressed its commitment to support Somalia in its 
continuing transition towards peace and stability but acknowledged, on the other hand 
too, that many challenges remained, and in particular those concerned with security, 
governance, human rights, displacement and development.825One factor which may 
prevent refugee repatriation from becoming a durable solution after prolonged stays in 
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exile is that refugees discover upon repatriation that their homeland has changed.826 
Changes which may have taken place in the homeland during the period in which these 
refugees were in exile can cause refugees not to feel at home in their country of origin, 
and lead them to forsake827 their repatriation. Many years of exile therefore make state 
rebuilding, which includes the return of asylum seekers to a country of origin, a difficult 
process. The protracted conflict in Somalia and the subsequent prolonged stays of 
refugees in exile is one such case. The need to address the root causes of the conflict more 
proactively is paramount in order to avoid superficial, reactive remedies that cannot 
stand the test of time. 
 
Research has indicated that safety is not all that returnees need, despite the emphasis 
upon this by hosts. For example, simply removing the root causes of flight may not be 
sufficient to promote repatriation, since decisions can be informed by broader 
considerations828.Should Somalia be safe for return may not in itself be a sufficient reason 
for one to return because refugees consider broader issues like the standard of living, 
access to land, education and healthcare.829Other safety considerations, apart from the 
overemphasized political security, are also crucial for refugees‘ return.There is a false 
                                                          
826 D. Warner, ‗Voluntary Repatriation and the Meaning of Return to Home: A Ctrique of Liberal 
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828 K. Koser, ‗Information and repatriation: The case of Mozambican refugees in Malawi‘, Journal of Refugee 
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829 Interview with Ibrahim Ali, 40, at Dadaab UNHCR compound on 22ndOctober 2016. 
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separation in the considerations promoted. It seems that a greater human security 
paradigm is needed, rather than one that just focuses on political security. 
 Others, still, may not be influenced by objective indicators of the quality of life at home 
and in exile but rather by their general perception of patriotism, nationalism and the 
desire for belonging. Addressing these broader issues play a big role in motivating 
refugees to return-after all many countries have their own security challenges. 
 
Fixing broader issues that caused refugees to flee, though painstakingly complex and 
slow, is the only sustainable solution to the refugee problem. Many countries, however, 
tend to approach the refugee problem in a reactive manner hence offer superficial 
temporary solutions to a rather deep rooted problem. Regimes in home countries, for 
instance, might suggest that home is now safe for return in order to increase their 
legitimacy both at home and abroad without serious thought as to whether returnees will 
return in safety and dignity and live comfortably thereafter.  
 
Host states on the other hand prefer to keep refugees in temporary shelters, mostly in 
tents and shanties, which disconnect them from the economic and political affairs of the 
host state. In the long run, host states fail to draw upon the potential human resource 
capacity of refugees, condemning them as burdens. While most host states exclude any 
possibility of integrating refugees, to their local population, this may prove uneconomical 
to the host state. This is because a lot of resources are channeled towards restricting and 
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monitoring refugee movement yet these refugees are not allowed to productively engage 
and contribute to the economy. Consequently, refugees contribute very little to the host 
state because of limited opportunities afforded them by host states. 
 
Studies830 have also shown that many refugees want to settle where they can develop 
their full potential and did not necessarily have an overwhelming attachment to any 
particular place. To such refugees, what mattered was a dignified human life, wherever 
that may be. In this case what seem to matter is a dignified human life and not necessarily 
the idea of belonging to a nation state. In this regard, policy makers, state and non-state 
actors must strive to provide a conducive environment to allow return. Promoting an 
environment of such holistic growth helps attract returnees to their home nation state 
such as Somalia. Otherwise, asylum seekers in exile may not be attracted by the mere idea 
of wanting to belong to a nation state if that cannot guarantee a dignified life. 
 
6.2.1Promoting livelihoods (for returnees) in the state of origin as a catalyst for 
repatriation 
The tenability of the current refugee regime particularly in dealing with millions of 
refugees has been put to question. Indeed, there is every possibility that if more resources 
                                                          
830J. Edward Taylor et al, ‗Economic impact of refugees‘, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 
113, no.27, 2016.Available at http://www.pnas.org/content/113/27/7449.full[Accessed 24th April, 2018] 
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could be channeled to conflict prevention, and not just peace keeping, the millions of the 
refugees today may not have been so. 
Conflict Prevention is the object of a wide range of policies and initiatives; its aim is to 
avoid the violent escalation of a dispute. According to John Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies conflict prevention includes: 
i) Monitoring and/or intervening to stabilize a potentially violent conflict before its 
outbreak by initiating activities that address the root causes as well as the triggers of a 
dispute. 
ii) Establishing mechanisms that detect early warning signs and record specific indicators 
that may help to predict impending violence. 
iii) Using planned coordination to prevent the creation of conflict when delivering 
humanitarian aid and in the process of development. 
iv) Institutionalizing the idea of preventing conflict at the local, regional, and 
international levels.831 
The UN peacekeeping on the other hand ‗helps countries navigate the difficult path from 
conflict to peace‘832.Conflict prevention is prior to war and is deterrent in nature while 
peacekeeping focuses on restoring peace during the postwar period. 
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jhu.edu/content/conflict-prevention, [Accessed 25th April, 2018] 
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The question is how many millions of dollars have been injected into Dadaab refugee 
camps by Kenya and the international community since its inception 27 years ago? 
Supposing these resources had, instead, been channeled towards conflict prevention in 
Somalia, could there have been better results? Could other means of conflict 
transformation work better other than military intervention? Answers to these critical 
questions are essential if conflict in Somalia and other parts of Africa is to be resolved and 
sustained. It appears  time has come to rethink what the Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary 
of Kenya, Amina Mohamed, said as she challenged the UN member states and UNSC in 
New York to ‗…invest as much in conflict prevention mechanisms as in peace keeping, 
particularly in Africa where governance institutions are relatively weak.‘833 
A more immediate approach to the refugee problem should be to address the reasons for 
refugee flight, in order to create an environment that can sustain voluntary repatriation. 
Bearing in mind those years of conflict has destroyed peoples‘ livelihoods and destroyed 
economic prospects for the same; economic reconstruction is paramount as a tool for 
sustained livelihood during and after repatriation. Appreciating that refugee numbers are 
on the rise, it is incumbent upon the refugee actors to try and address the underlying 
reasons that make repatriation difficult. One of them and possibly the main one, is the 
lack of sustainable livelihoods after repatriation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
832UN, ‗What peacekeeping does‘, Available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en[Accessed 25th April, 2018] 
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320 
 
In Somalia, the famine between 2009 and 2011 forced thousands of Somali to flee to 
Kenya. While they were registered as refugees, the cause of their flight was drought and 
famine and they sought survival in Dadaab refugee camps where the UNHCR, WFP and 
other agencies distribute food rations. Promoting sustainable livelihoods in Somalia is 
therefore paramount for the survival of the returnees whose lives are not only 
endangered by physical insecurity caused by the militias, but also by a lack of food, 
shelter, clothing and the general socio-economic security required for a dignified life.   
The recent attempts by the UN to increase its funding for the United Nations Peace 
Building Fund (UNPBF) in Somalia is therefore a step in the right direction and needs to 
be intensified and expanded. The UNPBF is the Secretary General‘s Fund, ‗launched in 
2006 to support activities, actions, programmes and organizations that seek to build a 
lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict‘834. Announcing a $3 million to Somalia-
Kenya border pilot project for Somali refugees, the Fund noted that the project was 
unique as it reaches across borders and targets the same population, first in asylum in 
Dadaab, Kenya, and then upon return to Baidoa, Somalia.835The initiative, according to 
the Fund, is designed to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict in 
Somalia, in addition to supporting the Government‘s priorities for stabilization and 
peaceful dividends, including investment in jobs836. 
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While the idea of channeling resources to create livelihoods in conflict zones is 
challenging, it is the only tenable way to prevent economic migrants and to convince the 
refugees to repatriate. It is not surprising therefore that recently Germany has suggested a 
form of Marshall Plan for Africa to the solve refugee crisis that now directly affects 
Europe. The plan would involve a massive economic boost to African nations to create 
jobs and slow the flow of refugees into Europe.837Others have clearly indicated that 
migrants are not welcome in Europe and that, ‗The solution is peace…and the return of 
migrants to their homes.‘838While critics will be quick to suggest that this is bound to fail 
as it works on a premise that asylum seekers fleeing to Europe are economic migrants, 
which is always not the case, its implications could be positive. Such a plan could 
encourage refugees to return to their home countries, and if peace-building and economic 
recovery was seriously addressed could help in transforming various conflicts that relates 
to struggles over resources and economic survival839. 
Attempts to promote livelihoods in post conflict zones, though noble idea may face 
resistance from those benefitting from the conflict in terms of resources. Beneficiaries of 
                                                          
837 The Marshall Plan was the USA investment into Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II. 
Germany has suggested a form of ‗Marshal Plan for Africa‘ in a bid to boost Africa‘s economy hence reduce 
the flow of economic migrants to Europe. www.rt.com/news/366524-germany-marshall-plan-africa/ 
838Reuters, ‗Czech finance minister says ‗no place‘ for migrants in Europe‘ 20th December, 2016. He was 
reacting to an attack on Berlin Christmas market that he blamed on migrants and that Germany was 
‗paying a high price on this policy‘. He was referring to an open policy towards refugees advocated for by 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Available at www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-truck-czech-basis-
idUSKBN149226?feedType=RSS&feedNme=worldNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&ut
m_campaign=Feed:+Reuters%2FworldNews+%28Reuters+world+News%29 [Accessed 27th December 
2016] 
 
839S. Ghali Ibrahim, S. Abba, and F. Bibi, ‗Resource based conflicts and political instability in Africa: Major 
trends, challenges and prospects‘, International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education, Vol.1, no. 
9, 2014, pp 71-78 
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resources during conflict are normally domestic politico-economic networks working in 
conjunction with international actors such as multinational corporations840 and western 
states. Western states, while protecting their economic interests, have been accused of 
supporting regime change.841American interests842 in oil in Libya contributed to the fall of 
the Gadaffi regime led by the USA and her allies. The French too have been blamed for 
the bloody war in Mali.843Western states and multinationals control massive resources in 
Africa and can easily manipulate Africa governments. Economic resources are normally 
used by those wielding power as a tool to command respect and power. Consequently, 
western states may not agree with autonomous economic decisions that may not be in 
their interests, even when they might promote livelihoods in post conflict zones. Through 
propaganda, those in power may propagate the narrative that such foreign financial 
support, though meant to promote livelihoods, as a means through which donors, mostly 
foreign, interfere with internal affairs of a state hence negate the essence of such 
programmes. To promote the chances of success in socio-economic boost s, there is need 
for consultation to ensure that the initiated projects are community driven so as to 
encourage a sense of belonging and ownership. There is therefore need to lobby all the 
                                                          
840Multinational corporations, Available at https://www.britannica.com/topic/multinational-
corporation[Accessed 25th April, 2018] 
841M. Zhira, ‗Review: Presidential Regime-Change and Continuity in Africa‘, Journal of Southern African 
Studies Vol. 36, No. 1 , 2010, pp. 241-245  
842S. Mufson, ‗Conflict in Libya: U.S. oil companies sit on sidelines as Gaddafi maintains hold‘, Washington 
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843Deutsche Welle, ‗The interests behind France's intervention in Mali‘, Available at 
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stakeholders involved to see to it that economic stimulus programmes achieve the 
desired objective-that of promoting peace and reconstruction in post war periods. 
6.2.2 Strengthening governance structures 
Clanism844 and the subsequent weak governance institutions845also contributed to civil 
war in Somalia in 1991 and the resultant forced migration of refugees. Until these clanism 
issues are resolved and political institutions are re-built and institutionalised, many 
refugees in Dadaab expressed a fear of returning. This is because they might not be able 
to enjoy the protection of the state, either because the state is unwilling or is too weak to 
offer such protection. Functional state institutions guarantee the protection of life and the 
general protection of human rights. With militias and clan factions threatening the 
establishment of these state institutions, many will still be reluctant to return and 
reconstruct Somalia for fear of being oppressed and exploited by these militias846 that are 
known to deploy brutal force against their targets. Many militia groups target 
government officials and installations.847They may also target civilians especially those 
thought to be supporting government ideology. 
                                                          
844A. Kusow, ‗The Genesis of the Somali Civil War: A New Perspective‘, Northeast African Studies, Michigan 
State University,  vol 1.no1, 1994,pp31-46 
845 K. Menkhaus,  ‗Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of 
Coping‘, International Security, vol.31, no.3, 2007, pp.74–106 
A. Kusow, ‗The Genesis of the Somali Civil War: A New Perspective‘, Northeast African Studies, Michigan 
State University,  vol. 1.no1, 1994,pp31-46 
846 There are several militia groups in Somalia and have kept on evolving over time. Examples include 
Union of Islamic Courts, Al Shabaab among others. See L. Makhubela, ‗Understanding civil militia groups 
in Somalia‘, 16th August 2016. Available at http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/understanding-civil-
militia-groups-somalia/[Accessed 25th April, 2018] 
847K. Menkhaus,  ‗Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of 
Coping‘, International Security, vol.31, no.3, 2007, pp.74–106 
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In Dadaab, for instance, refugees who were reluctant to take up the organized 
repatriation package from the UNHCR cited the fact that Somalia is still unsafe for return. 
One refugee in Hagadera wondered why he should even think of repatriation when, 
‗There are many reported security incidences in Somalia perpetrated by the Al Shabaab 
militia. Didn‘t you people hear of the Al Shabbab El-Ade attack that killed many Kenyan 
soldiers? Al Shabaab kill and maim on a daily basis…I don‘t want to die.‘848 The El-Ade 
attack has been termed as the worst military loss for Kenya. Many of those interviewed 
cite insecurity as the main reason they cannot voluntarily repatriate. Considering that 
Dadaab camps have been in existence since 1991, and the conflict in Somalia continues to 
date, it is only conceivable that repatriation will only be possible once peace is restored. 
In this case, the international community through UN bodies such as UNSC and UNPBF 
should intervene and implement their programmes. Indeed the mandate of UNPBF if 
implemented fully could go a long way in resolving conflicts and restoring peace. 
According to UNPBF, they fund: 
 
(i) Activities designed to respond to imminent threats to the peace process, support for 
the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue, in particular in relation to 
strengthening of national institutions and processes set up under those agreements; 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
See L. Makhubela, ‗Understanding civil militia groups in Somalia‘, 16th August 2016. Available at 
http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/understanding-civil-militia-groups-somalia/[Accessed 25th 
April, 2018] 
848 Interview with refugee, Habibo , in Hagadera camp 22 August 2016. 
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(ii) Activities undertaken to build and/or strengthen national capacities to promote 
coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict and to carry out peacebuilding activities; 
(iii) Activities undertaken in support of efforts to revitalize the economy and generate 
immediate peace dividends for the population at large; 
(iv) Establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related 
human and technical capacities which may include, in exceptional circumstances and 
over a limited period of time, the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent 
costs849. 
Programmes such as those of UNPBF above could go a long way in restoring peace.It 
only needs a partnership and goodwill from all stakeholders for successful 
implementation. 
Several institutions within Somalia need to be strengthened. These include the state 
security apparatus such as the Somali Police Force (SPF)850and the Somali National 
Armed Forces(SNAF)851 in order to increase their capacity to maintain law and order in 
post-conflict Somalia. UNSC‘s call to strengthen the SPF and the SNAF so as to increase 
                                                          
849UNPBF, ‗What we fund‘, http://www.unpbf.org/what-we-fund/[Accessed 25th April, 2018]. 
850 SPF is the national police force and the main civil law enforcement agency of Somalia. As with most 
other police forces in the world, its duties include crime fighting, traffic control, maintaining public safety, 
and counter-terrorism.See http://amisom-au.org/2018/01/amisom-to-intensify-training-of-somali-police-
force-this-year/[Accessed 25th April, 2018]. 
851SNAF are military forces of Federal Republic of Somalia. Headed by the President as Commander in 
Chief, they are constitutionally mandated to ensure the nation's sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity 
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capacity852 to prevent and counter terrorism has attracted the attention of many countries, 
particularly those bordering Somalia. The Government of Kenya for instance has called 
on the international community, specifically the EU and the USA ‗…to strengthen the 
police force of Somalia so that they can enforce peace while the national army is being 
strengthened.‘853 The capacity of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)854 
and the court system should also be increased in order to complement the work of SPF 
and SNAF through actionable intelligence and jurisprudence respectively. 
Besides strengthening the state apparatus, any complaints by citizens of abuses by this 
security apparatus must be investigated with a view to reform the system to be more 
civilian centered and friendly. An Amnesty International report indicates that tension is 
rife between civilians and the SNAF. According to the report, informal checkpoints and 
roadblocks are used as a means to loot civilians in areas under the control of government 
or allied armed groups. On 26 January 2013, masked gunmen reportedly in SNAF 
military uniforms stopped two minibuses and robbed passengers.855 On 3 February 
2013gunmen in military uniforms stopped two minibuses and robbed the passengers of 
                                                          
852UNSC, Security Council  8215thMeeting ,SC/13264,  27th March, 2018 Available at 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13264.doc.htm[Accessed 25th April, 2018] 
853 International Crisis Group, ‗Somalia: Transforming Hope into Stability‘, 30th April, 2017, 
www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/somalia-transforming-hope-stability [Accessed 29th 
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854NISA is the national intelligence agency of the Federal Republic of Somalia is in-charge of secret service, 
intelligence and covert operations for the national interests of Somalia, The main objective of (NISA) is to 
collect the intelligence data through different means and to safeguard the national 
interests.Seehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Intelligence_and_Security_Agency[Accessed 25th 
April 2018] 
855UN, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 
(2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013, S/2013/413, Annex 8.1, p 392. 
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money and possessions.856 Somali police have also been accused of using excessive force 
against civilians. An Amnesty International report cites a case of forced evictions by 
police, as narrated by one victim: 
A government official, accompanied with a heavy police force and a van with ‗AU 
police‘ written on it arrived at 7am. They began destroying shelters with the 
bulldozer, and hit anyone who tried to resist. They threatened they would take us 
to the police cells. I begged them not to destroy my shelter, we just accepted to 
collect our belongings and move.857 
 
Excessive force by police during eviction, as in Waarberi district in the area of Majo 
camps, is rampant and has affected 2000 households and 200 orphaned children.858 
Consequently, there is need to build trust among Somalis of the SPF and SNAF as they 
are reformed into a professional service. The government of the day through legitimate 
political institutions must earn the confidence of the people in order to distinguish itself 
from the Al Shabaab, who through their strict interpretation of the Sharia Law, are 
known for handing out harsh ‗punishments‘ which are human rights abuses, such as 
public floggings and beheadings for those perceived to flout it.859 
 
                                                          
856UN, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 
(2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013, S/2013/413, Annex 8.1, p 394. 
857 ) http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-home-2014.pdf  pg.43 
858UNOCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin, October 2013. 
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Even though some scholars like Rogge860and Kibreab861 agree that repatriation is the most 
preferred and feasible solution to the refugee problem, it is predicated upon the fact that 
peace will soon return to allow for repatriation take place. However, most of the conflicts 
in the 21st century have been protracted and this has left thousands of refugees to 
continue waiting in host states. While repatriation is the most preferred solution to the 
refugee problem, it cannot take place unless sustainable peace is restored at the home 
countries.  
Peace, however, should not be as a result of absence of violence but rather one that is 
positive.862 According to Galtung, the inspiration behind the concept of positive peace 
was the health sciences, where health can be seen not merely as the absence of disease, 
but something more positive: making the body capable of resisting disease.863 Positive 
peace therefore requires building and strengthening the factors that foster peace.864Indeed 
as Paul Lederach puts it, ‗Peacebuilding requires a vision of relationship. Stated bluntly, 
if there is no capacity to imagine the canvas of mutual relationships and situate oneself as 
part of that historic and ever-evolving web, peacebuilding collapses‘.865Cordial 
                                                          
860 Rogge, J., ‗Africa's Resettlement Strategies‘, International Migration Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1981, pp. 195-
212. 
861 Kibreab, G., ‗Citizenship Rights and Repatriation of Refugees‘, International Migration Review, New York, 
The Center for Migration Studies of New York Vol. 37, No. 1, 2003, pp.24-73. 
862J. Galtung, ‗An editorial‘, Journal of Peace Research, vol.1.no1.1964,pp1-4 
863J. Galtung, Twenty-five years of peace research: Ten challenges and some responses, Journal of Peace 
Research, vol.22.no.2, 1985, pp141-158 
864Y. Mahmoud, ‗Freeing Prevention from Conflict: Investing in Sustaining Peace‘, IPI Global Observatory, 
April 21, 2016, available at 
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relationships between factions are thus critical in building lasting peace, as are structural 
transformations to build a positive sustainable peace. 
 
Besides the conventional security systems like the police, military, prosecution and 
intelligence departments being strengthened, there is also need to complement these 
efforts with the traditional Somali system of conflict resolution. This is particularly 
important considering that although Somalia is ethnically homogenous; conflict between 
different factions has been intense especially at the clan level. It therefore indicates that 
the existing conventional systems of security and justice have not been sufficiently rooted 
in society to have legitimacy. Interviews866 show that Somali people in general and those 
holding radical Islamic views in particular indicate that punitive brutal force like 
neutralization through the military is counterproductive in deterring the militia‘s agenda. 
Indeed radical militia tend to fear being arrested, prosecuted and jailed and may prefer 
dying through military firepower instead. This explains why many voluntarily 
participate in suicide missions and die in the process. Perhaps the radical Islamic teaching 
on the benefits of dying a martyr has encouraged several Islamic mujahidin867, to fight to 
death. Military engagement in this case may not be effective and may in fact be counter-
productive. Such radical views can never be fought militarily and an alternative narrative 
                                                          
866 Interviews/FGD‘s held at Dagahaley and Hagadera in Dadaab Refugee camps  between 17th -25th 
November 2016.Many interviewees who wished not to be identified or quoted directly held the view that 
use of military power was counterproductive in defeating militants in Somalia. 
867 Plural of mujahid, ‗one who engages in jihad.‘ Often translated as ‗warriors of God.‘ Technically, the 
term does not have a necessary connection with war. In recent years those Muslims who engage in armed 
defense of Muslim lands call themselves or are called mujahidin. See 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1593[Accessed 29th January 2018] 
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must, thus, be established to contest radical views that are intolerant and replace them 
with acceptable options that propagate peaceful co-existence.  
Consequently, the professionalization of the state security apparatus must be acceptable 
to the Somali people so as to avoid being rejected on the basis of being  foreign and 
alienated from the aspirations of Somali people868. Hence, the institutions of the state 
ought to be encouraged to work alongside religious leaders and elders and should seek 
consensus as much as possible. This way, political institutions will be legitimized by the 
majority of the population who will identify with and consider such structures as 
domestic and homegrown. 
Despite UNHCR‘s concerted effort to promote voluntary repatriation, as it did in 1992, by 
declaring a repatriation decade869, unless protracted conflicts are solved, with the support 
of the international community, and potential conflicts deterred, the world could be 
witnessing at an unprecedented number of refugees in the 21st century. 
6.2.3 Promoting social services 
Besides security and safety concerns, refugees assess their ability to access education and 
social services and consider whether humanitarian services will be available upon return. 
Asked why he was hesitant to repatriate to Somalia, one refugee cites the fact that ‗There 
is no water, education and health services in Somalia‘.870Concerns about access to 
                                                          
868K. Menkhaus, After the Kenyan Intervention in Somalia. The Enough Project Report, 2012, p.6 
869 Stein B., Cuny F. and Reed P., Refugee Repatriation during Conflict: a new conventional wisdom, Papers from 
the CSSC conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 1992, Centre for the Study of Societies in Crisis, 
Dallas, TX, 1995. 
870 Interview with refugees Abdirahman and Maalim in Hagadera Camp, 22 November 2016. 
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education and healthcare were found to be critical among the youthful population 
interviewed in this study. A good number of these refugees were either born in Dadaab 
camps or came along with their parents/guardians when they were very young. 
Somali returnees require a dignified life through access to basic services. Refugees 
repeatedly stressed in interviews that access to services was essential to enable them live 
a dignified life. Repatriation entails the restoration of meaningful citizenship, in which 
fundamental human rights are protected by the state or, in the context of a fragile state, 
perhaps communities.871 In this context, repatriation ought to be considered and planned 
carefully, in conjunction with a broader peace-building and socio-economic development 
and services strategies that promote social welfare. 
 
Access to education in Somalia is therefore essential if young adults and teenagers are to 
choose to repatriate. Moreover, many young adults fear that their many years of 
education in Kenya may prove fruitless upon return as they may fail to secure jobs. In 
addition, they expressed concern about a lack of opportunities for further education once 
they are in Somalia. 
6.3.1 Military intervention in Somalia: Time to change strategy? 
In a stateless society like Somalia, intervention is necessary to assist in state-building. 
State-building is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of 
                                                          
871K. Long,   Home Alone? A Review of the Relationship between Repatriation, Mobility and Durable Solutions for 
Refugees, Geneva, Policy development and evaluation service, UNHCR, 2010, p.40. 
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existing ones.872It is creating and strengthening the institutions necessary to support long-
term economic, social, and political development.873In most cases state building is done 
by foreign powers although the possibility of benevolent state-building interventions by 
foreign powers has been questioned.874 
Aware of the positive role of such interventions in the promotion of peace, militant 
groups in Somalia have vehemently opposed any form of foreign intervention-especially 
military intervention. The fact that there has been no sustained military victory in 
Somalia raises the question of the efficiency of military intervention in Somalia. Military 
engagement in Somalia has borne little fruit for the past 26 years.   
For instance, various UN operations were launched periodically from 1992 to 1995 as part 
of this intervention. The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), 
launched in August 1992, was comprised of 500 Pakistani peacekeepers.875 Its main 
mandate was to monitor a ceasefire between warring factions in the capital, Mogadishu 
and to protect relief workers operating within Somalia following a humanitarian crisis 
caused by famine in the country. This UN operation, however, failed to meet its mandate 
                                                          
872F. Fukuyama, ‗The imperative of state-building‘, Journal of Democracy, vol.15.no.2, 2004, pp 17-31 
873Center for Global Development, ‗State building and development‘, Available at 
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because of the strong resistance from warring factions876. This failure necessitated the 
formation of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the result of collaboration between 
UNOSOM I and the United States (US), in December 1992.877 This operation, which ran 
until 1993, was also referred to as Operation Restore Hope failed to restore hope in 
Somalia. The operation formed the basis for Somali resentment of the US as the country 
was viewed as having sided with one faction of the warring parties over the other during 
the operation.878There were also a number of situations in which American helicopters 
fired on civilians in urban areas – leading to much greater resentment.879In 1993, UNITAF 
was replaced by UNOSOM II, which operated until 1995 when it was withdrawn880 from 
Somalia. 
In 2006, neighboring Ethiopia invaded Somalia881, sending in its troops at the behest of 
then president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG882) Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, 
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who called upon his eastern neighbors to help fight the Islamic Courts Union (ICU883) 
that was considered a challenge to the government‘s operations in the capital.884 This 
intervention was widely viewed as one aimed at achieving regime change and the 
imposition of a Somali government which would be friendly to Ethiopia. Observers have 
also raised concerns that the recent Kenya‘s military operation into Somali territory could 
work to Al Shabaab‘s advantage, by rallying Somalis against a foreign occupation, in 
much the same way that Al Shabaab enjoyed significant popular support when Ethiopia 
occupied Mogadishu885 in 2007 and 2008.886 
 
Kenya‘s military intervention in October 2011 seemed to have signified a change in 
Kenya‘s foreign policy in Somalia. Kenya had, since independence, pursued a policy of 
good neighbourliness and had not engaged in any military confrontation with her 
neighbours. Most recently, however, a spate of cross-border kidnappings by Somalis of 
Western tourists and aid workers has devastated tourism along Kenya‘s northern coast887. 
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While the Government of Kenya maintained888 that the kidnappings and the cross-border 
raid by Al Shabaab was the reason for Kenya‘s offensive, others889 think that this was just 
the pretext for Kenya‘s offensive against Al Shabaab, but that the plans for a Kenya-
backed military operation in the border area have been in place for some 
time.890Observers think that this may have been one of many examples of Al Shabaab‘s 
growing linkages to criminal networks in the region, including with pirates. The 
beginning of African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM)891military campaigns has, 
however, in the recent past weakened the Al Shabaab‘s capacity to unleash terror in 
Somalia. Al Shabaab, however, continue to pose serious security challenges to AMISOM 
and the western-backed government of Somalia as it has reportedly enhanced its ability 
to engage in asymmetric warfare with ‗increasing  efficiency and lethality.‘892 
Kenya‘s pursuit of Al Shabaab may mark the beginning of a longer military engagement 
in Somalia. With the increasing Al shabaab reprisal attacks in Kenya (see chapter 3), 
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892 African Union, Peace and Security Council,544th Meeting, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the 
Follow-up of the Relevant Provision of Communique PSC/PR/COMM. (DXXI) on the Situation in Somalia,18 
September 2015, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-rpt-somalia-18-09-2015-9p.pdf,para.14. 
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scholars like Menkhaus893 have warned that the danger could grow larger the longer 
Kenyan forces stay inside Somalia. The recent attacks of KDF camps in El-Ade894 and 
Kulbiyow camps respectively in which Kenya could have lost approximately 200 soldiers 
indicates that Kenya may, in the near future, consider withdrawing her military from 
Somalia. 
The various military interventions above point to the fact that military intervention in 
Somalia may not, by itself, bring a long lasting peace and security. While military 
intervention may be necessary to protect life, it is a temporary measure that should be 
replaced with functional government systems. 
This is especially critical because the history of foreign military intervention, and the long 
history of colonial rule895 under 5 different European powers and the division of the 
territory among them in Somalia impacts upon Somali views of foreign (military) power. 
This is perceived with caution, suspicion and mistrust. To minimize the adverse effects 
on perceptions, any foreign military intervention in Somalia must be short-lived and 
should be withdrawn as soon as the objective of the intervention is attained, only being 
maintained when their continued stay is absolutely necessary. 
                                                          
893K.  Menkhaus, After the Kenya intervention in Somali. ENOUGH Project January,  2012 p.6 
894‗Kenya lost 173 soldiers in terror attack on KDF base in Somalia, survivor says‘ The Standard Newspaper 
16th January, 2017. 
www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000229998/kenya-lost-173-soldiers-in-terror-attack-on-kdf-base-in-
somalia-survivor-says[Accessed 17th February 2017] See also 
www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001227555/kulbiyow-camp-battle-left-68-compatriots-dead 
[Accessed 1st February 2017]. 
 
895 E.R Turton, ‗Somali resistance to colonial rule and the development of Somali political activity‘, The 
Journal of African History Vol. 13, No. 1 ,1972, pp. 119-143  
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Besides that, military interventions must strive to win the goodwill and support from the 
local Somali community that they are serving. This is important not only to avoid 
situations where foreign soldiers are betrayed, but to enhance the chance that law and 
order prevails in zones that are already demilitarized. 
 
In this Dec. 14, 2011 file photo, two Kenyan army soldiers shield themselves from the downdraft of a 
Kenyan air force helicopter as it flies away from their base near the seaside town of Bur Garbo, Somalia. 
Military interventions produce mixed results. Photo by AP /Ben Curtis. Available at 
https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/kenya-attacks-last-stronghold-of-somali-militants-1.975030[Accessed 29th 
April, 2018] 
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6.3.2 Locals against foreign military intervention in Somalia: the need to demystify 
foreign intervention 
Militants often develop and propagate negative narratives about foreign military 
intervention in Somalia896 in order to incite the population against the foreign forces. As a 
result, many foreign interventions in Somalia have been undermined by lack of support 
from the local population. This is hardly surprising given the history of colonialism 
where locals rallied against foreign invasion. This narrative has been so successful to the 
extent that despite the massive military hardware that foreign forces possess, they have 
not been able to quell the militia that have been operating in Somalia since Said Barre was 
ousted in 1991.Some of these foreign forces, after suffering heavy casualties, have been 
forced to withdraw without achieving the objective of stabilizing Somalia. 
Military firepower alone has proved ineffective to bring stability to Somalia. Rivalry 
between various clans in ethnically and linguistically homogenous Somalia has 
prolonged the 27 year old conflict. Indeed, there is need to educate and persuade the 
Somali population for them to fully support foreign military interventions aimed at 
stabilizing Somalia.897This is because in itself, military intervention is not sufficient to 
restore normalcy unless the conflicting parties commit to dialogue and non-violence. 
                                                          
896 M. Terdman, Somalia at war – between radical Islam and tribal politics, The S. Daniel Abraham Center for 
International and Religious Studies, Tel Aviv University, March 2008.Available at 
https://dacenter.tau.ac.il/sites/abraham.tau.ac.il/files/Somalia%20at%20war.pdf[Accessed 29th April, 
2018] 
897H. S. Mohamud, ‗How to win the war against Al Shabaab‘, Aljazeera, 11th October, 2013.Available at 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/10/how-win-war-against-al-shabab-
201310119652136824.html[Accessed 29th April, 2018] 
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Partnership and support from local Somalis and those in diaspora is essential in 
promoting peace efforts in Somalia.898 
Negotiations with militia groups in Somalia can still be pursued with a view to a political 
settlement through compromise. Military engagement appears counter-productive and 
tends to harden radical militants, instead of weakening them. This may work for some of 
the clan-based militants. 
It is evident that local Somali support is paramount for the success of any peace efforts by 
Somalia and international community. Any interventions that have not won the hearts 
and minds of Somalis is bound to fail in the long term. Mobilizing Somalis in any peace 
efforts should be primary before any intervention programmes can be implemented. 
6.4 Problems faced by returnees 
6.4.1 Insecurity and clan tensions 
Since the civil war broke out in Somalia in 1988, many parts of the country have been 
zones of contestation by clans over rangeland, farmland, towns, and cities.899  
The coup d‘etat that brought an end to the government of Siad Barre900 became the 
catalyst for lawlessness in Somalia as various clan factions fought for the control of the 
                                                          
898 H. S. Mohamud, ‗How to win the war against Al Shabaab‘, Aljazeera, 11th October, 2013.Available at 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/10/how-win-war-against-al-shabab-
201310119652136824.html[Accessed 29th April, 2018] 
899Although clan is not the sole source of social and political organization in southern Somalia, in the Jubba 
regions clanism has been consistently mobilized in land disputes. See UN, Report of the Secretary General 
on Somalia, 3 September 2013, S/2013/521, para17 and  UN, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 3 
September 2013, S/2013/521, para41. 
900Siad Barreled a military junta that came to power after a coup d'état in1969. He was overthrown after clan 
based militia clashed defeated his government and forcing him into exile in May, 1991. Barre died on 
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government. Siad Barre was a dictator, propped up by a number of Western powers, and 
fermented ethic attachments and rivalries that extended the divide and rule strategies of 
the colonial powers in the post-colonial period.901 
The lack of an accepted central government, ongoing armed conflict, clan-based rivalries, 
and power vacuums leading to lawlessness, have fuelled an ongoing severe humanitarian 
and human rights catastrophe in Somalia.902 Insecurity and clan tension continue to 
threaten peace in Somalia and efforts by many regional and international forces have not 
borne much fruit. 
 
According to some recent reports, the general security situation in Mogadishu and the 
regions of southern and central Somalia remain volatile.903Dynamics of conflict play out 
involving Al Shabaab, clan militias and inter-clan disputes.904 Violence between various 
factions is reportedly mainly fuelled by disputes over land and political control.905Indeed 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
January 2, 1995 in Lagos reportedly from a heart attack. See World Peace Foundation, 7th August, 
2015.Available at 
https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war/[Accessed 30th 
April, 2018] 
901T. Atlas, ‗Cold War rivals sowed seeds of Somalia tragedy‘, 13th December, 1992.Available at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-12-13/news/9204230505_1_mohamed-siad-barre-somalia-
tragedy-military-aid[Accessed 29th April, 2018] 
902UNDP, Somalia Human Development Report 2012 – Empowering Youth for Peace and Development, 28 
September 2012. 
903 UN Security Council (UNSC),Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,8 January 2016, S/2016/27, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5698a0b64.html, para. 12 
904 United States Department of State,2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- Somalia,13 April 2016, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5716120a8.html  [Accessed 20th April 2017] 
905 For example, where pro-Government forces and AMISOM have forced Al Shabaab to retreat from homes 
and land, disputes over land have arisen. United States Department of State,2015 Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices-Somalia,13 April 2016 http://www.refworld.org/docid/5716120a8.html. See also 
ICRC, Annual Report 2014- Somalia,9 June 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/558131ac2c.html 
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questions abound over access to resources as part of peace-building efforts (.See 6.2.1 for 
discussion on the desire by foreign powers to control resources and sometimes push for 
regime change). 
6.4.2 Sexual and gender-based violence 
Reports indicate that civilians in Somalia continue to face widespread sexual and gender-
based violence.906 Government forces, AMISOM troops and clan militia are reported to be 
responsible for grave human rights violations including killings, rape, other forms of 
sexual abuse and violence, and sexual exploitation.907 While sexual and gender-based 
violence occurs in societies that are not at war, the scope and magnitude in war zones are 
wide and intense respectively. Hopefully, as the general security situation in Somalia 
improves, institutions dealing with sexual and gender-based violence will be able to 
arrest perpetrators and carry out a campaign to curb and discourage it. Indeed Adera 
opines that many sexually-related offences in Somalia go unreported because many 
Somalis condemn a raped woman to lifelong shame since Somali society values sexual 
chastity and women are expected to be virgins at marriage.908While the author seems to 
link rape to sexual promiscuity, this is a question of patriarchal values about women, not 
about chastity and virginity. 
                                                          
906 HRW, Somalia: Civilians at Serious Risk, 27 January 2016, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/56b120a111.html [Accessed  20th April 2017] 
907 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,12 May 2015/S/2015/331, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/556581e64.html,para .62.See also UNSC, Children and Armed Conflict: 
Report of the Secretary-General, 5 June 2015, A/69/926-S/2015/409, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/557/abf904.html,para 145-159 
908  Adera, E., The Impact of Refugee Settlements on the Environment: A Survey of Ifo and Utange Refugee Camps in 
Kenya, Master‘s Thesis, Moi University, 1997, p.14. 
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6.4.3 Scarce livelihood opportunities 
Because of dilapidated infrastructure networks and a lack of industries and factories, the 
Somali economy is unable to create the requisite job opportunities for the population and 
the economy is weak with a lack of livelihood opportunities.909 It is indeed the lack of 
livelihood opportunities that threaten the possible reintegration of returnees and has 
often led to the recurrence of conflict as various factions fight for resources910. In fact, the 
UNHCR has observed that ‗returnees and other persons of concern to UNHCR need to 
have access to reasonable resources, opportunities and basic services to establish a self-
sustained livelihood in conditions of equal rights with those of other local residents and 
citizens. Their reintegration should take place under conditions of social, economic, 
cultural, regional and gender-based equity.‘911 
 
In addition, various humanitarian organizations have been offering services with a view 
to improving the humanitarian situation in Somalia. However, conflict continues to have 
a detrimental impact on the humanitarian situation, with vital humanitarian assistance 
reportedly being intercepted and confiscated by armed groups.912 
 
                                                          
909Amnesty International, No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced, p.9. AFR 
52/001/2014. London, Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-home-
2014.pdf  
910B. Menke, The role of ‘Livelihood ,natural resources in conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding, 
Masters project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Environmental 
Management degree in the Nicholas School of the Environment of Duke University 2009 
911UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation, International Protection, 1996, 6.4. 
912 UN General Assembly, Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in Africa: Report of the 
Secretary-General, 20 August 2015, A/70/337, http://www.refworld.org/docid/560149a34.html, para.44. 
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6.4.4 Inadequate education and health facilities 
Many refugees in Dadaab cited the lack of education and health facilities in Somalia as 
one of the reasons they were unwilling to repatriate. This is especially so as many 
considered their access to education as guaranteeing a more prosperous future for 
themselves and their children. While in Dadaab, these services are offered freely, by 
UNHCR913 and other partner NGOs914in Dadaab. 
Many of the parents and students in secondary schools at the camps expressed optimism 
that access to education would guarantee a better future.. One such student confided in 
this researcher that, ‗Every refugee student is hopeful to get resettlement (in a third 
country) and continue with quality education abroad.‘915 According to one charitable 
organization, Windle Trust Kenya (WTK)916, in charge of secondary and post-secondary 
education among refugees in Dadaab, refugee students who excel and attain university 
entry grades are granted scholarships through their education partners. This ultimately 
enhances the chances that such students would stand a higher chance of resettlement 
once in third countries on scholarship. Resettlement, in a third country, is popular among 
many refugees in Dadaab regardless of whether they are undertaking studies or not. This 
is largely informed by their perceptions that there are better opportunities for asylum 
seekers in developed countries. One respondent argued that, ‗I would rather that 
                                                          
913UNHCR, ‗Education‘, http://www.unhcr.org/ke/education[Accessed 29th April 2018] 
914 Some of the NGO‘s that partner with UNHCR in the provision of education are CARE KENYA, 
Norwegian Refugee Council and Windle Trust Kenya 
915An anonymous Interviewee in Dadaab 23/08/2016.He was responding why he is not in support of 
repatriation as it would interfere with his education. 
916 In 1977, Hugh Austin Windle Pilkington sets up the Windle Charitable Trust in Kenya(WTK),mainly to 
support needy Kenyan students and also to assist refugees in the country. 
Seehttp://www.windle.org/About_us.html[Accessed  29th April, 2018] 
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refugees be resettled in other country…to enable them heal from the past…going back to 
Somalia will reopen the wounds.‘917 
According to WTK, hundreds of students have benefitted from the scholarship 
programme since its inception. Although only approximately 20 annually benefit from 
the programme, many consider it the ultimate way of escaping the confinement in the 
camps and accessing global opportunities enjoyed by the Somali diaspora. The fact that 
‗Somalia has no education system in place‘918 according to one respondent, is reason 
enough he would only leave the camp as the last resort. He asked, ‗How can I take 
several years to study and then repatriate before I sit for the national exams.‘ He is among 
the candidates expected to sit for the for Kenya Secondary School Education national 
examinations, a gateway to post-secondary education globally. 
The fact that one of the reasons that make refugees prefer resettlement to third countries 
in Europe, Australia and the USA is because of the need for quality further education. 
This suggests that some refugees would take up repatriation if comparable educational 
opportunities were made available in their home countries. 
This is a similar argument regarding health services that are considered crucial for 
potential returnees. While many respondents did not cite the lack of health facilities in 
Somalia as a major reason to avoid return, many acknowledged that they were happy 
                                                          
917 Interview in Dadaab 23/08/2016.The interviewee who spoke in confidence believed that repatriating to 
Somalia would evoke bad memories of war and make healing difficult. 
918An anonymous Interview in Dadaab 23/08/2016.He was responding why he is not in support of 
repatriation as it would interfere with his education 
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with the free health facilities in the refugee camps and would have wished that the same 
healthcare facilities were available in Somalia. As soon as the Government of Kenya 
announced the intention to close the Dadaab camps, MSF, one of the health providers in 
Dadaab challenged the move citing the lack of health facilities in Somalia. According to 
Head of Mission for MSF Kenya at the time,  
‗What is clear is that returning to Somalia now will have disastrous consequences 
on people‘s health…It will escalate their vulnerability to malnutrition, weakening 
their immune systems and making them vulnerable to infectious diseases.‘919 
 
According to the MSF report, extreme levels of insecurity and a dangerous absence of 
medical care mean that the conditions necessary for a safe and dignified return are 
simply not present in many parts of Somalia today.920 
6.4.5 Land and property rights 
Access to land is an important factor for returnees. Apart from security, access to land is 
the next most important factor that refugees in exile consider before taking the step to 
repatriate. Protracted conflicts resulting in decades spent in exile have made it difficult 
for many refugees to access their former parcels of land on return. This also applies to 
land that was communally owned. An Amnesty International report indicates that many 
returnees have not been able to return in safety and dignity because of several factors 
                                                          
919 A report by MSF titled ‗Dadaab to Somalia: Pushed Back into Peril‘. The study was carried out in Dadaab 
during the months of July and August 2016 sampled 838 respondents and was released in October 2016.The 
report argued that repatriation was premature and could expose refugees to different health hazards in 
Somalia since health facilities were either lacking or with no capacity. 
920 A report by MSF titled ‗Dadaab to Somalia: Pushed Back into Peril‘. The study was carried out in Dadaab 
during the months of July and August 2016. It sampled 838 respondents and was released in October 
2016.It challenged repatriation on the grounds that Somalia was not yet safe for a dignified return. 
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including the lack of access to land or livelihoods.921For instance, in one localized study of 
the internally displaced in Mogadishu, 25% of people surveyed owned land in their areas 
of origin.922This finding is consistent with Somali refugees recently surveyed in Kenya 
and Ethiopia where according to the report, roughly 25% of people surveyed said they 
would have access to land.923This implies that about 75% of returnees may not be able to 
access land upon return. Repatriation plans should consider this to ensure that returnees 
have access to land as an essential livelihood resource and so as not to become displaced 
within Somalia. 
 
According to the report, there is no national legal framework governing land tenure and 
land management in Somalia, while there is weak technical capacity in land management. 
With land records incomplete or nonexistent,  land appropriations are rampant and have 
led to a ‗gatekeeper system‘, a lucrative business led by powerful individuals and groups, 
often with links to district commissioners and other local level authorities or militia, who 
present themselves to internally displaced people as legitimate landowners924. 
Gatekeepers take on an informal role of camp managers for profit, in the absence of 
formal camp management throughout the years due to insecurity. Gatekeepers occupied 
                                                          
921 Amnesty International (2014:9). No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced. AFR 
52/001/2014. London: UK. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-
home-2014.pdf  
922Save the Children, Profiling of IDPs in Darwish and Sigale Settlements, March 2013, p17. 
923Danish Refugee Council, Durable Solutions: Perspectives of Somali Refugees Living in Kenyan and 
Ethiopian Camps and Selected Communities of Return, 2013, p .37. 
924 Amnesty International (2014:37). No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced. AFR 
52/001/2014. London: UK. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-
home-2014.pdf [Accessed 17th August 2016] 
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the lacuna that was left by the collapsed state land institutions. The fact that most Somalis 
were nomadic pastoralists even before the conflict in 1991 means that land was 
communally owned among them-a typical feature among many pastoralists including 
Somalis in Northern Kenya. This suggests the necessity of a new communal land 
ownership framework to sustain pastoralist communities. The land ownership 
framework generally, too, needs to be audited and deficiencies addressed. 
 
Women who return to Somalia without their male family members may be the most 
disadvantaged on land rights. Sharia law is often strictly interpreted in line with many 
restrictive Somali customary norms which limit women‘s ability to own, rent or inherit 
land or other property in their own names.925 The inability of these women to access land 
in their own right affects their ability to provide for themselves and their families upon 
their return, could lead to other rights violations, and is also discriminatory. The fact that 
many Somali families have lost male family members because of the years of conflict and 
displacement, leaving displaced women as the head of their household with primary 
responsibility for children and other dependent family members means many families 
could be headed by women. A new land ownership framework that could grant women 
rights to land is necessary to address this problem. 
 
                                                          
925 Amnesty International (2014:38). No place like home: Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced. AFR 
52/001/2014. London: UK. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/no-place-like-
home-2014.pdf [Accessed 17th August 2016] 
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Another challenge related to land in Somalia is the fact that many of those willing to 
return may not want to return to their areas of origin, especially to rural areas. Many 
refugees from Dadaab in Northern Kenya, for instance, have become accustomed to 
urban lifestyles and are thus reluctant to return to their original rural homes. Being 
accustomed to an urban lifestyle also means the many social amenities like water, internet 
services, education, piped water, jobs and others available in urban areas and people may 
find it extremely difficult to now live without these services in rural Somalia. The same 
challenges experienced by resettled Internally Displaced People926 (IDP‘s) in Somalia 
since 2012 could be experienced by Somali refugees from Dadaab upon return. The 
government of Somalia should therefore put measures in place to mitigate these 
challenges as returnees continue to arrive. 
 
6.4.6Conclusion 
It is evident that sustainable peace and security is not just signified by the absence of war, 
but rather by a more cohesive society where justice and the rule of law are upheld by all. 
Most importantly, the need to address the reasons for the conflict that led to refugees is 
fundamental before the sustained efforts at repatriation can be promoted. 
In this chapter, I explored the circumstances under which the 1951 UN Convention was 
enacted. I argue that the refugee law was more focused on resettling the post WW2 
refugees and was limited in scope. The 1969 OAU Convention broadened the concept of 
                                                          
926UN, Somalia Consolidated Appeal, 2013-2015.You may also refer to Save the Children, Profiling of IDPs in 
Darwish and Sigale Settlements, March 2013, p20 and African Union Convention on for the Protection and 
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), Arts. 9(2) (e) and 11(1). 
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who a refugee is in the African context. The theories of both conventions have faced 
challenges of implementation as a result of the masses of refugees that overwhelm host 
states. I suggest that the refugee regime needs to change to capture the new realities of 
the refugee challenge today. 
To address the more protracted nature of today‘s refugee problem, I propose that focus 
should shift from the plight of refugees in the camps to the reasons for their flight.I argue 
that solving the reasons for their flight is the only way that refugees will be attracted to 
permanently repatriate. To achieve this, the security problem at home must be addressed 
to allow a dignified return. 
Besides that, I argue that access to livelihood opportunities is essential to returnees. 
Promoting social services and strengthening governance structures is also important so as 
to inspire confidence to prospective returnees and those that have returned. Local 
support is important for any intervention programme(s) to succeed. For the case of 
Somali returnees, I propose that all problems faced by returnees including insecurity, 
gender based violence, inadequate social services and issues of land rights must be 
addressed. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I set out to explore the repatriation process among the Somali 
refugees in Dadaab refugee camp in Northeastern Kenya. To this effect, I first sought to 
explore the perceptions of the Government of Kenya, SFG, UNHCR and Somali refugees 
regarding the safety and security of Somalia as prerequisite for repatriation. I sought to 
examine the responsibilities if each of these actors as provided for in the TA and what 
was actually being implemented. Besides that, I examined the extent of refugee 
participation in decision making including in the choice to repatriate or otherwise. 
Finally, I extrapolated how a refugee centered approach to repatriation could apply more 
broadly to African refugee crises. 
 
This dissertation starts began with the introduction of key aspects regarding who a 
refugee is, the refugee regime and the complexity of the repatriation process. The 
introduction set out the statement of the problem as that of Kenya‘s increasing concern 
with national security and its desire for the repatriation of Somali refugees as a security 
strategy. Chapter two explored the existing literature and identified key gaps in it. It also 
highlighted the contribution of the study to the existing body of literature. Chapter three 
explored the various perceptions of refugees regarding the safety and security situation 
in Somalia. The roles and responsibilities of the TA parties in repatriation were discussed 
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in chapter four and the extent of refugee participation in decision making was discussed 
in chapter five. Chapter six concludes by suggesting a refugee centered approach that 
could apply more broadly to refugee crises in Africa. 
 
In chapter one, I defined a refugee and explored the refugee regime, especially the 1951 
UN Convention. The demand by the Government of Kenya for the mass repatriation of 
Somali refugees formed the basis of the research problem. Considering that the refugee 
regime envisages that repatriation must be voluntary, the demand by the Government of 
Kenya for the mass repatriation of Somali refugees from Dadaab violates this provision. . 
 
In chapter two, I interrogated the literature on the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, as the blueprint of refugee regime globally. I examined 
the limited scope of the 1951UN Convention and the subsequent 1967 protocol that 
expanded its mandate. The Organization of African Unity Convention, Governing 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969 was also explored as an African 
domestication of the 1951 UN Convention. I argue that the refugee regime is outdated 
and limited in scope as it overlooks other causes of refugees, for instance social and 
economic exclusion. The regime too seems to overlook the interests of host states as it was 
meant to protect the vulnerability of refugees. 
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I traced the antagonistic relationship between Kenya and Somalia that dates back to the 
early 1960‘s. Somalia‘s desire to have NFD/NEP unified with Somalia, and the 
subsequent resistance from Kenya was also examined. The current refugee crises in 
Dadaab brings to the fore the tense relationship between Kenya and Somalia given the 
porous and vast border between the two countries. Kenya has often blamed Somali 
refugees in Kenya as supporting military elements from Somalia to launch attacks in 
Kenya. I, however, conclude that that has just remained an allegation with no substantial 
evidence. 
 
The challenge of implementing the 1951 UN Convention principle of non-refoulement is 
also extensively discussed in this chapter. I conclude that the principle of non-refoulement 
remains in theory rather than in practice as the UNHCR does not have the power to 
dictate to host states on matters of refugees on their soil. This chapter also discussed the 
challenges of mass repatriation through tripartite agreements. I maintain that many 
tripartite agreements are not as a result of intensive and extensive consultation with 
refugees, but are primarily determined by a few policy makers. This top-down approach 
by refugees‘ actors (host state, home country and UNHCR) is criticized. 
 
Finally, in this chapter, I discuss the existing gaps in literature. Notably, is the fact that 
most reports are those by humanitarian workers and organizations and not by 
independent academic researchers. Many reports also do not capture individual refugee 
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opinions but tend to rely on ‗experts‘ who are in charge of decision making in refugee 
matters. Many reports, too, are based on the top-down approach in refugee issues.  
 
In chapter three, I explored different perceptions of the Tripartite parties and refugees 
about the security situation in Somalia as a prerequisite for return. The Government of 
Kenya has insisted that Somalia is relatively ‗safe‘ for the return of thousands of Somali 
refugees. The Government of Kenya has pressurized refugees to return, sometimes 
threatening to close down the refugee camps and forcefully repatriate them. Albeit 
without evidence, it has blamed refugees for increased insecurity and terrorist attacks in 
Kenya. Kenya has claimed that some terror elements hide within the refugee camps as 
they plan to launch attacks on Kenya-an assertion that, too, lacks substance as there is no 
evidence as many refugees accused of these allegations have often been acquitted by the 
courts. This seems to be a ‗smear campaign‘ against refugees to serve Kenyan interests. 
The SFG is also interested in the positive legitimacy and credit that it is likely to receive 
locally and internationally by welcoming refugees back from exile. It is however 
grappling with weak governance structures in the face of a resurgent Al Shabaab militia 
that seeks to topple it. Returnees also complicate local politics and threaten the relative 
calm in Somalia as returnees and locals fight over rights to land and other resources. 
 
The UNHCR on the other hand seeks to protect refugee welfare without antagonizing the 
host state and state of origin. The fact that refugees are a political issue leaves the 
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UNHCR with very limited options and a requirement to work within what is allowed by 
the host state. Reduced funding to the UNHCR puts the UNHCR in a fix as states adopt a 
more restrictive approach to hosting refugees. Refugees, perhaps aware of this 
predicament, are forced to rely on their networks and judgment to either return or remain 
in the camps amidst dwindling UNHCR support to stay in the camps. Although the 
majority of Somali refugees in Dadaab cite insecurity in Somalia as a reason not to return, 
they admit they have limited options. The situation is dire. 
 
Because refugees cannot directly make decisions regarding return, a preserve of the elites, 
they are forced to creatively bear the consequences of such decisions. The fact that the 
Government of Kenya, SFG and the UNHCR arrived at and signed the Tripartite 
Agreement, despite refugee perceptions of the in(security) in Somalia, implies that the 
elites direct  these systems for interests that may not have the refugees at the centre. This 
is in line with elite theory where a few privileged individuals or organizations make 
decisions on behalf of the masses. Aware of these embedded interests, refugees rely on 
their own networks to verify information about Somalia and make independent decisions 
regarding return. 
 
Chapter four focused on the role of the governments of Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR 
as envisaged by the TA. As discussed above, however, the TA signed on 10th November 
2013 has faced numerous challenges regarding its implementation. According to the TA, 
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the government of Kenya should provide security for refugees while in Kenya, help put 
up logistics for return, and manage and control refugees during return. I also discussed 
the role of the government of Kenya in supporting what can be termed as induced return.  
The TA tasks the government of Somalia with providing refugees with security upon 
return. It should also promote national development and create an environment for 
humanitarian assistance. The UNHCR on the other hand should mobilize resources to 
support the repatriation process. The TA expects the UNHCR to be the custodian of 
refugee rights during repatriation. 
While the TA envisages a voluntary repatriation exercise, the Government of Kenya has 
been accused of coercing Somali refugees to return. In her defense, the Government of 
Kenya claims that Somalia is now ‗safe‘ for return and accuse the UNHCR of wanting 
Somali refugees to continue staying in Kenya, even when conditions at home have 
improved. The SFG has opposed massive repatriation of Somali refugees preferring a 
staggered system so as to allow it to welcome refugees at home in a safe and dignified 
manner. 
Members of the TA do not seem to agree on the un(safety) of Somalia, they differ on how 
best to implement repatriation as discussed in this chapter. I argue that it is evident that 
although signatories of the TA agreed in principle about voluntary repatriation of Somali 
refugees, they have differed greatly about how the actual implementation of repatriation 
should be carried out. I have also discussed what constitutes a voluntary return. 
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The refugees, who are not directly party to the TA, its representation by UNHCR 
notwithstanding, are left between a rock and a hard place as members of the TA engage 
in what can be termed as ‗supremacy battles‘. The TA in theory seems to be far removed 
from practice and only refugees themselves understand this reality. I maintain that 
refugees interests as Persons of Concern to the UNHCR should be paramount and should 
supersede the individual interests of the members of the TA. 
As discussed in chapter five, I have criticized the nature of organized returns that seem to 
work on the premise that refugees should return en masse. I have criticized the fact that 
refugee voices seem to have been overshadowed, especially in organized repatriations. I 
indeed suggest that refugee democratic spaces within the UNHCR be expanded. I have 
cited cases of Afghan refugees whose perspectives may suggest they were not fully 
informed of what awaited them at home. They simply perceived repatriation as the only 
option they had been given, hence impeding their freedom to choose otherwise. This I 
argue, violated the refugee regime that outlaws involuntary returns. 
 
Moreover, I have cited the 1996 case of Rwandan refugees in Tanzania as amounting to 
involuntary return. While what the refugees feared might happen to them upon return 
did not actually happen, their fears were founded and needed be respected nevertheless. 
Similarly, I explored the views of Somali refugees in Dadaab whose majority are not 
ready yet to voluntarily repatriate to Somalia despite the TA to facilitate return. Indeed 
the uptake of the voluntary repatriation return package by the UNHCR has been very 
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slow with only about 20%927 of refugees repatriated as of 2018.I maintain that many 
refugees still perceive the security situation in Somalia as volatile and hence are reluctant 
to return. The large number of refugees seeking entry to European countries has put 
potential European host states in a dilemma between humanitarian concerns and the 
need to protect their borders for security reasons. Following this, I suggest that it is 
probably time the refugee regime needs to be changed in line with these new realities. As 
it is, I argue that the refugee regime is inadequate particularly when dealing with millions 
of refugees. 
 
Decisions touching on refugees must be refugee centered so as to have legitimacy among 
refugees. Engaging refugees in decision making will help decision makers arrive at 
decisions that are generally acceptable to a majority of refugees. Even in organized 
repatriations, I argue that individual refugees should be allowed to make an informed 
decision and have free choice to return or otherwise. 
 
As discussed in Chapter six, sustainable peace and security is not just signified by the 
absence of war, but rather by a more cohesive society where justice and the rule of law 
are upheld by all. Most importantly, the need to address the reasons for the flight that led 
to refugees is fundamental before the sustained efforts at repatriation can be promoted.  
 
                                                          
927http://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/02/Voluntary-Repatriation-Analysis-2-
February-2018.pdf[Accessed 20th April, 2018] 
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In this chapter, I explored the circumstances under which the 1951 UN Convention was 
enacted. I argue that the refugee law was more focused on resettling the post WW2 
refugees and was limited in scope. The 1969 OAU Convention broadened the concept of 
who a refugee is in the African context. The theories of both conventions have faced 
challenges of implementation as a result of masses of refugees that overwhelm host 
states. I suggest that the refugee regime needs to change to capture the new realities of 
refugee problem. 
 
To address the more protracted nature of today‘s refugee problem, I recommend that 
focus should shift from the plight of refugees in the camps to the reasons for their flight. I 
argue that only by solving the reasons for their flight will refugees be attracted to 
permanently repatriate. To achieve this, the security problem at home must be addressed 
to allow a dignified return. 
 
Access to livelihood opportunities is essential to returnees. Promoting social services and 
strengthening governance structures is also important so as to inspire confidence in 
prospective returnees and those that have returned. 
Finally, I argue that military intervention alone is not reliable in promoting sustainable 
peace. I instead suggest that local support is essential for the success of any intervention 
programme(s). For the case of Somali returnees, I propose that all problems faced by 
returnees, including insecurity, gender based violence, inadequate social services and 
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issues of land rights must be addressed. This will act as pull factors and refugees will be 
attracted to repatriate. Unless the problems that led to the flight of refugees are 
addressed, refugees may only return when subjected to push factors in asylum and this 
amounts to involuntary repatriation. 
 
Perceptions on the safety and security situation in Somalia are highly influenced by the 
interests of states and non-state actors. As such, I claim that refugee perceptions should 
be viewed as paramount and should, comparatively, be treated as critical. I have 
maintained that albeit theoretically the TA parties agreed on the need to promote 
voluntary repatriation, they have greatly differed in practice. This, I argue, points to a 
refugee regime that is not comprehensive in fully addressing the refugee repatriation 
process. Consequently, there is need to review the refugee regime. 
 
On refugee participation in decision making, I conclude that refugees seem to be at the 
periphery. They are not actively involved in decision making as they ought to be.A 
framework needs be in place to remedy this and place refugees at the centre of decision 
making. 
Finally, only by addressing the reasons for the flight of refugees would a repatriation 
process be truly voluntary. This is the only sure way of having sustainable peace and 
security in post-conflict states. 
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The refugee regime appears to make decisions about refugees informed by a top-down 
approach. It focuses on the views of the ‗experts‘ who determine policy issues about the 
refugee problem. As determined in this dissertation, the refugee problem can best be 
understood from the experiences of refugees themselves. For sustainability, refugee 
solutions should be ‗home-grown‘ so as to have legitimacy and thus acceptance by 
refugees. I argue that expert opinion is sometimes detached from refugee experiences 
thus likely to face resistance from refugees. Refugees should be at the centre of decision 
making on matters affecting them and not at the periphery. I argue that refugee actors 
should only create a supportive environment that allows refugees to determine their 
destiny and play a ‗leading‘ role in finding lasting solutions to the refugee problem.
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APPENDIX 
Interview Schedule 
 
This schedule is for academic purposes only. The respondent’s views remain 
anonymous and confidentiality will be strictly adhered to. 
 
A. Perception of Kenya, Somalia, UNHCR and refugees on the safety of Somalia 
1. (a) Do you perceive Somalia as safe for repatriation? Yes/no 
    b) If yes, give reasons 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
   c) If no, 
why?.....................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................... 
2. (a)Do you consider your perception in question 1.above personal or you consider it 
generally held by others like refugees, UNHCR, Kenya etc.? 
(b)Give reasons for your 
answer………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
B. Role of Kenya, Somalia, UNHCR (Tripartite parties) and refugees in promoting successful 
repatriation, stability and security in the region. 
3. (a)What do you think is the role and responsibility of Tripartite parties and refugees in 
ensuring successful 
repatriation?........................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
(b)To what extent, in your view, have each (not) fulfilled their roles and responsibilities 
regarding repatriation preparation 
process?...............................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
(c)Why have they failed/succeeded in promoting 
repatriation?........................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................ 
4 (a) What do you think is the role and responsibility of Tripartite parties and refugees in 
promoting stability and security in the 
region?.................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................... 
(b) To what extent, in your view, have each (not) fulfilled their roles and responsibilities 
in enhancing stability and security in their 
region?.................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
(c) How can their role in promoting stability and security be 
enhanced?..................................................................................................................................... 
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C. Refugee preparedness for voluntary repatriation inclusivity 
5(a) Why would you consider refugees (not) prepared for voluntary 
repatriation?........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................ 
(b) How could refugee readiness for repatriation be 
improved?........................................................................................................................................ 
6. (a)Why would some refugees not consider returning to Somalia at 
all?........................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................... 
(b) How can the desire to return home be 
encouraged?........................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................... 
7. (a) Are you aware of the Tripartite Agreement on repatriation signed on 10th November 
2013? Yes/no 
(b)If yes, how did you participate in the process? (if at all you 
did)?...................................................................................................................................... 
(c) If no, why?......................................................................................................................... 
8. (a) How did refugees participate in the preparation of the  Tripartite agreement before 
it was signed? 
D How refugee-centered repatriation can apply more broadly in Africa 
   (b) In your assessment, why is the Tripartite Agreement (un)workable as far as refugees 
are 
concerned?..........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................ 
 9. (c) What could you suggest as a model to makeTripartite agreements refugee-centered 
(refugee driven) in 
Africa?..................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
   
 
 
